Dismissed

Raja Munda and Ors. v. Rajendra Mahto and Ors.

Jharkhand HC21 Aug 2018C.M.P./151/2013

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court dismissed an interlocutory application seeking condonation of a 13-year delay in filing a Civil Miscellaneous Petition for restoration of a case. The court held no sufficient cause existed given multiple applicants and a pending title suit.

What did the court decide?

I.A. No. 4256 of 2013 dismissed with cost of Rs. 10,000/- to be deposited in Juvenile Justice Fund. C.M.P. No. 151 of 2013 stands disposed of.

Raja Munda and Ors. Vs Rajendra Mahto and… — Civil Procedure and Limitation | Jharkhand HC (2018)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

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C.M.P. No. 151 of 2013 with

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I.A. No. 4256 of 2013

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-----

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Raja Munda & others …. Petitioners Versus

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Rajendra Mahto & others …. Respondents

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----- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE D.N. PATEL HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAV K. GUPTA

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For the Petitioners : Mr. Alok Lal, Advocates Mr. Santosh Kumar, Advocates For the Respondents : Mr. Atanu Banerjee, G.A. Mr. Apurv, A.C. to G.A. Mr. Dilip Kumar Prasad, Advocate Mr. Jitesh Kumar, Advocate Mr. Ramawatar Chaubey, Advocate

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28/Dated: 21^st August, 2018 Oral order: Per D.N. Patel, J.:

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I.A. No. 4256 of 2013

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1. The present Interlocutory Application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condoning the delay of 4758 days in preferring Civil Miscellaneous Petition (C.M.P.) No. 151 of 2013. 2. C.M.P. No. 151 of 2013 has been preferred for restoration of Miscellaneous Judicial Case (M.J.C.) No. 695 of 1999(R) in which order was passed on 8^th February, 2000 to remove the office defects within certain period and as the same was not removed M.J.C. No. 695 of 1999(R) stood dismissed with effect from 22^nd February, 2000.

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3. M.J.C. No. 695 of 1999(R) was preferred for restoration of L.P.A. No. 35 of 1997(R) which was dismissed for default vide order dated 13^th October, 1999.

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4. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that L.P.A. No. 35 of 1997(R) was preferred by these applicants in which initially an order was passed on 20.08.1997 whereby, LPA was dismissed for want of removal of office defects.

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5. Thereafter M.J.C. No. 578 of 1997(R) was preferred for restoration of L.P.A. No. 35 of 1997(R).

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6. Vide order dated 16^th September, 1997, the Letters Patent Appeal was restored.

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7. After restoration of the Letters Patent Appeal the lethargic approach of the appellants continued. There was no improvement with the appellants nor there was any zeal on the part of the appellants to remove the office defects and hence, again vide order dated 13^th October, 1999 L.P.A. No. 35 of 1997(R) was dismissed.

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8. One more M.J.C. No. 695 of 1999(R) was preferred. In this restoration application also office defects were not removed and hence, an order was passed on 8^th February, 2000 to remove the office defects within certain period, but, the defects were not removed and M.J.C. Case No. 695 of 1999(R) stood dismissed with effect from 22^nd February, 2000.

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9. For restoration of this M.J.C. No. 695 of 1999(R), C.M.P. No. 151 of 2013 was preferred after 13 long years with I.A. No.4256 of 2013.

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10. Thus, I.A. No. 4256 of 2013 has been preferred for condonation of delay of 13 years i.e. approximately 4758 days .

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11. We have heard the counsels at length and perused the reasons given in this Interlocutory Application for condonation of delay. There are no sufficient reasons for condonation of delay.

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12. Much has been argued out about the death of one of the applicants of M.J.C. No. 695 of 1999(R), but, looking to the memo of M.J.C. No. 695 of 1999(R) there are several applicants. If a slightest care had been taken by those applicants M.J.C. No. 695 of 1999(R) would not have been dismissed. The order was passed on 8^th February, 2000 to remove the office defects. Any one of the applicants could have taken care of. There were as many as six applicants, but, they had also not taken care.

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13. Moreover, much has been argued out by the other counsels on behalf of the respondents on the merits of the matter. We are not concerned at this stage with detailed merits or demerits of the case because civil suit – Title Suit No. 139 of 2007 has already been filed by these applicants for the very same land in question before the Civil

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Judge, Junior Division, Ranchi, which is pending as on today and they are prosecuting since 2007.

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14. Thus, looking to the memo of I.A. No.4256 of 2013 and looking to the affidavits filed in this case, there are no sufficient reason for condonation of delay of 13 long years i.e. 4758 days in preferring C.M.P. No. 151 of 2013 after dismissal of earlier M.J.C. No. 695 of 1999(R) vide order dated 8^th February, 2000 with effect from 22^nd February, 2000. It appears that there is consistent lethargic approach on the part of these applicants. Initially :

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(a) L.P.A. No. 35 of 1997(R) was dismissed vide order dated 20^th August, 1997;

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(b) By M.J.C. No. 578 of 1997(R), the Letters Patent Appeal was restored vide order dated 16.09.1997, but, thereafter again, the office defects were not removed and hence, again L.P.A. No. 35 of 1997(R) was dismissed vide order dated 13^th October, 1999;

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(c) Again further for restoration of L.P.A. No. 35 of 1997(R) restoration application being M.J.C. No. 695 of 1999(R) was preferred. In this case also defects were not removed despite the order dated 8^th February, 2000 and hence, that restoration application was dismissed with effect from 22^nd February, 2000;

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(d) Now Civil Miscellaneous Petition has been preferred after 13 long years being C.M.P. No. 151 of 2013 with I.A. No.4256 of 2013 for condonation of delay of 4758

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days .

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15. Thus, there is consistent lethargic approach on the part of the applicants. Looking to the reasons given by these applicants in I.A. No. 4256 of 2013, golden thread running throughout this Interlocutory Application is death of one of the applicants, but, as stated hereinabove, there were as many as six applicants in M.J.C. No. 695 of 1999(R). Others could have taken care of their restoration application. Even otherwise also, on merits, we are not discussing because for the very same property in question between the parties to this litigation Title Suit No. 139 of 2007 has already been filed by these applicants before the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ranchi, which is being prosecuted

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by these applicants since 2007. Even otherwise also, the question of title of the property is involved which can be taken care of by civil courts and not by the revenue records.

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16. Hence, we are not entering into the merits of the case at all or even the slightest. Title Suit No. 139 of 2007 shall be decided on its own merits and on the basis of the evidences on record and in accordance with law and the precedents by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ranchi. 17. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory, reported in (2012) 8 SCC

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524, para 6, 7 and 8 as under:

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“ 6 . This Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. Noida has explained the scope of condonation of delay in a matter where the Special Courts/Tribunals have been constituted in order to provide expeditious remedies to the person aggrieved and the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is one of them. Therefore, this Court held that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in such cases the court must keep in mind the special period of limitation prescribed under the statute(s).

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7. In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the period of limitation by this Court in place of the period prescribed by the legislature for filing the special leave petition. Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone the delay.

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8. Hence, in the facts and circumstances of the case as explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to entertain these petitions. The same are dismissed on the ground of delay.”

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(Emphasis Supplied)

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18. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme in the case of Londhe Prakash Bhagwan v. Dattatraya Eknath Mane & others, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 627, para no.9 as under:

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“9. Even if we assume that no limitation is prescribed in any statute to file an application before the court in that case, can an aggrieved person come before the court at his sweet will at any point of time? The answer must be in the negative. If no time-limit has been prescribed in a statute to apply before the appropriate forum, in that case, he has to come before the court within a reasonable time. This Court on a number of occasions, while dealing with the matter of similar nature held that where even no limitation has been prescribed, the petition must be filed within a reasonable time. In our considered opinion, the period of 9 years and 11 months, is nothing but an inordinate delay to pursue the remedy of a person and without submitting any cogent reason therefor. The court has no power to condone the same in such case. (See Cicily Kallarackal v. Vehicle Factory, State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty and K.R. Mudgal v. R.P. Singh.) In these cases, it has been held that the application should be rejected on the ground of inordinate delay. Furthermore, it is to be noted that appointment of the appellant was within the knowledge of

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Respondent 1 from day one but he did not take any step for such a long time.

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(Emphasis supplied)

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19. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme in the case of Brijesh Kumar and others v. State of Haryana, reported in (2014) 11 SCC 351, para 6, 10, 11 and 15 as under:

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“6. The issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained everyday by the courts. The law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

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10. The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However the court while allowing such application has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the court for condoning the delay. This Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone.

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11. It is also a well-settled principle of law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person.

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15. In the instant case, after considering the facts and circumstances and the reasons for inordinate delay of 10 years 2 months and 29 days, the High Court did not find sufficient grounds to condone the delay.”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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20. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, as there is no reasonable reason for condonation of delay of 13 long years i.e. 4758 days, I.A. No. 4256 of 2013 is hereby, dismissed with a cost of Rs.10,000/- (Rs. ten thousand only). This amount will be deposited by these applicants before the Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development & Social Welfare, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi, towards the Juvenile Justice Fund. This amount will be deposited in the Bank Account No. 3734498462-5, Jharkhand Juvenile Justice Fund, State Bank of India, Project Bhawan, Hatia, Ranchi, either by cheque or bank draft, within a period of eight weeks from today, towards Juvenile Justice Fund. This

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amount shall be utilised for the welfare of the juveniles as per the duties assigned to the State under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

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21. A copy of this order will be sent to the:

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