Industrial-area land acquisition was challenged for statutory lapse and defective consideration of objections. The court upheld the acquisition, held that the proceedings had not lapsed, and dismissed both writ petitions and all applications, vacating interim protection.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14306/2015
----Petitioners
Versus
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Corporation (Riico), Udyog Bhawan, Tilak Marg, Jaipur, Through Its Managing Director
----Respondents
Connected With
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12012/2015
1/2. Jagdish Prasad S/o Late Shri Ram Kanwar aged about 57 years R/o Village & Post Sawantsar Teh. Kishangarh, Distt. Ajmer. 1/3. Mangal Chand S/o Late Shri Ram Kanwar aged about 53 years R/o Village & Post Sawantsar Teh. Kishangarh, Distt. Ajmer. 2. Gopal S/o Late Shri Lalu Ahir aged about 55 years R/o Village & Post Sawantsar Teh. Kishangarh, Distt. Ajmer.
Petitioners
Versus
----Respondents
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| For Petitioner(s) | : Mr. Amit Kuri, Adv. through VC Mr. Sarthak Rastogi, Adv. through VC |
|---|---|
| For Respondent(s) | : Mr. RP Singh, AAG through VC Mr. Virendra Lodha, Sr. Adv. through VC |
| Mr. Vikas Jain, Adv. through VC |
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN
Judgment / Order
REPORTABLE
Reserved on 28/01/2022 Pronounced on 04/02/2022
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Bigha, situated in village Sanwatsar, Tehsil Kishangarh District Ajmer for industrial area Kishangarh Phase-VI.
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28/03/2016, the LAO deposited the rest of the award amount in the reference court. So, the facts suggest that entire amount of compensation has been duly disbursed in above terms and substantial possession out of 541.07 Bigha has been carried out. It is also to be considered that Kishangarh is a fast growing industrial area which is also called as Marble & Granite Mandi and not only in India but abroad, exports and domestic supplies are made. Recently, the Government has also acquired lands through their instrumentality like National Highway Authority of India, Indian Railways, Airport Authority and Rajasthan Housing Board to develop the said area as an industrial belt looking to nonavailability of land for industries and close proximity to major cities of Rajasthan.
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procedure required for issuance of notice Section 9 of the Act of 1894 has not been followed and that the publication of declaration done on 03/07/2013 issued under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 has not been published in two prominent daily newspapers. Further, the award dated 01/07/2015 passed by the LAO suffers from nonapplication of mind and that the land in question is not acquired by the private company. Alternatively, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted also submitted that while calculating compensation under the Act of 2013, correct multiplier effect has not been given and the compensation amount has been wrongly calculated on a very lower side. Learned counsel further submitted that as 371 Bigha of land acquired by the Rajasthan Housing Board is adjacently situated which is a residential area, therefore, the present acquisition cannot be used for industrial purpose. The petitioners are in possession of land and have not accepted any cheque towards compensation. Lastly, during course of arguments, in addition to above, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in The Executive Engineer, Goshikhurd Vs. Mahesh & Ors. [SLP (Civil) Nos.13093-13094 of 2018], decided on 10/11/2021
and on relying upon the same, submission of learned counsel for the petitioners was that in terms of Para 20 of the said judgment, the proceedings under Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 are waived as by virtue of Section 25 of the Act of 1894, notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was not issued within 12 months from January 1st, 2014. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon the judgments rendered in Anil Kumar Gupta Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.: (2012)12 SCC 443; Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.:
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(2012)1 SCC 792; Kamal Trading Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.: (2012)2 SCC 25; Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai & Ors.: (2005) 7 SCC 627; Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014)3 SCC 203 & Union of India Vs. Shiv Raj & Ors.: (2014)6 SCC 564 with reference to his above arguments towards opportunity of hearing not been granted as per provisions of Section 5A of the Act of 1894 and submitted that if the LAO has not applied his mind in a rational manner, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be set aside and that challenge to notifications under Section 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894 can be made at a belated stage also.
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(1997) 1 SCC 134 , and explained in Para no.10 which reads as
under:-
"10. Before parting with this case, we think it necessary to make a few observations relevant to land acquisition proceedings. Our country is now launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We are anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum extent. We propose to compete with China economically. We wish to attain the pace of progress achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to as "Asian tigers", e.g., South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however, recognised on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country. The means of transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernisation. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenges are generally in the shape of writ petitions filed in High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and in some cases, orders by way of say or injunction are also made. Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power of granting stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in a civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated
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on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lumpsum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interest. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings. "
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with the situation for calculation of compensation. They further submitted that the Supreme Court in its Constitutional Bench Judgment in Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal &
Ors.: (2020) 8 SC 129 , has held in Para 366 that under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a), in case the award is not made as on 01/01/2014, the date of commencement of the Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings and only compensation has to be determined. The provisions of Section 25 are qua Section 19 of the Act of 2013. They further submitted that in terms of Section 11A of the Act of 1894, the publication of declaration under Section 6 was made on 03/07/2013 and the award in terms of Section 11-A of the Act of 1894 was made within a period of two years on 01/07/2015. Hence, the argument of lapse of proceedings is not tenable.
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the fact that acquisition proceedings in the nearby area are also carried out by the other State Instrumentalities like Indian Railways, Rajasthan Housing Board, Airport Authority of India, State and RIICO.
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alternatively be established from the fact that as per provisions of Section 6 of the Act of 1894, notification was duly published on 03/07/2013 and under Section 11A of the Act of 1894, final award was quantified under the Act of 2013 within a period of two years on 01/07/2015. It is also worthwhile to mention that as per Section 114, Repeal and Saving clause, of the Act of 2013 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the affect of any right, privilege, obligation or liability will be continued and enforced under the existing law as if the law is not repealed.
"14. In paragraph 195 in Indore Development Authority (supra), the Constitution Bench held that the 2013 Act operates prospectively. Further, Section 114 of the 2013 Act effects a repeal but with certain savings, in accordance with Section 24. Thus, the acquisition proceedings are preserved under the 1894 Act till the stage of making of the award. Where an award is not made, the provisions relating to determination of compensation under the 2013 Act would apply; where the award is made, proceedings would continue under the provisions of the 1894 Act as if the said Act has not been repealed. Our interpretation of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act respectfully follows this precedent."
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"This dictum is subject to the caveat state in paragraph 16(supra) that a declaration which has lapsed in terms of Section 11A of the 1894 Act would not get revived."
In other words, the Apex Court has specifically said that if under the provisions of Section 11A of the Act of 1894, two years' period is not lapsed and was running, the provisions of Section 25 and the cut-off date of 01/01/2014 will not apply with a limit of 12 months.
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the Act of 1894 which stood as per saving clause under Section 114 of the Act of 2013 and on account of the judgment in Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Ors. (supra), more specifically by placing reliance upon issue no.6 "whether Section 24 revives stale and barred claim" where the Apex Court held as
under:-
"340. Before proceeding further, in our opinion, Section 24 contemplates pending proceedings and not the concluded ones in which possession has been taken, and compensation has been paid or deposited. Section 24 does not provide an arm or tool to question the legality of proceedings, which have been undertaken under the Act of 1894 and stood concluded before five years or more. It is only in cases where possession has not been taken, nor compensation is paid, that there is a lapse. In case possession has been taken, and compensation has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, the beneficial provision of the statute provides that all beneficiaries shall be paid compensation as admissible under the Act of 2013. The beneficiaries, i.e., landowners contemplated under the proviso to Section 24(2), are the ones who were so recorded as beneficiaries as on the date of issuance of notification Under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. The provision is not meant to be invoked on the basis of void transactions, and by the persons who have purchased on the basis of power of attorney or otherwise, they cannot claim the benefit Under Section 24 as is apparent from proviso to Section 24(2) and the decision in Shiv Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors
358. We are unable to accept the submission on behalf of the landowners that it is by operation of law the proceedings are deemed to have lapsed and that this Court should give full effect to the provisions. It was submitted that lapse of acquisition proceedings was not contemplated under the Act of 1894, and there is departure made in Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Thus, Section 24 gives a fresh cause of action to the landowners to approach the courts for a declaration that the acquisition lapsed, if either compensation has not been paid or the physical
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possession has not been taken. The decision of this Court in the Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 was relied upon to contend that there cannot be res judicata in the previous proceedings when the cause of action is different; reliance is also placed on Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty and Anr. (2018) 16 SCC 228, where the decision of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Ors. (supra) was followed as to belated challenges. Reliance was further placed on Anil Kumar Gupta v. the State of Bihar (2012) 12 SCC 443 in which it was held that vesting of land in the Government can be challenged on the ground that possession had not been taken in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The invocation of the urgency Clause in Section 17, can be questioned on the ground that there was no real urgency. The notification issued Under Section 4 and declaration Under Section 6 can be challenged on the ground of non-compliance of Section 5-A(1). Notice issued Under Section 9 and the award passed Under Section 11 can also be questioned on permissible grounds. Reliance has also been placed on Ram Chand and Ors. v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 4 to contend that inaction and delay on the part of the acquiring authority would also give rise to a cause of action in favour of the landowner.
359. The entire gamut of submissions of the landowners is based on the misinterpretation of the provisions contained in Section 24. It does not intend to divest the State of possession (of the land), title to which has been vested in the State. It only intends to give higher compensation in case the obligation of depositing of compensation has not been fulfilled with regard to the majority of holdings. A fresh cause of action in Section 24 has been given if for five years or more possession has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In case possession has been taken and compensation has not been deposited with respect to the majority of landholdings, higher compensation to all incumbents follows, as mentioned above. Section 24 does not confer a new cause of action to challenge the acquisition proceedings or the methodology adopted for the deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of reference court, in that case, interest or higher compensation, as the case may be, can follow. In our considered opinion,
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Section 24 is applicable to pending proceedings, not to the concluded proceedings and the legality of the concluded proceedings, cannot be questioned. Such a challenge does not lie within the ambit of the deemed lapse Under Section 24. The lapse Under Section 24(2) is due to inaction or lethargy of authorities in taking requisite steps as provided therein.
366.1 Under the provisions of Section 24(1) (a) in case the award is not made as on 1.1.2014 the date of commencement of Act of 2013, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of Act of 2013 ."
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no view was taken by the court and hence, there is no review in a withdrawal application.
(SAMEER JAIN),J
Raghu/
2 issues framed by the court
Did the acquisition lapse under the 2013 Act when the award was made within two years of publication of the declaration under the 1894 Act?
Was the industrial-area acquisition invalid for failure to consider objections under Section 5A or for absence of public purpose?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
The Executive Engineer, Goshikhurd Vs. Mahesh & Ors.Relied on¶97
Executive Engineer, Goshikhurd Vs. Mahesh & Ors. [SLP (Civil) Nos.13093-13094 of 2018], decided on 10/11/2021
Anil Kumar Gupta Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.Referred¶61
Anil Kumar Gupta Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.: (2012)12 SCC 443 · Who else cites this
Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.Referred¶64
(2012)1 SCC 792 · Who else cites this
Kamal Trading Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.Referred¶64
Kamal Trading Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.: (2012)2 SCC 25 · Who else cites this
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai & Ors.Referred¶64
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai & Ors.: (2005) 7 SCC 627 · Who else cites this
Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.Referred¶64
Vinod Kumar Vs. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014)3 SCC 203 · Who else cites this
Union of India Vs. Shiv Raj & Ors.Referred¶64
Union of India Vs. Shiv Raj & Ors.: (2014)6 SCC 564 · Who else cites this
Reliance Petroleum Ltd. Vs. Zaver Chand Popatlal Sumaria & Ors.Referred¶69
Reliance Petroleum Ltd. Vs. Zaver Chand Popatlal Sumaria & Ors.: (1996)4 SCC 579 · Who else cites this
Ramniklal N. Bhutta & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.Referred¶69
(1997) 1 SCC 134 · Who else cites this
Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Ors.Applied¶89
(2020) 8 SC 129
State of West Bengal & Others Vs. Debasish Mukherjee & Ors.Distinguished¶116
State of West Bengal & Others Vs. Debasish Mukherjee & Ors.: (2011) 14 SCC 187 · Who else cites this
10 provisions across 3 enactments
Ram Gopal Yadav
Ram Kanwar
State Of Rajasthan Through The Principal Secretary, Department Of Industries
Dy. Secretary, Industries (Group-I) Department
Rajasthan State Industrial Development And Investment Corporation (Riico)
Sub- Divisional Officer Cum Land Acquisition Officer, Kishangarh, District Ajmer
SAMEER JAIN
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
