Dismissed

K. Sanjeeva Reddy v. The National Highway Authority

Telangana HC6 Mar 2023WP/37980/2022

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A writ petition challenging a land acquisition award passed after a significant delay. The petitioner claimed the award was void due to delay, violation of limitation periods, and failure to deposit compensation. The court dismissed the petition, holding no statutory limitation applies and the delay was not unreasonable given political circumstances.

What did the court decide?

Writ petition dismissed; liberty granted to seek reference to arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 regarding quantum of compensation.

K. Sanjeeva Reddy Vs The National Highway Authority — Land Acquisition | Telangana HC (2023)

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[³²⁵⁶¹

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HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD

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(Special Original Jurisdiction)

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MONDAY, THE SIXTH DAY OF MARCH TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY THREE

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE MUMMINENI SUDHEER KUMAR

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WRIT PETITION NO: 37980 oF 2022

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Between:

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Q"I,Jgqyfngddy,^{S/gLateC_henna Reddy,Aged about 46 years, Rl/oH.} No.7-2-3201P, Padmasri Hiils, Bandlaguda -jagiiVillage, Ban<itaguda Jagir Municipal corporation, Ranga Reddy Diatrict.

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...PETITIONER

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AND

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Thef{ational-Highwa.yAuthority, represented by its chairman G s&6, Sector10, Dwarka, New Delhi.

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The Project Director, National Highway Authority of lndia, (plU), Hyderabad District.

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The Revenue Divisional officer/competent Authoritv of Land Acouisition.

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!3tignat^{HighwayAuthority, Chevelld Division,Chevelta,} RangrH;aiit'

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District.

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...RESPONDENTS

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Petition under Article 226 of the constitution of lndia praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High court may be pleased to issue an apprcpriate writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of mandamus declaring the impugned award No.2 of 2o1g dt.o8.12.2021 passed by the 3rd respondent behind the back of the petitioner after three years from the date of declaration under section 3D of rhe National Highways Act without preceded by depositing the amount also as the said award is paper award passed beyond period of limitation as illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14, 19,21 of the constitution of lndia and consequenfly set aside the said impugned award with a direction to initiate fresh land acquisition proceedings and pay compensation as per the niarket value existing as on date of issuance of the fresh preliminary notification under Section 3A of The Act.

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i J

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lA NO: 1 OF²⁰²²

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Petition^{under section151 cPC prayingthat in the circumstances statedin} the affidavit^{filed in support of the petition, the High courtmay be pleasedto stay} of all further^{proceedingsincluding dispossession of the petitionerfrom their lands} in^{pursuance to the impugned awardNo' 2 of 2018 dt'08'12'2021Passed by the}

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3rd resPondent.

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Gounsel^{for the Petitioner:SRI K'RATHANGAPANI REDDY} counsel^{for the Respondent ttos-.t-a zi sru PADMA RAOLAKKARAJU} CounselfortheRespondentNo.3:snIo.mJASEKHAR,AGPFoRLAND ACQUISITION

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The Gourt^{madethe following:ORDER}

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THE HON,BLE^{SRI JUSTICE MUMMINENISUDHEERKUMAR} WRIT PETITION NO.37980^{OF 2022}

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ORDER:

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This writ Petition^{is filed seeking a writ of Mandamusto} declare the Award^{No.2 of 2Ol8 dated O8.L2.2O21passed by the} third respondent^{under the provisions of the National Highways} Act, 1956 (*the Act,^{1g56',for brevity),as illegal and arbitrary} and sought for consequentially^{to initiateland acquisition} proceedings afresh and^{pay compensationas per the market} value existing as on date of^{issuance of fresh preliminary} notilication under Section^{3A of the Act, 1956.}

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The facts of the case are that,^{the petitioner herein claims} to be the absolute ownir^{of land admeasuringAc.0.34gts and} Acs.2.35 gts situated. in Survey^{Nos.73/1 and 98 respectivelyof} Kesaram village, chevella^{Mandal,Ranga Reddy District. A} portion of the subject land belonging^{to the petitioneris sought} to be acquired for the^{purpose of widening of National Highway} No.163 i.e. Bijapur^{National Highway,and for that purpose a} preliminary notification under Section^{3A of the Act, 1956 dated} 26.02.2018 was issued and^{thereafter, a declaration under sub-} Section. (1) of Section 3D of' the^{Act, 1956 was made on} 17.05.2018. Thereafter,^{an award under Section 3G of the Act,}

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..no."Tif,ik ro*

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1956 was passed on og.r2.2o21 acquiri,g an extent of 206r.2 square meters of land i, Survey No.9g beronging to the petitioner herein and another extent of 19223 square meters in survey No.73/ 1 beronging to the petitioner herein and five others. Aggrieved by the said Award, dated og.o2,2o2l, the petitioner approached this court by .firing the present writ Petition.

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3' Heard Mr. K. Rathanga pani Reddy, rearned counser for the petitioner, Mr. padma Rao Lakkaraju. learned standing counsel fcr the respondents I and, 2 and Mr. D. Rajasekhar, learned Assistant Government preader for Land Acquisition for the third respondent.

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It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned Award came to be passed after a lapse of more than three years since the date of declaration under sub-Section (r) of section 3G of the Act, 19s6, which is beyond the period of limitation and further contented that though there is no specific period of rimitation prescribed for passing Award under the Act, 19s6, the period of rimitation prescribed under section 2s of the Right to Fair compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 ("the Act, 2013' for brevity) appries to

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MSK,J 3 W.P.NO.37gao^{oF 2022}

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the acquisition^{proceedingsinitiated under the provisions of the} Act,^{1956 as well' In supportof the said contention'learned} counselforthepetitionerplacedrelianceonSection105(3)of theAct,2o|3andcontendedthatintermsofthesaidprovision read^{with Notification thereunder'compensationis payable in} consonancewiththeAct,2olg.Itisfurthercontendedthatin respectofthelandacquisitionproceedingsundertheprovisions of other^{enactments mentioned in IV Schedule to the Act' 2Ol3'} the compensation^{payable to the land losers thereinshall not be} reduced^{than the compensation payable underthe provisions of} the Act,^{2Ol3' Thus' he contendedthat the market valuethat} would^{be taken into considerationfor the PurPose of arrivingat} th6 land^{losers under the} the^{comPensation PaYable to} provisions^{of the Act' 1956is the date of preliminarynotilication} under^{Section 3A of the Act' 1956 and because of the abnormal} delay^{caused' in passing of the Award in the instant case' the} rnarket^{value that was prevailing as on 26'02'2018 was only} taken^{into consideration and Award was passed on O8'L2'2O21} andthereby,thepetitionerisdeprivedofgettingtheappropriate compensation.Thus,hecontendedthatbecauseofthedelay caused^{in passing the Award'the compensationthat is payable} to the^{petitioner is reduced'}

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4 MSK,J w.P.NO.37gaO OF 20/22

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Lea.rned counsel for the petitioner further contended that though there is no time limit prescribed for passing the Award under the provisions of the Act, 1956, the authorities are expected to pass Award rvithin a reasonable time and also placed reliance on a judgment of the Honble Apex court in collector of central Excise, Jaipur v. Raghuvar (Indial r,td.r. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the judgment of Rajasthan High court, Jaipur Bench in Madhavi sharma v. National Highways Authority & orsz. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned Award came to be passed without depositing the compensation amount payable to the petitioner and as such the impugned Award is a nullity and placed reliance on a judgment of this court in Madhava Rao Gandhe and ors. v. r,and Acquisition officer, euili eutubshah urban Development Authorltya. It is also contended by the learned counsel that the impugned Award came to be passed by the respondents behind the back of the petitioner and he was never put on notice about passing of Award at any stage and it is only through notice issueil in the month of July, 2022 requiring the petitioner to handover the possession of the subject land, the petitioner came

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r (2o(x)rs scc 299 : ?916t3l^{RLw 1s7e(R} UU 3 1994(3' ALT t7S ts.s.l

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5 MSKrJ W.P.NO.37980 0F 2022

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to know about^{passing of the impugned Award and immediately} thereafter the^{petitioner stated} to^{have approached} this^Court by filing the present Writ Petition.

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On the other hand, Mr. Padma Rao Lakkaraju, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2, submitted that the provisions of the Act, 2OL3 have no application to the land acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Act, 1956 and further contended that there is no limitation prescribed for passing Award and the only limitation that was prescribed under the Act, 1956 is for making a declaration as required under sub-Section (3) of Section 3D of the Act, 1956 and the Legislature intentionally did not fir any period of limitation for passing Award under Section 3G of the Act, 1956. He further contended that the petitioner herein failed to participate in the acquisition proceedings at any stage and ultimately, the third respondent passed the impugned Award after following due process of law and after following the procedure provided in First and Second Schedules of the Act, 2013, in terms of the Notification issued under Section 105(3) of the Act, 2Ot3. He also further contended that no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner because of the delay caused in passing the Award in question as the petitio_ner would be

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6 MSK,J W.P.NO.37980 0F 2c/22

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entitled for interest on the market varue fixed under the Award from the date of preriminary ,otification tilr trre date of passing Award. It is further contended that the petitioner has an effective remedy seeking fr-xation of fair compensation under sub-section 5 of section 3G of the Act, r9s6 through arbitration proceedings and instead of availing the said remedy, the petitioner approached this court by filing the present writ Petition

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7 ' Learned Assistant Govei-nment preadei for Land Acquisition submitted that the third respondent has followed the entire procedure that is required to be followed under the

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provisions of the Act, 1956 and there is no vioration of proceedings at any stage.

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8' This court, having considered the submissions made on either side and having perused the material on record as wefl as the provisions of the Act, r9s6 and the provisions contained under t].e Act, 2org, is of the considered view that the grounds that are raised for questioning the impugnd award by the learned counser for the petitioner are not sustainable and the reasons for the same are as under:_

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It is not in dispute that there is no period of limitation prescribed for passing award under the provisions of the Act,

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MSK,J W.P.NO.37980 0F 2022

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It is^{also not in disputethat a notification, as required} under sub-Section {3)^{of Section 105 of the Act, 2O13was} issued making the First and^{Second Schedules of the Act, 2OL3} applicable to the land acquisition under the Act, 1956.^Thus, the Ist Schedule and the IInd Schedule of the said Act, 20.13 are applicable to the land acquisitions under other enactments as specified in the IVft Schedule of the said Act, 2O13 and the Act, 1956 is one such enactment specified in the IV*t Schedule of the Act, 2013 at Serial No.7. In terms of Section 1O5 of the Act, 2013, the First and Second Schedules of the said Act, 2013 are made applicable to the land acquisition under the other enactments with a view to see that the provisions of the Act, 2Ol3 relating to payment of compensation or Rehabilitation and Resettlement is not reduced. It is only the I and II schedules of the Act, 2Ol3 that are made applicable for the land acquisition proceedings under the Act, 1956 but not the other provisions of thq Act, 2OL3. [n the absence of making t]re provision contained in Section 25 of the Act, 2OLg applicable to the acquisition proceedings under the Act, 1956, under no circumstances, the said provision can be imported to annul the Award passed under the provisions of the Act, 1956. Further, there is no doubt that there is a period of limitation prescribed

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MSK,J IV.P.NO.379AO OF 2c,22

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under Section 25 0f the Act, 2013 prescribing the period of lirnitation as twelve months from the date of pubrication of declaration under Section r9(r) of the Act, 2013 and any failure to pass Award within the period result in rapse of the entire acquisition proceedings. But at the same tirne, the first proviso to section 2s of the Act, 2ora confers power on the appropriate Governrnent to extend the period of twerr.,e months if in its opinion circumstances exist justi$,ing the same subject to recording reasons in writing. Thus, the period of rimitation prescribed under section 2s of the Act, 2or3 is not a. absolute one and the same can be extended from time to time by the appropriate Government from tirne to time and there is no outer timit on the maxirnum period for which such extension can be granted.

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9' In the right of the said power conferred on the appropriate Go'ernment to extenrl the period of limitation prescribed under .Section^{2s of the Act, 2ora,the contention of rearned} counsel for the petitioner that the said provision applies to the acquisition proceedings under the Act, 19s6, the same leads nowhere' For the very same reasons, the contention of the Iearned counser for the petitioner that the compensation amount payable to the petitioner is getting reduced as the

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':.i:.1 - -- ..-....

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.r.no.rY3'o F 2,,22

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market value fixed as on the date of preliminary notification under Section 3-A of the Act, 1956 is sought to be taken into consideration also liable to be rejected.

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The further contention that there is no period of limitation, within which an Award is required to be passed, the same is required to be passed within a reasonable time is concerned, there is no doubt on the setfled legal position on t]:is respect. But in the instant case, though the Award is passed beyond the period of three years from the date of declaration under sub-section 3 of section 3D of the Act, 19s6, the same cannot be said to be unreasonable period as even according to the petitioner, the proceedings are delayed because of the Election schedule, which came into force in the year 2oLg i.e. immediately after declaration under Section BD of the Act, 19s6 was published. Further, tl:e Parliament, while enacting the Act, 1956, deemed it fit to prescribe a period of rimitation for publishing a declaration under section 3D of the Act, 1956 and fixed the same as one year and whereas the parliament consciously did not fix any such period of timitation for passing an Award under section 3G of the Act, 19s6, as the intention of the Legislature is very clear, the question of importing t]:e provisions of other enactments into the provisions of tJre Act,

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'.'*,r:

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10 MSK,J W.P.NO.37980 0F 20/22

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1956 is not permissible. Further the imp,gned Award was passed on 08.12.2021 and it is not as if the petitioner is not aware of the initiation of the acquisition proceedings and it is not the case of the pelitioner as u'ell. The petitioner, having been aware of the acquisition proceedings initiated, cannot plead ignorance about passing of the imprigned Arvard, dated o8.r2.2o2L. But, for the reasons best known, the petitioner approachecl this court only in the month of october, 2022 i.e. after lapse of ten months since the date of passing of the impugned Award. For this reason also, this court is not inclined to entertain the writ Petition, especially keeping in view the purpose for which the land in question is sought to be acquired. If at all, the petitioner'has got any grievance about tJre quantum of compensation fixed under the impugned Award, it is always open for the petitioner to seek reference for arbitration under sub-section 5 of seition 3G of the Act, 19s6 and thereafter, the petitioner has further remedy of seeking reference to the civil court for fixing the just compensation. 1 1. As already noted above, the First and second Schedules of the Act, 2ol3 are made applicable to the acquisition proceedings under the Act, 19s6 and there is no allegation of not applying the First and Second Schedules while passing the

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!i II I I !

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i I I I I II I i i ,it i I :

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impugned Award. Even if there is any such violation, the same can be agitated under section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956. 12. The judgment of the Apex court in colrector of central

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Excise, Jaipur v. Raghuvar (rndiaf ttd. (r supra) wherein the Honble Apex court considered the aspect of prescribing the period of limitation to do or not to do a thing after expiry of period so stipulated as the consequence of creation and destruction of rights must be specifically communicated as prescribed therefor. In the instant case, there is no such prescription of limitation and in the absence of any such prescription of limitation, the said judgment of the Honbre Apex court is of no aid to the case of the petitioner and on the other hand, it supports the impugned Award.

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13' similarly, the judgment in Madhavi shar,a v. National

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Highways Authority & ors. (2 supra) is a case where the reference under sub-section 5 of section 3G of the Act, 1956 was considered and held that in the absence of prescribing any period of rimitation for seeking such reference, the period of limitation was held to be the limitation provided under generar provision namely Article 137 0f the Limitation Act, 1g63 but in the light of the findings recorded hereinabove on the issue of

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; * d

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L2 MSK,J W.P.NO.37980 0F 20/22

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limitati..,. this judgment has no application to the facts of the case o11 hand.

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In the other judgment reried upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Madhava Rao Gandhe and ors. v. Land Acquisition officer, euili eutubshah urban Development Authority (3 suprp), learned single Judge of this court considered section 11-A of the Act, 7gg4 vrhere it is mandatory requirement to make available the compensation amount payable under the Award. In the instant case, r.hough it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that rvithout depositing the compensation, the impugned Award came to be passed, there is no such provision under the Act, 19s6 and in fact in terms of section 3E of the Act, 19s6, the only condition precedent is to pay compensation or deposit the same before taking over possession of the acquired property, but there is no such pre-condition for passing the Award under Section 3G of the Act, 1956. Therefore, the above said judgment of this court is also of no much help to advance the case of the petitioner. 15. In the light of the above, this court is of the considered view that there are no merits in the case of the petitioner and the writ^petition is riabre to be dismissed and is, accordingry, dismissed. ""::., if the petitioner is aggrieved by the

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13 MSK,J W.P.NO.37980^{0F 20.22}

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compensation^{that is fixed under the impugned Award in} respect^{of the land acquired from the petitioner, the petitioneris} granted liberty^{tomake an application before the third} respondent^{seeking reference to arbitration under sub-Section 5} of Section^{3G of the Act, 1956 withina period of one (1) month} from the date^{of receipt of a copy of this order and in caseany} such request^{is made by the petitioner,the third respondent} shall make such^{a referencewithina further period of three(3)} weeks from the date^{of receiptof such a requestfromthe} petitioner.

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There shall be no order as^{to costs. Miscellaneous}

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applications,^{if any, pendingshall stand closed.}

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SD/.T.TIRU DEVI ASSISTANT

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//TRUE COPY/ SECTION OFFICER

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