Dismissed

Babburi Devender and 3 Others v. Bobburi Kamalamma and Another

Telangana HC18 Nov 2020SA/339/2017

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This second appeal under CPC against a property injunction suit was dismissed by the High Court at the admission stage. The court found no substantial question of law as the First Appellate Court's findings on facts regarding possession and partition were supported by evidence and not perverse.

What did the court decide?

Second Appeal dismissed at the admission stage; no order as to costs.

Babburi Devender and 3 Others Vs Bobburi Kamalamma… — Specific Performance | Telangana HC (2020)

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HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE^{OF TELANGANA} AT HYDERABAD

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WEDNESDAY, THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF NOVEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE G SRI DEVI

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SECOND APPEAL NO: 339 OF 2017

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Appeal under Section 100 of CPC against the Judgment and decree made in AS No.199 of 2016 dated 2810212017 on the file of the Court of the Vlll Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar, Hyderabad^preferred against the decreeⁱⁿ OS No.143 of 2013 dated 30/06/2016 on the file of the Court of the Junior Civil Judge, Hayathnagar, Ranga Reddy District.

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Between:

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Babburi Devender, S/o. Late Narayana, F/o.H.No.2-81, lnamguda Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, R.R.District.

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Babburi Narender, S/o. Late Narayana, R/o.H.No.2-81, lnamguda Village, Hayathnagar lvlandal, R. R. District.

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Babburi Krishna, S/o. Late Narayana, Fl/o.H.No.2-81, lnamguda Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, R.R.District.

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Babburi Srinivas, S/o. Late Narayana, Rl/o.H.No.2-81, lnamguda Village, Hayathnagar [t/andal, R. R. District.

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...APPELLANTS/ RESPONDENTS/ PLAINTIFFS

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AND

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Babburi Kamalamma, W/o. Late Narsimha, Fl/o. lnamguda Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, R.R.District.

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Babburi Srinivas, S/o. Late Narsimha, F/o.lnamguda Village, Hayathnagar Mandal, R.R.District.

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...RESPONDENTS/ RESPONDENTS

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SAMP. NO: 772 OF 2017

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Petition under Section 15'1 of CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased to grant interim injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the petitioners over the suit schedule property pending disposal of Second Appeal by suspending the operation of the impugned^judgment and decree dt.28.02.2017 passed in AS No.'199/20'16 on the file of Vlll Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy District.

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For the Appellants : SRl. M.DAMODAR REDDY

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For the Respondent Nos.1 & 2 : SRI K.SRINIVAS REDDY

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SRI N.MUKUND REDDY S AND S LAW ASSOCIATES

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The Court delivered the following: JUDGIVENT

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THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE G. SRI DEVI

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SECOND APPEAL No.339 of 2017

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IUDGMENT:

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This second appeal is filed under Section 100 of C.P.C., against the judgment and decree of the learned VIII Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar, dated 28.02.20'17, passed in A.S.No.199 of 2016, whereunder the learned Judge allowed the said appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Junior Civil Judge, Hayathnagar, Ranga Reddy District, dated 30.06.2016, passed in O.S.No.143 of 2013.

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Appellants herein are the plaintiffs, respondents are the defendants. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred to as thev were arraved in the suit.

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Necessary facts for disposal of this second appeai are^as follows:

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The plaintiffs filed the aforesaid suit for PerPetual^injunction reshaining the defendants, their men and servants^{frorn interfering} with the peaceful possession and enjoyment^{of the plaintiffs over the} suit schedule property i.e., agricultural^{land admeasuringAc.4.28} guntas situated in Sy.No.13 / AA^{of Inamguda Viliage, Hayathnagar} Mandal, Ranga Reddy District.^{It is the case of the plaintiffs that the} clefendants' fathcr late Babburi^{Narsimha,plaintiffs' fa therlate} Babburi Narayana and their brother^{late Babburi Venkatesh were}

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the real brothers^{and they jointly inherited agricultural lands in} Sy.Nos.1/AA, 5/AA,^{13/AA,32, 40/EE, 78/EE, 7e/AA and} 100/AA of Inamguda Village,^{Hayathnagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy} District. Though the said lands^{were jointlyinheritedby the above} said three brothers, the patta of most^{of the abovelands inciuding} the suit scheduled land originally stood in the^{name of late Babburi} Narsimha being the elder brother in the family. It^{was also} stated that long back the said three brothers got divided the above mentioned agriculture lands and in the said partition the suit schedule land had fallen to the share of the father of the plaintiffs by name late Babburi Narayana along with other lands and the said three brothers had been in possession and enjoyment of their respective shares. During the year 1979-1980, the Tahsildar, '. I{ayathnagar issued three separate Rythuwari pass books to the said three brothers in which the partition among the said three brothers had been reflected and that the suit scheduled property had been clearly shown in the name of the father of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the suit scheduled property stood in the name of the father of the plaintiffs and after his death in the year 2000, the mutation was effected in the name of the plaintiffs in respect of the share of the land held by late Narayana inciuding the suit schedule property and accordingly, vide proceedings No.B/719 /2000, dated 25.08.2000, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Hayathnagar, granted successton ln respect of the lands held by the father of the piaintiffs including the

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suit scheduled property in the name of the plaintiffs. Thereafter the names of the plaintiffs are being incorpor.ated as pattadars and possessors in the revenue records and they are in possession and enjoyment of the suit scheduled property as absolute owners and possessors and that the Revenue Department also issued pattadar pass books and title deeds in the name of the plaintiffs and they are stili in force. It was also stated that after the death of another brother Narasimha, his family members effected registered partition deed No.6713 /92, dated 1,1,.06.1992 and in the said document it has been clearly mentioned that they have effected partition only in respect of share of land which Narsimha got in partition with his brothers. After the death of another brother Venkatesh, his sons got inherited his share. It was further stated that while things stood thus, the defendants, wilh nmla fide intention initiated proceedings in file No.A2/1514/2003 on the file of the then Revenue Divisional officer, East Division, claiming exclusive right over the lands which was fallen to the share of late B.Narayana and inherited by the plaintiffs from him and sought for cancellation of ROR effectedⁱⁿ the year 2000 in favour of the plaintiffs and^{also cancellation of} pattadar pass books and title deeds. Basing on^{the said application,} the R.D.O., vide orders dated 26.04.2004 set aslde^{the RORwhich} was effected in the year 2000 in favour of the plaintiffs.^Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs preferred appeal^{vide No.DS/2a93/2004} before the Joint Collector and obtained interim stay. Thereafter, the

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Joint^{Collector,by order dated06.12.2005, directed the plaintiffs to} approach the Civil Court for adjudication.^{Chalienging the same,} the plaintiffs filed W.P.No.7710 ol^{2006 before this Court and this} Court, while granting stay, directed^{the defendantsto aPProachthe} civil Court for seeking correction of^{patta, which was granted in} favour of the plaintiffs, but the defendants did^not approach^{the civil} Court. Thereafter, this Court, by order dated^16.1"1.2006, disposed of the said Writ petition No.7710 of 2006 by rernanding the matter to Joint^{Collector for freshdisposal.As per the directions of the High} Coult, the Joint Collector, by order dated 29.09.2007, set aside the order passed by the R.D.O. in File No.A2/1514/2003 by giving liberty to the defendants to approach the R.D.O. for fresh disposal of the case,, but without approaching the R.D.O., the defendants filed W.P.No.28357 /2007 beforc this Court and this Court granted slalus qtto as to the enkies in Revenue Records in respect of the lands including the suit scheduled prope*y. By the time of passing the order in the said writ petition, the Revenue Department already issued pattadar pass books and title deeds in favour of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs are continued to be in possession and enjoyment of the suit scheduled property by cultivating the land with the help of bore well. While things stood thus, on 27.08.201.3, the defendants came to the suit scheduled property and tried to disturb the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs and when the plaintiffs reported the same to the police, they advised the plaintiffs to approach the civil

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Court as the matter is civil in nature. Therefore, having no other option, the plaintiffs filed suit for perpetual injunction.

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The said suit was contested by the defendants by filing written statement. It was contended that the land to an extent of Ac.7.30 guntas in Sy.No.S/AA and Ac.4.28 guntas in Sy.No.13lAA situated at Inamguda village, Hayathnagar Mandal were acquired by B.Narsimha, who is none other than the husband of the 1.t defendant and father of the 2nd defendant, about 50 years ago from its previous pattedar and the name of said B.Narasimha was entered in Khasra Pahani in the year 1954-1955. During his life time, the saic.l Narasimha cultivated the suit land and the plaintiffs, who are the legal heirs of the brother of B.Narsimha, colluded with the revenue officials, removed the name of B.Narsimha in the columns of possessor and pattedar of the village pahani patrikas against the suit lands from 1994-1995 onwards and managed to enter the names of Babburi Narayana and others as pattedars and possessors of the suit lands with a mala fide intention. It is further contended^{that after} coming to know of the said illegai activities,^{the defendantsfiledan} application before the Mandal Revenue^{Officerfor correction, but} they did not initiate any action and^{thereafterthe defendants} approached the District Collector, for redressal.^{Basing on the} directions of the District Collector,^{the M.R.O.,Hayathnagar,} submitted his remarks stating that^{to an extent of Ac.7.30guntasin} Sy.No.S/AA and Ac.4.28 guntas in Sy,No.13lAA,^{stands in the}

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name of B.Narasimha ttll 1,994-1'995^{and thereafter the nameof} Narasimha was removed^{and the name of one Ravinderwas entered} in Sy.No.S/AA to an extent of^{Ac.0.3.35guntasand the nameof} B.Narayana was entered in Sy.No.13/AA^{to an extent of Ac.4.28} guntas without any basis. It is further^{contended that the revenue} authorities have not followed the procedure while removing the name of Narasimha as per Section 26 of the A.P. Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act,t971. amended by Act, 1989. It is contended that the claim of the plaintiffs is based on fictitious and fabricated document by getting their names mutated in revenue recolds. Hence, the defendants sought for dismissal of the suit

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On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues:-

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1 Whether the plaintiffs are in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit scheduled property as on the date of filing of the suit?

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Whether the plaintiffs are entitied for the perpetual injunction against the defendants restraining them from peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit scheduled property of the plaintiffs?

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3 If so, to what relief.

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During trial, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.Al to A20 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 was examined and Exs.B1 to B15 were marked.

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The trial Court, on careful consideration of the rival contentions and also the entire material available on record, decreed the suit and directed the defendants not to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of tlle suit schedulecl property of the plaintiffs in any manner. Against the said judgrnent ancl clecree, the defendants carried the matter in appeal and the lower appellate Court, by its judgment dated 28.02.2017, allon,ed the aprpeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs

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At the stage of admission, with the consent of both the learned counsel for the appellants and the respondents heard the matter finally, as the second appeal is pending for admission since 2017.

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Learned Counsel for the appellants/ plaintiffs would submit that the trial Court has considered all the material asPects^{and held} that the suit scheduled property is not^{the personalpropertyof} Narasimha and it was the^joint family^{propertyof all the three} brothers and there was a^{partitionamong the three brothers andthe} same was incorporated in the^{revenuerecords.He also submits} that the suit is for injunction and^not for^{declarationof title. He} further submits that in paragraph^{No.26 of the judgment, the lower} Appellate Court has considered the^{effect of Ex.A9/registered} partition deed of the legal heirs of Narasimha^{and discardedthe said}

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document only on the^{groundthat the shares of Narayanaand} Venkatesham have^{not been mentioned in Ex.A9. In fact,Ex'A9 is} the registered partition deed only^{amongthe legal heirs of iate} Narasimha and the same was executed Pursuant^{to the suit filedfor} partition by Ratna Bai in respect of the share of^Narasimhaand therefore, oniy the share of Narasimha^is being^{mentionedtherein,} but, however, at page No.2 of the said document, the defendants admitted that when partition was effected among the three brothers, the scheduled property under Ex.A9 had fallen to the share of late Narasimha and accordingly, the legal heirs of Narasimha effected partition only in respect of the share of Narasimha. The plaintiffs also got marked Ex.A-28/copy of the plaint in O.S.No.368 of 1991, filed by Babburi Ratna Bai against the defendants, in which also there was a mention about the partition amongst the three brothers and that the said suit was the basis for execution of Ex.A9/registered partition deed, but the lower Appellate Court did not assign any proper and cogent reason to discard Ex.A-9 read with Ex.A28 while reversing the well-reasoned judgment passed by the trial Court. He further submits that after considering the documents filed by both the plaintiffs and defendants, the trial Court recorded a categorical finding that the defendants though pleaded that the suit properties are personal properties of late Narasimha, but they did not 1et in any documentary evidence or oral evidence in proof of exclusive ownership of Narsimha over the suit

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properties. However, the lower Appellate Court in paragraph No.17 of the judgment recorded a finding to the effect that though the suit scheduled properties are the joint family properties, the plaintiffs have failed to prove the partition among the three brothers and as such the plaintiffs are not entitled for injunction against the defendants, who are also having share in the joint family property. He further submits that it is not the case of the defendants that the suit properties are the joint family properties, but their case is that the suit properties are personal properties of late Narasimha and that they did not file any document to show that Narasimha is the exclusive owner of the suit properties. He further submits that insofar as partition among the three brothers is concerned, the plaintiffs have let in the documentary evidence as well as the own documents of the defendants, which would clearly go to show that the partition was held and it was incorporated in the revenue records and the same was acted upon. He further submits^{that the} trial Court has considered a1l the revenue^records from^{the year} 'L954-55 on wards and came to the conclusion that in the partition held between the three brothers,^{the suit properties have fallen to} the share of the plaintiffs. He^{further submits that the appellate} Court has not properly framed^{the point for considerationin the} appeal in terms of Order^{41 Rule 31 C.P'C.In suPPortof the said} contentions, he relied upon^{the followingcitations.}

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1, Morampudi Pitchaiah a. Aaalapati^{Ramchandra Raoand} othersl

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C.Bommul Reddy^{(died)and others u. C.R.BontmulRecldy and} others2

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Diganrbar Adhar Patil^{o. DearamGirdhar Patil (Died)3}

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4, M.Vidyasagar Reddy and^{otherstt. M.Padmamma and othersa}

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Subraya M.N. a. Vittala M.N.^{anil otherss}

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Ajambi^(Dead) by L.R. a. Roshanbi and others'

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Krrthuru Narasimha Reddy o, Pusala Venkataiah anil othersT

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Kolan Balzpanth Reddy a. Reddy langa Reddys

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lruoanti Gopinatha Rao^(died) and others o. Vaillapudi Narayana and otherse

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Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondents/ defendants would submit that the judgment of the trial Court is based on erroneous assumptions ancl presumptions, misinterpretation of oral and documentary evidence and as such, the respondents preferred A.S.No.199 of. 201,6 before the lower appellate Court. On proper re-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the lower Appeliate Court allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. While allowing the appeal, the lower Appellate Court held that the suit scheduled property was not the ancestral property of the three brothers and it was a separate property of late Babburi Narsimha and that Ex.A9 cannot be construed as reference to the partition of the suit scheduled property

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I (2011) 4 ALD 373

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2 (1989) 3 ALT 365 (D.8.) l AIR 1995 Supreme Coun I 728 (20 r6) 4 ALD 775 (DB)

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5 (20r6) 8 SCC 70s (20r6) 3 HLR 635 (S.C.)

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1 (201r) 4 ALD 567

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8 (201r) 6 ALD t05 (r997) 4 ALD 258

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by giving valid and cogent reasons. He further submits that a perusal of ground Nos.2 to 13 of the memorandum of grounds of appeal would show that they are only with regard to the factual aspects, but no substantial question of law is involved. However, in a Second Appeal under Section 100 C.P.C., only substantial question of law can be adjudicated. He also submits that it is a settled principle of law that it ts a sine qua non {or grant of injunction, the plaintiffs have to establish their possession and enjoyment over the suit scheduled property as on the date of filing of the suit, but the trial Court did not consider the said vital aspect and purely on the basis of Ex.A-9/partition deed and Ex.B-6 to B-9 held that the piaintiffs are the absolute owners and possessors of the suit scheduled property and also erred in holding that the plaintiffs are in possession without there being any documentary proof. There is no genuine documentary evidence placed by the plaintiffs to show their possession over the suit scheduled proPerty as on the date^of filing of the suit. Admittedly, the revenue Proceedings^wel'e pending for considerable time before the competent^{authoritiesand} ultimately this Court has granted status^{quo in the Writ Petitionand} the same is still subsisting.^{Hence, the trial Court has decreed the} suit erroneously relying on^{disputed entries. He furthersubmits} that the lower appellate Court on^{re-aPPreciationof oral and} documentary evidence-has given^{a categorical finding that Ex.A-9is} only internal partition deed of the^{respondents/defendants and by}

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the said document, it^{cannot be established that the suit scheduled} properry is an ancestral property.^{He further submitsthat the trial} Court ought to have seen^{that the suit is filed for injunction} simplicitor but not a^{partition or declaration and as such oughtnot} to have declared it as ancestral Property.^{The lowerappellateCourt} on re-appreciation of evidence^{both oral and documentary,held that} the plaintiffs and their supporting witnesses have not placed^any materiai to show that the plaintiffs could be abie to establish their possession over the suit scheduled property as on the date of filing of the suit and in the absence of the same, the trial Court erred in decreeing the suit by granting perpetual injunction and further erred in declaring the title of the plaintiffs. Therefore, there is no error committed by the lower appellate Court in setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and there is no substantial question of law involved in the present second appeal, warranting interference by this Court. In support of his contention, he cited the following decisions:-

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Bachan o. Kankarlo

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Vishua Vijay Bharti o. Fakhrul Hasanll

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3, Gooindaraju o, Mariammanl2

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Lal Chand^(D) a. larnail Singh (D)ls

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Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to refer to

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Section 100 of C.P.C., which reads as under:

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'oAIRt9?2sc2t5?

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'r^{AIR 1976sc1485}

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'2^{aln2oo5 sc too8} r3 ArR 2oo7 (Noc) 1755 (urR)

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"1.00. Second appeal.-(l) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other 1aw for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.

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(2) An appeal may lie under: this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.

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(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.

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(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shal1 forrnulate that question.

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(5) The appeai shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:

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Provided that nothing in this sub-section shali be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question."

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Though Section 100 C.P.C deals with the High Court's jurisdiction in second appeal, it has the effect of declaring that the first appellate court is the final court on facts and the High Court ir-r

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a second appeal cannot^{re-appreciateevidence or facts unless the} case involves a substantial^{questionof law.}

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In Dudh Nath Paniley v. Suresh Chandra Bhattasalila^the Supreme Coult held that the High Court^cannot set^{asidefindingsof} fact of the first appellate court and come to a different conclusion^on reappraisal of evidence while exercising^jurisdiction under Section 1()O C,P,C.

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Admittedly the suit was filed for injunction simplicitor. In a suit for injunction, the possession as on the date of suit is the prime consideration besides proof of attempt to interfere or infringe the legal right of plaintiffs. The burden is always on the plaintiffs to prove their settled possession and attempt to infringe or invade their iegal right and they cannot be allowed to take advantage of defects in the defendants' case for claiming an equitable reiief of permanent injunction under the provisions of Specific Relief Act. However, the trial Court did not consider this vital aspect and purely on the basis of Ex.A9/Partition Deed and Exs.B6 to 89 held that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners and possessors of the suit scheduled property There is no documentary evidence produced by the plaintiffs to establish their possession over the suit scheduled property as on the date of filing of the suit.

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A perusal of the evidence of P.W.1 would show that he has admitted in his cross-examination that they filed a Writ petition '' l^{teao; 3 scc :oo}

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No.7710 of 2006 against the orders of the Joint Collector and this Court by order dated 16.11.2006 remanded the matter to the Joint Collector for de norso enquiry and irr turn the Joint Collector remanded the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer. He also admitted that a Writ Petition No.28357 of 2007 was filed bv defendant Nos.1 and 2 challenging the orders in D5/677a/2006 dated 29.09.2007 and the same is sti1l pending before this Court and this Court issued slafus quo order with regard to the entries in the revenue records. However, the trial Court granted decree on erroneous view relying on disputed entries. The appellate Court on re-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, has given a finding that Ex.A.9 is only an internal partition deed of the defendants and by the said document, it cannot be established that the suit scheduled property is an ancestral property

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It is the contention of the defendants that the change of their father's name in Ex.B14/pahani for the year 1994-95^{was made} illegatly and as such the pattedar pass book and^{title deeds werenot} issued in the name of the father of the^{plaintiffs and thatthe} defendants have already filed^{an appealunder Section 5 (5) of the} A.P. Rights in Land and Pattedar^{Pass BooksAct, 1971, as required} under law in the year 2003 itself^{and the plaintiffs failed to prove} the alleged partition and their^{possessionand enioymentover the} scheduled property. Further, in the^{plaint, the plaintiffshave} pleaded that they are personally cultivating^{the suit land by digging}

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a bore well and taking eleckicity^{connection from the Central Power} Distributors Company Limited to draw^{water to the crops, but} surprisingly in their own document i.e., Ex.A1-pahani for^{the year} 2013, shows that no cultivation was there in the suit scheduled property as on the date of the alieged cause of action. Though the plaintiffs contended that they dug a bore well and obtained electricity connection, no scrap of paper is filed to show that they dug the bore well and draw rvater to the crops. Further, the plaintiffs though pleaded that the defendants, along with their antisocial elements came to the suit scheduled property at about 6.30 P.M, and tried to disturb their possession, P.W.1 in his evidence stated that he does not remember about the place of his presence on 27.08.20'13. Thus, the presence of P.W.1 on the date of alleged cause ' of action is doubtful. The trial Court failed to properly appreciate the facts and evidence.

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On an overall consideration of the entire material available on record, it is abundantlv clear that the plaintiffs did rrot approach the Court with clean hands and suppressed several facts and they are disentitled to claim equitable and discretionary relief under Section 38 of Specific Relief Act. Apart from that, they failed to establish the cause of action, i.e. tried to disturb the possession and enjoyment of land, which is the basic requirement under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act to grant a permanent injunction in favour of the ptaintiffs. Therefore, the appellate Court has rightly concluded that the

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plaintiffs failed to prove their lawful possession and enioyment of property, as on the date of filing the suit and that the judgment of the appellate Court in reversing the judgment of the trial Court is sustainable both in facts and in law.

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Further the decision of the first appellate Court is final insofar as finding of fact is concerned. This Court can only interfere, if the said finding is perverse or contrary to the evidence on record or based on no evidence. In the instant case, the first appellate Court gave convincing reasons for it's decision while reversing the judgment of the tlial Court. Since the decision rendered by the first appellate Court is based on evidence, it cannot be saicl to be perverse,, requiring interference by this Court in this second appeal. No substantiai question of law is invoived for consideration by this Court, for entertaining the second appeal.

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For the aforesaid reasons, the second appeal fails and the same is liable to be dismissed.

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Accordingly, the Second Appeal is dismissed at^{the admission} stage. There sha1l be no order as to costs.

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Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending, shall^{stand closed.}

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