Sk.Alim Vs State of Orissa

By means of the present application, the Petitioners seek to quash the order dated 02.05.2017 passed by the learned JMFC, Pattamundai in G.R. Case No.357 of 2014, which was initiated at the instance of the Opposite Party-wife against the Petitioners.

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The background facts of the case are that the Petitioners, being the husband and his relatives, were charge-sheeted in connection with G.R. Case No.357 of 2014, arising out of Pattamundai P.S. Case No.237 of 2017, for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A/341/323/294/406/506/34 of the IPC read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

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The Opposite Party No.2 lodged a complaint against the Petitioners before the I.I.C., Pattamundai, whereupon Pattamundai P.S. Case No.237 of 2014 was registered, and after investigation, charge sheet was submitted. As per the allegations, Opposite Party

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No.2 married Petitioner No.1 on 24.07.2011, and at the time of marriage, in compliance with the demand of the Petitioners, a cash amount of Rs.1,00,000/- along with ornaments and other articles was given to the family of the bridegroom. After the marriage, Petitioner No.1 along with his relatives allegedly subjected Opposite Party No.2 to cruelty demanding further dowry, and on account of non-fulfillment of such demand, they attempted to kill her by pouring hot water on her body and subsequently drove her out of the matrimonial home, compelling her to lodge the report.

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Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel for the Petitioners, submits that subsequently, the marital dispute between the parties was amicably settled through mediation. In terms of the said settlement, both Petitioner No.1 and Opposite Party No.2, being husband and wife, agreed to put an end to all litigations. Acting upon such settlement, they filed a joint petition for compromise before the learned Judge, Family Court, Kendrapara in Criminal Proceeding No.824 of 2014, which had been initiated by Opposite Party No.2 seeking maintenance. Pursuant to the settlement, Petitioner No.1 paid a sum of Rs.3,60,000/- to Opposite Party No.2 towards her permanent alimony and an additional sum of Rs.23,505/- by way of Bank Draft towards her dower and maintenance for the iddat period.

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By order dated 18.04.2017, the learned Judge, Family Court, Kendrapara disposed of the said proceeding, recording the fact of receipt of Rs.3,83,505/- by Opposite Party No.2. It was also clearly stated in the joint petition that Opposite Party No.2 (informant) would withdraw the criminal case initiated by her under Section 498-A IPC and allied offences. The order dated 25.06.2015

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passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Kendrapara in Criminal Proceeding No.824 of 2014 has been annexed as Annexure-4.

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According to learned counsel for the Petitioners, in view of the compromise having been duly acted upon, the continuation of the criminal proceeding pending before the learned JMFC, Pattamundai in connection with Pattamundai P.S. Case No.237 of 2014 would serve no fruitful purpose and, therefore, deserves to be quashed.

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Despite service of notice, Opposite Party No.2 did not appear. This Court has perused the joint petition filed by Petitioner No.1 and Opposite Party No.2 before the learned Judge, Family Court in Criminal Proceeding No.824 of 2014, as well as the order passed therein. It is evident that the proceeding initiated at the behest of Opposite Party No.2 before the learned JMFC, Pattamundai, pursuant to the FIR lodged at Pattamundai P.S., arose out of a matrimonial dispute between the parties. The subsequent settlement arrived at between Petitioner No.1 and Opposite Party No.2, being husband and wife, has already been acted upon, as reflected from the joint petition filed by them and the consequential order of the learned Judge, Family Court resolving the said dispute. Upon acceptance of permanent alimony, along with dower and maintenance for the iddat period by Opposite Party No.2, no fruitful purpose would be served in allowing the criminal proceeding pending before the learned JMFC, Pattamundai to continue.

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It is well-settled law that the very object of Section 498-A of the IPC should not be allowed to become counterproductive. In matters concerning family life and marital relationships, the

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benefits of discontinuing legal proceedings to give effect to a compromise or reconciliation often outweigh any social harm that may result from non-prosecution. If proceedings are allowed to continue despite a compromise reached by both parties, either the scope for conviction becomes minimal, or the life of the aggrieved party may be rendered miserable. In this way, the broader social good is served. The sensitivity inherent in family disputes, as well as the individual facts and circumstances of each case, cannot be overlooked.

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The counter-argument to the compoundability of offences under Section 498-A IPC is that permitting compounding would amount to legal recognition of violence against women, and that reconciliation cannot serve as a justifiable ground to condone such violence. Acceptance of this argument would imply that the law’s primary objective is to see criminal proceedings through to their logical conclusion and to punish the husband, regardless of the parties’ mutual desire to reconcile. In other words, whether or not reconciliation occurs, the husband must face prosecution and, if warranted, punishment, for Section 498-A to achieve its purpose. This reasoning, however, is fallacious. The objectives of Section 498-A are better served by allowing proceedings to take their natural course while taking into account the reconciliation that may have occurred between the parties. A balanced and holistic approach is necessary in addressing issues that affect family and social relations, with emphasis not solely on the punitive aspects of the law.

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In matters of this nature, the law should not stand in the way of genuine reconciliation or the restoration of harmonious relations between the husband and the estranged wife.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court, in B. S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana , reported in ( 2003) 4 SCC 675 , firmly held that, in order to serve the ends of justice, the High Court may, in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, quash criminal proceedings at the instance of a husband and wife who have amicably settled their disputes and wish to end the acrimony. However, the correctness of this decision was doubted by a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Anr. , reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 , and the matter was subsequently referred to a larger Bench. The larger Bench clarified that the High Court’s power to quash criminal proceedings, FIRs, or complaints in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct from the power conferred on a criminal court to compound offences under Section 320 CrPC. The High Court may quash criminal proceedings arising out of matrimonial disputes, including dowry-related cases or other family matters, where the alleged wrong is essentially private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. The decision is reproduced as follows –

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“48. The question is with regard to the inherent power of the High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings against an offender who has settled his dispute with the victim of the G crime but the crime in which he is allegedly involved is not compoundable under Section 320 of the Code.

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Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court

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which it has by virtue of it being a superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, 'nothing in this Code' which means that the provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e., to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.

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×××

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In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedituret id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest . The full import of which is wheneveranything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection.

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×××

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Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They

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are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

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×××

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The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for

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quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the C offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in K. Srinivas Rao vs. D.A. Deepa , reported in (2013) 5 SCC 226 , held that the High Court may quash criminal proceedings initiated pursuant to an FIR alleging an offence under Section 498-A IPC, even though such an offence is not compoundable, if the parties have reached an amicable settlement. Further, a Full Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. vs. Babita Raghuvanshi & Anr . , reported in (2013) 4 SCC 58 reaffirmed the decision in B. S. Joshi (supra), holding that the High Court, in exercise of its inherent powers, can quash criminal proceedings, FIRs, or complaints in

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appropriate cases to serve the ends of justice, and that Section 320 CrPC does not limit or affect the High Court’s powers under Section 482 CrPC.

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In view of the foregoing discussion, since the matter has been amicably settled between the parties, Petitioner No.1-Husband and Opposite Party No.2-Wife, as has already been acknowledged by the learned Judge, Family Court, Pattamundai, the criminal proceedings pending before the learned JMFC, Pattamundai, will have no further consequence and, therefore, deserves to be quashed. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.05.2017 passed by the learned JMFC, Pattamundai in G.R. Case No.357 of 2014 is hereby quashed. The CRLMC is allowed.

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(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge

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AKPradhan

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed Signed by: ANANTA KUMAR PRADHAN Designation: Sr. Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 14-Oct-2025 16:47:32

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Sk.Alim v. State of Orissa

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Sk.Alim v. State of Orissa

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