Allowed

G.Anjaneyulu v. K.Veera Narayana and Anther

Telangana HC8 Oct 2010SA/71/1999

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In a suit for permanent injunction regarding land title disputes, the High Court allowed the second appeal. The Court held that the settlement deed was nominal, the plaintiff failed to prove possession, and a vendor cannot cancel a registered sale deed via a cancellation deed. The trial court decree was restored.

What did the court decide?

The Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the trial Court are restored. The First Defendant shall be restored possession of the property.

G.Anjaneyulu Vs K.Veera Narayana and Anther — Property and Title | Telangana HC (2010)

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.CHANDRA KUMAR

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SECOND APPEAL No.71 of 1999

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Dated: 0 8 th October, 2010

Between:-

…Appellant

AND

…Respondent

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.CHANDRA KUMAR SECOND APPEAL No.71 of 1999

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JUDGMENT:-

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In this Second Appeal, the appellant challenges the judgment dated 27.08.1998 passed in A.S.No.8 of 1995 by Senior Civil Judge, Addanki (‘lower appellate Court’, for brevity) whereby and whereunder, the judgment and decree dated 31.03.1995 passed in O.S.No.126 of 1984 by the Additional District Munisif, Addanki (‘trial Court’, for brevity) was set aside.

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2. The appellant herein is the first defendant and the first respondent herein is the plaintiff in original suit, i.e., O.S.No.126 of 1984 on the file of Additional District Munisif (Junior Civil Judge), Addanki. Since the first respondent died, he is being represented by his Legal Representatives i.e. R-3 to R-5. The plaintiff filed a suit against defendants 1 and 2, seeking permanent injunction. The said suit was dismissed by the judgment dated 31.03.1995. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff preferred an appeal in A.S.No.8 of 1995 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Addanki. Learned Senior Civil Judge, by judgment dated 27.08.1998, allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Aggrieved by the

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same, the first defendant in the Original Suit filed this Second Appeal. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be arrayed as they were arrayed before the trial Court.

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3. The facts of the case, in brief, are as follows:-

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The subject matter of the appeal is the land admeasuring Acs.0.60 cents in Survey No.420/2 situated at Kotapadu village, Prakasam District (‘suit schedule property’, for brevity). The suit schedule property originally belongs to one Ravipati Ramamma. Ravipati Ramamma got this property by virtue of a Will executed by her father – G.Adiseshu under Ex.B.5 dated 05.02.1934. Ravipati Ramamma and her husband Veeraiah had no issues. Ravipati Ramamma and her husband had adopted one Ravipati Keshavulu. There were disputes between Ravipati Ramamma and her adopted son Ravipati Keshavulu. Bathina Ramaseethamma (hereinafter referred to as ‘Ramaseethamma’) (P.W.9) is the daughter of step mother of Ravipati Ramamma. Ravipati Ramamma executed a registered Settlement Deed on 16.03.1950 under Ex.A.1 in favour of Ramaseethamma settling several properties i.e. about 26 items including the suit schedule property. The plaintiff is the purchaser of suit schedule property from Ramaseethamma. The plaintiff’s case is that since execution of Ex.A.1, Ramaseethamma had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property till she sold it to him. The plaintiff’s further case is that he purchased Acs.0.30 cents of land under registered sale deed dated 01.09.1983 from the sons of Ramaseethamma

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and remaining Acs.0.30 cents of land by another registered sale deed dated 09.12.1983 from Ramaseethamma and her sons and that Ramaseethamma ratified the sale deed dated 01.09.1983 executed by her sons in favour of the plaintiff by executing a ratification deed on 09.12.1983.

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4. The defendants’ case is that the suit schedule property originally belongs to Ravipati Ramamma and that she and her husband Veeraiah had adopted one Ravipati Keshavulu and that said Keshavulu filed a suit in O.S.No.60 of 1961 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Ongole, against Ravipati Ramamma, Ramaseethamma and Goruntla Veeraraghavaiah seeking partition of several properties including the suit schedule property and that the said suit ended in compromise and as per the compromise recorded by the Court on 21.11.1968, the suit schedule property was allotted to Ravipati Ramamma and accordingly, the said suit was decreed. It is also the case of the first defendant is that he had purchased the suit schedule property from Ravipati Ramamma under registered sale deed under Ex.B.1 for a valuable consideration on 30.06.1971 and that since then he has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. It is also the case of first defendant that Ex.A.1 – Settlement Deed executed in favour of Ramaseethamma was nominal and it was never acted upon.

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5. The further case of the plaintiff is that Ravipati Ramamma had no right to alienate the suit schedule property in favour of the first defendant and that she had

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already lost her title and possession over the suit schedule property by virtue of the registered Settlement Deed executed by her in favour of Ramaseethamma and that the first defendant had fraudulently obtained the sale deed from Ravipati Ramamma in the year 1971.

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6. The defendants further case is that after purchasing the suit schedule property from Ravipati Ramamma in the year 1971, he filed a declaration under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, and that he had also mortgaged the suit schedule property with some other property along with Andhra Bank, Addanki and obtained loan and that the bank issued legal notices to him. It is also his case that the original sale deed has been deposited in the bank and, therefore, he filed the certified copy of the sale deed dated 30.06.1971. It is also his case that Ravipati Ramamma and Ramaseethamma jointly and individually executed several documents on 30.06.1971 in favour of the first defendant and others.

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7. It is the case of the plaintiff that the second defendant aided the first defendant in obtaining the sale deed from Ravipati Ramamma. It is also alleged by the plaintiff that both the defendants were trying to dispossess him from the suit schedule property. It is also alleged that both the defendants destroyed the field channel through which, the suit schedule property received water. All these allegations have been denied by the first defendant in his written statement.

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8. The second defendant filed a written statement and denied the allegations that he aided the first defendant in obtaining the sale deed from Ravipati Ramamma. He has also denied the allegation that he along with the first defendant destroyed the field channel through which the suit schedule property received water. The second defendant’s further case is that he has purchased the land situated to the west of the suit schedule property, which originally belongs to one Guntupalli Swamulu and that one Kallem Venkayamma purchased the said land from said Swamulu and that from Kallem Venkayamma, he purchased the said land under registered sale deed dated 16.11.1984 and that his vendor had shown the eastern boundary, in the said sale deed as the land of the first defendant.

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9. On behalf of the plaintiffs, the plaintiff himself was examined as P.W.1 and second defendant was examined as P.W.2 and other witnesses on his behalf were examined as P.Ws.3 to 10 and Exs.A.1 to A.12 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, the first defendant was examined as D.W.1 and Exs.B.1 to B.14 were marked.

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10. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed necessary issues. The trial Court, relying on Ex.B.7 - Certified copy of the Compromise Petition in O.S.No.60 of 1961, came to the conclusion that the suit schedule property, which is item No.6 in the said Compromise Petition, was allotted to Ravipati Ramamma as per the said Compromise Deed and, therefore, whatever

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rights that were conferred under Ex.A.1 – Settlement Deed in favour of Ramaseethamma stood ceased by subsequent Compromise Decree in between the settler and the settlee. It was also opined that Ex.A.1 – Settlement Deed in favour of Ramaseethamma was not acted upon insofar as the suit schedule property is concerned. It was also opined that Ravipati Ramamma, along with Ramaseethamma, executed Exs.B.1 to B.4 and if at all Ravipati Ramamma had no subsisting title, there was no necessity for her to take part in alienating the properties under Exs.B.1 to B.4. It was also held that since Ex.B.14 – Registered Sale deed executed by Ravipati Ramamma in favour the first defendant was also executed on the same day i.e. on 30.06.1971, it shows that Ramaseethamma had every knowledge about execution of Ex.B.14 by Ravipati Ramamma and that neither Ravipati Ramamma nor Ramaseethamma ever challenged or disputed Ex.B.14. It was also held that the defendant was in possession of the suit schedule property and that he raised loans from banks. Holding so, the trial Court dismissed the suit

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11. On appeal by the plaintiff in the original suit, the lower appellate Court, however, did not agree with the findings of the trial Court and on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. The lower appellate Court observed that from the recitals of Ex.A.1, it is clear that Ravipati Ramamma settled suit schedule property along with other properties on Ramaseethamma and that there is a clear recital in Ex.B.7 that the plaintiff in

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O.S.No.60 of 1961, Ravipati Keshavulu, has no right to question Ex.A.1 and thereby title of Ramaseethamma is unquestionable and Exs.A.2 and A.3 proves that the plaintiff purchased the suit schedule property and the oral evidence and recitals of Exs.A.7, A.8 and A.9 proves the possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property. Aggrieved by the same, the first defendant in the original suit filed this appeal.

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12. Sri T.Rajendra Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant/first defendant submitted that admittedly, the suit schedule property originally belongs to Ravipati Ramamma and that as there were some disputes between Ravipati Ramamma and her adopted son Ravipati Keshavulu, she had executed Ex.A.1 – nominal Settlement Deed in favour of Ramaseethamma on 16.03.1950 and it was never acted upon. It is also his submission that the adopted son of Ravipati Ramamma – Ravipati Keshavulu filed a suit in O.S.No.60 of 1961 and that the said suit ended in compromise in the year 1968 and as per the terms of compromise, the suit schedule property was allotted to Ravipati Ramamma. It is also his submission that Ravipati Ramamma sold the suit schedule property to the first defendant and on the same day, Ravipati Ramamma and Ramaseethamma executed registered sale deeds under Exs.B.1 to B.4 and sold several properties covered under Ex.A.1 and these circumstances show that Ex.A.1 – Settlement Deed in favour of Ramaseethamma was nominal and it was never acted upon. It is also his submission that the first defendant purchased the suit

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schedule property on 30.06.1971 and since then, he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same and that Ramaseethamma had no right to sell the suit schedule property to the plaintiff and that Ravipati Ramamma had also no right to execute Ex.A.5 –Registered Cancellation Deed dated 09.12.1983, that too, after a period of twelve years after selling the suit schedule property to the first defendant. It is also his submission that a registered sale deed cannot be cancelled by executing a cancellation deed. He had relied on the decision of this Court in case between Property Association of Baptist Churches, Kavali, Nellore, Regional Office, Preston Institute, Jangaon, Warangal District Vs. Sub-Registrar, Jangoan, Warangal District and others^[1] . It is also his submission that Ramaseethamma had also signed on the Compromise Petition in O.S.No.60 of 1961, and, therefore, she is bound by the terms of the compromise and that she had no right to sell the suit schedule property to the plaintiff. It is also his submission that as far as the possession of the suit schedule property is concerned, Ex.A.8 – Certified copy of Adangal for the year 1981 – 83 shows that first defendant was in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit. It is vehemently argued that if at all the facts and circumstances are taken into consideration, the only conclusion that can be reached is that, the first defendant was in possession of the suit schedule property and that he was illegally dispossessed after filing of the suit. It is also his submission that the plaintiff ought to have examined Ravipati Ramamma who is a crucial witness and for non-examination of Ravipati Ramamma, an adverse

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inference has to be drawn against the plaintiff. In support of this contention, he had relied upon the judgment between Pisipati Punnakotiah (died) and others Vs. Kallapalli Kolikamba and others^[2] . It is also his submission that the plaintiff had filed a suit for mere injunction and when there is serious dispute with regard to the title, the plaintiff ought to have amended the suit seeking the relief of declaration of title.

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13. Per contra, Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent / plaintiff submitted that admittedly, Ravipati Ramamma is the original owner of the suit schedule property and that she had settled the property in favour of Ramaseethamma and once the property is settled in favour of Ramaseethamma, Ravipati Ramamma looses her title and she will not have any subsisting title to alienate the said property at a subsequent stage. It is also his submission that even as per the compromise entered into between the parties in O.S.No.60 of 1961, the suit schedule property had been allotted to Ravipati Ramamma and that she also executed a deed canceling the sale deed executed in favour of the first defendant. It is also argued that though the first defendant claims that he purchased the property in the year 1971, he has not filed a scratch of paper to show that he was in possession of the property from 1971 to 1983. It is also his submission that the plaintiff purchased the property from Ramaseethamma and by virtue of his sale deeds, he continues to be in possession. It is also his submission that the plaintiff, in support of his contention, examined P.Ws.1 to 9, i.e., all the neighboring land owners

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and that on behalf of the defendants, except the first defendant, no other witness has been examined. It is also his submission that stray entry of possession in Ex.A.8 – Certified copy of Adangal for the year 1981 – 1983 does not prove the possession of the first defendant. It is also his submission that presumption may be drawn both backward and forward depending upon the nature of the things and surrounding circumstances as per illustration ‘D’ of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Reliance is placed on the judgment in case between Ambika Prasad Thakur Vs. Ram Ekbal Rai (died )^[3] . Relying on the judgment in case between Ammanamanchi Venkateswarlu Vs. Thummuri Ganga Raju^[4] , it is submitted that mere land revenue receipts do not show the possession of the first defendant. It is also his submission that admittedly, Ravipati Ramamma executed a Settlement Deed in Ex.A.1 in the year 1950 and after execution of the same, the settler cannot subsequently alienate the same property in favour of others. In support of this contention, learned counsel has relied on the judgment in case between Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam Vs. Alapati Hymavath i^[5] .

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14. In reply, learned counsel for the appellant / first defendant submitted that by executing Ex.A.5 – Cancellation Deed by Ravipati Ramamma, it becomes an admitted case that she executed Ex.B.1 – registered sale deed in favour of the defendant in the year 1971 and from the date of execution of the sale deed in favour of the first defendant till the date of its cancellation, the period is more

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than twelve years and this itself shows that the first defendant had perfectly strayed by way of adverse possession.

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15. As seen from the grounds of appeal, the substantial questions of law that arise for consideration in this appeal are as follows:

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1. Whether the lower appellate Court is right in relying on Ex.A1 settlement deed which was never acted upon by the parties thereto and in view of the compromise decree in O.S. No.60/61 on the file of the Sub-Court, Ongole;

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2. Whether a registered sale deed can be cancelled by the vendor by executing a cancellation deed without notice and knowledge of the vendee of the said sale deed;

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3. Whether the Court below is right in deciding the possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property without considering the possession of the appellant in view of Ex.B14 registered sale deed dated 30.06.1971, admittedly executed by Smt. Ramamma in favour of the appellant;

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4. Whether the finding of the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by placing reliance on Ex.A9 to A12 which are the documents came into existence subsequent to the suit and in the absence of specific pleading by the plaintiff that he was put in possession of the property on such and such date is not perverse; and

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5. Whether the judgment of the lower appellate Court has legs to stand in the absence of deciding the adverse possession pleaded by the appellant.

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16. I have considered the above rival contentions. It has to be seen that this is an appeal filed against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court by which the judgment of the lower Court was reversed. Thus, this is an appeal against the reversal judgment. So, the findings of both the Courts blow are not concurrent in this case. The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. Even if the findings of the Courts below are concurrent, but where they have ignored the material evidence or had drawn wrong inference from the proved facts or wrongly cast the burden of proof on any party, then in those circumstances the High Court can interfere even at the stage of second appeal. As discussed above the Courts have to read the entire evidence before drawing any conclusions.

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17. It is the bounden duty of the Courts to meticulously read the entire evidence on record. Unless the Judge reads the entire evidence, he may not be in a position to draw correct conclusions. Thus, the conclusions of a Court must be based on critical analysis of the evidence and on sound reasoning. The circumstances under which a document was executed, the intention of the parties and the subsequent events have to be taken into consideration to decide whether it is a nominal document and acted upon or not.

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18. It appears from a close reading of the entire material on record that the trial Court has properly

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appreciated the evidence on record. It should be never forgotten that the trial Court Judge will have an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties and the witnesses examined before it. Therefore, a superior Court should be slow in disturbing the findings of the trial Court. Unless and until it appears that the appreciation of the evidence is not proper and the findings are not based on evidence, the appellate Court will not be justified in substituting its own conclusions in the place of the conclusions already reached by the trial Court.

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POINT No.1:-

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19. Coming to the facts of the case on hand, it is not in dispute that Ravipati Ramamma executed Ex.A.1 – registered Settlement Deed dated 16.03.1950, in favour of Ramaseethamma settling several properties, i.e., 26 items on her. Admittedly, Ravipati Ramamma and her husband had no issues. It is also not in dispute that they had adopted Ravipati Keshavulu and subsequently, disputes arose between Ravipati Ramamma and Ravipati Keshavulu.

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20. The circumstances under which Ex.A.1 was executed should be taken into consideration. Admittedly, Ravipati Keshavulu, the adopted son of Ravipati Ramamma, was claiming right over several properties including the suit schedule property and as such there were disputes between them. Certain crucial admissions appear to be not taken into consideration by the lower appellate Court. The important witness examined in this case is

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Ramaseethamma (P.W.9). She had categorically admitted that in view of the disputes between Ravipati Keshavulu and Ravipati Ramamma in O.S.No.60 of 1961, Ravipati Ramamma executed Ex.A.1 – Settlement Deed dated 16.03.1950 in her favour. As referred above, 26 items were settled on Ramaseethamma. These circumstances and particularly admission of PW.9 itself gives an impression that Ex.A1 was executed in order to defeat the claim of Ravipati Kesavulu.

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21. Now it has to be seen whether Ramaseethamma exercised her right after execution of Ex.A1. Admittedly, Ravipati Ramamma executed the sale deed i.e., original of Ex.B.14 and sold the suit schedule property to the first defendant on 30.06.1971. This circumstance itself shows that Ravipati Ramamma had exercised her rights over the suit schedule property to the knowledge of one and all and the evidence on record shows that even to the knowledge of Ramaseethamma. There is nothing on record to show that Ravipati Ramamma ever challenged the sale deed executed in favour of the first defendant at any time till she executed the cancellation deed under Ex.A5 on 09.12.1983. The plaintiff ought to have filed any document to show that Ramaseethamma in fact enjoyed the suit schedule property from 16.03.1951 i.e. from the date of Ex.A.1 till he purchased the suit schedule property from her in 1983. Admittedly, no documents have been filed by the plaintiff to show that Ramaseethamma enjoyed the suit schedule land at any time or at least from the year 1951 to 1971. Even Ex.A7 the 10(1) account and

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Ex.A8 the certified copy of Adangal, though show the name of Ramaseethamma, do not show her exclusive possession over the suit schedule property rather the recitals of those documents reveal that Ravipati Ramamma’s name was continued as owner of the land in the revenue records. Now it has to be seen that admittedly Ravipati Ramamma and Ramaseethamma had jointly executed several sale deeds in Exs.B1 to B4 selling several items covered by Ex.A1. Ex.B.1 – Sale deed executed by Ravipati Ramamma and Ramaseethamma in favour of Guntupalli Swamulu on 30.06.1971. On the same day they had jointly executed Ex.B.2 and B3. Ex.B2 is the sale deed executed in favour of Guntupalli Sree Ramulu and Ex.B.3 is the registered sale deed executed in favour of Rachagiri Venkateshwarlu and also Ex.B.4 is the registered Sale deed executed by Ramaseethamma in favour of Gaddam Rama Bapaiah. Thus, it is clear that except Ex.B.4, the other documents i.e. Exs.B.1, B.2 and B.3 were jointly executed by Ravipati Ramamma and Ramaseethamma. It has to be seen that on the same day when the original of Ex.B.14 – Sale deed was executed by Ravipati Ramamma in favour of the first defendant, Exs.B.1 to B.4 were also executed. A perusal of the recitals of Ex.A1 and Exs.B1 to B3 reveal that certain lands in Sy.Nos.63, 389/2, 354/2 and 360/11, settled on Ramaseethamma under Ex.A1, were sold by Ravipati Ramamma and Ramaseethamma jointly on 30.06.1971. If at all Ex.A1 was acted upon, there was no necessity for Ravipati Ramamma to execute Exs.B1 to B3 along with Ramaseethamma. The other circumstances are admittedly, the suit schedule property was item No.6 in the ‘B’

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Schedule property in O.S.No.60 of 1961 instituted by Ravipati Keshavulu against Ravipati Ramamma on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Ongole. Thus, the suit schedule property was claimed by Ravipati Keshavulu as one of the items to be partitioned between him and his adoptive mother Ravipati Ramamma. The recitals of the terms of compromise in Ex.B7 entered into between parties in O.S. No.60 of 1961 show that the parties agreed not to challenge Ex.A.1 i.e. settling of the suit schedule land on Ramaseethamma, but however in Para ‘D’, it is mentioned that ‘B’ Schedule property which includes suit schedule property, shall be allotted to Ravipati Ramamma. Thus, the recitals of Ex.B7 are not clear and they create a doubt as to whether the suit schedule property was allotted to Ravipati Ramamma or Ramaseethamma in the compromise entered in O.S.No.60 of 1961. There is another circumstance which suggest that even Ramaseethamma had knowledge about the execution of sale deed in favour of the first defendant on 30.06.1971. Admittedly, Exs.B1 to B.4 and original of Ex.B14 were executed on the same day. The attestor of Exs.B1 to B3 and the original of Exs.B14 is one and the same person. Similarly, the scribe of Exs.B1 and B2 and Ex.B14 is also one and the same person. Ramaseethamma admitted that she was present along with Ravipati Ramamma in the office of the Registrar on 30.06.1971. Thus, it is clear that, in all probabilities, Ramaseethamma had knowledge about the execution of original of Ex.B.14 by Ravipati Ramamma in favour of the first defendant. There is another circumstance against the plaintiff, i.e., P.W.9 – Ramaseethamma herself admitted that the suit schedule

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property was allotted to Ravipati Ramamma in the compromise in O.S.No.60 of 1961.

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22. In the absence of any document to show that Ramaseethamma ever cultivated the land or paid the land revenue or exercised any right over the property and in view of her categorical admission that in view of the disputes between Ravipati Ramamma and her adopted son Ravipati Keshavulu, Ravipati Ramamma executed Ex.A1, it is clear that Ex.A.1 was never acted upon and it is a nominal document. The purpose of execution of Ex.A.1 appears to be, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant and as observed by the trial Court, to defeat the claim of Ravipati Keshavulu in anticipated litigation. In the above circumstances, for non-examination of Ravipati Ramamma, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant, adverse inference has to be drawn against the plaintiff. Reliance is placed on the decision in Pisipati Punnakotaiah (died) and others v. Kallapalli Kolikamba and others (2 supra)

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23. The plaintiff’s case is that he purchased Acs.0.30 cents of land from the sons of Ramaseethamma on 01.09.1983. Now it has to be seen whether the plaintiff is an innocent purchaser without the knowledge about purchase by the first defendant from Ravipati Ramamma in 1971. The evidence on record, particularly the evidence of P.W.9 – Ramaseethamma herself, shows that there were disputes between herself and the first defendant. It is not the case of the plaintiff that he had obtained any

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encumbrance certificate from the office of the Registrar to verify as to whether any sale deeds were executed alienating the suit schedule property before he purchased the suit schedule property. As a prudent purchaser, he ought to have verified the encumbrance register. Had he verified the same, he would have come to know about the sale deed executed by Ravipati Ramamma in favour of the first defendant. The admissions made by the witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff and the recitals of Ex.A.8 themselves go to show that the first defendant was in possession of the property, when the plaintiff purchased he same. Admittedly, the plaintiff had not obtained the sale deed under Ex.A2 from Ramaseethamma and he had obtained the same from the sons of Ramaseethamma. It is not clear as to why he had obtained the sale deed from the sons of Ramaseethamma when Ramaseethamma herself was alive by that date. Of course, he had subsequently obtained rectification deed from Ramaseethamma under Ex.A4 on 09.12.1983 ratifying the sale under Ex.A.2 by her sons and on the same day he had purchased remaining 0.30 cents of land from Ramaseethamma and her children under Ex.A3. Admittedly, on the same day Ravipati Ramamma had executed Ex.A5 cancelling the sale deed executed by her in favour of the first defendant. It is interesting to note that Sanikonda Guravaraju and Gaddam Venkateswarlu are the attestors of Exs.A3 to A5. Similarly, all the documents Exs.A3 to A5 were scribed by one and the same person, namely Dharmavarapu Harigopala Rao. From these circumstances, the only inference that can be drawn is that the plaintiff had knowledge about the

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execution of Ex.A.5 by Ravipati Ramamma. When he had knowledge about execution of Ex.A.5 by Ravipati Ramamma canceling the original of Ex.B.14, it is clear that he had knowledge of purchase of the suit schedule property by the first defendant from Ravipati Ramamma under original of Ex.B.14. Thus, the plaintiff knowingly purchased the suit schedule property from Ramaseethamma and her sons that already Ravipati Ramamma executed a sale deed in favour of the first defendant in 1971 itself.

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24. The reason assigned by Ravipati Ramamma for executing Ex.A5 as seen from the recitals of Ex.A5 is that she had forgotten about the execution of sale deed in favour of the first defendant in 1971. The second reason assigned by her is that she had not received the sale consideration amount under the original of Ex.B14 i.e., the sale deed in favour of the first defendant. Admittedly, the recitals of Ex.B14 go to show that the entire sale consideration amount was paid to Ravipati Ramamma while executing the original of Ex.B14. Admittedly, the plaintiff has not examined Ravipati Ramamma as a witness in this case. Admittedly, there is no evidence in support of the recitals of Ex.A5 that no sale consideration amount was paid to Ravipati Ramamma while executing the original of Ex.B14. In fact, even if there is any evidence, the same cannot be considered in view of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, which envisages that no oral evidence can be allowed to adduce to disprove the recitals of a document. Execution of original of Ex.B.14, i.e., sale deed in favour of the first defendant by Ravipati Ramamma is not

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in dispute. Admitted facts need not be proved. None of the circumstances, as envisaged under Proviso 11 to Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act are neither pleaded nor proved in this case.

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25. A reading of the evidence of witnesses examined by the plaintiff also shows that the first defendant had been disputing with the plaintiff. Thus, the title of the plaintiff was denied by the first defendant even prior to the filing of the suit. Even the plaint averments go to show that the first defendant got executed the registered sale deed from Ravipati Ramamma in the year 1971 and the same was cancelled by her. A reading of the plaint averments further go to show that there was a title dispute between the plaintiff and the first defendant and the validity of the documents executed in favour of Ramaseethamma and the first defendant were in question. Even according to PW.9 Ramaseethamma there were disputes between herself and the first defendant. However, admittedly, Ramaseethamma did not take any steps to challenge the sale deed in favour of the first defendant till the plaintiff purchased property in 1983. Thus, the arguments of learned counsel for the respondent appears have no force. It is illogical to say that though Ravipati Ramamma had right to execute Ex.A.5 cancellation deed in 1983 but she had no right to execute sale deed in favour of the first defendant in 1971 and that she had divested her right in favour of Ramaseethamma under Ex.A.1. Admittedly, she continued to exercise her right in respect of several properties including the suit schedule property. As seen from the recitals of Ex.B.7 – the

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terms of compromise, certain properties covered by Ex.A.1 were allotted to Ravipati Keshavulu and some other properties were allotted to G.Veera Raghavulu, the second defendant in the suit.

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26. Lastly, Sri M.V.S.Suresh Kumar submitted that a settler cannot subsequently bequeath the same property in favour of others and in support of his contention he has relied on a decision reported in Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi (5 supra). It is true that a settler cannot bequeath the same property covered by the earlier settlement in favour of others. The facts of above cited case are not similar to the facts of the present case. More over, as discussed above, once it is held that the settlement deed was nominal and it was never acted upon and the purpose of execution of settlement deed under Ex.A1 was only to defeat the rights of the adopted son of Ravipati Ramamma, it is clear that the principle laid down in the above said decision is not applicable to the facts of this case.

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27. To sum up, the circumstances which show that Ex.A.1 was only a nominal document and never acted upon are (A) the fact that the assertion of right by Ravipati Ramamma by executing the registered sale deed in favour of the first defendant on 30.06.1971 under the original of Ex.B14. (B) There is nothing on record to show that Ramaseethamma had ever cultivated the land paid the land revenue from 1951 to 1971 or till 1983. (C) The admission of Ramaseethamma (PW.9) in her evidence is that the suit

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schedule property was allotted to Ravipati Ramamma under Ex.B.7 in O.S.No.60 of 1961. (D) The fact that though under Ex.A.1 about 26 items were settled on Ramaseethamma, but as per the compromise entered into in O.S. No.60 of 1961 and as seen from the recitals of Ex.B7 certain properties i.e., 0-2 gts., of land in Survey No.401 has been allotted to the plaintiff in O.S. No.60 of 1961 and 0-79 cents in Survey No.122 and 0-40 cents of land in Survey No.131/1 seems to have been allotted to G. Veera Raghavulu the second defendant in the said suit. So, certain properties that were settled on Ramaseethamma under Ex.A.1 were allotted to the plaintiff Kesavulu in O.S. No.60 of 1961 and to other defendants. (E) The other circumstance is that Ravipati Ramamma and Ramaseethamma jointly sold certain lands covered under Ex.A.1; and (F) The fact that Ravipati Ramamma executed a cancellation deed under Ex.A5 cancelling the sale in favour of the first defendant showing that she asserted her right even as on 09.12.1983. These circumstances give an impression that Ex.A1 was not acted upon and it is only a nominal document. The lower appellate Court failed to consider the above important aspects and committed error in drawing the conclusions not based on evidence.

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28. It has to be seen that the plaintiff has filed a suit for bare injunction and not for declaration of title and injunction. It has to be seen that even when the first defendant had disputed the title of the plaintiff and asserted his title, then also the plaintiff has not amended the plaint. The question as to what is to be done when there is a

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serious dispute with regard to title of the plaintiff has been considered by the Apex Court in case between Anathula Sudhakar Vs. P.Buchi Reddy (dead) by L.Rs .^[6] , wherein, it was observed as follows:-

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“Where a cloud is raised over plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter.”

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“As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession.”

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“But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title [either specific, or implied as noticed in

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Annaimuthu Thevar (supra)]. Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction. 2005 AIR SCW 3516”

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“Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case.”

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29. In the above circumstances, it has to be held

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that the plaintiff ought to have filed a suit for declaration or ought to have amended the suit claiming the relief of declaration when the defendant had asserted his title.

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30. Suffice to say that the findings of the trial court that Ex.A.1 was never acted upon, appears to be based on well appreciation of evidence and on sound reasoning and the findings of the lower appellate Court on this point, since perverse, are set aside. This point is decided accordingly.

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POINT No.2:-

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31. I n Property Association of Baptist Churches, Kavali, Nellore, Regional Office, Preston Institute, Jangaon, Warangal District Vs. Sub-Registrar, Jangoan, Warangal District and others (1 supra), relied on by the learned counsel for he appellant, this Court, after referring to the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908, and Rule 58 made there under, categorically held that the District Registrar has no power to cancel the sale deed and if any party is aggrieved by a registered document he has to file a civil suit seeking appropriate declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act read with Article 59 of the Schedule under the Limitation Act, 1963. Admittedly, Ravipati Ramamma executed the sale deed in favour of the first defendant on 30.06.1971 and she had executed Ex.A5 cancellation deed canceling the said sale deed on 09.12.1983.

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32. The case of Ravipati Ramamma, as seen from the recitals of Cancellation Deed under Ex.A.5, is that

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she had not received the sale consideration amount under Ex.B.14. Even if Ravipati Ramamma had not received the sale consideration amount, she had no right to cancel the said document. A registered sale deed or mortgage deed cannot be cancelled by executing a cancellation deed. A suit has to be filed seeking the relief of cancellation of a registered deed. The maximum period for filing of the suit for cancellation of the Deed is three years under Article 59 of the Schedule under the Limitation Act. Admittedly, the original of Ex.B14 was executed on 30.06.1971 and no suit was filed seeking cancellation of the same within a period of 12 years. It has to be seen that either Ravipati Ramamma or Ramaseethamma had not raised their little finger till 09.12.1983, though according to PW.9 – Ramaseethamma, there were disputes between herself and the first defendant in respect of suit schedule property. Therefore, the settled legal position is that where a sale or mortgage deed has been executed and even if it is contended that the consideration is not paid, the proper remedy is filing of a suit for recovery of the amount due and not for cancellation (Refer Siddanna Bovi and others Vs. Hanumantha Reddy {AIR 1972 Mysore 23}). Of course, where a party claims that the documents are void or voidable, the relief by way of cancellation of the instrument by filing a suit may be claimed not only by the party to the instrument but by any person against whom the instrument is void or voidable. It is not the case of the plaintiff that the sale deed in favour of the first defendant is void or voidable instrument. Hence, it is clear that Ravipati Ramamma had no right to execute the cancellation deed and cancel the sale deed executed in

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favour of the defendant. This point is, accordingly, answered.

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POINT Nos.3 & 4:

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33. Learned counsel for the respondent, relying on the judgment in Ammanamanchi Venkateswarlu v. Thummuri Ganga Raju (4 supra), submits that when the defendant had set up possession to the property, the burden lies on him to establish the basis of possession. In that case there was no controversy about the plaintiff’s ownership over the land to which the suit relates. In the above circumstance, this Court observed as follows.

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“When a person admittedly owning immovable property complains against wrongful threats of interference with his possession and the defendants put forward a positive claim to the possession of the property, the onus undoubtedly rests upon the defendants to establish the plea.”

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34. There is no dispute with regard to the principle laid down in the above case, but each case has to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. It is settled legal position that in a suit for injunction, the plaintiff has to prove his title and possession and the likely irreparable loss if no injunction is issued. Initial burden lies on the plaintiff to prove his case. First of all the plaintiff has to prove that he has better title and he is in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit.

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35. Coming to the facts of the case on hand, the crucial aspect is whether the plaintiff was in possession of

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the suit schedule property on the date of filing of the suit. It is the case of the first defendant that he purchased the suit schedule property from Ravipati Ramamma on 30.06.1971 and subsequently, he made it cultivable wet land. It has to be seen that the plaintiff filed the suit on 21.05.1984. As referred above, he claims to have purchased the suit schedule property under Ex.A.2 i.e. Acs.0.30 cents of land on 01.09.1983 and remaining 0-30 cents under Ex.A3 on 09.12.1983. Thus, he had completed purchase of suit schedule land by December, 1983 and filed suit on 21.05.1984. So, he must prove that he was in possession of the suit schedule property as on 21.05.1984 and prior to that, his vendor Ramaseethamma had been in possession of the suit schedule property. He has also filed Exs.A.1 and A4 to A.12. Ex.A.1 is the registered Settlement Deed executed by Ravipati Ramamma in favour of Ramaseethamma. Ex.A.4 is the Ratification Deed executed by Ramaseethamma in favour of the plaintiff on 09.12.1983. Ex.A.5 is the deed executed by Ravipati Ramamma on 09.12.1983 canceling the sale deed dated 30.06.1971 executed in favour of the first defendant. Ex.A.6 is the Cist Receipt dated 29.06.1984. No survey number is mentioned in Ex.A.6. Ex.A.7 is Form 10 (1) Adangal. As discussed above, Ex.A.7 shows the names of Ravipati Ramamma, Venkayamma, Hanumamma, Bathina Ramaseethamma as joint owners in Form 10 (1) Account of 1393 Fasli 1983. Thus, Ex.A.7 not only shows the name of Ramaseethamma but also the name of Ravipati Ramamma. Therefore, it appears that Ex.A.7 does not completely support the case of the plaintiff. Ex.A.8 is the No.2 Account i.e. Adangal for the

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Fasli 1391, 1392 and 1393 corresponding to the year 1981 to 1983. Admittedly, in Ex.A.8, the names of Ramaseethamma, Gaddam Hanumayya and Gaddam Anjaneyulu (first defendant) had been written. Ex.A.8 is a crucial document. It is filed by the plaintiff himself which shows that the first defendant had been in possession of the suit schedule property along with Ramaseethamma and Gaddam Hanumaiah from the year 1981 to 1983 i.e. at the time of purchase of the property by the plaintiff. Ex.A.9 is the certified copy of Adangal for the year 1401 Fasli 1991. Ex.A.10 is also the Cist Receipt dated 31.03.1986. Ex.A.11 is also the Cist Receipt dated 14.04.1993, but it was wrongly mentioned as 10.04.1983 in the judgment of the trial Court. Ex.A.12 is dated 26.07.1994.

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36. Out of the above referred documents, admittedly, Ex.A.6, A.9, A.10, A.11 and A.12 are the documents obtained after the date of filing of the suit. Since it is argued that the circumstances show that the first defendant was illegally and forcibly dispossessed after filing of the suit, these documents cannot be relied upon to decide as to who was in possession of the property on the date of filing of the suit i.e. on 21.05.1984. Learned counsel for the respondent / plaintiff, Sri M.V.S.Suresh Kumar, referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Ambika Prasad Thakur (3 supra), wherein, it was held that if the state of things is shown to exist, an inference of its continuity within a reasonable proximate time both forward and backward may sometimes be drawn. Of course, from the subsequent events also, a presumption can be drawn under Section 114

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(d) of the Indian Evidence Act, but such drawing of presumption is always subject to rebuttal of evidence and it always depends upon the nature of evidence and nature of relief. Except Ex.A.7 and Ex.A.8, there are no other documents to show the possession of the parties over the suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit. Admittedly, Ex.A.7 shows the names of Ravipati Ramamma and the first defendant as the persons who are in possession of the suit schedule property from the year 1991 to 1993. In the above circumstances, in fact, presumption has to be drawn under Section 114 (d) of the Indian Evidence Act in favour of the first defendant. It is the case of the plaintiff that the first defendant had obtained his documents by having some intimacy with the village officer. It is the case of the first defendant that the plaintiff is an influential person and he had obtained the documents filed by him with the help of village officers who had helped him due to village politics. It is also his case that nobody would support him due to the influence of the plaintiff and, therefore, he is unable to examine any witness on his behalf.

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37. Now it has to be seen that oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff himself, if properly scrutinized, goes against him. P.W.2 is the adjacent land owner of the suit schedule property. He purchased his land under registered sale deed dated 16.04.1984. He had admitted that it is recited in the said sale deed that the name of the first defendant is shown as eastern boundary holder. Thus, the document which seems to have been executed between the

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third parties, without any anticipation of litigation between the plaintiff and 1^st defendant shows the name of the first defendant as the eastern boundary holder. P.W.2 also admitted as follows: “by the time of my purchase, D-1(first defendant) was in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. One or two years after, D-1 lost possession”. Admittedly, he purchased the property on 16.11.1984. Admittedly the suit was filed by the plaintiff on 21.05.1984. Thus, it is clear that on the date of filing of the suit, the first defendant was in possession of the suit schedule property and plaintiff was not in possession, even as per the admission made by P.W.2. According to PW.3, the plaintiff was in possession of the suit schedule property since four years prior to his examination i.e., prior to 27.04.1994 (he was examined before the Court on 27.04.1994). Thus, the evidence of P.W.3 also goes against the plaintiff. P.W.4 was aged about 25 years when he was examined before the Court on 27.10.1994. Therefore, he must be about 15 years old in 1984 and his evidence does not help the plaintiff. P.W.5 was aged about 30 years as on 27.10.1994 when he gave evidence before the Court. According to him, the plaintiff had been cultivating the lands since ten years. Thus, even according to P.W.5, the plaintiff had been cultivating the lands since October, 1984. According to him, by the time he got worldly knowledge, the plaintiff and the first defendant are litigating with each other in respect of the suit schedule land.

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38. It is also the case of P.W.6 that the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the land for about

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10 years prior to his giving evidence on 27.10.1994. P.W.7 is no other than the son of Ramaseethamma. P.W.8 is also another son of Ramaseethamma who admitted that he does not have any document to show that the land was in their possession by the date of their sale in favour of the first defendant. Thus, except the self-serving statement of P.W.1 and the oral evidence of his vendors, there is no other cogent and convincing evidence to show that the plaintiff was in possession of the property on the date of filing of the suit. Once it is established that there is no satisfactory evidence to show that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit schedule property on the date of filing of the suit and the evidence on the other hand, the evidence adduced by the plaintiff himself shows that the first defendant was in possession of the suit schedule property during the relevant period, it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled for the discretionary relief of injunction. The lower appellate Court failed to consider the evidence of above witnesses, particularly the evidence of P.W.2, and committed an error in drawing conclusions. Admittedly, Ravipati Ramamma is crucial witness in this case. The plaintiff has not examined the said witness. Learned counsel for the appellant relied o n Pisipati Punnakotiah (2 supra), wherein, it was held that for non-examination of material witness without assigning any reasons, adverse inference has to be drawn against the party who fail to produce such witness. These points are answered accordingly.

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POINT No.5:

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39. As seen from the record, it is clear that the first defendant purchased the suit property on 30.06.1971 and that his vendor again executed a cancellation deed Ex.A.5 in 1984 and the lower appellate Court ought to have decided as to whether the first defendant had proved his title by adverse possession as pleaded by him.

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40. In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that the findings of the trial Court are based on proper appreciation of the entire evidence available on record and the lower appellate Court has not considered the evidence in proper perspective and failed to appreciate the material evidence and as such, the findings of the lower appellate Court are perverse and are liable to be set aside.

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41. As seen from the evidence, it is clear that the first defendant was dispossessed after filing of the suit and in the above circumstances, status quo ante has to be restored with the first defendant. Therefore, the first defendant should be restored the possession of the suit schedule property immediately. Since it appears that the first defendant was unjustly deprived of his possession for quite a long period, he may, if so advised, seek damages from the plaintiff.

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42. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed with throughout costs by setting aside the impugned judgment of the lower appellate Court. Consequently, the judgment and the decree passed by the trial Court is restored. If the first defendant applies for restoration of the possession, the trial Court shall restore him the possession

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of the suit schedule property.

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_______________________________ JUSTICE B.CHANDRA KUMAR

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08^th October, 2010 Bvv / Nsr

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[1] 2003 (4) ALD 671

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[2] AIR 1967 AP 83

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[3] AIR 1966 Supreme Court 605

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[4] 1969 AP.L.J. 304

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[5] AIR 1996 Supreme Court 2220

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[6] AIR 2008 SC 2003

G.Anjaneyulu v. K.Veera Narayana and Anther

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G.Anjaneyulu v. K.Veera Narayana and Anther

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