Justice Paramjeet Singh dismissed an application for leave to appeal under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. against an order of acquittal in a case involving caste-based insult. The High Court held that the trial court's decision was not perverse or based on a misreading of evidence, requiring no interference.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
CRM A-6-MA of 2012 (O&M)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
CRM -A 6-MA of 2012 (O&M) Date of Decision: April 26, 2013
Seema Parshad
... Petitioner
Versus
Chanchal Dadwal and another
... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARAMJEET SINGH
Present: Mr. T.C. Dhanwal, Advocate, for the petitioner.
Paramjeet Singh, J.
The instant application has been filed under Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. for grant of leave to appeal against the impugned judgment dated 12.11.2011 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon, whereby respondent no.1 has been acquitted of the charges framed against her.
Brief facts of the case as mentioned in the impugned judgment are as under:-
“On 27.4.2001, Smt. Seema Parshad complainant instituted a criminal complaint under Section 3 of the Act against Smt. Chanchal Dadwal accused. In complaint, complainant inter-
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alia pleaded herself to be working as Child Development Project Officer at Nagina. Accused is working as a Programming Officer. Accused is inimical towards complainant due to her Chamar caste. On 9.4.2007 at about 11.30 AM complainant went to office of accused in Vikas Sadan Gurgaon for seeking permission for handing over charge of post as she had already taken charge at HRRS office Chandigarh. When complainant went inside office of accused, 2-3 persons namely Richpal Mandi etc. were sitting. On seeking complainant, accused started shouting on her as complainant entered her office without permission. Complainant objected the language and behaviour of accused. Accused said to her “Chamari teri himmat kesi hui mere office of aane ki. Chamari jera se Afsar Kaya ban gai apni jaat deekha rahi hai”. Accused intentionally insulted complainant in presence of 2-3 persons without any reason. Complainant sat on chair. Accused stated that how she could dare to sit on chair. On this some altercation took place between complainant and accused. The complainant was shunted out by accused from her office. Many persons gathered outside room of accused. Richpal consoled complainant. Complainant went to police station and narrated the incident to the incharge Police Station Civil Lines Gurgaon and requested for lodging of FIR but of no use. Complainant also met higher officers for action but of no effect. Hence, the criminal complaint.”
On the preliminary evidence, learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gurgaon vide order dated 26.11.2008 summoned respondent no.1-accused. Thereafter, learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurgaon vide order dated 15.10.2010 committed case to the Court of
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Sessions.
Thereafter, learned Special Judge, Gurgaon vide order dated 09.11.2010 charge was framed against the accused to which she pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined PW1 Seema Parshad complainant and PW2 Richpal Singh.
Thereafter, statement of accused-respondent No.1 under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded. All incriminating facts and circumstances were put to the accused wherein she pleaded complete innocence and false implication.
The learned Trial Court, after appreciating the evidence, accused-respondent No.1 was acquitted of the charges framed against her vide judgment dated 12.11.2011. Hence, this application for grant of leave to appeal.
I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and gone through the impugned judgment.
The learned trial Court, after appreciating the evidence on record, observed as under:-
“ 21. From perusal of record in light of rival contentions it is crystal clear that the alleged occurrence took place on 9.4.2007 at about 11.30 AM. The criminal complaint was instituted by complainant on 27.4.2007. So, there is delay of about 18 days in lodging the criminal complaint. PW1 Seema Parshad stated that she had gone to police but police did not entertain her application. In cross examination she could not
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tell name of police officer who had taken written application but did not receive by saying that it is trivial matter. Copy of application to police is not produced in Court. As such there is no satisfactory explanation for 18 days delay in filing of criminal complaint. PW1 Seema Parshad stated that accused stated to her “Chamari teri himmat kaise hui mere daftar me aane ki” Chmari Afsar kya ban gayi apni jaat dikha rahi hai”. In cross examination she stated that when I entered office of accused, she was alone in her office. I had talk with her for about 2-3 minutes. Again said one person Richpal entered with her in room.... In fact I contacted Richpal on telephone, who came along with me to Courts. He herself engage a counsel for me and got his complaint filed on 27.4.2007.....”. PW2 Richpal Singh in cross examination by Public Prosecutor stated that it is correct that I made statement Ex.PA before Magistrate on 10.5.2007. In cross examination he stated that he “.... I saw the accused hurling abuses on complainant while both of them standing in gallery of premises..... After 9.4.2007, I never came in contact with the complainant. It was only on 10.5.2007 I and Seema met for the first time in the Court after the occurrence when I was invited by her to depose in her favour....”. So, the statements of PW1 Seema Parshad and PW2 Richpal Singh are contradictory.
22. At time of occurrence accused was an official duties as a public servant. Complainant, has not obtained prior sanction for prosecution of accused as per Section 197 Cr.P.C.
23. The ratio of judgments in Sawaran Singh vs. State of Haryana's case (supra), E.Tirupem Reddy vs. Deputy Superintendent of Police's case (supra) and Golugiri
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Ramakrishna Reddy vs. State of A.P.'s case (supra) regarding offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act is not at issue. Judgment referred by learned counsel for accused regarding delay in filing complaint, regarding non obtaining of prior sanction and discrepancies in statement of witnesses are not in doubt. In view of above material facts and principles of law it is held that prosecution has not adduced clear, cogent and convincing evidence to prove guilt of the accused. Accordingly, point of determination is decided against prosecution.
24. Hence, in view of above findings, it is held that prosecution has miserably failed to prove guilt of the accused upon the hilt beyond shadow of all reasonable doubts. Thus by giving benefit of doubt the accused is acquitted of charges framed against her.......”
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in 'Allarakha
K.Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, 2002(1) RCR (Criminal)
748', held that where, in a case, two views are possible, the one which favours the accused, has to be adopted by the Court. This view has been
reiterated in State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755', and 'Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415'.
A Division Bench of this Court in 'State of Punjab v. Hansa Singh, 2001(1) RCR (Criminal) 775', while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, has opined as under:-
“We are of the opinion that the matter would have to be examined in the light of the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan,
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1991(1) SCC 166, which are that interference in an appeal against acquittal would be called for only if the judgment under appeal were perverse or based on a misreading of the evidence and merely because the appellate Court was inclined to take a different view, could not be a reason calling for interference .”
In 'Mrinal Das & others v. The State of Tripura,
2011(9) SCC 479', decided on September 5, 2011, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after looking into many earlier judgments, has laid down parameters, in which interference can be made in a judgment of acquittal, by observing as under:
“An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons”, for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference. When the trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts etc., the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial Court depending on the materials placed .”
Similarly, in the case of 'State of Rajasthan v. Shera
Ram alias Vishnu Dutta , (2012) 1 SCC 602', the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“ 7. A judgment of acquittal has the obvious consequence of granting freedom to the accused. This Court has taken a consistent view that unless the judgment in appeal is contrary to evidence, palpably erroneous or a view which could not have been taken by the court of competent jurisdiction keeping in view the
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settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, this Court shall be reluctant to interfere with such judgment of acquittal.
8. The penal laws in India are primarily based upon certain fundamental procedural values, which are right to fair trial and presumption of innocence. A person is presumed to be innocent till proven guilty and once held to be not guilty of a criminal charge, he enjoys the benefit of such presumption which could be interfered with only for valid and proper reasons. An appeal against acquittal has always been differentiated from a normal appeal against conviction. Wherever there is perversity of facts and/or law appearing in the judgment, the appellate court would be within its jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of acquittal, but otherwise such interference is not called for .”
Thereafter, in the above case a large number of judgments
were discussed and then it was opined as under:-
“ 10. There is a very thin but a fine distinction between an appeal against conviction on the one hand and acquittal on the other. The preponderance of judicial opinion of this Court is that there is no substantial difference between an appeal against conviction and an appeal against acquittal except that while dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court keeps in view the position that the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused has been fortified by his acquittal and if the view adopted by the High Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion reached by it had its grounds well set out on the materials on record, the acquittal may not be
CRM A-6-MA of 2012 (O&M)
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interfered with. Thus, this fine distinction has to be kept in mind by the Court while exercising its appellate jurisdiction. The golden rule is that the Court is obliged and it will not abjure its duty to prevent miscarriage of justice, where interference is imperative and the ends of justice so require and it is essential to appease the judicial conscience.”
Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to show any error
of law or on facts on the basis of which interference can be made by this Court in the judgment under challenge.
As such, this application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
April 26, 2013 [Paramjeet Singh] vkd Judge
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of GujaratReferred¶42
Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, 2002(1) RCR (Criminal) 748
State of Goa v. Sanjay ThakranReferred¶44
State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 · Who else cites this
Chandrappa v. State of KarnatakaReferred¶44
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 · Who else cites this
State of Punjab v. Hansa SinghReferred¶46
State of Punjab v. Hansa Singh, 2001(1) RCR (Criminal) 775
Ashok Kumar v. State of RajasthanReferred¶47
Ashok Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 1991(1) SCC 166 · Who else cites this
Mrinal Das & others v. The State of TripuraReferred¶51
Mrinal Das & others v. The State of Tripura, 2011(9) SCC 479 · Who else cites this
State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram alias Vishnu DuttaReferred¶54
State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram alias Vishnu Dutta, (2012) 1 SCC 602 · Who else cites this
Seema Parshad
Chanchal Dadwal
PARAMJEET SINGH
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
