Rajan Sao Vs the State of Jharkhand

1. The instant appeal preferred under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 is directed against the order dated 09.07.2025 passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.1186 of 2025 by the learned AJC-XVIII-cum-Special Judge-ATS, Ranchi whereby and whereunder the prayer for bail of the appellant in connection with ATS Court Case No.02 of 2024 in arising out of ATS P.S Case No.07 of 2023 registered for the offence under Sections 353, 332, 333, 307, 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code, Section 27 of the Arms Act and Section 16, 17, 20 of U.A.P Act has been rejected.

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Factual Matrix

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2. At the very outset, it needs to mention herein that earlier the prayer for bail of the appellant was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated

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16.04.2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.244 of 2024 by a co-ordinate

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Division Bench of this Court. Thereafter, again the prayer for bail of the appellant was rejected by this Court vide order dated 12.12.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.823 of 2024 on merit by passing a detailed order.

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3. The prosecution case is based upon the self-statement dated 17.07.2023 of one Law Kumar Singh, Inspector alleging therein that for the last few months accused Aman Sao @ Aman Sahu gang in a planned manner is operating gang from jail and through his gang members is indulged in extortion money from different individuals. On 17.07.2023 at about 21:30 hrs. the S.P, ATS received confidential information that Aman Sao from the Jail conspired with his other associates Akash Rai @ Monu, Hari Tiwari @ Dhirendra Tiwari, Boby Sao @ Sidharth Sao, Mayank Singh and other active members of the gang are collecting ransom from contractors, businessman, coal transporters, coal extracting companies, truck owner association on the threat of life.

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4. It has further been alleged that the extortion money received by them is used for purchasing AK-47 and other sophisticated fire arms, large number of pistols, Carbine, revolver, cartridges explosives and those weapons and explosives are used to damage the Central Government and State Government institution, N.T.P.C, L&T, CCL which are working for the development of the country. Accused Aman Sao is associated with TPC and PLFI, banned organization of Jharkhand, and has nexus of interstate and international contacts, the high profile criminals of Bihar, Rajasthan, Punjab, UP, Haryana, Nepal etc. The extortion/levy recovered is being used in country as well as outside

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country by his associate-Narayan Thapa of Nepal through Hawala and by using the said extortion money, sophisticated international standard weapons and explosive substance are purchased. Aman Sao through his associates is able to stop the development work of the State Government and Central Government, the railway and road construction work and coal extraction work. Aman Sao is involved in about 90 cases of serious nature in Jharkhand and other States who is operating the gang from jail and due to his fear the businessmen, coal transport officials all under fear of life and many of them after giving the extortion money does not report to the police. Many shooters of Aman Sao gang, namely, Chandan Sahu who is accused of Barkagaon P.S. Case No.156 of 2023 in which the official of Ritwik Company was murdered. He is also accused of Argora P.S. Case No.261 of 2023. An information was received that he along with his associates has stayed in the house of Champa Devi w/o Jodhan Munda in Vill- Dardag, Ormanjhi P.S. The said information was registered in station diary and for ascertaining the same and taking the action one team was constituted by A.T.S. under Sri Niraj Kumar, Dy. S.P. and several other police personnel which the members of the team including the informant at about 11.45 left for the abovementioned place and apprehended Chandan Sao and one Sonu Kumar with firearm and forged Aadhar card. On interrogation, Chandan Sao accepted that he made firing upon Ranjeet Gupta in Argora along with his associate Waris Ansarı @ Musa. He informed that he has kept the used fire arm with Hidayat Ansari and Bobby Sao @ Sidhrath Sao. He also said that he can get the said fire arms and motorcycle recovered, which were used in

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the crime. The informant informed the senior officials and under the leadership of Dy S.P. Niraj Kumar, Chandan Sao and Sonu Kumar was taken with them towards Ramgarh and near Banjari Devi Temple one Waris Ansari Musa was apprehended along with fire arms, cartridges and motorcycle. On interrogation, Chandan Sao informed that under command of his boss Aman Sao, Mayank Singh, Sunil Kumar Meena, Hari Tiwari, Yogeshwar Mahto, Waris Ansari he along with his other associates were to conduct meeting in village Rochap Terpa in which his other gang members Digambar Prajapati, Akash Sao, Rajan Sao, Bobby Sao, Raja Ansari, Ravi Munda and other members were to meet and commit one big incident at Ramgarh. They arrested accused Waris Ansari, Sonu Kumar along with fire arm (Pistol), (Revolver/Cartridges), Motorcycle and other articles. The team members took them to Dhurwa A.T.S. for registration of formal FIR thereafter along with Chandan Sao the team proceeded for arrest and recovery of fire arms under the leadership of Dy SP. Niraj Kumar. They reached near village Terpa, when they came to Daridih Mahuwa More at about 20.10 hrs. and on being asked from the local person, they informed that persons sitting on motorcycle are the accused as the person wearing cap was Siddharth Sao @ Bobby Sao and one another person standing there was Rajan Sao. When the Dy. S.P. along with S.I. Sonu Kumar Sahu proceeded towards them all of a sudden they started firing upon the police party with intention to kill them in which Dy. S.P Niraj Kumar and S.I. Sonu Kumar Sahu sustained fire arms injury, the Dy. S.P. shouted that they are the police personnel and they were having direction to arrest. They

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ordered to arrest the accused persons but taking the advantage of forest and darkness the accused persons they managed to flee away. The injured police personnel were taken to hospital and from the place of occurrence automatic 9 MM pistol, cartridges were recovered and the damaged mobile phone of Realme Company of S.I. Sonu Kumar Sahu was also recovered. One pair of sleepers of the accused and key of the motorcycle were recovered and seizure list was prepared and the FIR was lodged in the matter.

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5. On the basis of the aforesaid written report A.T.S. P.S Case No.07 of 2023 dated 18.07.2023 was registered for the offence under section 353, 332, 333, 307, 120(B) of the IPC and Section 27 of Arms Act and under Section 16, 17, 20 of U.A.P Act against the present appellant and other co-accused persons.

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6. After investigation, the police had submitted charge-sheet against the present appellant and other co-accused persons on 20.01.2024 under section 353, 332, 307, 120(B) of Indian Penal Code, under section 27 of Arms Act and under sections 16, 17, 20 of U.A.P Act.

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7. The prayer for bail of the present appellant was made before the learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application No.3731 of 2023 but the same had been rejected by the learned trial Court vide order dated 25.01.2024 against which an appeal was preferred being Cr. Appeal (DB) No.244 of 2024 but Vide order dated 16.04.2024 the aforesaid appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.

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8. Thereafter, again the prayer for bail of the appellant was rejected by this Court vide order dated 12.12.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.823 of 2024 on merit by passing a detailed order.

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9. The appellant has again preferred an application for regular bail before the learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application No. 1186 of 2025 which was dismissed vide order dated 09.07.2025.

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10. Being aggrieved, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the order dated 09.07.2025 which is impugned herein. Submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant:

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11. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that earlier to the present appeal, the present appellant had moved before this Court twice by filing criminal appeals. First attempt was made by filing Cr. Appeal (DB) No.244 of 2024 which was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 16.04.2024 by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court.

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12. The appellant again approached this Court by filing another criminal appeal being Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 823 of 2024 which was dismissed vide order dated 12.12.2024 and thereafter, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the order dated 09.07.2025 passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.1186 of 2025 by which the prayer for grant of bail has been rejected by the learned trial Court.

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13. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case and is having no nexus with the member of the terrorist gang and has been made scapegoat to ease the burden of investigation.

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14. It has been contended that the reason for filing the instant appeal with prayer for bail for third time is the changed circumstance as the co-accused persons, namely, Ravi Munda, Hari Tiwari, Warish Ansari, Chandan Saw and Boby Saw @ Siddharth @ Siddharth Kumar have been granted bail by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court. The coaccused-Ravi Munda has been granted bail vide order dated 27.06.2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.404 of 2024; co-accused-Hari Tiwari @ Dhirendra Tiwari has been granted bail vide order dated 06.09.2024 passed in B.A No.4395 of 2024, co-accused-Warish Ansari @ Mussa has been granted bail vide order dated 08.05.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.745 of 2024, co-accused-Chandan Kumar Saw @ Chandan Saw has been granted bail vide order dated 13.08.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.871 of 2025 and co-accused-Boby Saw @ Siddharth @ Siddharth Kumar has been granted bail vide order dated 04.08.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.676 of 2025 and, as such, the present appellant may be granted bail on the ground of parity.

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15. It has been contended that no incriminating article has been recovered from the possession of the appellant relating to the present case.

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16. It has further been contended that except confessional statement, no any strong material has been found during the course of investigation.

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17. It has been contended that the investigation agency failed to proof criminal conspiracy and all the sections levelled against the present

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appellant are on the basis of investigation which is not sustainable in the eyes of law.

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18. It has been contended that nothing specific came against the present appellant during the course of investigation and the investigating agency failed to find cogent material regarding connectivity of the present appellant with alleged allegation as per FIR.

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19. It has been submitted that the appellant is in custody since 03.08.2023 and, as such, taking into consideration the long custody, delay in trial and on the ground of parity, it is a fit case where the impugned order may be interfered with.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the Respondent:

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20. Per contra, Mr. Vineet Kumar Vashistha, learned Spl.PP appearing for the respondent-ATS, has submitted that it is incorrect on the part of the appellant to take the ground that there is no allegation against him, rather, ample materials have come against the appellant of having in collaboration with the members of gang, as would appear from the various paragraphs of the case diary as also from the FIR itself.

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21. Further submission has been made that earlier the prayer for bail of the present appellant was rejected by this Court vide order dated 12.12.2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.823 of 2023 by a detailed order on merit.

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22. The submission has also been made that the gravity of allegation against the appellant is more serious in comparison to that of the aforesaid co-accused persons who have been granted bail, since, in course of investigation it revealed that the present appellant had started

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firing upon the police party with intention to kill them in which police personnel were sustained injuries.

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23. It has further been contended that the place from where the appellant was arrested one cartridge and large number of incriminating articles, i.e., sophisticated weapons, large number of pistols, carbine revolver, cartridges, explosives etc. were seized

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24. It has been contended that it has come on record that the appellant is having three criminal antecedents including the present one of like nature and, as such, it is not a fit case to interfere with the impugned order.

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25. So far delay in trial is concerned, it has been contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court recently in the case of Gurwinder Singh Versus State of Punjab and Another (2024 SCC OnLine SC 109) has held that for the offences under UAPA "Bail will be an exception and Jail will be the rule" and merely period of custody and delay in trial will not be a ground for grant for bail.

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26. So far as likelihood of delay in the trial is concerned, the submission has been made on behalf of respondent that out of 21 chargesheeted witness 7 witnesses have already been examined. As such, the plea of the petitioner about the probable delay in the trial is not fit to be accepted.

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27. Learned counsel for the respondent has emphatically submitted that the case is at advanced stage, as substantial number of prosecution witnesses have already been examined and the appellant having criminal antecedents and if at this stage the appellant would be enlarged on bail,

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there is every likelihood of influencing the witnesses and tampering with the evidence or may abscond, which would seriously prejudice the fair conduct of the trial.

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28. Learned counsel for the respondent has also submitted that no fresh ground, on facts as well as on law, has been agitated herein by renewing the prayer for grant of bail, hence, the instant appeal is also fit to be dismissed.

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Analysis:

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29. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record and the finding recorded by the learned trial Court as recorded in the impugned order dated 09.07.2025.

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30. Admittedly, the prayer for bail of the present appellant was made before the learned trial Court by filing Misc. Cr. Application No.3731 of 2023 but the same had been rejected by the learned trial Court vide order dated 25.01.2024 against which an appeal being Cr. Appeal (DB) No.244 of 2024 was preferred before this Court, but vide order dated 16.04.2024 the aforesaid appeal was dismissed as withdrawn.

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31. Thereafter, again the prayer for bail of the appellant was rejected by this Court vide order dated 12.12.2024 passed in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.823 of 2024 on merit by passing a detailed order. For ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid order i.e. order dated 12.12.2024 are being referred as under:

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“9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned court in the impugned order as also the FIR and the material which has been surfaced on the basis of statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C, as referred in the case diary.

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10. It is evident from the case diary particularly from paragraphs 4,5,6, 11, 14 and 16 that the name of the appellant has been disclosed by the person concerned in the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It has further come that due to assault on one Dy.S.P namely, Niraj Kumar and one SI, namely, Sonu Kumar Sahu sustained injury due to firing done by the accused persons.

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11. The appellant is having three criminal antecedents including the present one of like nature.

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12. Considering the nature of crime, in which, the appellant is alleged to be involved, and he is the member of the gang which is being operated by Aman Sao and further two police personnel have sustained injury due to sudden firing on the part of terrorist gang, this Court is of the view that the impugned order requires no interference by this Court.”

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32. From perusal of the aforementioned paragraphs of the order dated 12.12.2024 it is evident that this Court has already considered all the pleas of the present appellant/accused while rejecting his earlier prayer for bail and has taken into consideration the culpability of the present appellant in the alleged commission of crime. It has further been observed that the appellant is the member of the gang which is being operated by Aman Sao and further two police personnel have sustained injury due to sudden firing on the part of the gang.

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33. It is evident that after rejection of prayer for bail again Misc. Cr. Application No. 1186 of 2025 has been filed by the appellant before the learned trial Court which has been dismissed vide order dated 09.07.2025, against which the present appeal has been preferred.

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34. This Court, before proceeding to consider the legality and propriety of the impugned order, and rival submission of learned counsel for the parties, deems it fit and proper to first refer the some settled proposition of law and the relevant provisions of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (herein referred as Act 1967) which is required to be considered herein.

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35. The main objective of the Act 1967 is to make powers available for dealing with activities directed against the integrity and sovereignty of India. As per Preamble, Act 1967 has been enacted to provide for the more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations and dealing with terrorist activities and for matters connected therewith. Therefore, the aim and object of enactment of UAPA is also to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities.

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36. To achieve the said object and purpose of effective prevention of certain unlawful activities the Parliament in its wisdom has provided that where an association is declared unlawful by a notification issued under Section 3, a person, who is and continues to be a member of such association shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years, and shall also be liable to fine.

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37. Clause (m) of Section 2 of the 1967 Act defines “terrorist organization”. Chapters III onwards of the 1967 Act incorporate various offences. Chapter IV has the title “punishment for terrorist act”. Clause (k) of Section 2 provides that “terrorist act” has the meaning assigned to it under Section 15 and the terrorist act includes an act which constitutes

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an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule.

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38. At this juncture, it will be purposeful to discuss the core of Section 43(d)(5) of the Act 1967 which mandates that the person shall not be released on bail if the Court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations made are prima facie true apart from the other offences the appellant is accused of committing offences under Sections 17, 18 and 21 of the UA(P) Act,

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39. The requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of “ National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali” [(2019) 5 SCC 1] wherein at paragraph 23 it has been held by interpreting the expression “prima facie true” as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967 which would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigation agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the First Information Report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It has further been observed that it must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. The degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the

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accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special enactments. For ready reference, paragraph 23 of the aforesaid judgment is required to be quoted herein which reads hereunder as :-

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“23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to the offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the alleged offence. There is a degree of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable 11 grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is “prima facie” true. By its very nature, the expression “prima facie true” would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application

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or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act….”

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40. It is, thus, evident from the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Supra) that it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its mind to examine the entire materials on record for the purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused or not.

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41. Further, it is settled proposition of law that at the stage of granting or non-granting of the bail, the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise and the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage.

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42. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court by setting out propounding the law in the same case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) , has observed that the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage and the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise. For ready reference, paragraph 24, 25 and 26 of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein under:-

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“ 24. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage—of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail—is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to

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be done at this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.

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25. From the analysis of the impugned judgment, it appears to us that the High Court has ventured into an area of examining the merits and demerits of the evidence. For, it noted that the evidence in the form of statements of witnesses under Section 161 are not admissible. Further, the documents pressed into service by the investigating agency were not admissible in evidence. It also noted that it was unlikely that the document had been recovered from the residence of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt till 16-8-2017 (para 61 of the impugned judgment). Similarly, the approach of the High Court in completely discarding the statements of the protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 CrPC, on the specious ground that the same was kept in a sealed cover and was not even perused by the Designated Court and also because reference to such statements having been recorded was not found in the charge-sheet already filed against the respondent is, in our opinion, in complete disregard of the duty of the Court to record its opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned is prima facie true or otherwise. That opinion must be reached by the Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents of the case diary and including the chargesheet (report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.) and other material gathered by the investigating agency during investigation.

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26. Be it noted that the special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967 Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof. To wit, soon after the arrest of the accused on the basis of the FIR registered against him, but before filing of the charge-sheet by the investigating agency; after filing of the first charge-sheet and before the filing of the supplementary or final chargesheet consequent to further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC, until framing of the charges or after framing of the charges by the Court and recording of evidence of key witnesses, etc. However, once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to

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justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along with the chargesheet (report under Section 173 CrPC), do not make out reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case.”

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43. It is, thus, evident that the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage of granting bail of giving reasons for grant or nongrant of bail that is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. Rather, the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.

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44. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Gurwinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 109 while taking into consideration of the judgment as rendered in the National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali ( Supra ) has observed that, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail and lays down that if the Court, ‘ on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ’, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV

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and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond.

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45. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase - ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ - unless circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act and the ‘exercise’ of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope.

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46. In the aforesaid context, it has further been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand and in dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail and the ‘justifications’ must be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the Special Court.

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47. In the aforesaid background, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the test for rejection of bail is quite plain and Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It has further been observed that it is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied - that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the ‘ tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing

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witnesses, tampering with evidence).

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48. For ready reference, following paragraphs of the aforesaid

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Judgment are being quoted herein under:

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“27. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D shows that apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an accused on bail, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail. It lays down that if the Court, ‘ on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ’, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond. It is interesting to note that there is no analogous provision traceable in any other statute to the one found in Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act. In that sense, the language of bail limitation adopted therein remains unique to the UAP Act.

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28. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase - ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ - unless circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act. The ‘exercise’ of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D (5)‘ shall not be released’ in contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC - ‘ may be released’ - suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule.

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29. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand. In dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail. The ‘justifications’ must be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the Special Court. The legislature has prescribed a low, ‘ prima facie’ standard, as a measure of the degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by Court when scrutinising the justifications [materials on record]. This standard can be contrasted

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with the standard of ‘ strong suspicion’, which is used by Courts while hearing applications for ‘discharge--”

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49. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the ‘ tripod test’ (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence) . This position is made clear by Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail.

¶135

50. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment after textual reading of Section 43 D (5) UAP Act, has formulated the guideline which was summarized in the form of a twin-prong test . For ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted herein under:

¶136

“ 31. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the inquiry that a bail court must undertake while deciding bail applications under the UAP Act can be summarised in the form of a twin-prong test:

¶137

Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?

¶138

1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged ‘accusations’ make out an offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP Act

¶139

1.2 Such examination should be limited to case diary and final report submitted under Section 173 CrPC;

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Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail in light of the general principles relating to grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC (‘tripod test’)?”

¶143

51. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid settled position of law is now proceeding to examine that whether impugned order by which bail has been rejected requires interference by this Court.

¶144

52. Since no fresh ground or change in circumstance is available herein, therefore, the learned counsel for appellant has taken the ground of long custody i.e. about 2 years and 7 months approximately and probable delay in conclusion of trial has also been taken as one of the grounds. The learned counsel for the appellant has also raised the issue of parity and submitted that since other co-accused persons have been granted bail therefore the appellant herein also deserves to be released on bail by interfering with the order impugned.

¶145

53. While on the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has argued that ample evidence has been collected in course of investigation wherefrom it is evident that there is specific attributability regarding the appellant being member and co-aid of gang being operated by one Aman Sao, who indulge in extortion from businessmen with the aid of his gang members including the appellant. It has further been submitted by referring to paragraphs 4,5,6, 11, 14 and 16 of the case diary that specific attributability of the appellant has surfaced in course of investigation.

¶146

54. The ground, therefore, has been agitated that the case of the appellant is not identical to the said co-accused against whom parity has

¶147

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been claimed rather herein the accused/appellant is active member of gang of Aman Saw and had played the vital role as would be evident from different paragraph of the case dairy. Further, the appellant is having three criminal antecedents of like nature and as such it is not a fit case to interfere with the impugned order.

¶150

55. Adverting to the contention of the learned counsel for the parties, admittedly herein, earlier the prayer of the appellant for bail has already been rejected on merit vide order dated 12.12.2024 by this Court passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 823 of 2024 and the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid order has already been quoted hereinabove in preceding paragraphs. The present appeal has been filed on the ground of period of custody and probable delay in trial and in addition thereto ground of parity has also been raised.

¶151

56. In the aforesaid backdrop, it requires to refer herein that the statutory mandate contained under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act 1967 imposes a stringent embargo upon the release of an accused charged with such grave offences on bail, unless the twin conditions stipulated therein are satisfied. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurwinder Singh (supra) , wherein after considering the judgment in Union of India v. Κ.Α. Najeeb (supra), it was reiterated that the statutory parameters contained in Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act 1967 must be applied while considering bail in cases involving serious offences under the Act. It has been held that only where the allegations are found to be prima facie untrue, on the basis of the material collected during investigation, can the prayer for bail be considered, and

¶152

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conversely, where the allegations appear prima facie true, the privilege of bail cannot be extended.

¶155

57. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer herein that only the long incarceration herein 2 years and 7 month is not the ground to be looked into for enlarging the accused on bail rather the accusation so made against the accused persons as also societal impact is also to be taken care of.

¶156

58. As per the settled proposition of law as discussed referred hereinabove in the preceding paragraph, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail must be rejected as a ‘rule’, if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. This position is made clear by Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail.

¶157

59. In the present case, it is apparent from the appellant/accused has been charged for offences punishable under Sections of the UA(P)Act 1967, having maximum punishment of imprisonment for life.

¶158

60. Although, the culpability of the present accused/appellant has already been dealt with by this Court in its order dated 12.12.2024 but at the cost of repetition same has been reiterated herein in precise form.

¶159

61. It is evident from the case diary that the appellant has played major role in the alleged offence. The appellant and his associates have

¶160

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¶162

hatched a conspiracy to commit a grave offence and one of the coaccused had shot fire on the police party, in which the two police personnel got serious bullet injuries.

¶163

62. It has come in the case diary that when police reached near village Terpa, and when they came to Daridih Mahuwa More at about 20.10 hrs. and on being asked, the local persons have informed that persons sitting on motorcycle are the accused as the person wearing cap was Siddharth Sao @ Bobby Sao and one another person standing there was Rajan Sao(appellant). When the Dy.S.P. along with S.I.-Sonu Kumar Sahu proceeded towards them all of a sudden they started firing upon the police party with intention to kill in which Dy. S.P. Niraj Kumar and S.I. Sonu Kumar Sahu sustained fire arms injury, the Dy S.P. shouted that they are the police personnel and they were having direction to arrest. They ordered to arrest the accused person but taking the advantage of forest and darkness the accused persons managed to flee away and from the place of occurrence automatic 9 MM pistol, cartridges were recovered and the damaged mobile phone of Realme Company of S.I. Sonu Kumar Sahu was also recovered. One pair of sleepers of the accused and key of the motorcycle were recovered and seizure list was prepared and the FIR was lodged in the matter.

¶164

63. Thus, the materials as well as facts available on the record suggest the involvement of the appellant in the instant case which is related to an organized crime of the serious nature and he is identified as a member of the notorious gang operating in the state as well as other parts of the country.

¶165

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64. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that matter relates to organized crime related to collection of levies from coal traders, business man and other persons of the locality by means of organized crime, in the name of gangster Aman Sao and attempt to murder to police persons while they were performing their duties.

¶168

65. Thus, there is no material change in the fact or situation so far the culpability of the present appellant is concerned but ground of custody and delay in trial as also issue of parity has been raised herein.

¶169

66. It requires to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) taking into consideration the ratio of judgment of Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb , (supra) has observed that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:

¶170

"46. As already discussed, the material available on record indicates the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities backed by members of banned terrorist organisation involving exchange of large quantum of money through different channels which needs to be deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released on bail there is every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses of the case which might hamper the process of justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted."

¶171

67. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its recent judgment in the case of

¶172

Gulfisha Fatima versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2026 LiveLaw

¶173

(SC) 1 while appreciating the implication of Article 21 vis-vis Section 43D (5) of the Act 1967 and taking into the consideration the ratio laid

¶174

25

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¶176

down in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) has categorically observed that if prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does not operate as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory restraint, for ready reference, the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are being quoted as under:

¶177

“32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, this Court recognised a constitutional safeguard that cannot be ignored: statutory restrictions cannot be applied so as to render the guarantee of personal liberty illusory. It was held that where the trial is not likely to commence or conclude within a reasonable period, constitutional courts retain the jurisdiction to grant bail notwithstanding statutory restraints. The decision thus operates as a protection against unconscionable detention and there can be no second opinion on the said principle.

¶178

33. The same decision, however, does not indicate as laying down a mechanical rule under which the mere passage of time becomes determinative in every case arising under a special statute. The jurisprudence of this Court does not support a construction whereby delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory regime enacted by Parliament to address offences of a special category.

¶179

35. The proper constitutional question, therefore, is not whether Article 21 is superior to Section 43D (5). The proper question is how Article 21 is to be applied where Parliament has expressly conditioned the grant of bail in relation to offences alleged to implicate national security. The law does not contemplate an either-or approach. Nor does it contemplate an unstructured blending of statutory and constitutional considerations. What is required is disciplined judicial scrutiny that gives due regard to both.

¶180

47. A closely allied consideration is the role attributed to the accused. Prosecutions under the UAPA may allege varying degrees of participation, ranging from peripheral acts to strategic, organisational, or ideological centrality. The constitutional significance of prolonged incarceration cannot be assessed uniformly for all accused regardless of role. Where the attribution suggests a central or organising role in the alleged design, the need for circumspection before constitutional intervention displaces a statutory

¶181

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embargo is correspondingly greater. Conversely, where the role is peripheral or episodic, prolonged incarceration may more readily assume a punitive character.

¶184

56. It therefore becomes necessary to state, with clarity, the governing approach. In prosecutions alleging offences which implicate the sovereignty, integrity, or security of the State, delay does not operate as a trump card that automatically displaces statutory restraint. Rather, delay serves as a trigger for heightened judicial scrutiny. The outcome of such scrutiny must be determined by a proportional and contextual balancing of legally relevant considerations, including (i) the gravity and statutory character of the offence alleged, (ii) the role attributed to the accused within the alleged design or conspiracy, (iii) the strength of the prima facie case as it emerges at the limited threshold contemplated under the special statute, and (iv) the extent to which continued incarceration, viewed cumulatively in the facts of the case, has become demonstrably disproportionate so as to offend the guarantee of personal liberty under Article 21.

¶185

58. In Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court expressly cautioned against the mechanical invocation of prolonged incarceration as a ground for bail in cases involving serious offences under special enactments. The judgment reiterates that the gravity of the offence, the legislative context, and the prima facie material on record cannot be eclipsed merely because the trial has taken time.

¶186

59. This Court in CBI v. Dayamoy Mahato reiterated that while Article 21 remains paramount, it does not operate in a vacuum divorced from competing constitutional interests. The Court emphasized that claims to liberty must be examined in the totality of circumstances, particularly where allegations implicate organised criminality or matters of public interest. Delay, though undoubtedly significant, was held not to assume the character of an absolute or solitary determinant. The emphasis, once again, was on structured judicial reasoning rather than on formulaic outcomes."

¶187

68. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid settled position of law, it is evident that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences, as one involved in the instant case, cannot be used as a ground to grant bail.

¶188

69. There is no dispute and it cannot be disputed that the jurisprudence of Article 21 has, as it develops, recognised various facets

¶189

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to be intrinsic to the right to life and liberty such as speedy trial, timely completion of investigation, fair trial etc. but at the same time circumspection in granting the relief of bail in offences that harmful to society such as in this case, stems from a place of concern, understandably legitimate at that, about public order, societal security, overall peace and the general deterrent force in criminal law.

¶192

70. The scales of justice must balance on the one hand-the constitutionally consecrated and jealously guarded right under Article 21 and on the other, the recognition that individual liberty is not absolute and is subject to just exceptions i.e. the paramount considerations of national interest and societal interest.

¶193

71. There can be no manner of doubt on the proposition that Article 21 rights are placed on a pedestal, and rightly so, at the same time, though, the individual cannot always be the center of attention. We observe, therefore, that while Article 21 rights must always be protected, but however, in cases where the security of the society and nation is called into question, the long incarceration cannot be the sole ground of consideration.

¶194

72. The act of the accused persons must be looked at, on the whole, and all relevant factors must be given due consideration while granting or denying bail. Needless to add, any Court seized of bail application(s) arising out of such offences must record, in their order the reasons and factors that weighed with them in the ultimate outcome.

¶195

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73. In view of the discussion made above, it is the settled fact that the rights of an individual are always subservient to the nation/societal interest.

¶198

74. Further, in the case of Gurwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (supra) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has expressed its concern to the threat raised by terrorist organizations and held that where the accusations against the respondents are prima facie true, the mandate contained in the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act would become applicable and the accused would not be released on bail.

¶199

75. Herein, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted at Bar that out of 21 charge-sheeted witness 7 witnesses have already been examined, therefore taking into consideration the aforesaid submission, the apprehension of appellant in probable delay in trial is not fit to be accepted.

¶200

76. Further, it has been submitted by the respondent that if the present appellant is allowed to be released on bail, then, he will get all opportunities to tamper with the evidence as well as influence the witnesses or he may abscond.

¶201

77. Thus, from the aforesaid discussion it is evident that there are serious allegations against the appellant/accused that he being the active member of Aman Sao Gang has participated in the serous crime therefore, it is considered view of this Court that prayer for bail of the appellant on the ground of custody or delay in trial, is not fit to be accepted.

¶202

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78. Further, the learned counsel for the appellant has raised the issue of parity and has submitted that the other co-accused persons who are similarly placed have already been directed to be released on bail, therefore the prayer of the petitioner is fit to be accepted.

¶205

79. The learned counsel for the appellant has further raised the issue of parity by stating that the co-accused-Ravi Munda has been granted bail vide order dated 27.06.2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.404 of 2024; co-accused-Hari Tiwari @ Dhirendra Tiwari has been granted bail vide order dated 06.09.2024 passed in B.A No.4395 of 2024, co-accused-Warish Ansari @ Mussa has been granted bail vide order dated 08.05.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.745 of 2024, coaccused-Chandan Kumar Saw @ Chandan Saw has been granted bail vide order dated 13.08.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.871 of 2025 and co-accused-Boby Saw @ Siddharth @ Siddharth Kumar has been granted bail vide order dated 04.08.2025 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.676 of 2025, therefore, the prayer of the present appellant for bail is fit to be allowed.

¶206

80. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the allegation as surfaced against said co-accused cannot be said to be identical with the case of the appellant,

¶207

81. It needs to refer herein that the law is well settled that the principle of parity is to be applied if the case of the fact is exactly similar, then, only the principle of parity will be applied in the matter of passing order but if there is difference in between the facts, then, the principle of parity, is not to be applied.

¶208

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82. It is further settled connotation of law that the Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail and by only simply saying that another accused has been granted bail, is not sufficient to determine whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established.

¶211

83. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Tarun Kumar Versus Assistant Director Directorate of Enforcement, reported in (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1486 has observed that parity is not the law and while applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration.

¶212

84. It is further settled connotation of law that Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail and by simply saying that another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to determine whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs.

¶213

Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230 wherein it has been held as under:

¶214

"25. We are constrained to observe that the orders passed by the High Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law. They are oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and to the severity of the punishment in the event of conviction. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527], this Court has

¶215

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held that while applying the principle of parity, the High Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail. This Court observed :(SCC p. 515, para 17)

¶218

17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand was taken that the second respondent was a history sheeter, it was imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinise every aspect and not capriciously record that the second respondent is entitled to be admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated with absolute certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore, the impugned order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] clearly exposes the non application of mind. That apart, as a matter of fact it has been brought on record that the second respondent has been charge-sheeted in respect of number of other heinous offences. The High Court has failed to take note of the same.Therefore, the order has to pave the path of extinction, for its approval by this Court would tantamount to travesty of justice, and accordingly we set it aside." 26. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is the manner in which the High Court has applied the principle of parity. By its two orders both dated 21-12- 2020 [Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2986] , [Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2988] , the High Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). Parity was sought with Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was granted on 22- 10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the ground (as the High Court recorded) that he was "assigned similar role of armed with stick (sic)". Again, bail was granted to Vanraj Koli (A16) on the ground that he was armed with a wooden stick and on the ground that Pravin

¶219

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(A-10), Kheta (A15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13) who were armed with sticks had 42 been granted bail. The High Court has evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law."

¶222

85. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal position, this Court has gone through material available on record.

¶223

86. It has come on record that there is direct allegation against the present appellant that he started firing on seeing the police party in which two police officers/personnel had got injuries and, as such, it is not a fit case to interfered with the impugned order.

¶224

87. This Court, in view of the principle of parity as discussed hereinabove and taking into consideration the material available against the present appellant and also the culpability of the present appellant in alleged commission of crime, is of the view that the principle of parity cannot be extended to the present appellant.

¶225

88. Further, although the prayer for bail of aforesaid co-accused persons have been allowed by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court but earlier the prayer for bail of the present appellant has been rejected by this Court by a detailed order and prima facie the nexus of the present

¶226

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appellant with the Aman Sao gang has been established by the investigating agency, therefore, prima facie a case of criminal conspiracy against the present appellant is made out and, as such, the issue of parity is not available to the present appellant.

¶229

89. This Court, in view of the principle of parity as discussed hereinabove and taking into consideration the material available against the present appellant and also the culpability of the present appellant in alleged commission of crime, is of the view that the principle of parity is not fit to be applied herein.

¶230

90. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect and settled position proposition of law rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) and Gurwinder Singh (supra), this Court is now adverting to the order dated 09.07.2025 passed by the learned trial Court in Misc. Criminal Application No. 1186 of 2025 which is under challenge herein.

¶231

91. The learned trial Court in the said order dated 09.07.2025 has taken into consideration that the present appellant had earlier filed Misc. Criminal Application No.3731 of 2023 which had been rejected vide order dated 25.01.2024.

¶232

92. It reveals that against the said order, the appellant preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal (DB) No.244 of 2024 before the High Court which was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 16.04.2024 and thereafter again filed another criminal appeal being Criminal Appeal (DB) No.823 of 2024 which had also got rejected vide order dated 12.12.2024.

¶233

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93. The learned trial Court has observed in the order impugned herein that a prima facie case is being made out against the appellant on the basis of evidence collected by the ATS team during investigation. It has revealed during investigation that the appellant has taken active part in the criminal conspiracy. The learned trial Court has found from the materials available on record that the appellant is a member of Aman Sao gang which has linked with anti-national elements and also international gangs. Hence, the learned trial Court taking into consideration the seriousness of the crime and role played by the appellant by firing at police party, has rejected the prayer for bail of the present appellant by holding that successive bail is not maintainable as also there is no fresh ground for bail except the period of custody of the appellant.

¶236

94. This Court, based upon the aforesaid reason, is of the view that the impugned order rejecting the prayer for bail, suffers from no infirmity.

¶237

95. This Court vide order dated 12.12.2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.823 of 2024 had rejected the prayer for bail of the present appellant which was not challenged before any higher Forum/authority by the appellant and, as such, the said order attains its finality.

¶238

96. Herein, the learned counsel for the respondent-State has submitted at Bar that the trial in the instant case is in progress and charges have already been framed against the present appellant and out of 21 witnesses, seven witnesses have already been examined.

¶239

97. Thus, taking into consideration that this Court has earlier expressed its view while rejecting the prayer for grant of bail of the

¶240

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present appellant referred hereinabove, as also there is no vital change in circumstances as also taking into consideration the submission advanced on behalf of the respondent-ATS that the trial is going on expeditiously, this Court is of the view that the order impugned dated 09.07.2025 passed in Misc. Criminal Application No. 1186 of 2025 requires no interference.

¶243

98. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.

¶244

99. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

¶245

100. It is made clear that any observation made herein will not prejudice the case of the appellant in course of trial and the view as expressed by this Court is only limited to the instant appeal.

¶246

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

¶247

(Sanjay Prasad, J.)

¶248

(Sanjay Prasad, J.)

¶249

Sudhir Dated: 07/04/2026. Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi AFR

¶250

Uploaded on 08/04/2026.

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36

Rajan Sao v. the State of Jharkhand

Case brief

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Rajan Sao v. the State of Jharkhand

Case brief

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