Dismissed

Baddala Venkataiah v. Sri B.Aravinda Reddy, I.A.S.

Telangana HC19 Sept 2014CC/783/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In this Contempt of Courts application, the court dismissed the petition seeking punishment for disobedience of orders to pay exgratia. The court held that the respondent’s reasoned rejection of the claim, made after consideration, constituted proper discharge of duty rather than wilful disobedience, leaving the petitioner to challenge the rejection via writ.

What did the court decide?

The contempt case is dismissed and the respondents are discharged. It is noted that petitioners are at liberty to assail the order of rejection passed by the respondent.

Baddala Venkataiah Vs Sri B.Aravinda… — Constitutional and Fundamental Rights | Telangana HC (2014)

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI

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C.C.No.783 of 2014

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ORDER:

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This is an application filed under Sections 10 to 12 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, seeking to punish the respondents, alleging deliberate disobedience of the orders of this Court dated 5.12.2012 passed in W.P.No.16976 of 2008.

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2. Heard Sri P.Sridhar Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition, apart from perusing the material available on record.

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3. The petitioners herein filed W.P.No.16976 of 2008 for the

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following relief:

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“To issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus under article 226 of the Constitution of India declaring the inaction of the respondents in paying exgratia to the house properties of the petitioners situated in Sy.Nos.340/1-B and 401 of Bandarupalli Village, H/o. Kudumuluru, Vontimitta Manal, Kadapa District in terms of G.O.Ms.No.192, I & CAD Department dated 02.12.1998 though they are liable for submersion in the foreshore area of Somasila Project while paying the extratia to the similarly placed persons having houses in the same survey numbers as illegal, arbitrary, unjust, discriminatory and offends Articles 14 and 300-A of the constitution of India, and also violative of G.O.Ms.No.192 dated 02.12.1998 and consequently direct the respondents to pay exgratia to the house properties of the petitioners forthwith”

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4. This Court, by way of order dated 5.12.2012 disposed of the said writ petition and the operative portion of the said order reads as under:

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“Therefore, the respondents 1 and 2 shall duly examine, consider and pass appropriate orders or take necessary action in accordance with law on the recommendations of the Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), GNSS, Unit-II, Kadapa, in his letter dated 04-07-2008 to the 2nd respondent concerning the payment of ex gratia to the petitioners in respect of the structures or the house properties of which they were deprived because of the land acquisition in question in terms of their

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eligibility under G.O.Ms.No.192, dated 02-12-1998. This exercise shall be completed within 90 days from the date of communication of this order. The writ petition is ordered accordingly without costs.”

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5. It is the case of the petitioners herein that the registry of this Court dispatched copy of the order in the writ petition on 2.1.2013 and as the respondents did not choose to implement the said orders, the petitioners caused a legal notice dated 6.10.2013 to the respondents 1 and 2, calling upon to implement the order and the time stipulated by this Court in the said order came to an end in the first week of April 2013. It is also stated that similarly situated persons were paid compensation in terms of the orders of this Court in W.P.No.19561 of 2002.

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6. After receipt of the notice in this contempt case, a counter affidavit has been filed by the 2^nd respondent, denying the averments and allegations made in the affidavit filed in support of the contempt application and submitting inter alia that in pursuance of the orders of this Court in the writ petition, he passed orders vide Ref.No.A1/465/2009 dated 22.3.2014, rejecting the request of the petitioners for payment of exgratia and in view of the same, the present contempt case is not maintainable.

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7. The learned counsel for the petitioners Sri P.Sridhar Reddy emphatically contends that the action of the respondents in rejecting the claim of the petitioners undoubtedly tantamounts to intentional, deliberate and wilful disobedience of the orders of this Court and the respondents are liable for punishment for doing so under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is further contended that the 2^nd respondent did not consider the claim of the petitioners herein in true letter and spirit of the orders of this Court and the consideration said to have been made by the 2^nd respondent is in the direction of violating the orders of this Court. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for petitioners relies on the decision of this Court in

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D.Subbaramaiah v. Chief General manager (HR), APGENCO, Hyderabad and others^[1] .

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8. On the other hand, it is vehemently contended by the learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition that pursuant to the orders of this Court, the 2^nd respondent passed an order vide Ref.No.A1/465/2009 dated 22.3.2014, rejecting the claim of the petitioners by assigning elaborate and convincing reasons and after verifying the ground realities, as such the petitioners cannot maintain the present contempt case. It is further submitted by the learned Government Pleader that since the said orders are supported by reasons and are in the direction of implementing the orders of this Court, it is open for the petitioners to assail the same by way of filing a writ petition and it is further contended that the validity of the said order cannot be requested to be gone into in the present contempt case. It is further contended by the learned Government Pleader that there is no wilful disobedience of the orders of this Court and in the absence of the same, the contempt case is not maintainable. It is further contended that in pursuance of the orders of this Court, the 2^nd respondent considered the claim of the petitioners and passed orders of rejection. In support of his submissions and contentions, the learned Government Pleader places strong reliance on the judgments in J.S.Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and others^[2] , Union of India and another v. P.M.Rangaswam i^[3] , Anil Kumar Shahi and others v. Prof.Ram Sevak Yadav and others^[4] , Sushila Raje Holkar v. Anil Kak (Retired )^[5] and Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delh i^[6] .

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9. The complaint in the present contempt case is required to be examined in the light of the principles laid down in the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Government Pleader in support of their contentions.

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10. In D.Subbaramaiah v. Chief General manager (HR), APGENCO, Hyderabad (1 supra), this Court at paragraphs 7 to 10 held as under:

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“7. As per the Chambers Dictionary 10th Edition, the word 'consider' means "look at attentively or carefully; to think or deliberate on; to take into account; to attend to, to regard as, to think, hold the opinion, to reward, think seriously or carefully, to deliberate."

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8. As per the Oxford Dictionary Thesaurus and Wordpower Guide, Indian Edition 2007, the word 'consider' means "think carefully about; take into account when making judgment; contemplate; reflect an; examine; review; mull over; ponder; deliberate on."

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9. As per Collins English Dictionary, the word 'consider' means 'to think carefully about (a problem or decision); to bear in mind; to have regard for or care about; to discuss (something) in order to make a decision; to look at."

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10. Therefore, the dictionary meaning of the word 'consider' means to consider basing on the material available on record. To consider means to consider sincerely and honestly, which means to make sincere effort to pass an order in the letter and spirit of the directions of this Court. To consider means to make all efforts to fulfil the object of the order of the Court. To consider does not mean to search for a lame excuse. It does not mean to just pass an order and dismiss the claim of the petitioner on flimsy grounds, which were not at all taken in the earlier proceedings by the respondents. Therefore, the respondents by searching some or other technical ground rejected the claim of the petitioner when there is a specific direction by this Court to consider the case of the petitioner. They cannot take a ground which they had already taken in the earlier proceedings and which has been already considered and rejected by the Court. Rejecting an application or a representation on any one of the above referred grounds amounts to nothing but Contempt of Court and disobeying the orders of the Court.”

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10. In J.S.Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and others (2 supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph 5 held as under:

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“5. The question is whether an appeal against the directions issued by the learned Single Judge is maintainable under Section 19 of the Act? Section 19 of the Act envisages that:

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“An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction

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to punish for contempt—

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(a) where the order or decision is that of a Single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court;”

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Therefore, an appeal would lie under Section 19 when an order in exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court punishing the contemner has been passed. In this case, the finding was that the respondents had not wilfully disobeyed the order. So, there is no order punishing the respondent for violation of the orders of the High Court. Accordingly, an appeal under Section 19 would not lie.”

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11. In Union of India and another v. P.M.Rangaswami (3 supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 30 to 32 held as under:

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“30. There is no dispute that there was no challenge to the seniority list prior to 1997. Challenge to the change of date was not vis-à-vis Trehan and Nampoothiry. So far as the entry to Grade IV is concerned, the applicant was junior to Trehan and Nampoothiry. The challenge in the OA was not in respect of Trehan and Nampoothiry. As noted, there was no grievance prior to 7-3-1997. It is to be noted that there was no direction for promotion and only for consideration. Therefore, the question of any automatic promotion does not arise. The Tribunal never held that the respondent was entitled to promotion notwithstanding losing seniority. It appears from the record that despite losing seniority the respondent was considered for promotion to HAG on the basis of Tribunal’s order.

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31. The parameters to be considered while deciding as to whether contempt has been committed has been considered by this Court in several cases. For example Prithawi Nath Ram v. State of Jharkhan d² , Director of Education v. Ved Prakash Josh i³ , Dilip Mitra v. Swadesh Chandra Bhadg a⁴ , Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulat i⁵ and Suresh Chandra Poddar v. Dhani Ram⁶ .

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32. Above being the position, the Tribunal was not justified in holding that contempt had been committed. If the respondent has any grievance, it is open to him to assail the same in an appropriate proceeding.”

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12. In Anil Kumar Shahi and others v. Prof.Ram Sevak Yadav and others (4 supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph 50 held as under:

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“50. It is by now well settled under the Act and under Article 129 of the Constitution of India that if it is alleged before this Court that a

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person has wilfully violated its order it can invoke its jurisdiction under the Act to enquire whether the allegation is true or not and if found to be true it can punish the offenders for having committed “civil contempt” and if need be, can pass consequential orders for enforcement of execution of the order, as the case may be, for violation of which, the proceeding for contempt was initiated. In other words, while exercising its power under the Act, it is not open to the Court to pass an order, which will materially add to or alter the order for alleged disobedience of which contempt jurisdiction was invoked. When the Court directs the authority to consider a matter in accordance with law, it means that the matter should be considered to the best of understanding by the authority and, therefore, a mere error of judgment with regard to the legal position cannot constitute contempt of Court. There is no wilful disobedience if best efforts are made to comply with the order.

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13. In Sushila Raje Holkar v. Anil Kak (Retired) (5 supra), the Hon’ble

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Supreme Court at paragraph 23 held as under:

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“23. A proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act has a serious consequence. Whether the alleged contemnor has wilfully committed breach of the order passed by a competent court of law or not having regard to the civil/evil consequences ensuing therefor requires strict scrutiny. For the said purpose, it may be permissible to read the order of the court in its entirety. The effect and purport of the order should be taken into consideration. Whereas the court shall always zealously enforce its order but a mere technicality should not be a ground to punish the contemnor. A proceeding for contempt should be initiated with utmost reservation. It should be exercised with due care and caution. The power of the court in imposing punishment for contempt of the court is not an uncontrolled or unlimited power. It is a controlled power and restrictive in nature. (See P.C. Sen, R e³ and Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly⁴ . ) A contemnor, thus, may be punished only when a clear case for contumacious conduct has been made out.”

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14. I n Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi (6 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 38 held as under:

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“38. The contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature, the standard of proof required is in the same manner as in other criminal cases. The alleged contemnor is entitled to the protection of all safeguards/rights which are provided in the criminal

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jurisprudence, including the benefit of doubt. There must be a clear-cut case of obstruction of administration of justice by a party intentionally to bring the matter within the ambit of the said provision. The case should not rest only on surmises and conjectures. In Debabrata Bandhopadhyaya v. State of W.B .⁴⁶ , this Court observed as under: (AIR p. 193, para 9)

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“9. A question whether there is contempt of court or not is a serious one. The court is both the accuser as well as the judge of the accusation. It behoves the court to act with as great circumspection as possible making all allowances for errors of judgment and difficulties arising from inveterate practices in courts and tribunals. It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct not explainable otherwise, arises that the contemnor must be punished. … Punishment under the law of contempt is called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one’s duty and in defiance of authority. To take action in an unclear case is to make the law of contempt do duty for other measures and is not to be encouraged.”

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15. It is amply clear from the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above referred judgments that once an order is passed by the authorities on the basis of the directions of the Court, a fresh cause of action arises to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. It is also clear from the above decisions that when the Court issues directions to an authority to consider a matter in accordance with law, it implies that the matter will have to be considered to the best of the understanding by the authority and a mere error of judgment to the legal position cannot constitute contempt of court and the proceedings for contempt and the jurisdiction should be exercised with due care and circumspection and there must be a clear cut case of obstruction of administration of justice by a party intentionally and it is also clear from the above principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the question of punishment arises only in the cases of contumacious conduct.

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16. A perusal of the orders passed by this Court clearly shows that this Court by virtue of the order dated 5.12.2012, directed the respondents 1 and 2 to duly examine, consider and pass appropriate

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orders or take necessary action in accordance with law on the recommendations of the Special Deputy Collector vide letter dated 4.7.2008. A perusal of the order of rejection of the claim of the petitioners clearly discloses that the 2^nd respondent passed the said order after taking into consideration the material available before him. In the considered opinion of this Court and in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above referred judgments, the reasons assigned in the order of rejection cannot be the subject matter of interpretation in the present contempt case. Since it is a separate cause of action, the petitioners herein cannot complain any infirmities in the said order of rejection for the purpose of prosecuting the contempt case. As rightly submitted by the learned Government Pleader, it is always open for the petitioners herein to file a separate writ petition, questioning the order of rejection dated 22.3.2014, passed by the 2^nd respondent herein. In the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners in D.Subbaramaiah v. Chief General manager (HR), APGENCO, Hyderabad (1 supra) would not render any assistance to the petitioners herein. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court does not find any reason to proceed further with the present contempt case.

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17. For the aforesaid reasons, this contempt case is dismissed, discharging the respondents herein. However, it is made clear that the petitioners herein are at liberty to assail the order of rejection passed by the 2^nd respondent vide proceedings Ref.No.A1/465/2009 dated 22.3.2014. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.

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A.V.SESHA SAI, J

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Date: 19.9.2014 DA

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI

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C.C.No.783 of 2014

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19.9.2014

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