Dismissed

Trilochan Singh and Others v. State

Allahabad HC26 Nov 2019WRIC/30597/1992

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court dismissed a writ petition challenging an appellate order declaring 13.69 acres of land surplus under the U.P. Ceiling Act. The Court held that the Appellate Court had considered the merits and there was no grave miscarriage of justice warranting interference under Articles 226/227.

What did the court decide?

The writ petition was dismissed; interim order, if any, stands vacated.

Trilochan Singh and Others Vs State — Land Acquisition | Allahabad HC (2019)

¶1

¶2

Court No. - 34

¶3

Case :- WRIT - C No. - 30597 of 1992

¶4

Petitioner :- Trilochan Singh And Others Respondent :- State of U.P. and others Counsel for Petitioner :- S.K. Mehrotra,R.Asthana Counsel for Respondent :- S.C.

¶5

Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.

¶6

Heard Sri Ramendra Asthana, learned counsel for petitioners and perused the record.

¶7

This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has arisen from judgment dated 29.05.1992 passed by Additional Commissioner (Judicial) First, Bareilly Division, Bareilly (hereinafter referred to as “Appellate Court”) dismissing petitioners' Appeal No. 10/22 of 1992 filed under Section 13 of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1960”) confirming the order of Prescribed Authority passed on 18.12.1991.

¶8

Sri Asthana, learned counsel for petitioners submitted that argument advanced by petitioners has not been examined and the judgment is cryptic and unreasoned.

¶9

However, aforesaid judgment shows that after several round of remand etc. ultimately order was passed by Prescribed Authority declaring 13.69 acres land surplus, whereagainst aforesaid appeal was preferred. The only argument advanced before Appellate Court is that sons of Sri Atar Singh were already in possession over land prior to 1971 having purchased the same and, therefore, sons land could not be included in the holding of Atar Singh and this argument has been rejected by Appellate Court with reference to Explanation I of Section 5 holding that the aforesaid proceedings are initiated in view of Benami transaction of land. The argument advanced by learned counsel for

¶10

¶11

petitioners reads in judgment of Appellate Court reads as under:

¶12

^^eSaus vihydrkZ ds fo}ku vf/koDrk ,oa jkT; ljdkj dh vksj ls Mh0th0lh0 ds rdksZa dks lqukA vihydrkZ ds fo}ku vf/koDrk us rdZ izLrqr fd;k] fd iwoZ esa 27-1-78 ds vkns'k }kjk vrj flag iq= nqyh pUn ds fo:) lhfyax dh dk;Zokgh dh tk pqdh gSA vkSj rnkuqlkj 5-80 ,sdM Hkwfe vfrfjDr ?kksf"kr dh tk pqdh gSA mDr dk;Zokgh esa vrj flag ds ckfyx yM+dksa dh tehu dks ugha 'kkfey ekuk x;k FkkA oSls Hkh vrj flag ds yM+ds o"kZ 1971 ls iwoZ Lo;a ml tehu dks [kjhns FksA rc ls gh mDr Hkwfe ij dkfct gSaA muds ifjokj vyx gSa] muds uke dkxtkrksa esa ntZ gSa] vrj flag dks tksr esa mudh Hkwfe tksM+us dk vkSfpR; ugha gSA blds vfrfjDr vihyV U;k;ky; us vius fnukad 27-6-87 ds vkns'k esa fuEu lkr fl)kUrksa ds vk/kkj ij fu.kZ; ysus dk funsZ'k fn;k Fkk&

¶13

1. The sources from which purchage money was derived.

¶14

2. The possession of the property.

¶15

3. The position of parties and their relation to another.

¶16

4. The circumstances or otherwise of the alleged transfer.

¶17

5. His motive in taking the alleged transfer.

¶18

6. The custody and production of tittle deeds.

¶19

7. The previous and subsequent conduct of parties.

¶20

ijUrq fu;r izkf/kdkjh }kjk dsoy dCts ds rdZ ij gh viuk fu.kZ; fn;k x;k gSA voj U;k;ky; }kjk vihysV U;k;ky; ds funsZ'kksa ds vuqikyu esa fo'ks"k :i ls lkr fcUnqvksa ij foLr`r foospuk dh tkuh gSA tks ugha dh x;h gSA fu;r izkf/kdkjh us izR;sd fl)kUr dh foospuk vihydrkZ }kjk lk{; ds ifjos'k esa dh gS vihydrkZ ds fo}ku vf/koDrk dk ;g rdZ fd o"kZ 1978 esa vrj flag [kkrsnkj ds fo:) dk;Zokgh gks tkus ds ckn iqu% /kkjk 10 ¼2½ dh dk;Zokgh ugha gks ldrh ls eSa lger ugha gwWa D;ksafd nwljh dk;Zokgh vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 5 ds ds Li"Vhdj.k la0&1 ds vUrxZr cSukeh vk/kkj ij dh x;h gSA tcfd iwoZ okn ds vrj flag vihydrkZ ds uke vafdr Hkwfe ds izfr gh FkkA esjs fopkj ls fu;r izkf/kdkjh }kjk leLr fcUnqvksa ij foLrkj ls foospuk djus ds mijkUr fu.kZ; fy;k x;k gSA vkSj mlesa fdlh izdkj ds la'kks/ku dh vko';drk ugha gSA**

¶21

“I heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and also by DGC on behalf of the state government. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that by the order dated 27.01.1978, the ceiling proceedings have been conducted against Atar Singh s/o Duli Chand, and an area of land measuring 5.80 acres has been declared in excess. In the aforesaid proceeding, the lands owned by major sons of Atar Singh were taken to be included therein. The sons of Atar Singh themselves had purchased the land before 1971, and they are in the possession of the same since then. Their families live separately and their names are registered in records. Hence, there was no justification to add their lands to the holding of Atar Singh. Besides, the appellate court in its order dated 27.06.1987 has directed to take decisions on the following seven issues -

¶22

1. The source from which purchase money was derived.

¶23

¶24

2. The possession of the property.

¶25

3. The position of parties and their relation to another.

¶26

4. The circumstances or otherwise of the alleged transfer.

¶27

5. His motive in taking the alleged transfer.

¶28

6. The custody and production of title deeds.

¶29

7. The previous ad subsequent conduct of parties.

¶30

But on the plea of mere possession, a decision has been taken by the competent authority. In pursuance of the directions of the appellate court, the lower court has to extensively discuss, especially, the seven issues; which has not been done. The competent authority has discussed everything in the light of the evidence adduced by the appellant. I do not agree with the argument of the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant that no proceeding u/s 10 (2) can take place again after the proceeding has taken place against the Atar Singh Khatedar in 1978 because the second proceeding has taken place on the basis of sale deed under explanation no. 1 of the section 5 of the Act, whereas the previous case was related to the land mentioned against the name of the appellant. In my view, the decision by the competent authority has been taken after all the seven issues having been discussed by him in detail, and there is no need of modification therein.” (English translation by Court)

¶31

No other point appears to have been argued before Appellate Court and nothing could be shown to this Court that any other point has been argued which has not been considered by Appellate Court. Even memo of appeal has not been placed on record. In these facts and circumstances it cannot be said that judgment of Court below is unreasoned and cryptic, since the very issue raised by petitioners has been considered and decided by Appellate Court.

¶32

Further, scope of judicial review in such matters where the orders of Courts below are assailed before this Court in a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution is very limited. This power involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. But this power does not vest the High Court with any unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction

¶33

¶34

of the Court or Tribunal. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.

¶35

In D. N. Banerji Vs. P. R. Mukherjee 1953 SC 58 the Court said:

¶36

“Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere.”

¶37

A Constitution Bench of Apex Court examined the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution in Waryam Singh and another Vs. Amarnath and another AIR 1954 SC 215 and made following observations at p. 571 :

¶38

"This power of superintendence conferred by article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J. in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vs. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal. 193 , to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors".

¶39

In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and Ors. AIR 1984 SC 38

¶40

the Apex Court held that this Court has very limited scope under Article 227 of the Constitution and even the errors of law cannot be corrected in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power can be used sparingly when it comes to the conclusion that the Authority/Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction or proceeded under erroneous presumption of jurisdiction. The High Court cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decision. For interference, there must be a case of flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or where order of the Tribunal, etc. has resulted in grave injustice.

¶41

For interference under Article 227, the finding of facts recorded by the Authority should be found to be perverse or patently erroneous and de hors the factual and legal position on record. (See: Nibaran Chandra Bag Vs. Mahendra Nath Ghughu, AIR 1963 SC 1895; Rukmanand

¶42

¶43

Bairoliya Vs. the State of Bihar & ors., AIR 1971 SC 746; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & ors., AIR 1980 SC 1896; Laxmikant R. Bhojwani Vs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Singh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCC 576; Reliance Industries Ltd. Vs. Pravinbhai Jasbhai Patel & ors., (1997) 7 SCC 300; M/s. Pepsi Food Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Sub-Judicial Magistrate & ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749; and Virendra Kashinath Ravat & ors. Vs. Vinayak N. Joshi & ors. (1999) 1 SCC 47).

¶44

It is well settled that power under Article 227 is of the judicial superintendence which cannot be used to up-set conclusions of facts, howsoever erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse or so unreasonable that no Court could ever have reached them. (See: Rena Drego Vs. Lalchand Soni & ors., (1998) 3 SCC 341; Chandra Bhushan Vs. Beni Prasad & ors., (1999) 1 SCC 70; Savitrabai Bhausaheb Kevate & ors. Vs. Raichand Dhanraj Lunja, (1999) 2 SCC 171; and Savita Chemical (P) Ltd. Vs. Dyes & Chemical Workers' Union & Anr.,(1999) 2 SCC 143).

¶45

Power under Article 227 of the Constitution is not in the nature of power of appellate authority enabling re-appreciation of evidence. It should not alter the conclusion reached by the Competent Statutory Authority merely on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. (See: Union of India & ors. Vs. Himmat Singh Chahar, (1999) 4 SCC 521 ).

¶46

In Ajaib Singh Vs. Sirhind Co-opeative Marketing cum Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC 82, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that there is no justification for the High Court to substitute its view for the opinion of the Authorities/ Courts below as the same is not permissible in proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

¶47

In Mohan Amba Prasad Agnihotri Vs. Bhaskar Balwant Aheer, AIR 2000 SC 931, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that jurisdiction of

¶48

¶49

High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not appealable but supervisory. Therefore, it cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by Courts below unless there is no evidence to support findings or the findings are totally perverse.

¶50

In Indian Overseas Bank Vs. Indian Overseas Bank Staff Canteen Workers' Union (2000) 4 SCC 245, the Court observed that it is impermissible for the Writ Court to reappreciate evidence liberally and drawing conclusions on its own on pure questions of fact for the reason that it is not exercising appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by Tribunal. The findings of fact recorded by the fact finding authority duly constituted for the purpose ordinarily should be considered to have become final. The same cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having based on materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of Writ Court to warrant those findings. At any rate, as long as they are based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose no interference is called for. Even on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and possibly be taken the High Court can not interfere.

¶51

In Union of India Vs. Rajendra Prabhu, (2001) 4 SCC 472 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, cannot reappreciate the evidence nor it can substitute its subjective opinion in place of the findings of Authorities below.

¶52

Similar view has been reiterated in State of Maharashtra Vs. Milind & ors., (2001) 1 SCC 4; Extrella Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97; and Omeph Mathai & ors. Vs. M. Abdul Khader, (2002) 1 SCC 319.

¶53

In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and others (2003) 6 SCC 675 , it was held that in exercise of supervisory power under Article 227, High Court can correct errors of jurisdiction committed by

¶54

¶55

subordinate Courts. It also held that when subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or jurisdiction though available is being exercised in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned, the Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. However, it also said that be it a writ of certiorari or exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or law unless error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law; or, a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.

¶56

In Jasbir Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2006 ) 8 SCC 294, the Court said:

¶57

“...while invoking the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution, it is provided that the High Court would exercise such powers most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority. The power of superintendence exercised over the subordinate courts and tribunals does not imply that the High Court can intervene in the judicial functions of the lower judiciary. The independence of the subordinate courts in the discharge of their judicial functions is of paramount importance, just as the independence of the superior courts in the discharge of their judicial functions.”

¶58

In Shalini Shyam Shetty and another Vs. Rajendra Shankar

¶59

Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 , the Court said that power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. The above authority has been cited and followed in Kokkanda B. Poondacha and others Vs. K.D. Ganapathi and another AIR 2011 SC 1353 and Bandaru Satyanarayana Vs. Imandi Anasuya (2011) 12 SCC 650 .

¶60

In Abdul Razak (D) through Lrs. & others Vs. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle and others (2010) 2 SCC 432 , Apex Court reminded

¶61

¶62

that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227, High Courts should not act as if they are exercising an appellate jurisdiction.

¶63

In T.G.N. Kumar Vs. State of Kerala and others (2011) 2 SCC 772 , the Court said that power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is both administrative and judicial, but such power is to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority.

¶64

In Commandant, 22^nd Battalion, CRPF and others Vs. Surinder Kumar (2011) 10 SCC 244 , Apex Court referring to its earlier decision in Union of India Vs. R.K. Sharma (2001) 9 SCC 592 observed that only in an extreme case, where on the face of it there is perversity or irrationality, there can be judicial review under Articles 226 or 227.

¶65

In view thereof, I find no justification warranting interference with the orders impugned in this writ petition.

¶66

Dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

¶67

Order Date :- 26.11.2019 AK

Trilochan Singh and Others v. State

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Trilochan Singh and Others v. State

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Nahida Sultana Vs Kashi Gramin Bank and Another

Nagendra Nath Tripathi Vs State of U.P. and Others

Om Prakash Tripathi Vs State of U.P. Thru Principal Secy. and Ors.

Smt. Jay Raji Vs State of U.P. and Others

Babu Ram Vs Spl. Judge

Tribhuwan Vs the Special Judge Basti and Others