Ratikanta Satpathy Vs State

This Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 27.03.2010, passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Cuttack, in T.R. Case No.55 of 1996 (Sambalpur) / T.R. Case No.134 of 2004 (Bhubaneswar) / T.R. Case No.281 of 2007, arising out of Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No.59 of 1995, wherein the Appellant, Ratikanta Satpathy, was found guilty of offences under Sections 7/13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter, “the P.C. Act”). The Appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in default, to undergo R.I. for seven days for the offence under Section 7 of the P.C. Act, and R.I. for one year and a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default, to undergo R.I. for fifteen days for the offence under Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act, with the further direction that the sentences shall run concurrently.

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The factual matrix giving rise to the Appeal is that, the Appellant, while posted as S.D.O. (Electrical) at Kamakshyanagar in the district of Dhenkanal, being a public servant, committed criminal misconduct by corruptly obtaining a pecuniary advantage of Rs.300/as gratification to supply electrical connection to the L.I. Point to a farmer under the scheme meant for the SC & ST Society, intended for supply of free water to 160 cultivators of village Jaladharpur under Kamakshyanagar P.S. According to the prosecution, one of the cultivators, Rabinarayan Patra (the Informant) requested the Appellant to supply electrical connection to the L.I. Point to facilitate free water supply to his land. The Appellant demanded a sum of Rs.600/- as bribe and informed the complainant that the electrical connection cannot be supplied unless the bribe would be paid.

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On the request of the Informant, the Appellant asked him to come to his office the next morning with Rs.300/-, on the condition that the balance of Rs.300/- would be paid later. Not being acceptable to the informant, he reported the matter in writing to the Additional S.P. Vigilance, Cuttack, who directed the O.I.C. Vigilance P.S., Cuttack, to register the case under Sections 7/13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act (Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No.59 of 1995) and to lay a trap. The complainant was directed to attend the revenue Rest Shed of Kamakshyanagar on 20.11.1995, and preparations for the trap were made.

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Upon completion of the formalities, the trap was laid on 21.11.1995 at 8:20 a.m. The detection report was prepared following the trap and recovery of the tainted bribe money from the Appellant, and the matter was investigated by an Inspector of Vigilance. During

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the course of investigation, the I.O. recorded statements of witnesses, seized the tainted money, the collected hand wash samples of the Appellant in a bottle, as well as the wash solution of the magisterial witness, The Appellant’s won wearing apparels and the wash solution from its pocket preserved in bottles too was seized besides the Personal money of the Appellant amounting to Rs.20/- kept in his undergarment pocket, copies of the preparation report, and the concerned L.I. Point electric supply file under different seizure lists. The hand wash solution bottles were sent for chemical examination to S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar, and the chemical examination report was obtained. Sanction for prosecution against the Appellant was obtained from the G.A. Department, Government of Orissa, and upon completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted for the offences mentioned above.

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The plea of the Appellant before the trial court was one of complete denial, contending that the case against him had been falsely initiated.

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In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined six witnesses: P.W.1, the magisterial witness; P.W.2, the overhearing witness; P.W.3, the Informant; P.W.4, the Scientific Officer, S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar; P.W.5, the Junior Engineer (Electrical) at Kamakshyanagar, where the Appellant was working as S.D.O.; and P.W.6, the Investigating Officer. No evidence was adduced on behalf of the defence to support the Appellant’s case.

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The learned Trial Court, having relied upon the prosecution evidence, more particularly the testimonies of P.Ws. 1, 2, 4, and 5- together with the surrounding circumstances of the case, and taking

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into account the portions of evidence of P.W.3 supporting the prosecution version, held the Appellant guilty of the offences charged and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as discussed above.

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Mr. L. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant, while assailing the impugned judgment, argued that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charges and that the learned trial court erred both in appreciating the evidence and in applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, thereby arriving at an erroneous conclusion in holding the Appellant guilty. It was further submitted that the very genesis of the case i.e. the demand of bribe has not been proved. He emphasized that the Informant (P.W.3) has categorically stated that the Appellant never demanded nor accepted the tainted money; rather, the Informant forcibly thrust the money into his pocket, to which the Appellant not only protested but also shouted at him. Thus, the primary evidence with regard to demand and acceptance, which requires corroboration, does not support the prosecution version, particularly when the star witness, P.W.3, himself does not support the case.

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It was further contended that the trial court misconstrued the evidence of P.W.2, who had never stated before the I.O. during his examination in his earlier recorded statement, that the Appellant made a demand or that he witnessed the acceptance of money. Learned Counsel argued that the trial court overlooked the fact that the supply of electrical energy to the L.I. Point, which had been entrusted to the Agro-Industrial Corporation by the Government of Orissa for providing free irrigation water to farmers, did not rest

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entirely with the Appellant in his capacity as S.D.O. The said supply was contingent upon the completion of several other formalities such as the installation of the L.I. Point, installation of the meter, and submission of the testing report. On this note, it was further argued that as per the evidence of P.W.5, electrical energy could not have been supplied without a valid testing report, and it stood established that the said report was submitted only on 20.11.1995. Moreover, the electrical line could not have been charged without prior instruction from the Executive Engineer. Consequently, the allegation that the Appellant deliberately delayed the supply of electrical energy to the L.I. Point for illegal gratification cannot be sustained, as the essential formalities had not been completed to enable the Appellant to take action.

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It was further submitted that the responsibility entrusted to P.W.5 by the Agro-Industrial Corporation had already been discharged, and completion of the remaining work was beyond the control of the Appellant. Hence, the very question of demand of bribe does not arise. Learned counsel placed his reliance on the decision in Jamuna Choudhury and Others vs. State of Bihar, (1974) 3 SCC 774 , followed by the State of Orissa vs. Manogovinda Sahoo, ILR (2009) 1 Cuttack 606 . Drawing attention to these precedents and to the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, learned counsel submitted that the impugned judgment suffers from illegality, being contrary to the evidence on record, and therefore deserves to be set aside.

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Mr. Rizvi, learned counsel for the State (Vigilance), on the other hand, contended that ample evidence has been adduced

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through the witnesses substantiating the factum of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. He further argued that in order to prove the factum of demand and acceptance of gratification, it is not always necessary that such facts be proved by direct evidence; they may also be established by circumstantial evidence. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hazari Lal vs. State (Delhi Administration), (1980) 2 SCC 390 .

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He further submitted that P.W.1, the magisterial witness, P.W.2, the overhearing witness, and P.W.5 have consistently deposed about the manner in which the trap was laid, and that the demand and acceptance of bribe money by the Appellant that stood corroborated through their testimonies. This, according to him, gives rise to the application of Section 20 of the P.C. Act, where the statutory presumption operates in favour of the prosecution, and it becomes obligatory on the part of the Appellant to rebut the same.

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Mr. Rizvi also submitted that the defence plea of the Appellant-that the tainted money was forcibly thrust into his pocket by the decoy-remains unsubstantiated, inasmuch as no suggestion to that effect was put to any other witness except P.W.3, the complainant. He further contended that even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Appellant was not directly dealing with the particular work, that by itself does not exonerate him from criminal liability in view of the Explanation (d) to Section 7 of the P.C. Act. The said provision makes it explicit that a person who receives gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend to do, or is not in a position to do, or has not done, would

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nevertheless fall within the mischief of the section. Mr. Rizvi, therefore, urged that in light of the above statutory provision, the defence plea raised by the Appellant cannot withstand judicial scrutiny, and the prosecution evidence is sufficient to implicate him in the offences alleged. He submitted that the learned trial court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and has reached a just and proper conclusion in holding the Appellant guilty. Hence, the impugned judgment, according to him, calls for no interference.

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Keeping in view the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties, this Court has carefully examined the entire evidence on record. Admittedly, P.W.1, Budhinath Parida, a Dairy Inspector in the office of the Director of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services, Cuttack, was examined as an independent witness who had accompanied the Vigilance staff to Kamakshyanagar for the trap proceedings. P.W.2, Prasanna Kumar Swain, a Statistical Assistant in the same office, also accompanied the Vigilance team and was cited as an overhearing witness. P.W.3 is Rabinarayan Patra, the complainant, who allegedly offered a sum of Rs.300/- to the Appellant for facilitating electrical connection to the L.I. Point. P.W.4, Satyananda Maharana, Joint Director, S.F.S.L., Bhubaneswar, proved the chemical examination report marked as Ext.12. P.W.5, Ganesh Chandra Hembram, was serving as Junior Engineer (Electrical) at Kamakshyanagar at the relevant time, while P.W.6, Radhamohan Patra, was the Investigating Officer of the case.

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The learned defence counsel has laid emphasis on the evidence of the complainant, P.W.3, whose testimony constitutes

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the foundation of the prosecution case. In his deposition, P.W.3 stated that on the relevant day, i.e., 21.11.1995, he met the Appellant and requested him to provide electrical supply to the L.I. Point, for which he offered Rs.300/-. The Appellant, however, declined to accept the amount, whereupon the complainant forcibly thrust the money into the shirt pocket of the Appellant, to which the latter objected and shouted at him. It is an admitted position that P.W.3 was declared hostile and was cross-examined by the prosecution. Despite being confronted with leading questions, nothing material could be elicited from him to support the prosecution version. His testimony, even as a hostile witness, remained consistent insofar as he denied any demand or voluntary acceptance of money by the Appellant.

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This Court finds that the evidence of P.W.3, being the complainant and the only witness to the alleged demand and acceptance, does not substantiate the prosecution case. In the absence of credible proof of demand, which is a sine qua non for establishing an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the very foundation of the prosecution case appears to be shaken.

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As contended by the learned counsel for the Appellant, the surrounding circumstances of the case also warrant close scrutiny in order to determine whether there was, in fact, any demand or acceptance of illegal gratification. In this regard, the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2, and 5 assumes relevance. Among them, P.W.2 was cited as the overhearing witness, while P.W.5, the Junior Engineer

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(Electrical), was examined regarding the procedural aspects connected with supply of electricity to the L.I. Point.

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Upon careful examination of the deposition of P.W.2, it is found that though he stated in his examination-in-chief that he had witnessed the demand and acceptance of money by the Appellant, in his cross-examination he candidly admitted that he had not made any such statement before the Investigating Officer when his earlier statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded. When this contradiction was confronted to P.W.6, the Investigating Officer, during his deposition, he confirmed that P.W.2 had indeed not stated before him that he had seen the Appellant demanding or accepting the tainted money. This material omission, therefore, strikes at the root of the credibility of P.W.2’s testimony, rendering his evidence unreliable so far as the core issue of demand and acceptance is concerned.

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Coming to the testimony of P.W.5, he has deposed only with respect to the official procedure and formalities required for supply of electricity to the L.I. Point. In his evidence, he stated that though all formalities for supply of energy had been completed by March 1995, the essential steps such as submission of the test report, installation of the meter, and receipt of instruction from the Executive Engineer had not yet been complied with. He categorically stated that without these prerequisites, the Appellant, in his capacity as S.D.O. (Electrical), was not competent to order or effect the supply of electricity.

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In light of the above evidence of P.W.5, when the Investigating Officer (P.W.6) was confronted during cross-

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examination as to whether he had verified these aspects either before laying the trap or during the investigation, he answered in the negative. This omission assumes significance, for it raises serious doubt as to whether any work of the complainant was actually pending with the Appellant so as to afford him an occasion to demand illegal gratification.

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In such a factual scenario, the allegation that the Appellant deliberately withheld the complainant’s file or delayed the supply of electrical energy for want of bribe becomes doubtful. It is trite law that the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be invoked in the absence of proof of the foundational fact of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. The evidence of P.W.5 unequivocally establishes that as on the date of the alleged trap, the Appellant was not in a position to supply electricity, the necessary procedural formalities being incomplete. This circumstance, viewed in conjunction with the inconsistent and uncorroborated testimony of P.W.2 and the categorical denial by P.W.3, leads this Court to the conclusion that the demand of illegal gratification, which forms the ingredient of the charge under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

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In B. Jayaraj vs. State of A.P. reported in (2014) 13 SCC 55 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that –

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“7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position

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has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [(2010) 15 SCC 1] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [(2009) 3 SCC 779].

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Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.”

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court in it’s above decision held that failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification is fatal to the case, and mere recovery of the tainted amount from the accused, under Section 7 or Section 13 of the P.C. Act, would not by itself entail conviction. In the present case, as deposed by the complainant, the bribe money was forcibly thrust into the pocket of the Appellant. This naturally resulted in the pocket wash and hand wash turning pink, as the currency notes were smeared with phenolphthalein powder. Therefore, although recovery of the tainted money stood established, the same cannot be linked to a demand of bribe by the Appellant.

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Further, in Neeraj Dutta vs. State (NCT of Delhi) , reported in (2023) 4 SCC 731 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public

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servant, as a fact in issue, is a sine qua non for establishing guilt under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) of the P.C. Act, read as follows –

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“68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:

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(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and(ii) of the Act.

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(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.

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(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.

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(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

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(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

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(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

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(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt

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of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act.

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Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.

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(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

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(f) In the event the Complainant turns ‘hostile’, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.

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(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) of the Act.

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(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred

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to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.

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Keeping in view the aforesaid principles and the evidence of the prosecution, as discussed above, it is evident that there exists a gap between the alleged demand and acceptance of bribe in the present case. This goes to the root of the matter, as the evidence is inadequate to establish a nexus between the work entrusted to the Appellant, the alleged demand of bribe, and its acceptance. On a holistic consideration of the evidence, anomalies appear in the three essential aspects which are sine qua non to hold a public servant guilty of the offence. The specific fact, as stated by P.W.5, that no test report had been submitted prior to 20.11.1995 so as to enable the S.D.O. to issue direction for supply of electrical energy, nor was any instruction received from the Executive Engineer in that regard, completely rules out the role of the Appellant in proceeding with the file. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to believe that the there was any demand of bribe for non-supply of the connection. Thus, the prosecution case appears inadequate and incongruous to sustain a finding that the Appellant demanded or accepted the bribe money, which, according to the evidence, was thrust into his pocket and later recovered. The learned trial court, therefore, failed to appreciate the evidence and the law in its right perspective and consequently arrived at an erroneous conclusion in holding the prosecution to have proved the case. Accordingly, the impugned judgment suffers from illegality and is liable to be set aside.

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In the result, the impugned judgment and order dated 27.03.2010 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Cuttack in T.R. Case No.55 of 1996 (Sambalpur)/T.R. Case No.134

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of 2004 (Bhubaneswar)/T.R. Case No.281 of 2007, arising out of Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No.59 of 1995, are hereby set aside.

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Accordingly, the Appeal is allowed.

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(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge

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AKPradhan

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Signature Not Verified

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Digitally Signed Signed by: ANANTA KUMAR PRADHAN Designation: Sr. Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 14-Oct-2025 16:47:32

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Ratikanta Satpathy v. State

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Ratikanta Satpathy v. State

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