clerical staff. In fact, when there were „efficiency bars' in the pay scales such a qualification was treated as essential even for crossing the efficiency bar. Thus, by amendment dated 29.3.82 nothing new was done. A provision which already existed, though in different terminology in the sense that it was applicable to the Upper Division posts, made applicable to selection grade posts which had come into existence in the meantime. With the amalgamation of the Lower Division and Upper Division posts the rule as it stood having become redundant, and there being no provision holding the field regarding promotion to the selection grades, the State Government was certainly competent to issue administrative instructions. Had the field been occupied by statutory rules it could not have done so as it might constitute encroachment upon an occupied field. The ratio of the decision in Sant Ram Sharma's case is that if the statutory rule and the executive instruction can stand side by side, such instruction cannot be said to be invalid or illegal. The test thus would be whether the administrative instructions are inconsistent or repugnant to the statutory rule. In the instant case, the statutory rule having become redundant and inapplicable there was no question of repugnancy or inconsistency. As a matter of fact, as stated above, the amendment was to the same effect as the erstwhile rule, the only material difference is that the provision was made applicable to selection grades in place of the Upper Division posts. It must be pointed out, in fairness to the respondents, that no attempt was made on the side of the petitioners to submit that the amendment dated 29.3.82 was repugnant to or inconsistent with the erstwhile rule, the thrust of their argument was that without framing statutory rules with respect to the selection grade posts, passing the Accounts examination could not be made essential for promotion to the Selection Grades by administrative instructions.