Yagnika Chaitanya Cotha Vs Chaitanya v Cotha

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NC: 2025:KHC:39888 CRL.RP No. 1321 of 2025

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 8^TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2025

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI V HOSMANI CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION NO. 1321 OF 2025

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BETWEEN:

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YAGNIKA CHAITANYA COTHA W/O CHAITANYA V COTHA, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, R/A NO.17, 3^RD FLOOR, MANTRI ALTIUS APARTMENTS, RAJ BHAVAN ROAD, BANGALORE 560001.

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…PETITIONER

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(BY SRI ARUN GOVINDRAJ, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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CHAITANYA V COTHA S/O C VINOD HAYAGRIV, AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS,.

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Digitally signed by ANUSHA V Location: High Court of Karnataka

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C VINOD HAYAGRIV S/O C V HAYAGRIV, AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS,

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C TRIVENI VINOD W/O C VINOD HAYAGRIV, AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS, RESPONDENTS NO.1 TO 3 ARE RESIDENTS OF NO.1/34, HANUMANTHAPPA LAYOUT, ULSOOR ROAD, BENGALURU 560042.

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…RESPONDENTS (BY SRI SIDDHARTH SUMAN, ADVOCATE FOR RESPT.NO.1) (BY SRI. MANDEEP KALRA, ADV. FOR HITESH GOWDA B.J., ADV. FOR RESPTS.NO.2 & 3)

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THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED U/S.397 R/W 401(FILED U/S.438 R/W SEC.442 BNSS) CR.P.C PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 01.09.2025 AND 02.09.2025 PASSED BY THE LXXIII ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS COURT, MAYO HALL, BENGALURU IN CRL.A.NO.25313/2025 (ANNEXURE A AND A1) AND ETC.

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THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI V HOSMANI

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ORAL ORDER

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Challenging orders dated 01.09.2025 and 02.09.2025 passed by LXXIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Court, Mayo Hall, Bengaluru, in Crl.A.no.25313/2025 at Annexures-A and A1 respectively and consequently pass an order restraining respondents, their agents etc., from dispossessing petitioner or disturbing her possession from matrimonial home/shared household situated at no.17, 3^rd Floor, Mantri Altius Apartments, Raj Bhavan Road, Bengaluru - 560001 (hereinafter referred to as ' Matrimonial Home '), this Revision Petition is filed.

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At outset, Sri Mandeep Kalra, learned counsel appearing for Sri Hitesh Gowda, advocate for respondents no.2 and 3 submitted, revision petition would not be maintainable relying on decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Amar Nath and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr. reported in (1977) 4 SCC 137 , as order impugned was an interim order. It was submitted, impugned order would not even answer description of an 'intermediate order', as clarified by Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-21 of Girish Kumar Suneja v. Central Bureau of Investigation reported in (2017) 14 SCC 809 :

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"21. The concept of an intermediate order was further elucidated in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551, by contradistinguishing a final order and an interlocutory order. This decision lays down the principle that an intermediate order is one which is interlocutory in nature but when reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings and thereby resulting in a final order.Two such intermediate orders immediately come to mind - an order taking cognizance of an offence and summoning an accused and an order for framing charges. Prima facie these orders are interlocutory in nature, but when an order taking cognizance and summoning an accused is reversed, it has the effect of terminating the proceedings against that person resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Similarly, an order for framing of charges if reversed as the effect of discharging the accused person and resulting in a final order in his or her favour. Therefore, an

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intermediate order is one which if passed in a certain way, the proceedings would terminate but if passed in another way, the proceedings would continue."

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In addition to above, Sri Siddharth Suman, learned counsel for respondent no.1, would contend that reliefs sought by petitioner in I.As.no.2 to 4 filed before Trial Court and I.A.no.1 filed before Appellate Court would be available only in case, petitioner were to establish her possession of premises or in part thereof, in question.

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Learned counsel, firstly, sought to refer to observation made by learned Trial Judge that only at time of arguments, it was disclosed that premises claimed as matrimonial home did not belong to respondent no.1 (petitioner's husband), but to respondent no.2 - her father-inlaw. It also noted that respondent no.2 (petitioner's father-inlaw) was stated to have issued notice to respondent no.1 for vacating said premises and apprehending existence of dispute with respondents no.2 and 3, who were senior citizens. It was further submitted, as early as in June 2025, respondent no.1 had made arrangements for alternative residence of petitioner and children and therefore, impugned order would be justified

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and not call for any interference, even if petition were maintainable. It was further submitted impugned order was an ex parte order on an interlocutory application filed in Appeal against ex parte interlocutory order refusing to grant interim protection to petitioner on ground that it was necessary to hear other side before passing orders. Under such circumstances, petitioner was not entitled for any relief either interim or final and sought dismissal of petition.

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In reply, Sri Arun Govindraj, learned counsel for petitioner would submit that petitioner had filed Crl.Misc. no.237/2025 under provisions of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short, ' Act ') and also filed I.As.no.1 to 4 of 2025. I.A.no.1/2025 was filed under Section 18 read with Section 23 of Act for direction to respondents to withdraw Security Guard deployed within matrimonial residence, etc.; I.A.no.2/2025 for protection against dispossession or disturbing possession of petitioner and her children from matrimonial home, from alienating or disposal of same etc.; I.A.no.3/2025 for direction to respondents to

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remove themselves from matrimonial home etc., and I.A.no.4/2025 for maintenance etc.

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It was submitted, on 22.08.2025, trial Court had allowed IA no.1 in part and expressing that response of respondents would be required, deferred consideration of IAs no.2 to 4. But, while providing interim protection, it had made an observation as follows:

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" IA.no.1 u/s. 18 r/w Section 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, 2005, filed by the petitioner is hereby allowed in part.

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The respondents are hereby restrained from aiding, abetting, or committing any sort of domestic violence on the petitioner.

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The respondents are hereby restrained from attempting to communicate with the petitioner in any form whatsoever with her or her parents, including p-3rsonal, oral, written, electronic, or telephonic contact.

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The respondents are restrained from circulating any messages about the petitioner and her parents among the petitioner's family, friends, or any third parties."

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It was submitted, aggrieved by refusal to grant

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interim orders on IAs no.2 to 4 as well as above observation,

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petitioner had preferred Crl.A.no.25313/2025 before City Civil

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and Sessions Judge, Mayo Hall, Bengaluru. In said appeal,

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petitioner had filed I.A.no.1/2025 under Section 19 read with Sections 23 and 28 of Act seeking for an interim order not only staying operation of above extracted observation order, but also refusing to grant consequential order restraining respondents from dispossessing petitioner from matrimonial home.

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It was submitted, on 01.09.2025, learned Appellate Judge had granted an interim order staying above observation, but had not granted consequential protection. Therefore, petitioner had moved matter for consideration of second part of prayer in IA no.1. On 02.09.2025, Appellate Judge passed an order stating that said prayer could be considered only after hearing respondents. It was submitted, refusal to grant interim protection to petitioner even when there was clear averments in petition along with material to establish that petitioner was residing in matrimonial home, refusal to grant interim protection to petitioner was not justified, rendering petitioner and her children vulnerable.

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It was submitted, petitioner had pleaded that she

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and respondent no.1 being members of an Association, were

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required to attend Annual General Body Meeting scheduled on 24.07.2025 at Udaipur. It was submitted petitioner, her children and respondent no.1 attended same. But on returning, it was found that respondents no.2 and 3 had broke-open lock of matrimonial house, removed door latches and kept clothes and other articles of petitioner and her children packed and they had also locked master bedroom, which was hitherto occupied by petitioner.

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It was submitted provisions of Act entitled wife to protect her possession of matrimonial home. Under above circumstances, refusal to provide interim protection would amount to determination of rights and therefore, impugned order could not be stated to be an interim order. Hence, Revision Petition was maintainable and sought for allowing it.

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Heard learned counsel and perused material on

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record.

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Admittedly, order impugned are at interim stage in appeal against an exparte interim order in original proceedings. Both Courts were considering applications based only on assertions and material of petitioner. Though, learned counsel

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for respondents wanted to present their material before this Court to contest petitioner's assertions, since said material was not available before Appellate Court/Trial Court, this Court desisted from receiving same. Legality of impugned order has to be tested based on assertions and material, which were available at time of passing order. It is further noted that this Court on 03.09.2025 has granted an interim order restraining respondents no.1 to 3 from dispossessing petitioner from matrimonial home.

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Prima facie as per petitioner's assertions, petitioner was residing in matrimonial house along with her children and respondent no.1; while, respondents no.2 and 3 were stayed elsewhere. Even if as observed by trial Court that respondent no.1 was issued with notice to vacate said premises, same would not either indicate or establish that petitioner was not in possession or residing in matrimonial house. Though respondent no.1 claims to have made alternative arrangement of residence for petitioner and children in a premises equal in all respects, said assertion and material to substantiate same is yet to be placed on record. In meanwhile, when petitioner is

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alleging imminent threat of dispossession and issuance of notice for vacating by respondents no.2 and 3 would prima facie support petitioner's assertions, it was not appropriate for trial Court to have refused interim protection. On other hand, observation made by it (extracted above) would justify, if not indicate manner of dispossession, which would run counter to spirit of provisions of Act. Observation made with reference to Section 19 (1) (f) of Act, could be made only at time of disposal of application and not at interim stage, that too, if circumstances warranting such observations were made out.

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Likewise, when appellate Court appreciated petitioner's contention and granted interim order of stay of observation, it would be justified in denying interim protection against dispossession as a natural consequence at least until appearance of respondents and placing any material contradicting petitioners' assertions. In light of same, it is held that orders impugned herein denying interim protection would not be interim orders, but one that would determine rights of parties and thus revisable. It is in this context held that Revision Petition is maintainable.

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Though, Crl.A.no.25313/2025 is filed by petitioner herein against refusal to grant interim orders on I.As.no.2 to 4, present revision petition is filed challenging interim order denying interim protection against dispossession only. Learned counsel for petitioner on instructions, fairly submitted that petitioner would not pursue Appeal in other respects and be satisfied to pursue other reliefs before trial Court itself.

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Even learned counsel for respondents would submit that instead of keeping Appeal pending, it would be appropriate to relegate parties to pursue applications before trial Court itself, but in time bound manner.

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Said submission appears just and proper, as it is also seen that this Court has granted interim order protecting petitioner from dispossession on appreciation of above facts and circumstances, and fact that respondents herein are yet to appear and contest petitioner's assertions in petition/applications before trial Court.

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Therefore, it is found appropriate to relegate parties to trial Court to pursue pending IAs.no.2 to 4 by permitting respondents to appear and contest applications by filing

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objections along with material, direct trial Court to consider same and pass orders on merits of applications/petition in time bound manner and continue interim protection granted herein till then.

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In view of above, revision petition is allowed, interim order granted on 02.09.2025 restraining respondents no.1 to 3 from dispossessing petitioner from matrimonial home shall continue till trial Court considers and pass appropriate orders on I.A.no.2, subject to its outcome.

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It is clarified that all contentions of both parties are kept open and trial Court would be at liberty to pass any appropriate order without being bound by observations made by this Court in course of this order. To facilitate early disposal of applications, respondents are permitted to file objections to applications/petition within three weeks and trial Court is directed to expedite consideration of pending applications, especially I.A.no.2 as early as possible, in accordance with law.

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It is further clarified that trial Court would be at liberty to proceed with applications separately as found appropriate.

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