the prisoner defaulted in any way in surrendering
at the appropriate time on parole or furlough
leave to be ground to refuse furlough to such a
prisoner. The said rules of 1959 are statutory
rules. If that is the ground invoked by the
authority in a given case, by no standards, it
can be said that it amounts to inflicting
punishment on the person in respect of which he
has already been punished under the same rules.
The rule of double jeopardy has no application to
the case on hand. For, that is a circumstance or
a condition provided for in rule 4, so as to
refuse furlough leave. Indeed, availing of
furlough leave is a right of the prisoner, but
that right is not absolute, indefeasible or
unbriddled, albeit subject to the other
provisions of the Rules of 1959 such as Rule 4.
The fact that the prisoner has been already
punished for overstaying the furlough leave,
cannot be the basis to hold that he is entitled
for furlough leave inspite of the earlier
default, and the authority would be unjustified
in entertaining apprehension that such a person
is likely to indulge in similar act and perhaps
not become available to undergo the remaining