Allowed

The Executive Director (Ghzandhz), v. G. Rukmaiah

Telangana HC9 Oct 2023WP/21764/2014

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A writ petition by APSRTC challenged a Labour Court award that reinstated an intoxicated employee as a fresh recruit. The High Court quashed the reinstatement, holding that the valid domestic enquiry justification for removal should stand, citing precedents barring substitution of departmental punishment absent shockingly disproportionate outcomes.

What did the court decide?

Award dated 07.06.2013 passed in ID No.54 of 2012 set aside; punishment of removal from service upheld; salary/emoluments already paid to be retained by petitioner.

The Executive Director (Ghzandhz), Vs G… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Telangana HC (2023)

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[³³⁰¹ ]

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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD

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(Special Original Jurisdiction)

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MONDAY, THE NINTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY THREE

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PULLA KARTHIK

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WRIT PETITION NO: 21764 OF 2014

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Between:

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The Executive Director(GHZ&HZ), APSRTC, Ir/GBS, Hyderabad.

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The Regional Manager, APSRTC, Medak Region, Sanga Reddy.

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The Dy.CTM, APSRTC, Medak Region, Sangareddy.,^-

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The Depot Manager, APSRTC, Medak Depot, Medak Dist.

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...PETITIONERS

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AND

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1 G. Rukmaiah, S/o Narayana, E.251619, Ex. Conductor, APSRTC, R/o H.No.9-130, PO and Village, Chegunta, Dist. Medak.

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The Presiding Officer, Labour Court-ll, Hyderabad

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...RESPONDENTS

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Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of lndia^praying thatⁱⁿ the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the^{High Court maybe} pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction more especially one in the nature of Writ of Certiorari to call for the records relating to^Award,dated 07.06.2013 passed in l.D. No.54 of 2012 on the file of^{the LabourCourt-ll,at} Hyderabad, published in G.O.Rt.No.741, dated 06.08.2013, and to^{quash or set} aside the same, in the interest of^justice.

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l.A. NO: 2OF 201s(wPMP .No:25432 OF 2015

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Petition under Section 151 CPC^praying that in the^{circumstancesstated in} the affidavit filed in support of the^petition, the^{High Court may be pleasedto} direct the Respondents 1 to 4 herein to^{Pay Last drawnwages payableUnder} Section 17-B of lndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the^{petitioner,duringthe} pendency of the writ petition.

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l.A. NO: 1 OF 2014(W PMP. NO: 27295 OF 20141

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Petition under section 151 cpc praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High court may be pleased to suspend the Award, dated 07.06.2013 passed in I.D. No.54 of 2o12 on the file of the Labour court-ll, at Hyderabad, pending disposal of the main writ petition.

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Counsel for the Petitioners :SRt A.SRIN|VAS REODY (SC FOR TSRTC)

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Counsel for the Respondents: SRI A.K.JAYAPRAKASH RAO

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The Court made the following: ORDER

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THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE PULLA KARTHIK

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WRJT PETITION No.21764 of 2Ol4

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ORDER:

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This Writ Petition has been hled by the petitioner-Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (in short^{,CorporationJ} seeking to call for the records pertaining to Award dated 07.06.2013 passed in I.D. No.54 of 2Ol2 by the Labour Court-ll at Hyderabad (in short 'Labour CourtJ and published in G.O.Rt.No.741, dated 06.08.2013, and quash the same.

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2l For the sake of convenience, the parties are hereinafter referred to as they are arrayed before the Labour Court.

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The case of the petitioner-employee is that he joined the services of the respondent-Corporation in the year 19g9 as a Conductor. On I 1.04.2009 while the petitioner was performing his duties, as conductor, in the bus bearing No.AP23 U 6885 in the route of Veldurthi-Narsapur, at about 1630 hours, a surprise check was conducted at stage No. 11/ 12 wherein the petitioner was found in an intoxicated condition and committed several dereliction in his duty. Thereafter, while placing the petitioner under suspension from 15.04.2009, a charge sheet was issued to the petitioner framing as many as six charges against the petitioner, to which, the petitioner has submitted his explanation. Having dissatisfied with the said explanation, a domestic enquiry was ordered. In the domestic

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enquiry, the petitioner was found guilty and all the charges were held proved. Thereupon, a show cause notice of removal was issued followed by the order dated 15.12.2009 passed by 4h respondent removing the petitioner from service. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed an appeal and the sarle was dismissed on 01.02.2010. Further, the Review petition, second review petition and mercy petition lrled by the petitioner rvere rejected / dismissed on 28.O4.2O1O, 07.06.20|0 and 02.06.20 I 1 respectively. Questioning the same, the petitioner raised an Industrial Dispute (1.D.) before the Labour Court, which allowed the I.D. in part and modihed the order of dismissal to that of reinstatement of the petitioner into service as a fresh recruitee in any pay post of Shramik without protecting his pay and seniority and also held that he is not entitled for any back wages and attendant benefits. Questioning the same, the Corporation is before this Court.

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4l Heard Sri A. Srinivas Reddy, learned Standing Counsel, appearing for the respondent-Corporation and Sri A.K. Jayaprakash, learned counsel for petitioner-employee.

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It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation that as the explanation submitted by the petitioner to the charge memo was not satisfactory, a domestic enquiry was ordered. The domestic enquiry was conducted in a fair and transparent manner, in accordance with the Rules and due

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opportunity was provided to the^{petitionerat every stage of enquiry.} Hence, there is no bias on the^part of^{the Enquiry Officer.It is further} contended that as the charges against^{the petitioner wereheld proved} in the enquiry and in view of the^gravityof the^{misconduct,the} respondent-Corporation was^justihed in^{removingthe petitioner from} service apart from dismissing the appeal,^{reviewsand mercy petitions} filed by the petitioner. It^{is furthercontended that the Labour Court,} having held that the domestic^{enquiry was valid, erred in modifying} the punishment imposed upon the^{petitioner, without anyvalid} reasons. It is further contended that^once the^{charges wereheld} proved in the enquiry and the Labour Court held^{that the enquiry was} valid, the Tribunal ought not have taken a^{lenient view and modified} the punishment of dismissal from service^{by reinstatingthe petitioner} into service as a fresh recruitee in the^post of Shramik^without protecting his pay and seniority. Hence,^prayed to^{set aside the} impugned Award and consequently to^{restore the order of removal'} In support of his contentions, learned^{counsel has placed reliance on} the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme^{Court inDiulslonal} Controller, N.E.K.R.T.C. v.^{H.AmareshlandDeputg} Commlssioner, Kendrlga Vidgalaga^{So,ngtho,n u. J. Hussain2.}

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Per contra, the learned counsel for the^{petitioner-employeehas} contended that the domestic enquiry was^conducted in^{a biased}

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'^{(2006) 6 SCC 187}

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, (2013) t0 scc Lo6

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manner and not conductcd in accordance with the Regulations of the Corporation. It is lurther contended that imposition of punishment of removal from service is grossly disproportionate for the alleged charges against the petitioner. It is further contended that the Tribunal by taking into consideration the long service and also the medical report showing that the petitioner was suffering from epilepsy, has rightly modified the punishment on the ground of proportionality. Hence, prayed to dismiss the writ petition.

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7\ This Court has taken note of the submissions made by the respective counse[.

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A perusal of the record, more particularly the impugned Award, discloses that the Labour Court having held that the domestic enquiry was valid, however, interlered with the punishment imposed by the authorities on the petitioner, on the ground of proportionality and has taken a lenient view towards the petitioner by modifying the removal order to that of reinstating the petitioner into service as a fresh recrLlitee without protecting his pay and seniority.

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It is to be seen that in a catena of cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that once the charges are held to be proved and the domestic enquiry was held valid by the Tribunal, the Courts ordinarily shall not interfere with the punishment imposed on the employees. It

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/',

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is apt to refer the ratio laid down^{by the Hon'ble SupremeCourt in} this regard.

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ln A,nraresh's case^{(reJerredsupra), the Honble Supreme} Court, at paras 20 to 23,^{held as under:}

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"20. Once a domestic tribunal^{basedon evidence comes to a particular} conclusion normally it^{is not open to the tribunal and the courtsto} substitute their subjective^{opinion in placeof the onearrived at by the} domestic tribunal.

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21 . Coming to the^question of^{quantum of punishment,this Court in} Divisional Controller,^{KSRTC (NWKRTC)v. A.T. Mane3 has held as under:} "12- Coming to the^{questionof quantum of punishment,one} should bear in mind^{the fact that it is not the amount of money} misappropriated that becomes a^{primaryfactor for awarding} punishment; on the contrary,^{it is the loss of confidencewhich is} the primary factor to^be taken^{into consideration. In our opinion,} when a person is found^{guilty ofmisappropriatingthe} corporatio's funds, there^{is nothingwrongin the corporation} losing confidence or^faith in^{sucha personand awardinga} punishment of dismissal."

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We may also beneficially^{refer to a judgmentrendered by a three-} Judge Bench of this Court^{in M.P. Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra} Sharmaa. This Court held that^{the tribunals would not sit in appeal over} the decision of the employer^{unless there exists a statutory provisionin} this behalf. Moreover,^{the LabourCourts must act within thefour} corners of the statute concerned, in^{terms of the provisionsthereof.} When the Labour Court^{had held that Charge 4 stood proved,no} interference by the learned^{SingleJudgeor by the DivisionBench was} called for. In the instant^{case, the jurisdictionvestedwith the la.bour} Court has been exercised capriciously^{and arbitrarily} in^{spite of the} finding that Charge 4, with regard to the^{pilferage,has beenproved}

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I (2005) 3 SCC 2s4 2005 scc (L&s) 407

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4 (2005) 3 SCC 401 20os scc {r.&s) 4 l7

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beyond any doubt. In our opinion, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court in ordering reinstatement u,as shockingly disproportionate in the nature of Charge 4 found proved. When Charge 4 is provcd, which is grave in natrlre, interference \r'ith the punishment of dismissar cannot be justified. Sirnilarly, the High court gets jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constittrtion only when it finds that the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved.

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23 Ms Anitha Shenoy also cited a recent decision of this court in Rajasthan SRTC v. Zakir Hussains (Ruma pal and Dr. AR. l,akshmanan, JJ). The respondent therein was also a conductor of the appellant Corporation. He challenged the termination of his service as being in violation o[ the provisions of the standing order. However, without availing the remedy available to him under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, he approached the civil Courts and obtained decrees in his favour. It was challenged by the management before rhe High Court. The High Court declined to interfere with the orders passed by the lower court since there is concurrent findings on tact by both the courts below and that no substantial question of la\r, arises, the appellant Corporation preferred thc special leave petition before this Court questioning the correctness of the orders passed by the courts below and of the High court particurarry on the question ofjurisdiction of the civil courts to entertain and try the suit instead of an industrial dispute. This Court held that the civil court has no jurisdiction and that the jurisdiction cannot be conferred by any by any order of the court and that where an act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specihed manner the performance cannot be enforced in any other manner, It was held that the employees o[ the State Road Transport Corporation are not civil servants and, therefore, they are not entitled to protection under Article 311 of the Constitution and that their terms of appointment are govemed by the letter of appointment and, therefore, the management was well within its right to terminate the services of the respondent during the period of probation if their services were not found to be satisfactory during the said period and in such an event the appeltant Corporation rlas not obliged to hold an enquiry before terminating the

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s (2oos) 7 SCC 447 : 2OOS SCC (L&S) 94S

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services. In the concluding part of the^judgment, this Court has observed that since the respondent workman has not acted bona fide in instituting the suit, the respondent was not entitled to any back wages and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the said case, it would not be appropriate to order refund of the back wages paid to him and that he shall not be allowed to continue in service any further and shall be discharged forthwith. "

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In .Elusscin's ca.se (reJerred. suprq), the Hon,ble Supreme

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Court, at paras 7 to 9, held as under:

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"7. When the charge is proved, as happened in the instant case, it is the disciplinary authority with whom lies the discretion to decide as to what kind of punishment is to be imposed. Of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and gravity of the charge. The disciplinary authority is to decide a particular penalty specihed in the relevant Rules. A host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such a discretion which inctude, apart from the nature and gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of dutjes assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in the department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist.

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The order of the appellate authority while having a relook at the case would, obviously, examine as to whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is reasonable or not. lf the appellate authority is of the opinion that the case warrants lesser penalty, it can reduce the penalty so imposed by the disciplinary authority. Such a power which vests with the appellate authority departmentally is ordinarily not available to the court or a tribunal. The court while undertaking judicial review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its own opinion on reappraisal of facts.... In exercise of power of judicial review, however, the court can interfere with the punishment imposed when it is found to be totally irrational or is outrageous in defrance of logic. This limited scope of judicial review is permissible and interference is avaitable only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of

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good faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the court lesser punishment u,ould have been more appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the discretion of the departmental authorities.

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When the punishment rs lound to be outrageously disproportionate to the nature of charge, principle oI proportionality comes into play. It is, however, to be borne in mind that this principle would be attracted, which is in tune with the doctrine o[ Wednesbury rule of reasonableness, only when in the facts and circumstances of the case, penalty imposed is so disproportionate to the nature of charge that it shocks the conscience of the court and the court is forced to betieve that it is totally unreasonable and arbitrary. "

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l2l In the iight of the above, I am of the view that once the Tribunal held the domestic enquiry as valid, it is not open to it to show misplaced sympathy on the emplolree and order his reinstatement into service afresh.

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Further, though the learned counsel for the petitioner-employee has taken the piea of bias on the part of the respondent authorities in conducting domestic enquiry, the same could not be^proved by leading evidence before the Labour Court. Therefore, the Labour Court was justihed in holding that the enquiry was valid and the same cannot be interfered with by this Court. Further, in^view of the law laid down by the Honl:le Apex Court, in the above^referred judgments, the action of the Labour Court in modifying the punishment is liablc to be set aside.

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For the afore-mentioned reasons, the Writ^Petition is^allowed, Award dated 07.06.2013 passed in I.D.^{No.54 of 2Ol2 by the Labour} Court-ll at Hyderabad and published in^{G.O.Rt.No.741, dated} 06.08.2013, are set aside and the punishment^{of removal from service} imposed on the petitioner-employee holds good. However,^{the salary} and other emoluments already^paid to the^{petitioner employee shall} not be recovered from him.

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Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.^No

costs.

SD/-N. SRIHARI

ASSISTANT REGIS

//TRUE COPYII

SECT!ON FICER

To,

The Executive Director^{(GHZ&HZ),APSRTC, MGR-S,Hyderabad'} i. iii; neoionar Manaqer,'APSRTC;^{Medak Region,Sanga Reddy'} 5 fhe Ov."CttU. APSR-TC,^{MedakRegion' Sangareddy', -} +. fne O6oot M'anaser,^{APSRTC, Medak Depot, Medak Dist'} S. Tne PnisiOinq Oficer,^{Labour Court-lt,} ily{etqn4' o. o"i, cc to^{5Rr n"SnintvnsREDDY (sq FoR TSRTc-)' [oluc]} i: on; ca 6 SRlA.r.lnvepnnKAsH^{RAo, Advocate. [oPUC]} 8. Two CD CoPies. BSK GJP

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ANX

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HIGH COURT DATED:0911012023

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ORDER

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WP.No.21764 of 2014

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