received by due to driving undertaken by him in that trip and cannot, as such, be regarded as injury caused to him in the course of his employment. Strong reliance is placed by him on Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali and another, (2007) 11 SCC 668 and Regional Director, ESI Corporation and another v. Francis De Costa and another, (1996) 6 SCC 1 to fortify his submissions . It is, however, the contention of Mr. HK Bhowmik, the learned counsel for the claimant-respondent, that there are sufficient evidence to show that the claimant was engaged as driver for more than one month as a substitute for the permanent driver, who had gone on leave and was in the course of employment when he was attacked by stroke due to stress and strain. Referring to Sub-section (dd) of Section 2 of the Employee‘s Compensation Act, 1923, which substituted sub-section (n) of Section 2 of the erstwhile Workmen‘s Compensation Act, 1923, he submits that under the new definition of ―employee‖ substituting the definition of ―workman‖, that it matters not whether the employment of claimant under the respondent No. 2 was of a casual nature or not, he now satisfies the definition of ―employee‖, and the objection raised on this issue by the appellant has now become merely academical in nature. He relies on Jyothi Ademma v. Plant Engineer, Nellore and anr., AIR 2006 SC 2830 and para 44 of Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti (supra) to support his various contentions. He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity warranting the interference of this Court.
