21. Learned counsel submitted that it is not only a case of relying on evidence given in preliminary enquiry prior to the charge memo, it is also a case of relying on unreliable and undependable witnesses as the witnesses have turned turtle in the cross-examination. In this regard, learned counsel for writ petitioner pressed into service a judgment of a Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in K.N.Ramesh Babu's case [K.N.Ramesh Babu Vs. Additional Director General of Police (Law and Order), Chennai – 4 and Another reported in (2018) 8 MLJ 129]. Placing reliance on this judgment, learned counsel submitted that this K.N.Ramesh Babu's case is an authority for the proposition that if evidence adduced in the Departmental proceedings is doubtful, nature of offence and background of motive cannot be inferred on the basis of mere preponderance of probabilities. K.N.Ramesh Babu's case is one where a Sub Inspector of Police faced disciplinary proceedings on the allegation that he had demanded and accepted illegal gratification for release of a person on bail. In this K.N.Ramesh Babu's case, in the enquiry, it came to light that witnesses had a motive or in other words, witnesses had an axe to grind. On this basis, Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court came to the conclusion that when witnesses in enquiry qua disciplinary proceedings are not reliable, charges as well as nature of offence qua delinquency cannot be inferred from such witnesses. In the instant case, though it is not a case of witnesses having motive, it comes across clearly that witnesses are not dependable / reliable as they have turned turtle and have said the complete converse / reverse of what they had said in the preliminary enquiry is learned petitioner's counsel say. In other words, in the case on hand, it is submitted that the evidence does not pass the muster or in other words, it does not pass the test of even preponderance of probabilities degree of proof as the witnesses have turned turtle in cross-examination and said the exact reverse/converse of what they have said in the preliminary enquiry. In criminal jurisprudence parlance, as an analogy it can be said that they had turned hostile. Therefore, the argument of the counsel for writ petitioner that processual law violation caused an infarct of the proceedings is sustained by negativing State counsel's argument that a mere procedural violation cannot be the basis to challenge a major punishment. The narrative thus far will make it clear that the statement and evidence given in preliminary enquiry has been taken into account. To be noted, this preliminary enquiry was prior to the charge sheet. Therefore, the second point cannot but be sustained.
