Allowed

FPA-PMLA-1331/JP/2016 of Shiv Charan Hedasons v/s The Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement, Jaipur

ATFP15 Feb 2017FPA-PMLA-1331/JP/2016

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Appellate Tribunal considered an appeal against a stay order in a PMLA matter. The appellant faced an 88-day delay in filing the appeal due to lack of resources and concurrent trial obligations. The court relied on Supreme Court precedents to find sufficient cause.

What did the court decide?

The 88-day delay in filing the appeal under MP-PMLA-2698/JP/2016 was condoned subject to payment of costs of Rs. 10,000.

FPA-PMLA-1331/JP/2016 of Shiv Charan Hedasons v/s The Deputy… — Money Laundering | ATFP (2017)

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APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT AT NEW DELHI

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MP-PMLA-2698/JP/2016 (COD) FPA-PMLA-1331/JP/2016 Shiv Charan Hedasons … Appellant/Applicant Versus The Deputy Director Directorate of Enforcement, Jaipur … Respondent

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Advocates/Authorized Representatives who appeared

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For the appellant : Shri Bhagabhati Prasad, Advocate For the respondent : Ms. Shilpi Satyapriya Satyam, Advocate

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CORAM
JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH	: CHAIRMAN
SHRI G.C. MISHRA	: MEMBER
SHRI B.K. BANSAL	: MEMBER

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ORDER

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15.02.2017

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MP-PMLA-2698/JP/2016 (COD)

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The appellant has filed the appeal against the order dated 15^th January, 2016 passed by the Adjudicating Authority in O.C No. 522/2015 with the prayer that the contents of the said appeal may be read as the part of the present application appeal as the same is not being repeated for the sake of brevity.

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It is stated that the appellant after receiving the impugned order has sent the copy of the order to the counsel for filing an appeal. However, due to lack of resources as well as due to day-to-day trial of three cases, they could only come on 06^th June, 2016 to sign the appeal and depose the affidavit. In the meanwhile, limitation expired on 17^th March, 2016, thus the delay of 88 days has occurred. Reply has been filed opposing

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FPA-PMLA-1331/JP/2016 Page 1 of 4

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the prayer. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred two decisions

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of the Supreme Court.

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3. N. BALAKRISHNAN Versus M. KRISHNAMURTHY (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 123

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The same are read as under:-

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11. Rules of limitation are meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer person to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

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12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntal Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality.

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13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.

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Page 2 of 4

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FPA-PMLA-1331/JP/2016

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In second case referred by him is S. GANESHARAJU (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND ANOTHER Versus NARASAMMA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. AND OTHERS

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(2013) 11 Supreme Court Cases 341

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

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12. The expression “sufficient cause” as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to show mala fide in not approaching the court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the courts while dealing with the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given a go-by.

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13. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

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Admittedly, by virtue of the impugned order, the respondent has to attached the properties of the appellant and the next step is available with the respondent to take the possession of the other property. There would be injustice if the prayer made in the application is not allowed despite of sufficient cause shown by the appellants.

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In view of the two decisions rendered by the Supreme Court we are inclined to condone the delay subject to the cost Rs. 10,000/which shall be paid by the appellant to the learned counsel for the respondent within four weeks from today.

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List for 05^th May, 2017.

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FPA-PMLA-1331/JP/2016

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In appeal, issue notice. Learned counsel for the respondent accepts the notice. Reply be filed within six weeks. Rejoinder thereafter within

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Page 3 of 4

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FPA-PMLA-1331/JP/2016

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four weeks. Both the parties will file the written synopsis on or before the