Ramesh Kumar Tudu vs Central Bureau of Investigation Thru. Cbi/ Acb Lko. and Another

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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW

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APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 1121 of 2026

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Ramesh Kumar Tudu

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.....Applicant(s)

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	Versus
Central Bureau Of Investigation Lko. And Another	Thru. Cbi/ Acb .....Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s) Counsel for Opposite Party(s)	: Raj Kumar Singh, Ambrish Rai : Aakash Prasad

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Court No. - 14

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HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

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Heard Sri Raj Kumar Singh, Advocate learned counsel for the applicant and Sri Aakash Prasad learned counsel for C.B.I.

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The present application has been filed challenging the validity of an order dated 30.01.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge Anti-Corruption, C.B.I. Court No. 2, Lucknow in Session Trial No. 1604/2025 arising out of RC No. 0062025A0001 under Section 61(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNS’) and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the P.C. Act’) whereby the application filed by the applicant seeking his discharge, has been rejected.

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Briefly stated, the facts of the case that are on 03.02.2025, one Rohan Gupta gave a complaint to the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., Lucknow stating that he had been selected on the post of ABPM (Assistant Branch Post Master) under GDS (Grameen Dak Sewa) and that he had completed three days’ training. The complaint stated that Ramesh Kumar Tudu (the applicant) and Brikesh Pandey (the applicant in Application No. 1352 of 2026) had demanded Rs. 25,000/- from the complainant for permitting him to join the aforesaid post. After discreet verification, the CBI registered the aforesaid FIR under Section 7 of the P.C. Act and 61(2) of BNS against the applicant and Brikesh Pandey.

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A trap was laid on 04.02.2025 during which the co accused Acche Lal (the applicant in Application No. 1346 of 2026) demanded bribe from the complainant allegedly on the instructions of the applicant. The other named accused Brikesh Pandey (the applicant in Application No. 1346 of 2026) was also present there. All the persons were caught on the spot.

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A charge-sheet was submitted on 29.03.2025 against (1) the applicant, (2) Brikesh Pandey and (3) Acche Lal, for the offences under Section 61(2) BNS and Section 7 of the P.C. Act, stating that the investigation has revealed that for allowing the complainant to join the ABPM post, the applicant had demanded and accepted undue advantage from the complainant in connivance with Brikesh Pandey and Acche Lal.

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The applicant filed an application before the Trial Court seeking discharge mainly on the ground that no money had been recovered from him, the recovery of Rs. 7500/- was made from another co accused Acche Lal and there is no evidence of the applicant’s involvement in demanding and receiving the alleged illegal gratification.

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The trial Court has rejected the application seeking discharge by means of the impugned order dated 30.01.2026 on the ground that the call records, the recovery of tainted money from a co-accused person, the trap proceedings and arrest of a co accused person after being caught red handed and the facts that the applicant was posted as S.D.I., he had direct control and influence over the joining of the complainant at the post of ABPM, establish a prima facie case for prosecution of the applicant for the alleged offences.

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The Trial Court has framed charges against the applicants by means of an order dated 12.03.2026 under Sections 61(2) of BNS read with Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

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The learned counsel for applicant has submitted that the allegations considered along with the evidence on record do not do not give rise to a grave suspicion against the appellant as no amount has been recovered from him and there is no other direct evidence of his involvement in the alleged bribe obtainment. He has submitted that in rejecting the discharge application of the accused the trial court has gone beyond the limits as prescribed by Section 227 Cr.P.C and therefore, the impugned judgment is unsustainable in law. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation , (2010) 9 SCC 368, in which the following principles have been culled out regarding the scope of Section 227 Cr.P.C.: -

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“ Exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 227 and 228 CrPC

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21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:

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(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to

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determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

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(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

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(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

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(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

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(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

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(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

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(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”

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The learned counsel for the applicant has next submitted that demand and acceptance are sine qua non for prosecuting an accused person under the P.C. Act and since bribe money has not been recovered from the applicant, there is no reason to believe that he had demanded or accepted the illegal gratification for discharge of his functions as a public servant and no prima facie case is established against him. In support of his contention, he has relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. Dist. Inspector of Police : (2015) 10 SCC 152, wherein it was held that: -

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“ 20. This Court in A. Subair v. State of Kerala [(2009) 6 SCC 587 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 85] , while dwelling on the purport of the statutory prescription of Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act ruled that (at SCC p.

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593, para 28) the prosecution has to prove the charge thereunder beyond reasonable doubt like any other criminal offence and that the accused should be considered to be innocent till it is established otherwise by proper proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, which are vital ingredients necessary to be proved to record a conviction.

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21. In State of Kerala v. C.P. Rao [(2011) 6 SCC 450 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 1010 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 714] , this Court, reiterating its earlier dictum, vis-à-vis the same offences, held that mere recovery by itself, would not prove the charge against the accused and in absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused had voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be bribe, conviction cannot be sustained.

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22. In a recent enunciation by this Court to discern the imperative prerequisites of Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, it has been underlined in B. Jayaraj [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] in unequivocal terms, that mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Section 7 as well as Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and ( ii) of the Act. It has been propounded that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. The proof of demand, thus, has been held to be an indispensable essentiality and of permeating mandate for an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. Qua Section 20 of the Act, which permits a presumption as envisaged therein, it has been held that while it is extendable only to an offence under Section 7 and not to those under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, it is contingent as well on the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Such proof of acceptance of illegal gratification, it was emphasised, could follow only if there was proof of demand. Axiomatically, it was held that in absence of proof of demand, such legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act would also not arise.

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23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under"20. This Court in A. Subair v. State of Kerala [(2009) 6 SCC 587: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 85] , while dwelling on the purport of the statutory prescription of Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act ruled that (at SCC p. 593, para 28) the prosecution has to prove the charge thereunder beyond reasonable doubt like any other criminal offence and that the accused should be considered to be innocent till it is established otherwise by proper proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, which are vital ingredients necessary to be proved to record a conviction."

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The learned Counsel for the applicant has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt of

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NCT of Delhi) : (2023) 18 SCC 251, wherein it was held that if no circumstances brought on record which prove the demand for gratification, the ingredients of the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act are not established and consequently, the offence under Section 13(1)( d ) will not be attracted.

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Per contra, the learned counsel for CBI has submitted that although demand is a pre requisite to initiate prosecution under Section 7 P.C. Act, the demand may not necessarily be direct in every case. Even an indirect demand i.e. receiving or obtaining bribe through another person would fall within the ambit of demand and such demand shall be a ground to prosecute an accused under the P.C. Act.

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Learned counsel for C.B.I has also placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sajjan Kumar (supra) to contend that at the stage of deciding the discharge application under Section 227 Cr.P.C., the Court is not required to analyse the entire evidence and the complete material on record. The Court is merely required to arrive at a satisfaction that there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused on the basis of a grave suspicion that he might have committed the offence.

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The learned counsel for the CBI has submitted that although the bribe amount has not been recovered from the applicant, yet the call recordings of conversations between the applicant and the accused persons and the transcript of the DVR clearly establish that the applicant had instructed the complainant to give the bribe amount to co-accused Acche Lal and he is the main accused and the mastermind of the entire offence. The learned Counsel for the C.B.I has submitted that the appellant has misused and abused his official position to procure an unjustified and unlawful gain to himself in the form of illegal gratification from the complainant in connivance with the other co accused persons.

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Section 7 of the P.C. Act reads as follows: -

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"7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed.-- Any public servant who,--

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(a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant; or

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(b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself or another public servant; or

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(c) performs or induces another public servant to perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear performance of such duty in anticipation of or in consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any person,

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shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

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Explanation 1.--For the purpose of this section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not been improper.

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Illustration.--A public servant, 'S' asks a person, 'P' to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his routine ration card application on time. 'S' is guilty of an offence under this section.

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Explanation 2.--For the purpose of this section,--

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(i) the expressions "obtains" or "accepts" or "attempts to obtain" shall cover cases where a person being a public servant, obtains or "accepts" or attempts to obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by abusing his position as a public servant or by using his personal influence over another public servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means;

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(ii) it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party."

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The language of Section 7 of the P.C. Act makes any person who obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain an undue advantage for performance of public duty as a public servant either by himself or by any other public servant or obtains such advantage for forbearing from such performance by him or by any other person or performs or induces another public servant to perform such public duty improperly as a consequence of such acceptance, liable for prosecution under the aforesaid section.

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Explanation 2(ii) appended to Section 7 states in unequivocal terms that it is immaterial that whether the said demand as envisaged under this section is directly made by the public servant himself or it is made through a third party. The said explanation is intended to bring within the ambit of its scope all such cases where the person does not directly demand the undue advantage but obtains such undue advantage by instructing that the said amount be paid to his co conspirator/ or any other person.

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In Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) : (2023) 4 SCC 73, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that: -

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"88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as

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under:

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88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

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88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.

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88.3. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.

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88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

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(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

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(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

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(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

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88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not.

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Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

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88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns “hostile”, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.

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88.7. (g) Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

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88.8. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in sub-para 88.5(e), above, as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.

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***

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90. Accordingly, the question referred for consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as under:

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In the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary, oral/documentary evidence) it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution."

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In Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab : (2025) 4 SCC 493, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that: -

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“ 12. Further it is seen that, Section 7 speaks of the “attempt” to obtain a bribe as being in itself an offence. Mere demand or solicitation, therefore, by a public servant amounts to commission of an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. The word “attempt” is to imply no more than a mere solicitation, which, again may be made as effectually in implicit or in explicit terms.

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13. Actual exchange of a bribe is not an essential requirement to be prosecuted under this law. Further, those public servants, who do not take a bribe directly, but, through middlemen or touts, and those who take valuable things from a person with whom they have or are likely to have official dealings, are also punishable as per Sections 10 and 11 of the 1988 Act, respectively.”

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(Emphasis added)

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Even if the bribe amount has not been recovered from the applicant,

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prima facie it appears that he has gained undue advantage by entering into a criminal conspiracy along with the co accused persons and the amount of bribe has been accepted on his behalf or on his instruction then he must be held liable as is the person accepting the undue advantage. The Trial Court has held that the call records prima facie point towards involvement of the appellant in the alleged offence. It has been held the appellant was fully aware about the entire incident and the whole design of the commission of the offence was in fact being carried out as per his directions. The Trial Court has recorded that the offence of criminal conspiracy is rarely hatched in open and therefore direct evidence thereon is rarely available and hence in such cases inference has to be drawn by circumstantial evidence.

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In view of Explanation 2 (ii) appended to Section 7 read along with the law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab (supra), the appellant cannot be absolved of his liability under Section 7 P.C. Act merely because there has been no recovery of any amount from him. Further, having directed the whole alleged incident of the demand of the illegal gratification, the appellant is liable for criminal conspiracy under Section 61(2) BNSS as well. The aforesaid factors clearly establish that prima facie there exists a grave suspicion against the appellant. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the order of the Trial Court rejecting the discharge application of the applicant.

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In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that there is no error or illegality in the order dated 30.01.2026 passed by the learned Special Judge Anti Corruption, C.B.I. Court No. 2 Lucknow in Session Trial No. 1604/2025 arising out of RC No. 0062025A0001 under Section 61 (2) BNS read with Section 7 PC Act, Police Station- CBI/ACB, Lucknow, whereby the application filed by the applicant seeking his discharge has been rejected and in the order dated 12.03.2026 passed by the trial Court framing charges against him.

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The petition lacks merits and the same is dismissed .

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(Subhash Vidyarthi,J.)

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May 11, 2026 Pradeep/-

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Digitally signed by :- PRADEEP SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

Ramesh Kumar Tudu v. Central Bureau of Investigation Thru. Cbi/ Acb Lko. and Another

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Ramesh Kumar Tudu v. Central Bureau of Investigation Thru. Cbi/ Acb Lko. and Another

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