Allowed

Sumit Knit Fab through Its Proprietor Rishi Jethi v. Punjab Pollution Control Board

NGT1 Apr 2025IA No. 463/2024 in Appeal No. 37/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appellant challenged environmental compensation order imposed by Punjab Pollution Control Board for alleged violations. Tribunal held order unsustainable as Board failed to disclose quantum, methodology, and adverse inspection findings before imposing liability, violating natural justice. Appeal allowed; order quashed and respondent directed to pass fresh order after proper hearing.

What did the court decide?

Impugned order dated 24.07.2024 set aside; Environmental Compensation order quashed; Pending applications disposed of; fresh order to be passed after hearing.

Sumit Knit Fab through Its Proprietor Rishi Jethi vs… — Environment and Pollution | NGT (2025)

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BEFORE THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH NEW DELHI

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APPEAL NO. 37/2024 (I.A. NO.464/2024, I.A. NO.463/2024 AND I.A. NO.22/2025)

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IN THE MATTER OF:

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1.	M/S. SUMIT KNIT FAB Through its Proprietor Rishi Jethi, 3-b, Industrial Area-A Extension, Ghore Wali Road, Ludhiana, Punjab-141010 ...Appellant
	Verses
1.	PUNJAB POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD Through its Chairman, Vatavaran Bhawan, Nabha Road, Patiala
2.	PUNJAB POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD Through its Member Secretary, Vatavaran Bhawan, Nabha Road, Patiala
3.	ADDITIONAL SENIOR ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEER Punjab Pollution Control Board, Vatavaran Bhawan, Nabha Road, Patiala
4.	REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEER Punjab Pollution Control Board, Zonal Office-1, E648-B, Phase-V, Focal Point Ludhiana ...Respondent(s)
COU	NSELS FOR APPELLANT(S):
Mr.	A.R. Takkar, Ms. Devika Singh Roy Chowdhury, Ms. Aastha Tyagi
and	Mr. Manan Takkar, Advocates

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COUNSELS FOR RESPONDENT(S):

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Ms. Atika Singh and Ms. Richa Kapoor, Advocates for PSPCB

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CORAM:

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HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRAKASH SHRIVASTAVA, CHAIRPERSON HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR AGARWAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER HON’BLE DR. A. SENTHIL VEL, EXPERT MEMBER

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RESERVED ON: JANUARY 15, 2025 PRONOUNCED ON: APRIL 01, 2025

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JUDGMENT

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BY HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDHIR AGARWAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER

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This is an Appeal assailing the order dated 24.07.2024 (at page 103 of paper book) passed by Punjab State Pollution Control Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘PSPCB’ ) imposing environmental compensation of Rs.6,42,25,000/- upon appellant for the period of violation i.e., from 01.04.2005 to 25.04.2019 and directing appellant to deposit the said amount within 15 days failing which PSPCB shall be constrained to take action for the recovery of the said amount.

¶14

The appellant has mentioned in the Memo of Appeal that it has been preferred under Section 18(1) read with Sections 14, 15, 16 and 17 of National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as ‘NGT Act, 2010’ ) but when we confronted, it could not be disputed by appellant that the appellate power is conferred upon Tribunal only under Section 16 and reference to Sections 14, 15, 17 and 18 is an irregularity. Following the law that mere wrong mention of the provisions will not deprive an Adjudicatory Forum of entertaining a matter where the power

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is otherwise vested in any other provision, we ignore the irregularity and treat this Appeal under Section 16 of NGT Act, 2010.

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Impugned order dated 24.07.2024 shows that appellant-M/s. Sumit Knit is a small scale ‘Red Category’ unit engaged in the process of dyeing and washing of the garments. PSPCB found that the unit in question was running in violation of directions issued under Section 33A of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Water Act, 1974’ ) and Section 31A of Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Air Act, 1981’ ) whereupon directions were issued to Punjab State Power Corporation Limited vide PSPCB’s letter dated 02.08.2019 for disconnection of electric supply of appellant’s unit and electric connection was accordingly disconnected. Later on, the unit was granted consent under Water Act, 1974 and Air Act, 1981, both, valid upto 12.05.2020 and electric connection was also restored.

¶18

On a complaint received from the office of Monitoring Committee constituted by Tribunal vide letter dated 20.08.2020, a team of the officers of PSPCB was constituted and it visited the unit on 28.10.2020 when Proprietor of the industry could not produce old records, bills and justification regarding bills dated 14.08.2007 to 18.08.2007 for sweater over dyeing washing attached with the complaint.

¶19

It is mentioned in the impugned order, in para 7, that due to lack of complete record, the exact date of dyeing/washing unit of the industry could not be adjudged.

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The unit was further granted Consent to Operate (hereinafter referred to as ‘CTO’ ) under Water Act, 1974 valid upto 30.06.2025 for Zero Liquid Discharge.

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Further, a complaint was received from SL Verma whereupon the Committee was constituted to make enquiry and the said Committee submitted report making observations as under:

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“1. There is no account of 2026 KL. Whereas, the effluent may either be directly disposed off after the ETP plant to MC sewer without evaporation to save cost of energy involved in evaporation.

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2. There is possibility of unmetered water source from where the water is taken for processing activities but is not accounted in records.

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3. RO is not functioning properly and efficiently and there are chances that the industry might be discharging its treated effluent without reusing in the process.

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4. It is neither feasible not advisable to use treated effluent with such a high TDS of around 1300 ppm for boiler feed or for dyeing/washing process as it will affect the boiler Infrastructure as well as affect the quality of product being manufactured by the industry.

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5. The possibility of discharge of effluent through flexible pipe from ETP or RO plant can’t be ruled out.

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6. The industry is not treating whole of the effluent through RO plant and about 2026 KL of effluent was found unaccounted. Hence, the quantities of RO reject will be much more as compare to 658 KL as recorded by the industry.

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7. The hazardous waste of cat. 33.1 were found scattered here & there and no record was maintained.

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8. The industry has not provided proper display board outside the hazardous waste storage room as only a computerized paper is pasted there.

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9. The industry has failed to submit any record of bills or documents to justify the regular and periodic maintenance of RO plant. Further, no bill regarding change of membrane or RO plant was produced.

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10. The industry has not complied with the condition of consent for providing automatic dosing arrangement for optimum chemical/coagulants in Its ETP instead of manual system.

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11. It has been apprehended that domestic effluent of the industry might be discharged into sewer through toilets.

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12. The industry is not complying with the conditions of consent to operate granted to industry under Water Act, 1974 and authorization granted under the Hazardous and Other Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016.”

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PSPCB issued show cause notice dated 19.04.2024 (annexure A/37 at page 261) under Section 33A of Water Act, 1974 for revocation of CTO and revocation of authorisation under Hazardous and other Wastes (Management & Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as ‘HWMTM Rules, 2016’ ). The relevant extract of the show cause notice requiring appellant to reply reads as under:

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“And whereas, the matter has been considered by the Competent Authority and it has now decided to revoke consent to operate granted under Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, to revoke authorization granted under the Hazardous and other Waste (Management & Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016, to impose the Environmental Compensation on the industry for degrading the environment and to issue following directions u/s 33-A of the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, to the industry, after giving an opportunity of personal hearing before Chairman of the Board:-

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1. That the industry will dismantle and remove all outlets and stop forthwith discharging its trade effluent into Sewer or drain or through any other mode.

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2. That the industry will not restart any process unless all necessary water pollution control measures are taken and concentration of various pollutants in its treated effluent conforms to the standards laid down by the Board.

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3. That the industry will not restart discharging effluent until it obtains the consent of the Board u/s 25/26 of the Water

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(Prevention & control of Pollution) Act, 1974 as amended in 1988.

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4. That Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL) authorities will be directed to disconnect the supply of electricity available to the industry.

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5. That the industry shall deposit Environmental Compensation due to environmental damage cause by it.

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As such, you are, hereby given an opportunity of personal hearing before the Chairman of the Board at Vatavaran Bhawan, Nabha Road, Patiala on 25.04.2024 at 11:00 am to explain your position with respect to above said violations , failing which action as deemed fit in the matter shall be taken under the provisions of Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Hazardous and other Waste (Management & Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016 and proposed directions shall be confirmed without giving any further opportunity/ notice.”

¶46

The appellant submitted its reply dated 25.04.2024 (annexure A/39 at page 265) stating that the complaint is totally false. The appellant has got all requisite permissions and No Objection Certificates (hereinafter referred to as ‘NOCs’ ) from the concerned authorities including PSPCB and there is no violation of environmental laws.

¶47

Thereafter, it appears that personal hearing was accorded to appellant on 25.04.2024 and proceedings dated 29.04.2024 of personal hearing with regard to notice issued for directions under Section 33A of Water Act, 1974 and revocation of authorisation under HWMTM Rules, 2016 are on record as annexure A/40 at page 266. The proceedings show that after giving opportunity of personal hearing, Chairman of the Board took following decisions:

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“1. The consent to operate granted to the industry under the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and authorization granted under the Hazardous and other Waste (Management & Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016 be revoked.

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2. The directions u/s 33-A of the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 be confirmed for closure of the industry and disconnection of electric connection.

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3. All the D.G. sets existing in the premises of the industry be sealed.

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4. A reminder be issued to MCL in continuation to letter no. 163 dated 11.01.2021 and to Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Excise and Taxation Department, Ludhiana. In continuation to letter no. 165 dated 11.01.2021 to intimate the date & year from which the industry is doing dyeing/washing process.

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5. The amount of Environmental Compensation be calculated after receipt of reply from MCL and Excise and Taxation Department, Ludhiana.

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6. The Environmental Engineer, Regional Office-1, Ludhiana shall verify the year wise installation/addition of machinery by the industry and pursue the matter with MCL and Excise and Taxation Department for early response.”

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The proceedings of hearing dated 25.04.2024 further show that the appellant was required to ensure compliance of the decision taken during hearing and thereafter, formal order dated 29.04.2024 (Annexure A/40 at page 266) was passed.

¶56

Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that it was brought to the notice of Chairman, PSPCB that observations of inspection team made during its visit of the unit on 28.10.2020 show spot position as it was on that date. Earlier, industry was engaged in the work of knitting, raising, tabling and fuse printing etc. and tub dyeing was used as per demand and in case of fault during washing, cold dyeing was done in washing milling machines. The industry started its washing and dyeing work in 2019 after obtaining requisite permissions and NOC from PSPCB and other authorities after installing Zero Liquid Discharge plant. 7

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CTO was granted under Water Act, 1974 vide letter dated 13.05.2019 valid upto 12.11.2019 for trade effluent discharge at the rate of 75 KLD into sewer after treatment through Effluent Treatment Plant (hereinafter referred to as ‘ETP’ ). CTO under Air Act, 1981 was issued vide letter dated 13.05.2019 and valid upto 12.11.2019. Before expiry of the above CTO, unit applied for renewal of consent on 05.11.2019 and it was granted CTO under Water Act, 1974 and Air Act, 1981 valid upto 12.05.2020. Since the consent period expired on 12.05.2020, electric connection was disconnected on 21.05.2020. The industry again applied for renewal of consent which was granted on 24.07.2020 under Water Act, 1974 and Air Act, 1981 valid upto 23.01.2021.

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Appellant urged that prior to 2019, there was no washing and dyeing work carried out by the appellant. In the show cause notice, it was clearly mentioned that without complete record of Excise and Sale Tax Department, and bills of all dyeing and washing machinery, exact date of start of dyeing/washing unit by the industry cannot be adjudged. The relevant observations of PSPCB read as under:

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“And whereas, without complete report of Excise & Sale Tax Department and without complete bill of all dyeing/ washing machinery, the exact date of start of Dyeing/washing unit by the industry cannot be adjudged.”

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It is thus argued that without there being any material to adjudge that washing and dyeing work was carried out by appellant prior to 2019, PSPCB had no material to conclude that the appellant has carried out the work without any consent for the period prior to 2019 and, therefore, the impugned order imposing environmental compensation for the period of 2004-2019 is patently illegal and shows total non-application of mind.

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The appellant’s Counsel further submitted that no show cause notice was given to the appellant with regard to quantum of environmental compensation for the period it was to be computed and the environmental compensation has been computed on the recommendations of “Environmental Compensation Verification Committee” which is patently illegal and in utter violation of principles of natural justice.

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When questioned, the Learned Counsel for PSPCB stated that show cause notice was issued to appellant on 19.04.2024 and, thereafter, personal hearing was also granted on 25.04.2024 and the minutes of the proceedings dated 28.04.2024 regarding personal hearing are on record at page 266.

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The submissions advanced on behalf of appellant are primarily and substantially on the issue that there is no compliance of principle of natural justice and the principle of “audi alteram partem” has been grossly violated.

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The power of imposition of environmental compensation has not been conferred specifically upon Pollution Control Boards and Pollution Control Committees but it has been held that the power to give directions for compliance of the provisions of the environmental Statues includes power to apply principles of ‘Polluter Pays’ and direct the violator to pay environmental compensation. Such power to give directions has been conferred under Section 33A of Water Act, 1974; Section 31A of Air Act, 1981; and, Section 5 of Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ‘EP Act, 1986’ ).

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For demanding environmental compensation by applying principle of ‘Polluter Pays’, the principle of natural justice must be followed. The polluter should be given opportunity.

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Power to demand environmental compensation by issuing directions is quasi-judicial power. Explaining the meaning of the term ‘quasijudicial’, Supreme Court in Namit Sharma vs. Union of India , (2013) 1 SCC 745 has observed that it involves deciding a dispute and ascertaining the facts and any relevant law, but differs in that it depends ultimately on the exercise of an executive discretion rather than the application of law. When law commits to an officer, the duty of looking into certain facts not in a way which it specially directs, but after a discretion in its nature judicial, the function is quasi-judicial.

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Supreme Court in Namit Sharma vs. Union of India (supra) refers to the meaning of quasi-judicial in ‘Advanced Law Lexicon’ (3^rd Edn., 2005) by P. Ramanathan Aiyar, wherein it explains the expression ‘quasijudicial’ stating that ‘of, relating to, or involving an executive or administrative official’s adjudicative acts’. Considering the provisions of Right to Information Act, 2005 and the power exercised by Information Commissioner etc., Supreme Court held that Information Commissioner performs adjudicatory functions and a hierarchy of Appeal is also provided. The orders of Information Commission may have the effect of affecting rights of a person and, therefore, it decides a lis also. It thus, can be said that Information Commission is essentially quasi-judicial in nature.

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In State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. vs. Mahendra Pal, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 731, Supreme Court said that expression ‘quasi-judicial’

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is a term which stands midway a judicial and an administrative function. If an authority has any express statutory duty to act judicially in arriving at the decision in question, it would be deemed to be quasi-judicial. Where the function to determine a dispute is exercised by virtue of an executive discretion rather than the application of law, it is a quasijudicial function. A quasi-judicial act requires that a decision is to be given not arbitrarily or in mere discretion of the authority but according to the facts and circumstances of the case as determined upon an enquiry held by the authority after giving an opportunity to the affected parties of being heard or wherever necessary of leading evidence in support of their contention.

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In Anjum vs. Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board, Appeal No.28/2023, decided vide judgment dated 21.02.2024, while considering the power of the authority to issue directions affecting adversely a person, must comply with the principle of natural justice, has been recognized and in para 39 and 42, Tribunal has said as under:

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“39. The directions issued by Competent Authority under Sections 3 and 5 may be of different nature and characteristics. Some may be for execution of functioning of the concerned proponent and some may have adverse effect upon his right to carry on process/operation including fastening liability, financial or otherwise. The directions which would have adverse effect upon proponent in the matter of running of its process or project or industry or operation or otherwise confer any liability upon it, such directions, in our view, cannot be issued without complying with the principle of natural justice.

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xxx…………………………………….xxx………………………………xxx

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42. In our view, such directions when are adverse to any person who is to comply the same, such directions are quasi-judicial in nature for the reason that the authority which exercise such power not only is supposed to follow the principle of natural justice but the exercise of function is analogous to judicial authorities but exercised by nonjudicial authorities.”

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In Anjum vs. UPPCB (supra) , Tribunal in para 47 and 49 has further held as under:

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“47. Under EP Act 1986, Water Act 1974 and Air Act 1981, while exercising power of issuing directions, Competent Authority may issue such directions which may affect the proponent’s right of carrying on business i.e., industry etc. and such directions, therefore, must precede with application of principle of natural justice and whenever such power is exercised, it can be said to be an exercise of quasijudicial power and to that extent, the authority exercising such power would act as a quasi-judicial authority.

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xxx…………………………………….xxx………………………………xxx

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49. Therefore, we have no manner of doubt that an order passed by respondent imposing environmental compensation and requiring the person to pay the same by applying principle of ‘Polluter Pays’ is a quasi-judicial order as it imposes financial liability upon it and without giving an opportunity of hearing and complying with the principle of natural justice, such liability cannot be fastened upon it.”

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It cannot be doubted that whenever a pecuniary liability is thrown on a person, it results in evil consequences and such person cannot be saddled with such monetary liability, without giving any opportunity of hearing and complying with the principle of natural justice.

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In A. K. Kraipak vs. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCR 457 , it was held that rules of natural justice operate in areas not covered by any law. They do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. They are not embodied rules and their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. If that is the purpose, there is no reason why the principles of natural justice be not made applicable to administrative proceedings especially when it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial ones. An unjust decision in an administrative inquiry may have a more far reaching effect than decision in a quasi-judicial inquiry.

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In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. L. K. Ratna & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 71 ; Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613 ; and, C. B. Gautam vs. Union of India, (1993) 1 SCC 78 , it was held that the principles of natural justice must be applied in the unoccupied interstices of the Statute unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary.

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Applying the above principles, we are clearly of the view that whenever any direction is issued by Statutory Regulator for imposition of environmental compensation, it must observe, comply and follow strictly the principles of natural justice. Due opportunity of hearing must be accorded to the affected party. The disclosure of adverse material on which Statutory Regulator intends to form opinion of violation of environmental laws on the part of the defaulter or violator and the manner in which it proposes to impose environmental compensation, all the relevant material in this regard must be disclosed to the person concerned so as to give him adequate opportunity to submit its defence. If any material is relied to form an opinion against the person concerned without disclosing it but will vitiate the principle of natural justice.

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Therefore, we have no manner of doubt that an order passed by Statutory Regulator imposing environmental compensation and requiring the person to pay the same by applying principle of ‘Polluter Pays’ is a ‘quasi-judicial’ order as it imposes financial liability upon it and without giving an opportunity of hearing and complying with the principle of natural justice, such liability cannot be fastened upon it.

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Considering the issue raised in the present matter i.e., whether the order impugned in the present Appeal complied with the principles of

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natural justice, we have gone through the show cause notice dated 19.04.2024 (annexure A/37 at page 261), and find that appellant was not confronted with the manner, methodology and proposed quantum of environmental compensation. Similarly in the minutes/proceedings of personal hearing, we do not find that any such facts have been disclosed to the appellant and on the contrary, one of the decisions by Chairman of the Board is that the amount of environmental compensation be calculated after receipt of reply from MCL and Excise and Taxation Department.

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Therefore, with regard to computation of environmental compensation, its methodology, and the period for which it was to be computed and for the reasons it was to be computed, we do not find that the relevant facts were disclosed to the appellant and it was afforded any opportunity consistent with the principle of natural justice before passing the impugned order imposing environmental compensation of Rs.6,42,25,000/-.

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We also find that in the show cause notice and proceedings of personal hearing, the reference is with regard to proposed revocation of CTO under Water Act, 1974 and authorisation under HWMTM Rules, 2016 but in para 16 of impugned order, for calculation of the environmental compensation, the factor of PI i.e., Pollution Index, has been taken as ‘80’ on the ground that proponent i.e., appellant was violating Water Act, 1974 and Air Act, 1981 and is a ‘Red Category’ industry though in the show cause notice or in the proceedings, there is no reference of violation of the provisions of Air Act, 1981. Therefore, it is also evident that in the impugned order, PSPCB has taken reference of

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Air Act, 1981 which was not subject matter of show cause notice dated 19.04.2024 or the proceedings of personal hearing dated 25.04.2024 which are filed as annexure A/39 at page 265.

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Impugned order further shows that after affording personal hearing to appellant on 25.04.2024, the industry of the appellant was visited by the officials of the Board on 30.05.2024 to ensure compliance of the decisions taken in the hearing held on 25.04.2024 and the said team made certain observations which are reproduced in para 13 of the impugned order as under:

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“1. The Excise and Taxation Department, Ludhiana has submitted its report vide their letter no. 124 dated 13.05.2024 stating that the unit has made purchases from the firms dealing in dyes and chemicals in the year 2005 and is carrying out the dyeing process. The unit is in the business of dyeing of Garments since, 2005.

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2. The industry was in operation without valid consent to operate under the Water Act, 1974 and Air Act, 1981 from 2004 to 2019 & discharging untreated effluent into sewer.

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3. The industry was visited by Senior Officers of the Board on 03.01.2019 and observed that the industry had installed the ETP but untreated effluent was being discharged into sewer. The effluent samples were collected and as per analysis report, various parameters were found beyond the prescribed limits of the Board. The industry is still discharging effluent beyond limit since 03.01.2019 and failed to submit fresh sample analysis report till date.

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4. As per point no. 8 of report of committee, during 01 hour and 30 minutes, 300 ltr of RO reject was evaporated. Hence the evaporator has operational capacity of about 200 ltr/hr. As per record maintained by the industry, total RO reject generated from 01.01.2023 to 01.02.2024 was 658 KL, which is equivalent to 2 KLD of RO reject. Hence, in case, this evaporator would be operated for 10 hrs, it can evaporate about 2000 Ltr of RO reject and in 24 hrs it can evaporate 4.8 KL. The committee further reported that RO permeate was expected against 75% permeate received as per records maintained. Then, rest of the 25% should be the RO reject, which will be 18.750 KL i.e. 25 % of 75 KLD consented discharge. So, there is a gap of an average of 13.95 KLD, The industry has not installed EMF meter at UF reject.

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5. The Board Committee verified that the ZLD plant is designed for RO permeate 50 ppm TDS and TDS of re-use water was around 1267 ppm. It seems that the efficiency of RO Is near to 5 % against the consented discharge of 75 KLD.”

¶102

With regard to the above findings of the inspection team recorded during its inspection dated 30.05.2024, we do not find from record that any show cause notice or opportunity, disclosing the facts which were found adverse to the appellant by PSPCB, was ever issued.

¶103

Therefore, certain material, adverse to the interest of the appellant, which has been taken into consideration by PSPCB while passing the impugned order, was withheld from appellant and it is in utter violation of principles of natural justice.

¶104

It is also evident from the impugned order that after recording the findings of inspection team, regarding its inspection made on 30.05.2024, immediately thereafter, Chairman of Board decided to refer the matter to Environmental Compensation Verification Committee and upon its recommendations, impugned order has been passed. Therefore, even recommendations of Environmental Compensation Verification Committee were never confronted to appellant while the law is well settled that any material which is considered to be adverse to the person against whom an order is passed by the authority, it must be disclosed to such person before passing any order against its interest.

¶105

It is well settled that civil rights cannot be affected adversely without disclosing the material found adverse to the person concerned.

¶106

The procedure followed by PSPCB otherwise is clearly in utter violation of principles of natural justice.

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In the light of the facts discussed above, we are clearly of the view that impugned order dated 24.07.2024 passed by PSPCB is unsustainable, being in violation of principles of natural justice and also having travelled beyond the facts which were disclosed to appellant in the show cause notice and at the time of personal hearing.

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Appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 24.07.2024 is hereby set aside. Pending IAs stand disposed of accordingly.

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However, this order shall not preclude the respondent PSPCB from passing a fresh order after giving due opportunity of hearing to appellant and in accordance with law including compliance of principles of natural justice and the observations made in this judgment.

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PRAKASH SHRIVASTAVA, CHAIRPERSON

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SUDHIR AGARWAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER

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DR. A. SENTHIL VEL, EXPERT MEMBER

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April 1, 2025 Appeal No.37/2024 R

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Sumit Knit Fab through Its Proprietor Rishi Jethi v. Punjab Pollution Control Board

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Sumit Knit Fab through Its Proprietor Rishi Jethi v. Punjab Pollution Control Board

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

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