Dismissed

Naresh Ganjhu v. Union of India through National Investigating Agency, New Delhi

Jharkhand HC7 Apr 2026Cr.A(DB)/82/2026

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court dismissed a bail appeal filed by a NIA accused under UAPA. The court held that allegations are prima facie true and delay does not outweigh statutory restraints, rejecting parity claims based on co-accused bail orders.

What did the court decide?

Bail prayer dismissed; appellant remains in judicial custody.

Naresh Ganjhu Vs Union of India through National… — Bail and Remand | Jharkhand HC (2026)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

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Criminal Appeal (DB) No.82 of 2026

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Naresh Ganjhu, aged about 29 years, son of Chandru Ganjhu, resident of village-Boda Tola, PO + PS-Chandwa, District-Latehar, Jharkhand

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.… … Appellant

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Versus

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Union of India through National Investigation Agency, New Delhi .… … Respondent

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD

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------For the Appellant : Mr. Birendra Kumar, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate

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C.A.V on 17.03.2026 Pronounced on 07/04/2026

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Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

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1. The instant appeal preferred under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 is directed against the order dated 08.12.2025 passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.2197 of 2025 by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVI-cum-Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi whereby and whereunder the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with Special (N.I.A) Case No.02 of 2020, corresponding to RC Case No.25/2020/NIA/DLI, arising out of Chandwa P.S. Case No.158 of 2019 dated 23.11.2019 registered for the offence under Sections 147, 148, 149, 452, 302, 353, 379 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Sections 10, 13, 17, 18 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act and Section 17 (i) (ii) of Criminal Law Amendment Act has been rejected.

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2. At the very outset, it needs to mention herein that earlier this Court vide order dated 11.05.2023 passed in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.256 of 2023 has dismissed the prayer for bail of the present appellant on merit by passing a detailed order.

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3. The prosecution case is that on 22.11.2019 the patrolling party had found the cadre of the banned terrorist organization i.e. CPI (Maoist) who were waiting in advance, fired indiscriminately at the police patrolling party in consequence thereof the four police personnel had died. Arms and ammunitions were looted from the martyred police personnel and by raising slogans, the Maoist fled away. One Home Guard, namely, Dinesh Ram who had escaped unhurt, rushed to the Chandwa Police Station and lodged a complaint, based upon the same Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 was instituted against eighteen named and some unknown accused persons. The police had completed the investigation.

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4. Thereafter, on the basis of fardbeyan of one of the members of the patrolling party, namely, Dinesh Ram, Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 dated 23.11.2019 u/s 147/148/149/442/302/353/379 of the IPC, section 27 of Arms Act, Section 17 of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 and section 10, 13, 17 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 was registered against eighteen named accused persons and some unknown persons. Thereafter, investigation was taken up by the SDPO, Latehar. During the investigation, the I.O. visited the place of occurrence and arrested accused persons who disclosed about concealment of motorcycle which was used in the said crime. Accused in

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custody Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1), Sunil Ganjhu @ Mangra (A-2), Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) (the present appellant) and Faguna Ganjhu (A-6) also disclosed about the concealment of looted ammunitions.

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5. Subsequent thereto, the Central Government in exercise of power conferred under Sub-Section (5) of Section 6 read with Section 8 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 has directed the N.I.A. to take up the investigation vide Order No. 11011/42/2020/NIA dated 22.06.2020 and accordingly, Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 was re-registered as R.C. No.25 of 2020/NIA/DLI under Sections 147,148,149,452,302,353 & 379 of Indian Penal Code, under Section 27 of the Arms Act, under Section 17 (i) & (ii) of Criminal Law Amendment Act and under Sections 10,13,17 and 18 of Unlawful Activity (Prevention) Act, 1967. The NIA had submitted the first supplementary chargesheet against 34 persons for the offences punishable under Sections 120 (B), 121, 121(A), 122, 147,148,149,302,307,353,395,396 & 427 of Indian Penal Code, under sections 10,13,16,17,18,20,21,38,39 & 40 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and under Sections 25(1-b) a, 26,27 & 35 of the Arms Act. The name of the appellant has come in course of investigation who has been arrayed as accused No.5.

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6. Thereafter, on the basis of fardbeyan of one of the member of the patrolling party, namely, Dinesh Ram, Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 dated 23.11.2019 u/s 147/148/149/442/302/353/379 of the IPC, section 27 of Arms Act, Section 17 of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908 and Sections 10, 13, 17 and 18 of the Unlawful Activities

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(Prevention) Act, 1967 was registered against eighteen named accused persons and some unknown persons. Thereafter, investigation was taken up by the SDPO, Latehar. During the investigation, the I.O. visited the place of occurrence and arrested accused persons who disclosed about concealment of motorcycle which was used in the said crime. As referred above, the accused in custody Baijnath Ganjhu (A-1), Sunil Ganjhu @Mangra (A-2), Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) and Faguna Ganjhu (A-6) also disclosed about the concealment of looted ammunitions.

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7. After investigation, the State Police had submitted charge-sheet before learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (ACJM), Latehar vide Charge Sheet No.58/2020 on 02.07.2020 under sections 147, 148, 149, 427, 307, 353, 302 & 120B of IPC, Sections 25(1-b)a, 26, 27 & 35 of Arms Act, section 17 (i) & 17(ii) of the Criminal Amendment Act and sections 10, 13, 16, 17, 18 & 20 of the UA (P) Act, 1967 against 06 accused persons namely (1) Baijnath Ganjhu, (2) Sunil Ganjhu, (3) Rajesh Ganjhu, (4) Sanjay Ganjhu, (5) Naresh Ganjhu i.e. the present appellant, and (6) Faguna Ganjhu.

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8. During investigation, the role of the present appellant is mentioned in paragraph 17.14 of the supplementary charge-sheet which is as follows:

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"On 19.11.2019, A-2 took him to Beerjangha forest to meet A-14, along with elder brother of A-14, Kunwar Ganjhu Next day i.e. 20.11.2019, A-1 informed Kunwar Ganjhu over mobile phone, that A-14 had called him at Beerjangha forest. Thereafter, A-1, A-2 and Kunwar Ganjhu went together to Beerjangha forest in a Motor Cycle belonging to Basant Turi. They parked the motorcycle near the house of Naresh Ganjhu (A-5). They saw 02 cadres of CPI (Maoist) and one of them took them to meet A-14. He met A-14,

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who was present, along with 10-12 armed cadres of CPI (Maoist). At that time, Ishwar Ganjhu, R/o Lukuiya also came to meet A-14. A-14 inquired about his wife Lalita Devi from Baijnath Ganjhu (Al) and Kunwar Ganjhu. Thereafter, on direction of A-14, A-1 and Ishwar Ganjhu brought 10 Kg of fish from one Lodha Ganjhu, R/o Bearjnagha. On the way, A-1 saw Sunil Ganjhu (A-2) and one Shivnath Yadav returning, after meeting A-14. A-1 delivered the fish to A-14 and further was asked to come the next day with Sunil Ganjhu. Thereafter, A-1 and Kunwar Ganjhu returned from there. On 21.11.2019, A-1 again went to meet A-14 at Bearganjha. A-14 asked him to bring 03 Jackets, 03 Blankets, 03 pair of Jeans and Shirts and 03 Towels (Gamcha). He also told to bring blankets first and also gave money Rs.3,000. He also sent one of the naxal cadre namely Vikash with A-1. Both came to Chandwa market and brought 02 numbers of blankets for Rs. 1300 each and sweets/Laddu (about 15-20 pieces) and Samosa (20 pieces). Thereafter, both of them returned to Bearganjha and parked motorcycle near the house of Naresh Ganjhu (A-5). From there, Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) also joined them and went to meet A-14. Thereafter, A-14 gave rupees 10,000 each to A-1 and A5 to bring remaining items. Thereafter, one Mrityunjay Kumar Singh @ Sonu Singh (A-8) r/o Alaudiya, Chandwa, Shivnath Yadav and two other persons came to meet A-14. A-1 saw Sonu Singh (A-8) giving money to A-14. Later, A-1 and A-5 returned from there."

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9. The appellant has been apprehended and taken into custody on 06.01.2020, i.e., prior to the taking over the investigation by the NIA, and, as such, prayer for bail was made by the present appellant before the learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application No.2580 of 2022 but the same has been rejected vide order dated 20.01.2023 against which criminal appeal being Criminal Appeal (DB) No.256 of 2023 was filed before this Court which was also dismissed vide order dated 11.05.2023 by this Court.

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10. Thereafter, the present appellant has preferred Misc. Cr. Application No.2197 of 2025 before the special Court with prayer for bail but the said supplication was dismissed vide order dated 08.12.2025 against which the instant appeal has been preferred.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant:

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11. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that earlier to the instant appeal, the present appellant had moved before this Court by filing Criminal Appeal being Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 256 of 2023 which was dismissed vide order dated 11.05.2023 and thereafter, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the order dated 08.12.2025 passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.2197 of 2025 by which the prayer for grant of bail has been rejected by the learned trial Court.

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12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case and is having no nexus with the member of the terrorist gang and has been made scapegoat to ease the burden of investigation.

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13. The reason for filing this regular bail application for second time is the changed circumstance as the co-accused-Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu, whose case was held to be identical to that of the case of the present appellant, has been granted bail vide order dated 30.10.2025 by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 812 of 2025 who earlier had rejected the prayer for bail of the co-accused Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu vide order dated 05.04.2023 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1458 of 2022 and relying upon which this Hon’ble Court has rejected the earlier prayer of bail of

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the present appellant vide order dated 11.05.2023 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.256 of 2023.

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14. It has further been submitted that another co-accused-Baijnath Ganjhu has been granted bail vide order dated 02.12.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1132 of 2025 by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court and, as such, the present appellant may also be enlarged on bail on the ground of parity.

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15. It has been submitted that very few witnesses have been examined in the trial and they have not supported the prosecution case as against the present appellant.

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16. It has further been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the fact that the Investigating Agency has given a list of large numbers of witnesses in charge sheet, but statement of most of the witnesses have not been recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C by the Investigating Agency.

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17. It has been submitted that the appellant is in custody since 06.01.2020 and, as such, taking into consideration the long custody and probable delay in conclusion of trial and in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb; (2021) 3 SCC 713 , it is a fit case where the impugned order may be interfered with.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the Respondent:

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18. Per contra, Mr. A.K. Das, learned counsel appearing for the NIA, has submitted that it is incorrect on the part of the appellant to take the ground that there is no allegation against him, rather, ample materials

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have come against the appellant of having in collaboration with the members of extremist gang, as would appear from the various paragraphs of the supplementary chargesheet.

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19. Further submission has been made that earlier the prayer for bail of the present appellant was rejected by this Court vide order dated 11.05.2023 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.256 of 2023.

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20. The submission has also been made that the gravity of allegation against the appellant is more serious in comparison to that of the said co-accused-Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu and another co-accused-Baijnath Ganjhu. Since, in course of investigation it revealed that the present appellant is a resident of village Beerjangha and he used to work as an overground worker of co-accused-Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) and used to provide logistic support to the members of CPI Maoist. The armed cadres of CPI (Maoist) used to occasionally reside in the said village and take food from the villagers. The present appellant provided food and other things to the cadres of CPI (Maoist) and helped them.

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21. The present Appellant (A-5) was taken into police remand by the NIA from 19.12.2020 to 23.12.2020 for a period of five days, during which he was interrogated. During the said interrogation, the appellant/accused Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) disclosed that his village, Beerjangha, is situated at the base of Beerjangha Mountain and that the armed cadres of CPI (Maoist) used to occasionally reside in the village and take food from the residents. It is further raveled that 4-5 days prior to the incident, while the appellant was working on his farmland with his family members, two armed cadres of CPI (Maoist) arrived and directed

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him to accompany them for some work. It is revealed that he was taken to Chorha Aamtand near the mountain, where he found co-accused Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) present along with 7-8 armed cadres. A-14 allegedly instructed the Appellant to convey a message to Sunil Ganjhu (A-2) that his maternal uncle (A-14) had called him to Beerjangha Pahar and to also inform Ishwar Ganjhu and Shivnath Ganjhu to meet him.

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22. During the investigation, it has further been revealed that on the same evening, the appellant went to village Lukuiya, conveyed the message of A-14 to A-2, and requested him to further inform Ishwar and Shivnath Ganjhu. The appellant allegedly told A-2 that upon reaching Hendehas Railway Track, they would meet two Maoist cadres who would escort them to A-14. On the following day, the appellant purportedly again visited Lukuiya and informed Ishwar Ganjhu. It is revealed that around noon, A-2 and Ishwar Ganjhu reached the railway track where two Maoists led them to A-14, and the appellant provided 2 Kgs of tomatoes to the Maoists before accompanying them to meet A-14. It is further revealed that on 20.11.2019, two Maoist cadres arrived at the appellant’s residence and demanded 10 Kgs of rice, which he had provided. Later that evening, he shortly saw A-2, Shivnath Yadav, and two unknown individuals returning from Beerjangha forest. On 21.11.2019, at around 15.00 hrs, while the appellant was bathing near a water tank, two Maoists had arrived and informed him that A-14 had called him. At the same time, A-1 arrived on a Hero Honda motorcycle, accompanied by a Maoist cadre, and thereafter A-1, the appellant and three Maoist cadres allegedly proceeded on foot to meet A-14 at Chorha

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Aamtand. On reaching there, the appellant saw A-1 handing blankets to A-14 and distributing snacks and sweets among the cadres. A-14 and A- 1 purportedly conversed privately for 10-15 minutes.

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23. That the investigation further revealed that A-14 handed over Rs. 3,000 to the appellant and directed him to purchase two jackets and a set of shirt-pant (28-inch size), and also asked for his motorcycle for the following evening, to which the appellant had agreed. Thereafter, A-1 and the appellant/accused Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) allegedly returned and exchanged mobile numbers. It is also alleged that on 22.11.2019 at around 06.30 hrs, two Maoist cadres arrived at the appellant’s residence and demanded vegetables, which he provided, and that subsequently the appellant returned the said amount of Rs-3,000 claiming that he needed to take his nephew for medical treatment. Later that evening, he went to Budh Bazar, Chandwa to sell vegetables and thereafter visited his inlaws' village Talsakhadiya. On the next day, he came to know about the alleged incident at Lukuiya More.

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24. It has been contended that during police custody, a disclosure memorandum and a pointing-out-memorandum proceeding were prepared at the instance of the present appellant, wherein he pointed out the location where he, along with the co-accused, had met A-14.

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25. It has been contended that in a Photo Identification Memorandum prepared by the police, the appellant/accused Naresh Ganjhu (A-5), the present appellant identified photographs of CPI (Maoist) cadres and associates, namely A-14, A-20, A-30, A-22, A-18 and A-23.

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26. It has been submitted that during the course of further investigation by NIA, involvement of the appellant-Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) emerged in the instant crime and evidence against accused Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) was collected and he was arrested on 06.01.2020. Sufficient prosecutable evidences has collected against him and on the basis of the outcome of the investigation, first supplementary chargesheet was filed by NIA vide Chargesheet No. 16/2021 on 30.04.2021, before the Special NIA Court, Ranchi against the appellant marked as Accused No. 05 along with 33 other accused persons, as their roles and offences completed had emerged on the basis of evidence gathered which is mentioned in internal page 94 of 109 of the 1^st Supplementary

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Chargesheet which is quoted herein under for reference:

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“ Investigation has established that A-5 used to work as an OGW of A-14 and used to provide logistic support to the members of CPI Maoist. On 18th & 19th Nov, 2019, he met A-14 at Beerjangha forest and on direction of A-14, he passed messages to A-1, A-2, Shivnath Yadav & Ishwar Ganjhu regarding meeting with A-14 at Beerjangha forest. On 20.11.2019, he provided 10 kg rice to the cadres of CPI(Maosit). On 21.11.2019, he went to Beerjangha forest & met A-14 where he received Rs.3000/- for purchasing 02 Jackets, one pair Pant Shirt.

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Therefore, as per averments made in pre-para, it is established that A-5 was an Over Ground Worker of CPI (Maoist), a proscribed organization, and was part of the conspiracy to assemble with deadly weapons to carry out terrorist attack on the police patrolling party which resulted in the killing of 04 police personnel and subsequently, snatching/ looting of Government issued arms and ammunitions. Thereby, A-S committed offences under sections 120B r/w 121, 121A, 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 353, 395, 396, 427 of IPC, sections 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967, as amended 2019 sections 25(1-B) a, 26, 27, 35 of Arms Act, 1959.

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27. It has further been contended that the statements of Protected

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Witnesses were recorded under Section 164 Cr. P.C and Protected Witness ‘B’ has supported the case of the prosecution.

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28. It has been contended that the charges against the present appellant have already been framed and the trial is progressing and as many 16 witnesses have already been examined in this instant case. Therefore, if the present appellant is released on bail, there are all probabilities that he may influence the witnesses and tamper with the evidences, which may cause serious prejudice to the prosecution of instant of crime.

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29. Mr. A.K. Das, learned counsel appearing for the NIA, has submitted that there are so many materials basis upon which it can be said that the allegation against the appellant is prima facie true and, hence, applying the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali reported in (2019) 5 SCC 1 , the appellant does not deserve to be released on bail.

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30. Learned counsel for the respondent has also submitted that no fresh ground, on facts as well as on law, has been agitated herein by renewing the prayer for grant of bail, hence, the instant appeal is also fit to be dismissed.

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Analysis:

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31. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record and the finding recorded by the learned trial Court as recorded in the impugned order dated 08.12.2025.

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32. Before entering into the merit of the case, it would be apt to refer herein that the prayer for bail of the present appellant was made before the learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application No.2580 of

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2022 but the same had been rejected by the learned trial Court vide order dated 20.01.2023 against which appeal was preferred being Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 256 of 2023 which has also been dismissed by this Court vide order dated 11.05.2023. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the order dated 11.05.2023 are being quoted as under:

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8. This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties and has considered the finding recorded by the learned court rejecting the bail application as also the averment made in the counter affidavit and the material gathered by the Investigating Agency in the case diary, since, the supplementary charge-sheet has been appended with the counteraffidavit. This Court in order to examine the difference in between the material which has been gathered in the case of Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu and the appellant, since, the argument which has been emphasized by learned Counsel for the appellant that the case of the appellant is different to that of the case of Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu. It appears from the order rejecting the bail application of Rajesh Ganjhu, wherein, the following paragraphs have been taken into consideration as would appear from paragraph 8 thereof, for ready reference is being referred herein:

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“A perusal of the charge-sheet would reveal that the appellant was an over-ground worker and is a sympathizer as well as a cousin of Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). The role played by the appellant has been defined in the charge sheet which reads as follows: “Investigation has established that A-3 was an over ground worker (OGW) of CPI (Maoist) and is relative of A-14. He used to provide logistic support to the Dasta of A-14. On 22.11.2019, A-14 went to Beerjangha forest and met A-14 who told that he will take revenge with Police for arresting his wife Lalita Devi and directed him to live with them. On 22.11.2019, he accompanied the Support Team headed by A-14 at Boda pond. After the incident, all members of CPI (Maoist) assembled there and congratulated each other for killing police personnel & looting their arms and ammunitions. Thereafter, he stayed over night with Dasta of A-14 at Beerjangha forest and 23.11.2019, he returned to his village Banjhi Tola. Therefore, as per averments made in prepara, it is established that A-3, was an Over Ground Worker/member

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of CPI (Maoist), a proscribed organization, and participated in the meeting in which conspiracy was hatched among co accused, with common intention, to assemble with deadly 6 weapons and to carry out terrorist attack on the police patrolling party which resulted in the killing of 04 police personnel and subsequently, snatching/looting of Government issued arms and ammunition at Lukuiya More. Thereby, A-3 committed offences under sections 120B r/w 121, 121A, 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 353, 395, 396, 427 of IPC, sections 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, as amended 2019, sections 25(1-B)a, 26, 27, 35 of Arms Act, 1959.”

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9. It is evident from the aforesaid material as quoted and referred hereinabove that in course of investigation it has been established that A-3, the appellant of Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 1458 of 2022 i.e. Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu was an over ground worker (OGW) of CPI (Maoist) and is relative of A-14, the main person who was handling the said proscribed organization and used to provide logistic support to the Dasta of A-14. The contention has been raised that there is no such allegation against the appellant or providing logistic support to the Dasta of A-14. In order to examine the aforesaid fact, this Court requires to refer herein the material which has been gathered by the Investigating Agency as has been incorporated in the supplementary charge sheet. The relevant would be the paragraph 17.14 of the supplementary charge-sheet wherein it has come in the aforesaid paragraph that A-1, A-2 and Kunwar Ganjhu had gone together to Beerjangha forest, the place where the indiscriminate firing was given its conclusion and in course of going that place they parked the motorcycle near the house of Naresh Ganjhu, A-5 (the appellant). They saw 02 cadres of CPI (Maoist) and one of them took them to meet A-14. It further appears from the aforesaid paragraph that A-1 again went to meet A-14 at Bearganjha and 7 while returning to Bearganjha the motorcycle was again parked near the house of Naresh Ganjhu A-5 and from there, Naresh Ganjhu also joined them and went to meet A-14. Thereafter, A-14 gave rupees 10,000 each to A-1 and A-5 to bring remaining items, for ready reference the relevant part of the paragraph 17.14 is being referred herein:

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“On 19.11.2019, A-2 took him to Beerjangha forest to meet A-14, along with elder brother of A-14, Kunwar Ganjhu. Next day i.e. 20.11.2019, A-1 informed Kunwar Ganjhu, over mobile phone, that A-

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14 had called him at Beerjangha forest. Thereafter, A-1, A-2 and Kunwar Ganjhu went together to Beerjangha forest in a Motor Cycle belonging to Basant Turi. They parked the motorcycle near the house of Naresh Ganjhu (A-5). They saw 02 cadres of CPI (Maoist) and one of them took them to meet A-14. He met A-14, who was present, along with 10-12 armed cadres of CPI (Maoist). At that time, Ishwar Ganjhu, R/o Lukuiya also came to meet A-14. A-14 inquired about his wife Lalita Devi from Baijnath Ganjhu (A 1) and Kunwar Ganjhu. Thereafter, on direction of A-14, A-1 and Ishwar Ganjhu brought 10 Kg of fish from one Lodha Ganjhu, R/o Bearjnagha. On the way, A-1 saw Sunil Ganjhu (A-2) and one Shivnath Yadav returning, after meeting A-14. A-1 delivered the fish to A-14 and further was asked to come the next day with Sunil Ganjhu. Thereafter, A-1 and Kunwar Ganjhu returned from there. On 21.11.2019, A-1 again went to meet A-14 at Bearganjha. A-14 asked him to bring 03 Jackets, 03 Blankets, 03 pair of Jeans and Shirts and 03 Towels (Gamcha). He also told to bring blankets first and also gave money Rs.3,000. He also sent one of the naxal cadre namely Vikash with A-1. Both came to Chandwa market and brought 02 nos of blankets for Rs. 1300 each and sweets/Laddu (about 15-20 pieces) and Samosa (20 pieces). Thereafter, both of them returned to Bearganjha and parked motorcycle near the house of Naresh Ganjhu (A-5). From there, Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) also joined them and went to meet A-14. Thereafter, A-14 gave rupees 10,000 each to A-1 and A 5 to bring remaining items. Thereafter, one Mrityunjay Kumar Singh @ Sonu Singh (A-8) r/o Alaudiya, Chandwa, Shivnath Yadav and two other persons came to meet A-14. A-1 saw Sonu Singh (A-8) giving money to A-14. Later, A-1 and A-5 returned from there.”

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10. It further transpires from the aforesaid paragraphs that the reference of the mobile phone which was being used by A-5 i.e. 8 6203949830 had been disclosed by the A-1. It has further been disclosed that on 30.12.2019, A-1 was called by Ravindra Ganjhu. It further appears from the paragraph 2 of paragraph 17.14 that while giving disclosure in the police custody it has been disclosed by A-2 that he along with Ishwar Ganjhu and Naresh Ganjhu, appellant herein (A-5) met Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), the leader of the aforesaid Maoist group. A-14 asked A-2 to come next day and also bring Kunwar Ganjhu. A-1 and Kunwar Ganjhu came to the house of Sunil Ganjhu (A-2) and from there all three went to Bearganjha forest to

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meet A-14 and on the way he kept his motorcycle in the house of Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) at Bearjangha Tola and enquired about Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) but he was not present there. It has further come at paragraph 5 of paragraph 17.14 that the appellant has confessed that A-14 gave Rs. 3,000/- and told to bring 02 Jackets, one pair of Pant Shirt. The reference of paragraph 15.3 also required to be made herein wherein the looted fire arms after the killing of the police personnel had been seized from the house of Accused No.1 and sent to Sergeant Major, Police Centre, Latehar for analysis and expert opinion. The opinion was given to the effect that all the bullets are live one and has given a finding to the effect that the said ammunitions are the same ammunitions issued to the Home Guards who were detailed with patrolling PCR vehicle of Chandwa Police Station on 22.11.2019 from the Armoury of Police Line, Latehar.

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11. This Court on the basis of the aforesaid material gathered against the appellant is not hesitant in coming to the conclusion that the case of the appellant is identical to that of the case of Rajesh Ganjhu rather, prima facie, it appears that the appellant was directly in touch of the members of proscribed group, MCC, since, it has come that he has accepted the money from the accused No. 14 for the purpose of purchasing Jacket etc. that show that he was actively involved to support the members of the proscribed group. In this reference the Hon’ble Apex Court held in Sudesh Kedia vrs. Union of India (2021) 4 SCC 704:

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11. Section 43-D(5) mandates that a person shall not be released on bail if the court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation made are prima facie true. Apart from the other offences, the appellant is accused of committing offences under Section 17, 18 and 21 of the UA (P) Act. The appellant is accused of providing funds to a terrorist organization. According to the prosecution, he has entered into a conspiracy with the other members of the organisation to strengthen and promote the activities of the organization. Further, an amount of Rs.9,95,000 (Rupees nine lakh and ninety-five thousand only) was seized from the appellant’s house, making him liable for punishment under Section 21 of the Act. 12. In NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali2, this Court considered the parameters for exercise of the power under Section 43-D (5), held as follows: (SCC p. 24, para 23)

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“23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to the offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence. There is a degree of difference between the satisfaction to be 10 recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is “prima facie” true. By its very nature, the expression “prima facie true” would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act….”

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12. This Court, therefore, is of the view that there is no reason to take different view as has been taken by learned Co-ordinate Bench of this Court while rejecting the bail of co-accused Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu vide order dated 05.04.2023 in Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 1458 of 2022.

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13. Accordingly, this Cr. Appeal is dismissed.

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33. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that the prayer for bail of the appellant was rejected by this Court on merit by due appreciation of evidence available on record. This Court has also taken into consideration the culpability of the present appellant who used to work as an overground worker of co-accused Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) and used to provide logistic support to the members of CPI Maoist.

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34. Thereafter the present appellant has again preferred an application being M.C.A. No. 2197 of 2025 before the special Judge but the same has been dismissed vide order dated 08.12.2025 against which the instant appeal has been preferred.

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35. This Court, before proceeding to consider the legality and propriety of the impugned order and rival submission of learned counsel for the parties, deems it fit and proper to first refer the some settled proposition of law and the relevant provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (herein referred as Act 1967) which is required to be considered herein.

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36. The main objective of the Act 1967 is to make powers available for dealing with activities directed against the integrity and sovereignty of India. As per Preamble, Act 1967 has been enacted to provide for the more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations and dealing with terrorist activities and for matters connected therewith. Therefore, the aim and object of enactment of UAPA is also to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities.

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37. To achieve the said object and purpose of effective prevention of certain unlawful activities the Parliament in its wisdom has provided that where an association is declared unlawful by a notification issued under Section 3, a person, who is and continues to be a member of such association shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years, and shall also be liable to fine.

¶117

38. Clause (m) of Section 2 of the 1967 Act defines “terrorist organization”. It is defined as an organization listed in the First Schedule. CPI (Maoist) has been listed at Item no. 34 in the First Schedule. Chapters III onwards of the 1967 Act incorporate various offences. Chapter IV has the title “punishment for terrorist act”. Clause (k) of Section 2 provides that “terrorist act” has the meaning assigned to it under Section 15 and the terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule.

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39. Further, section 10(a)(i) of Act 1967 provides that where an association is declared unlawful by a notification issued under Section 3 which has become effective under sub-section (3) of that Section, a person, who is continues to be a member of such association shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine therefore, so long as Section 10(a)(i) stands a person who is or continues to be a member of such association shall be liable to be punished.

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40. Further, it would be relevant to mention the offences punishable under Sections 13 of the 1967 Act, which read thus:

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13. Punishment for unlawful activities.—(1) Whoever— (a) takes part in or commits, or (b) advocates, abets, advises or incites the commission of, any unlawful activity, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. (2) Whoever, in any way, assists any unlawful activity of any association, declared unlawful under section 3, after the notification by which it has been so declared has become effective under subsection (3) of that section, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. (3) Nothing in this section shall apply to any treaty, agreement or convention entered into between the Government of India and the Government of any other country or to any negotiations therefor carried on by any person authorised in this behalf by the Government of India.

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41. Thus, it is evident that Section 13 prescribes Punishment for unlawful activities. It is further evident that as per section 13 (1) Whoever takes part in or commits, or advocates, abets, advises or incites the commission of, any unlawful activity, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

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42. At this juncture, it will be purposeful to discuss the core of Section 43(d)(5) of the Act 1967 which mandates that the person shall not be released on bail if the Court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations made are prima facie true apart from the other offences the appellant is accused of committing offences under Sections 17, 18 and 21 of the UA(P) Act, 1967.

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43. The requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of “ National

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Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali” [(2019) 5 SCC 1] wherein at paragraph 23 it has been held by interpreting the expression “prima facie true” as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967 which would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigation agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the First Information Report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It has further been observed that it must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. The degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special enactments. For ready reference, paragraph 23 of the aforesaid judgment is required to be quoted herein which reads hereunder as :-

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believing that the accused is “not guilty” of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable 11 grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is “prima facie” true. By its very nature, the expression “prima facie true” would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act….”

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44. It is, thus, evident from the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Supra) that it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its mind to examine the entire materials on record for the purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused or not.

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45. Further, it is settled proposition of law that at the stage of granting or non-granting of the bail, the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or

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otherwise and the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage.

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46. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court by setting out propounding the law in the same case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) , has observed that the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise. For ready reference paragraph 24, 25 and 26 of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein under:-

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“ 24. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage—of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail—is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.

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25. From the analysis of the impugned judgment, it appears to us that the High Court has ventured into an area of examining the merits and demerits of the evidence. For, it noted that the evidence in the form of statements of witnesses under Section 161 are not admissible. Further, the documents pressed into service by the investigating agency were not admissible in evidence. It also noted that it was unlikely that the document had been recovered from the residence of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt till 16-8-2017 (para 61 of the impugned judgment). Similarly, the approach of the High Court in completely discarding the statements of the protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 CrPC, on the specious ground that the same was kept in a sealed cover and was not even perused by the Designated Court and also because reference to such statements having been recorded was not found in the charge-sheet already filed against the respondent is, in our opinion, in complete disregard of the duty of the Court to record

¶141

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its opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned is prima facie true or otherwise. That opinion must be reached by the Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents of the case diary and including the chargesheet (report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.) and other material gathered by the investigating agency during investigation.

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26. Be it noted that the special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967 Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof. To wit, soon after the arrest of the accused on the basis of the FIR registered against him, but before filing of the charge-sheet by the investigating agency; after filing of the first charge-sheet and before the filing of the supplementary or final chargesheet consequent to further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC, until framing of the charges or after framing of the charges by the Court and recording of evidence of key witnesses, etc. However, once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along with the chargesheet (report under Section 173 CrPC), do not make out reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case.”

¶145

47. It is, thus, evident that the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage of granting bail of giving reasons for grant or nongrant of bail that is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. Rather, the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities

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regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.

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48. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in a very recent judgment rendered in Gurwinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 109 while taking into consideration of the judgment as rendered in the National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali ( Supra ) has observed that, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail and lays down that if the Court, ‘ on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ’, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond.

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49. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase - ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ - unless circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act and the ‘exercise’ of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope.

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50. In the aforesaid context, it has further been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand and in dealing with bail applications under UAP

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Act, the Courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail and the ‘justifications’ must be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the Special Court.

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51. In the aforesaid background, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the test for rejection of bail is quite plain and Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It has further been observed that it is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied - that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the ‘ tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing

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witnesses, tampering with evidence).

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52. For ready reference, following paragraphs of the aforesaid Judgment are being quoted herein under:

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“27. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D shows that apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an accused on bail, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail. It lays down that if the Court, ‘ on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ’, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond. It is interesting to note that there is no analogous provision traceable in any other statute to the one found in Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act. In that sense, the language of bail limitation adopted therein remains unique to the UAP Act.

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28. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase - ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ - unless circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act. The ‘exercise’ of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D (5)‘ shall not be released’ in contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC - ‘ may be released’ - suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule.

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29. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand. In dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail. The ‘justifications’ must be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the Special Court. The legislature has prescribed a low, ‘ prima facie’ standard, as a measure of the degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by Court when scrutinising the justifications [materials on record]. This standard can be contrasted with the standard of ‘ strong suspicion’, which is used by Courts while hearing applications for ‘discharge--”

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53. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the ‘ tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence) . This position is made clear by Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail.

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54. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment after textual reading of Section 43 D (5) UAP Act, has formulated the guideline which was summarized in the form of a twin-prong test . For ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted herein under:

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“ 31. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the inquiry that a bail court must undertake while deciding bail applications under the UAP Act can be summarised in the form of a twin-prong test:

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Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?

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1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged ‘accusations’ make out an offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP Act

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1.2 Such examination should be limited to case diary and final report submitted under Section 173 CrPC;

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1. Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail in light of the general principles relating to grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC (‘tripod test’)?”

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55. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid position of law and the factual aspect as has been gathered against the appellant is now proceeding to examine as to whether the prayer of the instant appeal is fit to be allowed or not.

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56. Since no fresh ground or change in circumstance is available herein, therefore, the learned counsel for appellant has taken the ground of long custody and probable delay in conclusion of trial as one of the grounds. The learned counsel for the appellant has also raised the issue of parity and submitted that since other co-accused have been granted bail, therefore, the appellant herein also deserves to be released on bail by interfering with the order impugned.

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57. Before entering into the merit of the case, it would be apt to

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refer herein that the prayer for bail was made before the learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application No.2580 of 2022 but the same had been rejected by the learned trial Court vide order dated 20.01.2023 against which appeal was preferred being Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 256 of 2023 which has also been dismissed by this Court vide order dated 11.05.2023.

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58. Thereafter, the appellant has again preferred an application for regular bail before the learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application No.2197 of 2025 which was dismissed vide order dated 08.12.2025.

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59. Being aggrieved, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant for grant of regular bail.

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60. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that this Court while rejecting the prayer for bail of the present appellant vide order dated 11.05.2023 has already expressed its view by taking into consideration the settled proposition of law.

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61. Now coming to the contention made by the learned counsel for the appellant, wherefrom it appears that no fresh ground has been raised except the ground of parity, custody and personal liberty since the appellant is languishing in judicial custody since 06.01.2020.

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62. In the aforesaid backdrop, it requires to refer herein that the statutory mandate contained under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act 1967 imposes a stringent embargo upon the release of an accused charged with such grave offences on bail, unless the twin conditions stipulated therein are satisfied. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh (supra) , wherein after considering the judgment in

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Union of India v. Κ.Α. Najeeb (supra), it was reiterated that the statutory parameters contained in Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act 1967 must be applied while considering bail in cases involving serious offences under the Act. It has been held that only where the allegations are found to be prima facie untrue, on the basis of the material collected during investigation, can the prayer for bail be considered, and conversely, where the allegations appear prima facie true, the privilege of bail cannot be extended.

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63. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer herein that only the long incarceration is not the ground to be looked into for enlarging the accused on bail rather the accusation so made against the accused persons as also societal impact is also to be taken care of.

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64. As per the settled proposition of law as discussed referred hereinabove in the preceding paragraph the test for rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. This position is made clear by Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail.

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65. In the present case, it is apparent from the appellant/accused has been charged for offences punishable under Sections of the UA(P)Act 1967, having maximum punishment of imprisonment for life.

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66. Although, the culpability of the present accused/appellant has already been dealt with by this Court in order dated 11.05.2023 but at the cost of repetition same has been reiterated herein in precise form.

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67. As per the prosecution version that on 22.11.2019 the patrolling party had found the cadre of the banned terrorist organization i.e. CPI (Maoist) who were waiting in advance, fired indiscriminately at the police patrolling party in consequence thereof four police personnel had died. Arms and ammunitions were looted from the martyred police personnel and by raising slogans, the Maoist fled away. The Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 was instituted against eighteen named and some unknown accused persons. The police have completed the investigation.

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68. Subsequent thereto, the Central Government in exercise of power conferred under Sub-Section (5) of Section 6 read with Section 8 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 has directed the N.I.A. to take up the investigation vide Order No. 11011/42/2020/NIA dated 22.06.2020 and accordingly the Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158 of 2019 was re-registered as R.C. No.25 of 2020/NIA/DLI under Section 147,148,149,452,302,353 & 379 of Indian Penal Code, under Section 27 of the Arms Act, under Section 17 (i) & (ii) of Criminal Law Amendment Act and under Sections 10,13,17 and 18 of Unlawful Activity (Prevention) Act, 1967.

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69. The NIA had submitted the first supplementary charge sheet against 34 persons for the offences punishable under Sections 120 (B), 121, 121(A), 122, 147,148,149,302,307,353,395,396 & 427 of Indian

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Penal Code, under sections 10,13,16,17,18,20,21,38,39 & 40 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and under Sections 25(1-b) a, 26,27 & 35 of the Arms Act. The name of the appellant has come in course of investigation who has been arrayed as accused No.5.

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70. It has come during investigation that the appellant was having direct contact with the leader of the aforesaid banned Maoist organization who happens to be accused No.14 and it has come in several paragraphs that he was actively associated with the accused No.14 as also the accused No.1.

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71. It has come on record that A-14 gave Rs. 10,000/- each to A-1 and A-5 (appellant herein) to bring certain items. It further appears from the paragraph 2 of paragraph 17.14 of the charge-sheet that while giving disclosure in the police custody it has been disclosed by A-2 that he along with Ishwar Ganjhu and Naresh Ganjhu, appellant herein (A-5) met Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14), the leader of the aforesaid Maoist group. A-14 asked A-2 to come next day and also bring Kunwar Ganjhu. A-1 and Kunwar Ganjhu came to the house of Sunil Ganjhu (A-2) and from there all three went to Bearganjha forest to meet A-14 and on the way he kept his motorcycle in the house of Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) at Bearjangha Tola and enquired about Naresh Ganjhu (A-5) but he was not present there. It has further come at paragraph 5 of paragraph 17.14 that the appellant has confessed that A-14 gave Rs. 3,000/- and told to bring 02 Jackets, one pair of Pant Shirt. The reference of paragraph 15.3 also required to be made herein wherein the looted fire arms after the killing of the police personnel had been seized from the house of Accused No.1

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and sent to Sergeant Major, Police Centre, Latehar for analysis and expert opinion. The opinion was given to the effect that all the bullets are live one and has given a finding to the effect that the said ammunitions are the same ammunitions issued to the Home Guards who were detailed with patrolling PCR vehicle of Chandwa Police Station on 22.11.2019 from the Armoury of Police Line, Latehar.

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72. It has further come in investigation that during police custody and disclosure memorandum and pointing out memorandum proceeding at the instance of A-5 was carried out in which the accused pointed out the exact location where he alongwith co-accused met with A-14. In photo identification memorandum A-5 identified photographs of CPI Maoist and its associates namely A-14, A-20, A-30, A-22 A-18 and A- 23. Further during TIP by eye witness protected B identified Naresh Ganjhu (present appellant) on 23/1/2021 who stated that “Naresh Ganjhu Mere Gaon Men Aaana Jana Karta Tha Isiliye Pahchanta Hun.”

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73. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that A-5 present appellant worked as overground worker of A-14 and used to provide logistic support to CPI Maoist. On 18/19.11.2019 he met A-14 at Beerjangha forest and on direction of A-14 he passed message to A-1, A2 Shivnath Ganjhu and Ishwar Ganjhu regarding meeting with A-14 at Beerjangha forest. On 20.11.2019 he went to Beerjangha forest and met A-14 where he received Rs.3000/- for purchase of 02 jackets one pair pant shirt.

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74. Thus, from the aforesaid it may be inferred that this petitioner was part of Criminal conspiracy hatched by proscribed terrorist organisation to assemble with deadly weapon to carry out terrorist attack

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on the police personnel in which four police personnel killed and government issued arms and ammunitions were looted.

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75. It requires to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) taking into consideration the ratio of judgment of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb , (supra) has observed that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:

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"46. As already discussed, the material available on record indicates the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities backed by members of banned terrorist organisation involving exchange of large quantum of money through different channels which needs to be deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released on bail there is every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses of the case which might hamper the process of justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted."

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76. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its recent judgment in the case of Gulfisha Fatima versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1 while appreciating the implication of Article 21 vis-vis Section 43D (5) of the Act 1967 and taking into the consideration the ratio laid down in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) has categorically observed that if prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does not operate as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory restraint, for ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted as under:

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“32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, this Court recognised a constitutional safeguard that cannot be ignored: statutory restrictions cannot be applied so as to render the guarantee of personal liberty illusory. It was held that where the trial is not likely to commence or conclude within a reasonable period, constitutional courts retain the jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding statutory restraints. The decision thus operates as a protection against unconscionable detention and there can be no second opinion on the said principle.

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33. The same decision, however, does not indicate as laying down a mechanical rule under which the mere passage of time becomes determinative in every case arising under a special statute. The jurisprudence of this Court does not support a construction whereby delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory regime enacted by Parliament to address offences of a special category.

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35. The proper constitutional question, therefore, is not whether Article 21 is superior to Section 43D (5). The proper question is how Article 21 is to be applied where Parliament has expressly conditioned the grant of bail in relation to offences alleged to implicate national security. The law does not contemplate an either-or approach. Nor does it contemplate an unstructured blending of statutory and constitutional considerations. What is required is disciplined judicial scrutiny that gives due regard to both.

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47. A closely allied consideration is the role attributed to the accused. Prosecutions under the UAPA may allege varying degrees of participation, ranging from peripheral acts to strategic, organisational, or ideological centrality. The constitutional significance of prolonged incarceration cannot be assessed uniformly for all accused regardless of role. Where the attribution suggests a central or organising role in the alleged design, the need for circumspection before constitutional intervention displaces a statutory embargo is correspondingly greater. Conversely, where the role is peripheral or episodic, prolonged incarceration may more readily assume a punitive character.

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56. It therefore becomes necessary to state, with clarity, the governing approach. In prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does not operate as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory restraint. Rather, delay serves as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny. The outcome of such scrutiny must be determined by a proportional and

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contextual balancing of legally relevant considerations, including (i) the gravity and statutory character of the offence alleged, (ii) the role attributed to the accused within the alleged design or conspiracy, (iii) the strength of the prima facie case as it emerges at the limited threshold contemplated under the special statute, and (iv) the extent to which continued incarceration, viewed cumulatively in the facts of the case, has become demonstrably disproportionate so as to offend the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21.

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58. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court expressly cautioned against the mechanical invocation of prolonged incarceration as a ground for bail in cases involving serious offences under special enactments. The judgment reiterates that the gravity of the offence, the legislative context, and the prima facie material on record cannot be eclipsed merely because the trial has taken time. 59. This Court in CBI v. Dayamoy Mahato reiterated that while Article 21 remains paramount, it does not operate in a vacuum divorced from competing constitutional interests. The Court emphasized that claims to liberty must be examined in the totality of circumstances, particularly where allegations implicate organised criminality or matters of public interest. Delay, though undoubtedly significant, was held not to assume the character of an absolute or solitary determinant. The emphasis, once again, was on structured judicial reasoning rather than on formulaic outcomes."

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77. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid settled position of law, it is

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evident that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences, as one involved in the instant case, cannot be used as a ground to grant bail.

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78. There is no dispute and it cannot be disputed that the jurisprudence of Article 21 has, as it develops, recognised various facets to be intrinsic to the right to life and liberty such as speedy trial, timely completion of investigation, fair trial etc. but at the same time circumspection in granting the relief of bail in offences that harmful to society such as in this case, stems from a place of concern, understandably legitimate at that, about public order, societal security, overall peace and the general deterrent force in criminal law.

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79. The scales of justice must balance on the one hand-the constitutionally consecrated and jealously guarded right under Article 21 and on the other, the recognition that individual liberty is not absolute and is subject to just exceptions i.e. the paramount considerations of national interest and societal interest.

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80. There can be no manner of doubt on the proposition that Article 21 rights are placed on a pedestal, and rightly so, at the same time, though, the individual cannot always be the center of attention. We observe, therefore, that while Article 21 rights must always be protected, but however, in cases where the security of the society and nation is called into question, the long incarceration cannot be the sole ground of consideration.

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81. The act of the accused persons must be looked at, on the whole, and all relevant factors must be given due consideration while granting or denying bail. Needless to add, any Court seized of bail application(s) arising out of such offences must record, in their order the reasons and factors that weighed with them in the ultimate outcome.

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82. In view of the discussion made above, it is the settled fact that the rights of an individual are always subservient to the nation/societal interest.

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83. Further, in the case of Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expressed its concern to the threat raised by terrorist organizations and held that where the accusations against the respondents are prima facie true, the mandate

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contained in the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act would become applicable and the accused would not be released on bail.

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84. Herein, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted at Bar that 16 witnesses have already been examined and all endeavor has been taken for expeditious conclusion of the trial and further the list of witnesses has already been pruned substantially, therefore taking into consideration the aforesaid submission, the apprehension of appellant in probable delay in trial is not fit to be accepted.

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85. Further, it has been submitted by the respondent that if the present appellant is allowed to be released on bail, then, he will get all opportunities to tamper with the evidence as well as influence the witnesses or he may abscond.

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86. Thus, from the aforesaid discussion it is evident that there is serious allegations against the appellant/accused that he being the active member of proscribed organization had conspired with other member of the said organization in the serious crime in which 4 police personnel died therefore, it is considered view of this Court that prayer for bail of the appellant on the ground of custody or delay in trial, is not fit to be accepted.

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87. Further, the learned counsel for the appellant has raised the issue of parity and has submitted that the other co-accused persons who are similarly placed have already been directed to be released on bail, therefore the prayer of the appellant is fit to be accepted.

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88. The learned counsel for the appellant has further raised the issue of parity by stating that another co-accused person, namely, Rajesh

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Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu has been granted bail vide order dated 30.10.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 812 of 2025 and another coaccused, namely, Baijnath Ganjhu has been granted bail vide order dated 02.12.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1132 of 2025, therefore, the prayer of the present appellant for bail is fit to be allowed.

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89. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the NIA has contended that although the prayer for bail of the co- accused, namely, Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu and Baijnath Ganjhu, has been allowed by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court but earlier the prayer for bail of the present appellant has been rejected by this Court and prima facie the nexus of the present appellant with the co-accused person, i.e., Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14) and other CPI (Maoist) cadres and he helped them by providing food and vegetables, conveying their messages to other covillagers and providing his motorcycle to them has been established by the investigating agency, therefore, prima facie a case of criminal conspiracy against the present appellant is made out and, as such, the issue of parity is not available to the present appellant.

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90. In the aforesaid context, it requires to refer herein that this Court is conscious with the settled position of law that the issue of parity, is to be taken into consideration but the same is to be taken into consideration by applying the factual aspect along with the surrounding facts, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486 wherein it has held as under:

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“18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr. Luthra to grant bail

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to the appellant on the ground that the other co accused who were

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similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration.”

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91. It is further settled connotation of law that Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail and by simply saying that another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to determine whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in “ Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana”, (2021) 6 SCC 230 wherein it has been held as under:

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“25. We are constrained to observe that the orders passed by the High Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law. They are oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and to the severity of the punishment in the event of conviction. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527], this Court has held that while applying the principle of parity, the High Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail. This Court observed: (SCC p. 515, para 17):

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“17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand was taken that the second respondent was a history sheeter, it was imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinise every aspect and not capriciously record that the second respondent is entitled to be admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated with absolute certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore, the impugned order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] clearly exposes the nonapplication of mind. That apart, as a matter of fact it has been brought on record that

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the second respondent has been charge-sheeted in respect of number of other heinous offences. The High Court has failed to take note of the same. Therefore, the order has to pave the path of extinction, for its approval by this Court would tantamount to travesty of justice, and accordingly we set it aside.”

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26. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is the manner in which the High Court has applied the principle of parity. By its two orders both dated 21-12- 2020 [Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2986] , [Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2988] , the High Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A15). Parity was sought with Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was granted on 22- 10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the ground (as the High Court recorded) that he was “assigned similar role of armed with stick (sic)”. Again, bail was granted to Vanraj Koli (A16) on the ground that he was armed with a wooden stick and on the ground that Pravin (A-10), Kheta (A-15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13) who were armed with sticks had been granted bail. The High Court has evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law.”

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92. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal position this Court

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has gone through material available on record.

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93. The learned counsel for appellant has contended that another co-accused person, namely, Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu has been granted bail vide order dated 30.10.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 812 of 2025 and another co-accused, namely, Baijnath Ganjhu has

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been granted bail vide order dated 02.12.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.1132 of 2025.

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94. It needs to refer herein that the co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 5.04.2023 passed in Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 1458 of 2022 had earlier rejected the prayer for bail of the said co-accused i.e Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu against whom parity has been claimed. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the order dated 05.04.2023 are being referred herein which reads as under:

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7. We have considered the rival submissions and have also perused the various affidavits filed by the respective parties including the supplementary charge-sheet.

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8. A perusal of the charge-sheet would reveal that the appellant was an over-ground worker and is a sympathizer as well as a cousin of Ravindra Ganjhu (A-14). The role played by the appellant has been defined in the charge-sheet which reads as follows:

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“Investigation has established that A-3 was an over ground worker (OGW) of CPI (Maoist) and is relative of A-14. He used to provide logistic support to the Dasta of A-14. On 22.11.2019, A-14 went to Beerjangha forest and met A-14 who told that he will take revenge with Police for arresting his wife Lalita Devi and directed him to live with them. On 22.11.2019, he accompanied the Support Team headed by A-14 at Boda pond. After the incident, all members of CPI (Maoist) assembled there and congratulated each other for killing police personnel & looting their arms and ammunitions. Thereafter, he stayed over night with Dasta of A-14 at Beerjangha forest and 23.11.2019, he returned to his village Banjhi Tola. Therefore, as per averments made in pre-para, it is established that A-3, was an Over Ground Worker/member of CPI (Maoist), a proscribed organization, and participated in the meeting in which conspiracy was hatched among co-accused, with common intention, to assemble with deadly weapons and to carry out terrorist attack on the police patrolling party which resulted in the killing of 04 police personnel and subsequently, snatching/looting of Government issued arms and ammunition at Lukuiya More. Thereby, A-3 committed offences under sections 120B r/w 121, 121A, 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 353, 395, 396,

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427 of IPC, sections 10, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 38 & 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, as amended 2019, sections 25(1B)a, 26, 27, 35 of Arms Act, 1959.”

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9. It therefore, appears that the petitioner had given logistic support to the terrorist organization and was involved in the meeting which was hatched and which culminated in the incident leading to institution of Chandwa P. S. Case No. 158 of 2019 and in view of a prima facie case having been made out against the appellant, we are not inclined to interfere in the impugned order and consequently this appeal is dismissed.

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95. Thus, from the aforementioned paragraph it is evident that the co-ordinate Bench of this Court while rejecting the prayer for bail had taken into consideration the culpability of the said co-accused i.e. Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu that the said co-accused had given logistic support to the terrorist organization and was involved in the meeting which was hatched and which culminated in the incident leading to institution of Chandwa P. S. Case No. 158 of 2019.

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96. Thereafter, the said co-accused i.e. Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu has again preferred the Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 812 of 2025 for bail and this time vide order dated 30.10.2025 the coordinate Bench after taking into consideration the long custody and probable delay in conclusion of trial has allowed the prayer for bail of the said co-accused, for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid order is being quoted as under:

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9. Pursuant to the order dated 11.09.2025 a report has -4- been submitted by the learned trial court which reveals that out of 133 witnesses 13 witnesses have been examined by the prosecution. A supplementary counter affidavit has been filed by the NIA from which it appears that the prosecuting agency intends to examine 89 witnesses. Even though the number of witnesses to be examined have

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been toned down but considering the fact that only 13 witnesses have been examined so far it does appear bleak that the trial would be concluded in the near future. The probability of delayed trial juxtaposed with the period of incarceration of the appellant enhances his claim for grant of bail and, we accordingly in view of the same set aside the order dated 21.04.2024 passed in Misc. Criminal Application No. 504 of 2025, in connection with Special (NIA) Case No. 02/2020 arising out of RC Case No. 25/2020, (Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158/2019) by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVIcum-Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi and direct that the appellant be released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount each, to the satisfaction of learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVI-cumSpecial Judge, NIA, Ranchi in connection with Special (NIA) Case No. 02/2020 arising out of RC Case No. 25/2020, (Chandwa P.S. Case No. 158/2019).

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97. It needs to refer herein that earlier this Court vide order dated 11.05.2023 passed in Cr. Appeal (D.B.) No. 256 of 2023 while dismissing the appeal by rejecting the prayer for bail of the appellant on merit has observed that the case of present appellant is on similar footing to the said co-accused i.e. Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu.

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98. Although the culpability of the present appellant is almost similar to the said co-accused i.e. Rajesh Ganjhu @ Rajesh Kumar Ganjhu and the co-ordinate Bench while allowing the appeal of the said co-accused has only taken into consideration the probable delay in conclusion of trial as well as long custody .

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99. This Court in the preceding paragraphs by taking reference from the settled position of law as settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh (supra ) and Gulfisha Fatima versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (supra) has already held that delay in trial or long custody alone cannot be ground for bail. Therefore, on the basis of

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discussion made hereinabove it is considered view of this Court the benefit of parity cannot be extended to the present appellant.

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100. This Court, in view of the principle of parity as discussed hereinabove and taking into consideration the material available against the present appellant and also the culpability of the present appellant in alleged commission of crime is of the view that the principle of parity is not fit to be applied herein.

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101. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect and settled position proposition of law rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) and Gurwinder Singh (supra), this Court is now adverting to the order dated 08.12.2025 passed by the learned trial Court which is under challenge herein.

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102. The learned trial Court in the said order dated 08.12.2025 has taken into consideration that the present appellant had earlier filed Misc. Criminal Application No.2580 of 2022 which had been rejected vide order dated 20.01.2023 against which the appellant preferred appeal being Criminal Appeal (DB) No.256 of 2023 before the High Court which had also got rejected vide order dated 11.05.2023.

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103. The learned trial Court has observed in the order impugned herein that a prima facie case is being made out against the appellant on the basis of evidence collected by the NIA during investigation. It has revealed during investigation that the appellant has taken active part in the criminal conspiracy. Prior to the alleged occurrence, the appellant herein has helped the extremists by providing them food, conveying their

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messages to other co-villagers, purchasing the articles for them and providing them his motorcycle. Hence, the learned trial Court taking into consideration the seriousness of the crime and role played by the appellant in preparation of extremist attack at Patrolling Party of police, has rejected the prayer for bail of the present appellant by holding that there is no fresh ground for bail except the period of custody of the appellant.

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104. Herein, the learned counsel for the respondent-NIA has submitted at Bar that the trial in the instant case is in progress and charges have already been framed against the present appellant and further substantial number of witnesses have already been examined.

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105. In the light of the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the NIA, this Court is of the view that since in the instant case trial is in progress, and this Court has already expressed its view on merit in earlier appeal being Cr. Appeal (DB) No.256 of 2023 which has been filed by the appellant with prayer for bail and since no fresh ground is available for the appellant except the ground of parity which has already been answered in the preceding paragraphs, therefore, the present appeal is not fit to be allowed.

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106. Thus, taking into consideration that this Court has earlier expressed its view with regard to the prayer for grant of bail of the present appellant as also there is no change in circumstances as no fresh ground has been agitated herein as also taking into consideration the submission advanced on behalf of the respondent-NIA that the trial is going on expeditiously, this Court is of the view that the order impugned

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dated 08.12.2025 passed in Misc. Criminal Application No. 2197 of

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2024 requires no interference.

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107. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.

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108. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands

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