A renewed challenge to industrial land acquisition was barred by res judicata and constructive res judicata, with suppression of earlier litigation also defeating writ relief. The court held Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act inapplicable to KIAD Act acquisitions and dismissed the appeal without costs.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 02ND DAY OF MARCH, 2021
PRESENT
THE HON’BLE MRS.JUSTICE B.V.NAGARATHNA
AND
THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
WRIT APPEAL No.1451 OF 2018 (LA – KIADB)
BETWEEN:
SRI. ANANTHASWAMY, S/O. LATE PATEL CHIKKAHANUMAIAH, AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS, R/AT PATEL HOUSE, AVALAHALLI, BANGALORE – 560 026. BENEFIT SENIOR CITIZEN NOT CLAIMED. ... APPELLANT
(BY SRI. B.V.RAMAN, ADVOCATE)
AND:
ENTERPRISE, REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, OFFICE AT NO.1, MIDFORD HOUSE, MIDFORD GARDEN OFF. M.G. ROAD, BANGALORE – 560 001. ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. VANI.H., AGA FOR R-1; SRI.P.V.CHANDRASHEKAR, ADVOCATE FOR R-1 & R-2; SRI. R.V.S.NAIK, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI. T.SURYANARAYANA & SRI. NITIN PRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR C/R-4)
THIS APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 25/04/2018 IN WP 19348-349/2016 AND 23686-696 [LA-KIADB] PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE OF THIS HON’BLE COURT AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW THE SAID WRIT PETITION.
THIS APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, NAGARATHNA, J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
The legality and correctness of the order dated 25.04.2018 passed in WP Nos.19348-349/2016 and 23686-696/2016 by the learned Single Judge is called in question in this intra-Court appeal.
appellant/petitioner had questioned the preliminary notifications bearing No.CI 196 SPQ 98 dated 19.12.1998, 29.01.2003 issued under Section 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘KIAD Act’ for the sake of
convenience) at Annexures-A & B respectively and the declaration and final notifications bearing No.CI 196 SPQ 98 dated 08.04.2003 and 05.07.2003 issued under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act at Annexures-C & D respectively to the writ petition. The petitioner sought for a declaration that the acquisition proceedings initiated under the KIAD Act had lapsed as per Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2013 Act’ for the sake of brevity) in respect of the following lands:
| Sl. No. | Village | Sy. No. | Extent |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Hosakerehalli | 71/2 | 7A 6G |
| 2 | Pantharpalya | 30 | 1A 23G |
| 3 | Pantharpalya | 26 | 1A 08G |
| 4 | Pantharpalya | 27 | 1A 02G |
| 5 | Pantharpalya | 28 | 20 guntas |
| 6 | Pantharpalya | 29 | 33 guntas |
| 7 | Pantharpalya | 31 | 08 guntas |
| 8 | Pantharpalya | 32 | 26 guntas |
| 9 | Pantharpalya | 33 | 2A 1G |
| 10 | Pantharpalya | 34 | 1A 31G |
| 11 | Pantharpalya | 35 | 1A 08G |
| 12 | Pantharpalya | 36 | 1A 10 G |
| 13 | Pantharpalya | 45 | 2A 16G |
No.4. and Smt. Vani H., learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent No.1 and perused the material on record.
for Respondent No.4 as well as learned counsel appearing
for the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (‘KIADB’ for short) submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition for two main reasons: firstly, that the appellant herein suppressed the fact that he had earlier approached this Court in W.P.Nos.43358-59/2003 assailing the very same acquisition process. Those writ petitions were partly allowed by order dated 18.12.2003, inasmuch as, 40% of the acquisition was quashed, whereas 60% of the acquisition was sustained against the appellant herein. The appellant as well as respondent No.4 had preferred their respective appeals. W.A.No.1558/2005 was filed by the appellant herein and that the said appeal was allowed on 29.06.2005, following the judgment and order passed in W.A.No.72/2004 and connected writ appeals disposed of on 28.02.2005. The entire acquisition was upheld by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court. That this very appellant had approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.1562-1563/2006 which was converted into C.A.Nos.3492-94/2005 connected with C.A.No.2141/2006, (which was filed by the appellant herein). The Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the co-ordinate Bench of this Court and the said civil appeals were dismissed on 20.04.2006. The petitioner has not disclosed any of these facts in the writ petition. Therefore, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of suppression of material facts.
For a better understanding of the matter, it would be useful to extract the prayers sought by the appellant in the writ petition as under:
“Wherefore, the Petitioners pray for:
i) ”Issue writ of certiorari quashing the preliminary notifications bearing No.CI 196 SPQ 98 dated:19.12.1998, 29.01.2003 issued u/s 28(1) of the KIAD Act 1966, produced and marked as ANNEXURE-A and B respectively in so far as the Petitioners lands are concerned.
C and D respectively in so far as the Petitioner’s lands are concerned.
of the writ petition seeking relief of quashing of acquisition notifications cannot be reconsidered and the writ petition has been rightly dismissed on the principles
of res judicata as well as constructive res judicata. In this regard, it would be useful to note that this very appellant/petitioner had approached this Court in WP.Nos.43358-59/2003. The said writ petition was partly allowed by the learned Single Judge of this Court by order dated 18.12.2003, inasmuch as 40% of the acquired lands i.e. the acquisition of the lands for township, construction of conventional centre are concerned was quashed. Insofar as 60% of the lands sought to be acquired for the formation of peripheral road, link road, service road and ramps are concerned were upheld.
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the Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.1562-63/2006 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was converted to C.A.No.2141/2006, and which was connected with C.A.Nos.3492-94/2005 and other Civil Appeals. The said Civil Appeals were also dismissed on 20.04.2006 and the said judgment is reported as State of Karnataka and Another vs. All India Manufacturers Organisation and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 683 (All India Manufacturers Organisation) . Paragraph 79 of the said judgment reads as under:
"79. The learned Single Judge erred in assuming that the lands acquired from places away from the main alignment of the road were not a part of the Project and that is the reason he was persuaded to hold that only 60% of the land acquisition was justified because it pertained to the land acquired for the main alignment of the highway. This, in the view of the Division Bench, and in our view, was entirely erroneous. The Division Bench was right in taking the view that the Project was an integrated project intended for public purpose and, irrespective of where the land was situated, so long as it arose from the terms of the FWA, there was no question of characterising it as unconnected with a public
purpose. We are, therefore, in agreement with the finding of the High Court on this issue."
(a) The decision of the Apex Court in
M.Nagabhushana vs. State of Karnataka, [2011 (3)
SCC 408] , (M.Nagabhushana) in respect of acquisition for the very same project under consideration on the principles of constructive res judicata and principles of analogous to the same can also be usefully cited as follows:
“In view of such authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench
of this Court, there can be no doubt that the principles of constructive res judicata, as explained in Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC, are also applicable to writ petitions.”
(b) The Apex Court, in Shankar Co-op Housing Society ltd., vs. M.Prabhakar & Others, [2011 AIR SCW 3033] , (M.Prabhakar) held that a second writ petition on the same cause of action cannot be filed and an issue which had attained finality cannot be entertained. In the said case, the Apex Court held that the High Courts ought not to entertain and grant relief to a writ petitioner, when there is inordinate delay and unexplained delay in approaching the Court and that subsequent writ petition is not maintainable in respect of an issue concluded between the parties in the earlier writ petitions.
(c) In fact, the Apex Court has also held that decisions rendered in a public interest litigation has a binding effect vide All India Manufacturers Organisation (supra) as long as the litigant acts bona fide , as a judgment in such a case binds the public at large and bars any member of the public from coming all the way
to the Court and raising any connected issue or an issue which has been raised should have been raised on an earlier occasion by way of public interest litigation.
(d) In Forward Construction Co. and Others vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and
Others, [AIR 1986 SC 391] , (Forward Construction Co.) the Apex court found fault with the High Court in holding that the earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata as one of the grounds taken in the subsequent petition was conspicuous by its absence in the earlier petition. Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC was relied upon to observe that any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in such suits shall be deemed to be a matter directly or substantially issue in such suit. According to the Apex Court an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or
defence. According to the Apex Court, the principle underlying Explanation IV is that there the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. It was further held that Section 11 of the CPC applies to the public interest litigation as well but it must be proved that the previous litigation was the public interest litigation, not by way of a private grievance, which was bonafide which is common and is agitated in common with others.
(e) In fact, in Manipur Vasant Kini vs. Union
of India & Others, [1998 (3) KLJ 121] , ( Manipur Vasant Kini), a Division Bench of this Court has held that principle of res judicata applies even to public interest litigation initiated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even though such proceedings are not governed by the Code of civil procedure. A decision given on merits in respect of a public right claimed by the petitioners in common with others, would bind not only the petitioners,
but also all other persons interested in such right and would operate as res judicata barring subsequent petition in respect of same matters.
(f) Nagaraj (Dead) by LRs And Others vs. B.R. Vasudeva Murthy And Others, [2010 (3) SCC
353], (Nagaraj (Dead) by LRs) is also a case pertaining to the constructive res judicata. The Apex Court held that if a ground of attack had not been taken in any earlier proceedings, the same cannot be raised in a subsequent proceeding because of the principle of constructive res judicata under explanation 4 to Section 11 of the Code which is applicable to writ petitions.
original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We have closely perused the memorandum of the writ petition filed by the appellant herein. Paragraph 10 thereof reads as under:
“10. The Petitioner has not filed any other Writ Petition with regard to the subject matter pertaining to the above Writ Petitions.”
The aforesaid pleading is false and this is a clear case of S uppressio veri, Suggestio falsi.
vs. Steel Authority of India limited and others,
[2008 (12) SCC 481] , (K.D.Sharma), wherein it has been held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching the writ Court must come with clean hands and put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. Where there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, the petition may be dismissed at
the threshold without considering the merits of the claim. The same rule was re-iterated in the case of G.Jayashree and others vs. Bhagwandas S.Patel and others, [2009 (3) SCC 141], (G.Jayashree) and also in Dalip Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, [(2010) 2 SCC 114] (Dalip Singh).
wherein it has been categorically held that Section 24 (2) of 2013 Act is not applicable to an acquisition proceeding initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act.
“ 24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894-
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the
commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”
“11. Section 24(1) begins with a non-obstante clause and covers situations where either no award has been made under the Land Acquisition Act, in which case the more beneficial provisions of the 2013 Act relating to determination of compensation shall apply, or where an award has been made under Section 11, land acquisition proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as if the said Act had not been repealed.
(underlining by us)
25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anasuya Bai
while setting aside the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court has held as under:
“28. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment however, has quashed the acquisition proceedings itself holding that they have lapsed. For this purpose, the High Court has taken aid of Section 24 of the new LA Act in the following manner: ( Anasuya Bai case, SCC OnLine Kar. paras 13-14)
‘13. It is also noted that the acquisition proceedings including preliminary and final declaration have been passed under the provisions of the KIAD Act. But there is no provision under the KIAD Act to pass an award and award has to be passed only under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. If the award has to be passed under the LA
Act, whether the new Act can be pressed into service to hold the acquisition proceedings are lapsed on account of nonpassing of award within a period of 5 years under Section 11. If the award is passed under the LA Act, the enquiry has to be conducted by the Deputy Commissioner or Collector before passing the award. Section 11A contemplates that if the award is not passed within 2 years from the date of publication of the final declaration, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall automatically stands lapsed. It is no doubt true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karnataka has held that Section 11-A of the Act is no application in respect of the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act. We have to consider in this appeal as to whether Section 24(2) of the new Act is applicable in order to hold that the acquisition proceedings deemed to be lapsed due to non-payment of compensation and nonpassing of the award within a period of five years from the date of declaration and with effect from non-payment of compensation to the landowners.
provisions of the new Act cannot be made applicable on account of nonpayment of compensation within a period of five years.’
“29. The appellant has not challenged the validity of the aforesaid provisions. Therefore, on a combined reading of the provisions of Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, it is clear that on the publication of the Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act i.e. from 30-3-2004, the land in question vested in the State free from all encumbrances by operation of Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act, whereas the land acquired under the said Act vests only under Section 16 thereof, which runs as under:
‘ 16.Power to take possession.- When the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the
Government, free from all encumbrances.’
30. On a comparison of the aforesaid provisions, namely, Section 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act with Section 16 of the said Act, it is clear that the land which is subject to acquisition proceeding under the said Act gets vested with the Government only when the Collector makes an award under Section 11, and the Government takes possession. Under Section 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, such vesting takes place by operation of law and it has nothing to do with the making of any award. This is where Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act are vitally different from Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act.
‘It is considered necessary to make provision for the orderly establishment and development of industries in suitable areas in the State. To achieve this object, it is proposed to specify suitable areas for industrial development and establish a Board to develop such areas and make available lands therein for establishment of industries.’
acquisition of land for public purpose and for payment of compensation. Acquisition of land under the said Act is not concerned solely with the purpose of planned development of any city. It has to cater to different situations which come within the expanded horizon of public purpose. Recently, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra held that Section 11-A of the said Act does not apply to acquisition under the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966.
supplemental to it. Therefore, the ratio in Mariyappa is not attracted to the facts of the present case.
36. Following the aforesaid well-settled principles, this Court is of the opinion that there is no substance in the contention of the appellant that acquisition under the KIAD Act lapsed for alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Section 11-A of the said Act. For the reasons aforesaid, all the contentions of the appellant, being without any substance, fail and the appeal is dismissed. ”
State of Maharashtra [(2011) 3 SCC 1] (Girnar Traders (3)), to hold that the provisions of the LA Act, 1894 and the BDA Act, 1976 being distinct, Section 24(2) of 2013 Act, is not applicable to an acquisition under the BDA Act and also in so far as acquisition under the KIAD Act is concerned. Therefore, the aforesaid dictum is
conclusive and is squarely applicable to the case on hand. Section 24 of 2013 Act does not apply to acquisition initiated under provisions of KIAD Act. Therefore, point No. 3 could be accordingly answered.
Thus, from the aforesaid dicta of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the applicability of Section 24 of 2013 Act to acquisition of land under KIAD Act is excluded.
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of a notification. Chapter III of the Act deals with establishment and constitution of the board. While the functions and powers of the Board are delineated in Chapter IV, Chapter V deals with finance, accounts and audit. Chapter VI deals with application of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974 and non-application of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, to Board premises. Chapter VII deals with acquisition and disposal of land. The provisions of Chapter VII apply to such areas from such dates as have been notified by the State Government under sub-Section (3) of Section 1. The procedure for acquisition of land is enunciated under Section 28 of the Act, which reads as under:
“28. Acquisition of land: (1) If at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land.
(2) On publication of a notification under subsection (1), the State Government shall serve notice upon the owner or where the owner is not
the occupier, on the occupier of the land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein to show cause, within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, why the land should not be acquired.
(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit.
(4) After orders are passed under sub-section (3), where the State Government is satisfied that any land should be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification issued under subsection (1), a declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be made to that effect.
(5) On the publication in the official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (4), the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances.
(6) Where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (5), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorised
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by it in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.
(7) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the State Government or any officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf may take possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.
(8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired.”
compensation, which is extracted as under:
“29. Compensation: (1) Where any land is acquired by the State Government under this Chapter, the State Government shall pay for such acquisition compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(2) Where the amount of compensation has been determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement.
(3) Where no such agreement can be reached, the State Government shall refer the case to the
Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid.
(4) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (3), the Deputy Commissioner shall serve notice on the owner or occupier of such land and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein to appear before him and state their respective interests in the said land.”
development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act and not otherwise. Thus, the main object of the KIAD Act is not acquisition of land.
enhancement of compensation by the reference Court by the land owner seeking a reference for a higher compensation. Part IV dealt with apportionment of compensation, while Part V of the said Act concerned with payment. Acquisition of land for companies was dealt with in Part VII of the said Act and a special procedure was prescribed. Part VIII pertained to miscellaneous provisions.
interpretation of statute. One such principle is that the Court is not entitled to read words into a provision of an Act or Rule for, the meaning is to be found within the four corners of the provision of an act or rule, as in the instant case. Therefore, while it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or lacuna, on the other hand, effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature. Thus, the golden rule of construction is that the words of a provision of a statute, or rule must be first understood in the natural, ordinary
or popular sense. Phrases and sentences must be construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. In other words, the golden rule
is that the words of a statute prima facie be given an ordinary meaning. Natural and ordinary meaning of words should not be departed from “unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning”. Such a meaning cannot be departed from by the judges “in light of their own views as to policy” unless it is shown to adopt a purposive
interpretation of the statute, which does not arise in the instant case.
“Thus, an ‘ordinary meaning’ or ‘grammatical meaning’ does not imply that the Judge attributes a meaning to the words of a statute independently of their context or of the purpose of the statute, but rather that he adopts a meaning which is appropriate in relation to the immediately obvious and unresearched context and purpose in and for which they are used.”
under LA Act, 1894 and not any acquisition initiated under any other Central or State enactment. Therefore, the words “ acquisition proceedings initiated under any other enactment ”cannot be added or supplemented by the Court after the expression “ in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894” under both sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 24 of 2013 Act. Further, the short title of Section 24 of 2013 Act reads as “Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.” This is another indication that Section 24 applies only to those acquisition “initiated” under the provisions of LA Act, 1894.
provisions of LA Act, 1894. Thus, if acquisition is initiated under any other Central or State enactment, Section 24 does not apply.
“114. Repeal and Saving : (1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals.”
“6. Effect of repeal .- Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not.-
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid;
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.”
However, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would
apply only when a saving clause as per subsection 2 of Section 14 is not expressly provided under 2013 Act. Section 24 of the 2013 Act, which is in the nature of a saving clause has created new rights in favour of land owners whose lands had been acquired under LA Act, 1894. Sub-section (1), lays down the conditions when the
land acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894, would be amenable to the provisions of 2013 Act or, continued under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894, on certain conditions or circumstances prevailing. Under subsection (2) of Section 24, the Parliament has, by a deeming provision, intended that if certain conditions are satisfied, the acquisition proceedings initiated under the LA Act, 1894, shall be deemed to have lapsed.
under any other law, then in my view Section 24 would not be applicable to such acquisitions. As already noted, KIAD Act, being distinct having a different object and scope and acquisition of lands being only incidental to the main object and scope under the said Act, the acquisition proceedings initiated under the said Act cannot be considered on par, so as to hold that land acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act are “land acquisition proceedings initiated under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894".
itself has been conscious of the fact that 2013 Act repeals and substitutes only LA Act, 1894, and not any other Central enactment or for that matter any other State enactment dealing with acquisition of lands. This is evident from Section 105 of the 2013 Act, which reads as under:
“105. Provisions of this Act not to apply in certain cases or to apply with certain modifications: (1) Subject to sub-section (3), the provisions of this Act shall not apply to the enactments relating to land acquisition specified in the Fourth Schedule.
(2) Subject to sub-section (2) of Section 106, the Central Government may, by notification, omit or add to any of the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule.
(3) The Central Government shall, by notification, within one year from the date of commencement of this Act, direct that any of the provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation in accordance with the First Schedule and rehabilitation and resettlement specified in the Second and Third Schedules, being beneficial to the affected families, shall apply to the cases of land acquisition under the enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule or shall apply with such exceptions or modifications
that do not reduce the compensation or dilute the provisions of this Act relating to compensation or rehabilitation and resettlement as may be specified in the notification, as the case may be.
(4) A copy of every notification proposed to be issued under sub-section (3), shall be laid in draft before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in disapproving the issue of the notification or both Houses agree in making any modification in the notification, the notification shall not be issued or, as the case may be, shall be issued only in such modified form as may be agreed upon by both the Houses of Parliament.”
“THE FOURTH SCHEDULE
[See section 105]
LIST OF ENACTMENTS REGULATING LAND ACQUISITION AND REHABILITATION AND RESETTLEMENT
enumerated in the Fourth Schedule to the 2013 Act or State enactments.
"43. Therefore, the acquisition in these writ petitions having been initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act, it cannot be held that the said acquisition has been initiated
under the provisions of the LA Act, 1894. More significantly, the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anasuya Bai's case is directly on the point of inapplicability of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of 2013 Act to an acquisition initiated under the provisions of the Act in question, which has been ignored in J.Venkatesh Reddy while expressing a contra opinion.
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the Division Bench of this Court in H.N.Shivanna to hold that in the absence of any time limit fixed under the provisions of KIAD Act for passing of an award, it would have to be made within a reasonable time, which is two years and if the award has not been passed within the said time, it would lead to grant of declaration that the acquisition has lapsed. More pertinently, having regard to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.Nagabhushana and Anasuya Bai , which are directly under the provisions of KIAD Act, the judgment in Ram Chand's case , which is concerning a situation prior to the insertion of Section 11-A to 1894 Act would also not apply. Consequently, the judgment of this Court in H.N.Shivanna cannot be held to be good law so as to have a binding effect. As already noted, H.N.Shivanna has ignored the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.Nagabhushana . Further, Anasuya Bai has also relied upon, inter alia, M.Nagabhushana to set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. Further, this Court in Ashwathanarayana , did not refer to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Offshore Holdings (P) Limited and Girnar (3), but, reliance was
placed on H.N.Shivanna to grant relief to the petitioners therein. But in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bangalore Development Authority, which arose from the judgment of this Court in Ashwathanarayana , it could be observed that H.N.Shivanna is no longer good law. Therefore, the petitioners herein cannot be granted relief on the basis of the dictum of the Division Bench in H.N.Shivanna and reliance placed on the said judgment by learned counsel for the petitioners is of no assistance to them. This is because the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.Nagabhushana and Anasuya Bai rendered under the provisions of the KIAD Act hold the field. Similarly, the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Offshore Holdings (P) Limited and Bangalore Development Authority which are rendered under the provisions of the BDA Act, 1976 are binding on this Court.
observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bangalore Development Authority and another vs. State of Karnataka and another, [(2018) 9 SCC 122 : AIR Online 2018 SC 876], the same is impliedly over-ruled even though the said observations were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of an acquition made under the provisions of BDA Act. Moreover, Anasuya Bai, which is a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court under KIAD Act holds the field and is binding on this Court.
2020 SC 1496] (Indore Development Authority) , wherein it has been held that where an acquisition is initiated only under the provision of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the benefit of Section 24(2) of 2013 Act would apply:
"95. Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 read with the non-obstante clause provides that in case of proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894 the award had not been made under Section 11, then the provisions of the Act of
2013, relating to the determination of compensation would apply. However, the proceedings held earlier do not lapse. In terms of Section 24(1)(b), where award under Section 11 is made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Act of 1894. It contemplates that such pending proceedings, as on the date on which the Act of 2013 came into force shall continue, and taken to their logical end. However, the exception to Section 24(1)(b) is provided in Section 24(2) in case of pending proceedings; in case where the award has been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, the physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and such proceedings cannot continue as per the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013.
24(2) has retroactive operation with respect to the acquisitions initiated under the Act of 1894
and which are not completed by taking possession nor compensation has been paid in spite of lapse of 5 years and proceedings are kept pending due to lethargy of the officials. The drastic consequences follow by the provisions contained in Section 24(2) in such cases.
(underlining by us)
Single Judge was right in holding that the provisions of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, is not applicable to an acquisition proceeding initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act. Hence, we find no merit in the appeal.
51. The appeal is hence dismissed .
However, we refrain from imposing costs on the
appellant.
In view of the dismissal of the appeal, all pending applications stand dismissed.
Sd/JUDGE
Sd/JUDGE
KTY CT:SN
3 issues framed by the court
Could the acquisition notifications be challenged again despite the earlier adjudication, including on additional material?
Did suppression of the earlier litigation disentitle the appellant to discretionary writ relief?
Could acquisition initiated under the KIAD Act lapse under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
State of Karnataka and Another vs. All India Manufacturers Organisation and OthersRelied on¶65
(2006) 4 SCC 683 · Who else cites this
M.Nagabhushana vs. State of KarnatakaRelied on¶73
[2011 (3) SCC 408] · Who else cites this
Shankar Co-op Housing Society ltd., vs. M.Prabhakar & OthersRelied on¶77
[2011 AIR SCW 3033] · Who else cites this
Forward Construction Co. and Others vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and OthersRelied on¶82
[AIR 1986 SC 391] · Who else cites this
Manipur Vasant Kini vs. Union of India & OthersRelied on¶86
[1998 (3) KLJ 121]
Nagaraj (Dead) by LRs And Others vs. B.R. Vasudeva Murthy And OthersRelied on¶90
[2010 (3) SCC 353] · Who else cites this
K.D.Sharma vs. Steel Authority of India limited and othersRelied on¶98
[2008 (12) SCC 481] · Who else cites this
G.Jayashree and others vs. Bhagwandas S.Patel and othersRelied on¶100
[2009 (3) SCC 141] · Who else cites this
Dalip Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and othersRelied on¶100
[(2010) 2 SCC 114] · Who else cites this
Delhi Development Authority vs. Sukhbir Singh and othersRelied on¶114
[(2016) 16 SCC 258] · Who else cites this
Munithimmaiah v. State of KarnatakaRelied on¶151
[(2002) 4 SCC 326] · Who else cites this
Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Bangalore Development AuthorityRelied on¶151
[(2011) 3 SCC 139] · Who else cites this
Girnar Traders (3) v. State of MaharashtraRelied on¶152
[(2011) 3 SCC 1] · Who else cites this
Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of IndiaRelied on¶193
[AIR 2002 SC 1351] · Who else cites this
Mrs.Premakala Prabhakara Reddy and another vs. State of Karnataka and othersRelied on¶256
[2019 (3) AKR 657]
H.N.Shivanna and others vs. State of Karnataka, Department of Industries and Commerce, Bengaluru and anotherDisapproved¶266
[2013 KCCR 2793 DB]
AshwathanarayanaExplained¶265
Ashwathanarayana
Bangalore Development Authority and another vs. State of Karnataka and anotherRelied on¶268
[(2018) 9 SCC 122 : AIR Online 2018 SC 876] · Who else cites this
Indore Development Authority vs. ManoharlalRelied on¶270
[AIR 2020 SC 1496] · Who else cites this
10 provisions across 5 enactments
ANANTHASWAMY
THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE
THE KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD
THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD, (BMICP)
M/S NANDI INFRASTRUCTURE CORRIDOR, ENTERPRISE
B.V.NAGARATHNA
N.S.SANJAY GOWDA
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
