Allowed

Sri Shivaraju T S v. State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC9 Jul 2024WP/2538/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A Tahsildar challenged the State Government's Section 17(A) prior approval granting the Lokayuktha authority to investigate him. Finding the approval order unreasoned, arbitrary and based on no legal or acceptable material, the High Court quashed it insofar as the petitioner was concerned, distinguishing the Apex Court's Section 19 sanction judgment as inapplicable to Section 17(A).

What did the court decide?

Impugned approval order quashed only in so far as petitioner is concerned; no opinion expressed on its merits regarding the Assistant Commissioner.

Sri Shivaraju T S Vs State of Karnataka — Corruption | Karnataka HC (2024)

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NC: 2024:KHC:26119 WP No. 2538 of 2024

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 9^TH DAY OF JULY, 2024

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR WRIT PETITION NO. 2538 OF 2024 (GM-RES)

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BETWEEN:

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SRI. SHIVARAJU T.S, S/O SRINIVASAMURTHY, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, WORKING AS OFFICE ASSISTANT, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT.

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RESIDING AT THOTAGERE VILLAGE, DASANAPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK, BENGALURU - 562 123.

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…PETITIONER

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(BY SRI. K.N. PHANINDRA, SR. COUNSEL FOR

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Digitally signed by YAMUNA K L Location: High Court of Karnataka

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SRI. SUBRAMANI M.A, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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STATE OF KARNATAKA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU - 560 001, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY.

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KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTHA, M.S. BUILDING, BENGALURU - 560 001

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NC: 2024:KHC:26119 WP No. 2538 of 2024

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REPRESENTED BY REGISTRAR.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. SUDEV HEGDE, AGA FOR R1; SRI. B.B. PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R2)

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THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER BEARING NO. RD 68 ADE 2021 DATED 09/08/2023 PASSED BY THE R1 (ANNEXURE-A) IN SO FAR AS IT RELATES TO THE PETITIONER AND ETC.,

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THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING: ORDER

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In this petition, petitioner seeks quashing of the impugned order at Annexure-A, dated 09.08.2023, whereby respondent No.1 granted approval in favour of respondent No.2-Lokayuktha to conduct an enquiry/inquiry/investigation against the petitioners, Shivaraju.T.S., and Arul Kumar, the Assistant Commissioner, Doddaballapur Sub Division.

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Heard learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, learned AGA for respondent No.1 and learned Counsel for respondent No.2 and perused the material on record.

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A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the petitioner was appointed as a Tahsildar in the year 2017 and was serving at various places. On 05.07.2021, the petitioner was promoted to the cadre of Tahsildar Grade-I and

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thereafter, he was transferred to the post of the Tahsildar, Doddaballapura Taluk, in which the aforesaid Mr. Arul Kumar was working as the Assistant Commissioner. There were Revenue proceedings between two private parties in relation to which, the petitioner, who was working as a Tahsildar made certain changes in the Revenue Records, which was challenged before the aforesaid Mr. Arul Kumar, who was a Assistant Commissioner in an appeal under the provisions of the Land Revenue Act. At that stage, pursuant to a complaint said to have been given by one Anand against the aforesaid Mr. Arul Kumar-Assistant Commissioner, respondent No.1 proceeded to pass the impugned order granted prior approval under Section 17(A) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for short ‘PC Act’) for the purpose of conducting enquiry/inquiry/investigation against the petitioner and the aforesaid Mr. Arul Kumar-Assistant Commissioner.

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Aggrieved by the impugned order at Annexure-A, dated 09.08.2023, granting approval as against the petitioner herein, he is before this Court by way of the present petitioner.

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In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the material on record,

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learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the impugned order at Annexure-A, dated 09.08.2023, in order to point out that apart from the fact that complaint by the complainant/Anand was only as against the Mr. Arul KumarAssistant Commissioner and not against the petitioner herein, the only/sole reason for granting approval under Section 17(A) of the PC Act was on the basis of a letter/communication dated 16.07.2021, which in turn refers to a complaint said to have been given against both petitioner and the aforesaid Mr. Arul Kumar-Assistant Commissioner. It is submitted that except for citing the said reason, which does not disclose absolutely any application of mind, no other reason is forthcoming in the impugned order so as to warrant grant of approval as against the petitioner herein and consequently, the impugned non-speaking and unreasoned order suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and non-application of mind and the same deserves to be quashed.

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In support of his submissions learned Senior Counsel places reliance upon the following judgments of this Court in the case of MAHESH.S.R. Vs. THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER AND THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY

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AND OTHERS in WP.No.250/2021 and MR. ARUL KUMAR Vs. STATE BY REVENUE DEPARTMENT AND OTHERS in WP.No.28622/2023 and H.V.SRIDHAR Vs. THE STATE OF

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KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER in WP.No.13773/2021.

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Per contra, learned AGA would support the impugned

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order and submits that the present petition is not maintainable and the same is liable to be dismissed.

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Learned AGA as well as learned Counsel for respondent No.2-Lokayuktha would submit that the petition filed against granting of sanction/approval under Section 17(A) of the PC Act is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. In support of his submissions, they placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CENTRAL

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BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND OTHERS Vs. PRAMILA

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VIRENDRA KUMAR AGARWAL AND ANOTHER - (2020) 17

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Supreme Court Case 664.

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Before adverting to the rival submissions and the impugned order, it would be necessary to extract the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Arul Kumar’s case supra in relation to grant of prior approval under Section 17(A) of the PC Act. In the said judgment, the Co-ordinate Bench of this

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Court has referred to earlier judgments of the Hon’ble Apex

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Court as well as this Court and as held as under:

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"10. Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, was brought into force on 26.07.2018. Section 17A of the said Act, reads as follows:

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“ 17-A. Enquiry or inquiry or investigation of offences relatable to recommendations made or decision taken by public servant in discharge of official functions or duties .—(1) No police officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under this Act, where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties, without the previous approval -

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(a) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of that Government;

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(b) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of that Government;

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(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed:

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Provided that no such approval shall be necessary for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any undue advantage for himself or for any other person:

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Provided further that the concerned authority shall convey its decision under this section within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month.”

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In terms of the above extracted provision of law introduced by an amendment, no Police Officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act, where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decisions taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties without the previous approval of the officer or authority concerned.

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11. Clause (a) thereof provides that in case of public servant who is or was employed in connection with the affairs of the Union at the time when the offence alleged to have been committed, the previous approval of the Central Government shall be obtained. Clause (b) likewise provides that in case of a public servant who is or was an employee in connection with the affairs of the State at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committee, the approval of the State Government shall be obtained before proceeding. Clause (c) provides that in case of any other person who comes within the definition of public servant previous approval of the competent authority to remove him from office at the time when the offence alleged to have been committee should be obtained. The narrative hereinabove cannot but indicate that the object of the Section was to protect public servants from malicious, vexatious or baseless prosecution. However, if enquiry into the circumstances in which the

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alleged administrative or official act was done by the public servant or where malfeasance committed by the public servant which would involve an element of dishonesty or impropriety is to be proceeded against, the approval of the competent authority is required.

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12. In my considered view, Section 17A of the Act and its purport must be observed with complete strictness bearing in mind public interest and protection available to such officers against whom offences are alleged, failing which many a time it would result in a malicious prosecution. Section 17A of the Act is clearly a filter that the prosecution must pass in order to discourage or avoid vexatious prosecution, though cannot be considered as a protective shield for the guilty, but a safeguard for the innocent.

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13. The provision (supra) was also considered by the Apex Court in the case of YESHWANTH SINHA v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION¹ . The Apex Court though did not consider as to how the previous approval of the competent authority has to be taken, but considered the amendment and its importance in the following paragraphs:

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" 117. In terms of Section 17-A, no police officer is permitted to conduct any enquiry or inquiry or conduct investigation into any offence done by a public servant where the offence alleged is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by the public servant in discharge of his public functions without previous approval, inter alia, of the authority competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been

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1 (2020) 2 SCC 338

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committed. In respect of the public servant, who is involved in this case, it is clause (c), which is applicable. Unless, therefore,

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there is previous approval, there could be neither inquiry or enquiry or investigation. It is in this context apposite to notice that the complaint, which has been filed by the petitioners in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 298 of 2018, moved before the first respondent CBI, is done after Section 17-A was inserted. The complaint is dated 4.10.2018. Para 5 sets out the relief which is sought in the complaint which is to register an FIR under various provisions. Paras 6 and 7 of the complaint are relevant in the context of Section 17-A, which read as follows:

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“6. We are also aware that recently, Section 17-A of the Act has been brought in by way of an amendment to introduce the requirement of prior permission of the Government for investigation or inquiry under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

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7. We are also aware that this will place you in the peculiar situation, of having to ask the accused himself, for permission to investigate a case against him. We realise that your hands are tied in this matter, but we request you to at least take the first step, of seeking permission of the Government under Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act for investigating this offence and under which, “the concerned authority shall convey its decision under this section within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month”.

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(emphasis supplied)

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118. Therefore, the petitioners have filed the complaint fully knowing that Section 17-A constituted a bar to any inquiry or enquiry or investigation unless there was previous approval. In fact, a request is made to at least take the first step of seeking permission under Section 17A of the 2018 Act. Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 298 of 2018 was filed on 24.10.2018 and the complaint is based on non-registration of the FIR. There is no challenge to Section 17A. Under the law, as it stood, both on the date of filing the petition and even as of today, Section 17-A continues to be on the statute book and it constitutes a bar to any inquiry or enquiry or investigation. The petitioners themselves, in the complaint, request to seek approval in terms of Section 17-A but when it comes to the relief sought in the writ petition, there was no relief claimed in this behalf.

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119. Even proceeding on the basis that on petitioners' complaint, an FIR must be registered as it purports to disclose cognizable offences and the Court must so direct, will it not be a futile exercise having regard to Section 17-A. I am, therefore, of the view that though otherwise the petitioners in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.298 of 2018 may have made out a case, having regard to the law actually laid down in Lalita Kumari [Lalita kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 524], and more importantly, Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, in a review petition, the petitioners cannot succeed. However, it is my view that the judgment sought to be reviewed, would not stand in the way of the first respondent in Writ Petition (Criminal) No.298 of 2018 from taking action on Ext. P-1, complaint in accordance with law and subject

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to first respondent obtaining previous approval under Section 17-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act."

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The Apex Court has considered the importance of previous approval of the competent authority in the afore-extracted judgment.

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14. Section 17A of the Act casts an obligation of application of mind on the part of the Competent Authority in three situations. The Section makes it clear that no officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investigation without previous approval. Therefore, the approving authority will have to look into the materials, apply its mind in all the three contingencies i.e., enquiry or inquiry or investigation. Though, enquiry and inquiry are often used interchangeably, there exists a difference between the two. Etymologically, the source of both enquiry and inquiry could be the same as ‘en’ is derived from French and ‘in’ is from Latin. Inquiry has a formal and official ring to it. Enquiry is informal and can be unofficial. Enquiry could even mean, to question; Inquiry is a formal investigation; investigation is a search. Therefore, the act casts an obligation of application of mind upon the authority to consider whether approval is sought for an enquiry, inquiry or an investigation. It becomes imperative for the authority to apply its mind to what is brought before it, as application of mind is the bedrock of any order that an authority passes, failing which, it would be contrary to the principles of natural justice, as non-application of mind is in itself violative of principles of natural justice.

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15. Application of mind by an authority is demonstrable only in the order that the

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authority makes, for the order to demonstrate application of mind by the authority, it must contain the reasons, as recording of reasons in an order is the only way that one can construe such application of mind. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker, to the controversy in question and the decision arrived at. Reason and application of mind are impregnable for an order to sustain the scrutiny of law, be it administrative or quasi judicial. Reasons in every circumstance need not be elaborate, but nevertheless should bear application of mind. The case at hand and the order impugned will have to be tested on the anvil of the mandate of the statute, the intent behind its enactment and the rule of application of mind.

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16. The order granting approval reads as follows:

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“ ಸ�ಾ�ರದ ಆ�ೇಶ ಸಂ�ೆ� : �ಆಸುಇ 61 �ೆಇ� 2023,

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�ೆಂಗಳ�ರು

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��ಾಂಕ :28.08.2023

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ಪ��ಾ�ವ�ೆಯ ! �ವ"�ರುವಅಂಶಗಳ$�ೆ%&ೆಯ ! , '�ೕ ಅರುಳ()*ಾ+ , �ೆ . ಎ . ಎ- . ( $ . .ೆ�ೕ ) $ಂ�ನ ಉಪ�1ಾ2ಾ3�ಾ" . �ೊಡ6ಬ8ಾ9ಪ:ರ ಉಪ�1ಾಗ , �ೊಡ6ಬ8ಾ9ಪ:ರಪ�ಸು�ತಸ�ಾ�ರದಉಪ�ಾಯ�ದ'� , ಆ<�ಕ ಇ&ಾ�ೆಇವರ�ರುದ=ದಆ>ೋಪಗಳಬ2ೆ? ಭ�AಾBCಾರಪ�Dಬಂಧಕ �ಾFG , 1988 ರಕಲಂ 17( ಎ ) ರI Jಾಗೂಸ�ಾ�ರದಸುKೊ�ೕ&ೆ ಸಂ�ೆ� : �ಆಸುಇ 64 ಎ�L 2022. ��ಾಂಕ :09.12.2022 ರನMಯತN�ೆ�ೈ2ೊಳ9ಲುಅಪರP ೕ- ಮJಾN�ೇ�ಶಕರು , ಕ�ಾ�ಟಕ &ೋ�ಾಯುಕ� P ೕ- �1ಾಗ ಇವ"2ೆ ಪSTಾ�ನುಮDNೕI ಆ�ೇ'ಸ&ಾU�ೆ .”

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Though the order does refer to certain proceedings, it does not indicate as to why

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investigation should be permitted. Section 17A of the Act being a protective filter against frivolous prosecution, the State ought to have applied its mind before permitting investigation. In this regard, it becomes necessary to notice the statement of objections. Paragraph 9 of which reads as follows:

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“9. It is respectfully submitted that, the Revenue Department, forwarded the proposal of the Additional Director General of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Bangalore on 28.07.2023 with the following opinion/recommendation.

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“… The Revenue Department has agreed to the proposal to grant prior permission to conduct inquiry/investigation against the said officer/employee under Section 17(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as the allegation alleged by the complainant appears to be bona fide.”

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(Emphasis added)

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The allegation against the petitioner is said to be bona fide. The averment in the statement of objection is that the petitioner has acted as a quasi-judicial authority in deciding an appeal. If there is no other attribute to the petitioner for deciding the said case, it cannot be that it becomes an attribute at the hands of certain disgruntled complainants.

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17. In the aforesaid circumstance, it becomes apposite to notice the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar vs. Union of India and others² , wherein it has held as follows:

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2 (1999) 7 SCC 409

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“35. Now when show-cause notice was issued to the assessee he was also asked to show cause as to why penalty be not imposed upon him. The stand of the Union of India before us, as stated in the counter affidavit, is:

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"It was observed that the petitioner in his capacity as adjudicating authority came to the conclusion that the party M/s HVPL had clandestinely cleared the goods with an intention to evade the payment of duty. He also ordered for the confiscation of the goods and confirmed the duty. In these circumstances, he would have imposed appropriate penalty on the party. It was under these circumstances, that the impugned charge-memo was issued."

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And further it appeared "that the discretion in this regard did not appear to have been exercised clearly and reasonably". It is not that non-levy of penalty by the appellant in his adjudication order was mere omission. The order is silent as to why he did not think it fit to impose any penalty on the assessee. In the case of the transporter who was also proceeded against the appellant did not impose any penalty as he said he (transporter) being the owner of a public vehicle. The transporter was merely cautioned "not to repeat such an act, as the same would be viewed seriously in future". The third noticee was also cautioned. Rather non-levy of penalty by the appellant on the assessee was intentional as he himself in his explanation dated 18-11-1996 said :

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(1) On going through the records of the case he was aware that there was no conclusive evidence against the assessee and the material evidence on record was not sufficient

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to sustain the charges levelled against the party.

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(2) He took a pro-Revenue stance in this case although there was perhaps a case, at least an arguable one, in their favour and his conclusion regarding mens rea on the part of the assessee was also based purely on circumstantial evidence; and that it was a weak case for the Department which he could uphold only on placing a little extra reliance on the evidence on record.

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(3) It would have been unfair to impose penalty on the assessee since the penal provisions should be invoked only in cases where the adjudicator is fully convinced with the material and there is direct evidence substantiating the guilt of the noticee and this view was fully supported by the judgments of the High Court, some High Courts and the Tribunal.

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(4) He had a nagging feeling that had he imposed any penalty on the assessee, they would have gone on appeal before the Appellant Tribunal and the Department would have not only lost the case in terms of penal action but probably the confirmation of the duty demanded could have been jeopardized.

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40. When we talk of negligence in a quasi-judicial adjudication, it is not negligence perceived as carelessness, inadvertence or omission but as culpable negligence. This is how this Court in State of Punjab v. Ex-Constable Ram Singh interpreted "misconduct" not coming within the purview of mere error in judgment, carelessness or negligence in performance of duty. In the case of K.K. Dhawan the allegation was of conferring undue favour upon the assessees. It was not a case of negligence as such.In

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Upendra Singh case the charge was that he gave illegal and improper directions to the assessing officer in order to unduly favour the assessee. The case of K.S. Swaminathan was not where the respondent was acting in any quasi-judicial capacity. This Court said that at the stage of framing of the charge the statement of facts and the charge-sheet supplied are required to be looked into by the court to see whether they support the charge of the alleged misconduct. In M.S. Bindra case where the appellant was compulsorily retired this Court said that judicial scrutiny of an order imposing premature compulsory retirement is permissible if the order is arbitrary or mala fide or based on no evidence. Again in the case of Madan Mohan Choudhary which was also a case of compulsory retirement this Court said that there should exist material on record to reasonably form an opinion that compulsory retirement of the officer was in public interest. In K.N. Ramamurthy case it was certainly a case of culpable negligence. One of the charges was that the officer had failed to safeguard government revenue.

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In Hindustan Steel Ltd. case it was said that where proceedings are quasi-judicial penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party charged had acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. This Court has said that the penalty will not also be imposed merely because it is lawful so to do. In the present case, it is not that the appellant did not impose penalty because of any negligence on his part but he said it was not a case of imposition of penalty. We are, however, of the view that in a case like this which was being adjudicated upon by the appellant imposition of penalty was

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imperative. But then, there is nothing wrong or improper on the part of the appellant to form an opinion that imposition of penalty was not mandatory. We have noticed that the Patna High Court while interpreting Section 325 IPC held that imposition of penalty was not mandatory which again we have said is not a correct view to take. A wrong interpretation of law cannot be a ground for misconduct. Of course it is a different matter altogether if it is deliberate and actuated by mala fides.

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42. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer cannot take place on information which is vague or indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in such matter. There must exist reasonable basis for the disciplinary authority to proceed against the delinquent officer. Merely because penalty was not imposed and the Board in the exercise of its power directed filing of appeal against that order in the Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to proceed against the appellant. There is no other instance to show that in similar case the appellant invariably imposed penalty."

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(Emphasis supplied)

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The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment was dealing with performance of quasi judicial function; allegations qua such function in the wake of disciplinary proceedings being initiated. The Apex Court holds that performance of quasi judicial function cannot result in departmental enquiry unless there is any attribute beyond what is alleged. If the Apex Court holds that no departmental enquiry can be initiated, setting criminal law into motion can hardly be justified. On all the aforesaid reasons, the mandate of Section 17A of the Act and the

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judgments of the Apex Court quoted supra, the petition deserves to succeed.

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18. For the aforesaid reasons, the

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following:

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ORDER

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i) The writ petition is allowed;

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ii) The impugned order in No.SiAaSuE 61 KEV 2023, Bengaluru dated 28.08.2023 passed by the first respondent, stands quashed. As a consequence, pending I.A.No.1/2024 stands disposed."

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As it is clear from the ratio of the aforesaid judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, it is incumbent upon respondent No.1 to assign valid and cogent reasons by passing a speaking order with proper application of mind before coming to the conclusion that prior approval can be granted in favour of respondent No.2-Lokayuktha to conduct an enquiry/inquiry/investigation against the petitioner for alleged offences under the provisions of the PC Act.

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In this context, it is relevant to state that apart from the fact that the original complaint by Anand was not even filed as against the petitioner, except for referring to a communication dated 16.07.2021, which was an internal communication between the Lokayuktha Police Officers, there is absolutely no other material/reasons forthcoming in the

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impugned order which would warrant grant of approval as against the petitioner. It is also pertinent to note for the purpose of satisfying myself as to the validity, legality and correctness of the impugned order, learned AGA was directed to produce the original records and the same has been placed before this Court.

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A perusal of the aforesaid original records containing the internal communication and other papers will clearly indicate that there is neither legal nor acceptable material that was placed before the State Government by the Lokayuktha, so as to justify the State Government to grant approval as against the petitioner herein.

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Under these circumstances, having regard to the complete lack of legal or acceptable material justifying grant of approval as against the petitioner coupled with the ratio of the judgments of this Court referred to supra, I am of the view, that the impugned order passed by respondent No.1 is an unreasoned, cryptic, laconic, arbitrary and non-speaking order without any application of mind, thereby violating principles of natural justice insofar as the petitioner is concerned and the same deserves to be quashed.

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Insofar as the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND

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OTHERS Vs. PRAMILA VIRENDRA KUMAR AGARWAL AND

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ANOTHER - (2020) 17 Supreme Court Case 664 relied upon by learned the Counsel for respondent No.2 is concerned, the said judgment was rendered in the context of Section 19 of the PC Act, which mandates that unless failure of justice was occasioned, it would not be permissible to interfere with an order granting sanction/approval. The scope and ambit of Section 17(A) and Section 19 of the PC Act being completely different and mutually exclusive from one another, the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

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CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND OTHERS Vs.

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PRAMILA VIRENDRA KUMAR AGARWAL AND ANOTHER -

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(2020) 17 Supreme Court Case 664 is clearly not applicable to the facts of the instant case. Under these circumstances, no reliance can be placed upon the aforesaid judgment by respondent No.2 in support of their contention.

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In the result, I pass the following:

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ORDER

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i) The petition is hereby allowed.

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ii) The impugned order at Annexure-A, dated 09.09.2023 is hereby quashed only in so far as the petitioner is concerned.

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iii) It is made clear that quashing of the impugned order only as against the petitioner herein will not be construed or treated as expressing any opinion on the merits of the impugned order, as against the Assistant Commissioner.

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Sd/JUDGE

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PHM List No.: 1 Sl No.: 3 CT: BHK

Sri Shivaraju T S v. State of Karnataka

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Sri Shivaraju T S v. State of Karnataka

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

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