It is stated that the rejection of the petitioner’s nomination on wholly unsustainable grounds is a manifestation of arbitrary exercise of power, in addition to being in violation of statutory norms. It is therefore contended that the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the above case clearly postulates that Article 329(b) cannot be a blanket ban on the exercise of Article 226 jurisdiction. This argument overlooks and ignores the observations made by the Supreme Court in para-33 to the effect that its conclusions should be read along with the rest of the Judgment wherein the conclusions were elaborately stated with reasons. Further, the argument also overlooks the fact that clause (3) of para-32 begins with the words “Subject to the above”, indicating that the contents of clauses (1) and (2) of para-32 would have overriding effect. In clause (1), the Supreme Court specifically mandated that if the election is to be called in question, ‘election’ meaning the entire proceedings commencing from the date of notification of the election till the declaration of result, and such petition has the effect of interrupting, obstructing or protracting the election proceedings, the invocation of the judicial remedy must be postponed till after the completion of the election proceedings. The observations in clause (3) of para-32 cannot, therefore, be read in isolation and divorced from the observations in the other clauses of para-32, to mean that in every case of arbitrary exercise of power or breach of law by a Returning Officer or Election Authority, a writ petition would be maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is to be noted that in ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA’s case, the Supreme Court did not, being bound by judicial discipline, deviate from the principle laid down in N.P.PONNUSWAMI’s case with regard to interference with the rejection of a candidate’s nomination. N.P.PONNUSWAMI’s case therefore continues to hold the field insofar as the rejection of a candidate’s nomination is concerned.
