Akhilesh Kumar Vs the State of Jharkhand through Anti Corruption Bureau

2025:JHHC:15570

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Criminal Revision No.165 of 2025

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Akhilesh Kumar, aged about 61 years, Son of Lakshmeshwar Prasad, Resident of C.P. Singh Colony Road, Club Road, P.O.-Club Road, P.S.-Mithanpura, District-Muzaffarpur (Bihar).

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… … Petitioner Versus The State of Jharkhand through Anti-Corruption Bureau … … Opp. Party

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

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For the Petitioner : Mr. Rahul Kumar, Advocate For the Opp. Party : Mr. Aditya Raman, AC to GA-III : Mr. Krishna Murari, Advocate

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C.A.V. on 09.05.2025 Pronounced on 13/06/2025

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1. The instant criminal revision has been preferred under Section 438 and 442 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 against the order dated 29.11.2024 passed in connection with Special Vigilance Case No. 45(A)/2013 arising out of Vigilance P.S. Case No. 45/2013 registered for the offence under Sections 406/409/420/467/468/ 471/120B of the IPC and under section 13(2) read with 13(i)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, whereby and whereunder the petition for discharge filed by the petitioner has been rejected and Charge has been directed to be framed against the Petitioner.

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Factual Matrix

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2. The brief facts of the case as mentioned in the instant petition, which are required to be enumerated read hereunder as :-

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3. The prosecution story in short is based on the written report of one Jitendra Kumar, Police Inspector, Vigilance Bureau, Ranchi dated 28.05.2011 wherein he has stated that a Preliminary Enquiry being 38/2009 has been referred by the Cabinet Vigilance Department of the Government of Jharkhand vide letter no. 1055 dated 22.08.2009 for enquiring into the affairs of Dhanbad Central Cooperative Bank Limited whereupon the FIR has been drawn.

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4. It has further been stated that in the Preliminary Enquiry being 38/2009, it has transpired that the Office Bearers of the Dhanbad Central Cooperative Bank had connived with the outsiders in the matter of grant of loan and have financially embezzled crores of rupees.

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5. It has further been stated that during enquiry and from the report as contained in Letter No. 448 dated 09.03.2009, the following facts emerged which are as under:-

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i) Bhutgarhia-Harladih Cooperative Credit Society - Although there had been dues upon the said Cooperative Society, but even then the then Managing Director Sri Ramod Narayan Jha had sanctioned loan of Rs. 31,34,000/- to the said Cooperative on 26.07.2008 and the entire money has been misappropriated.

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ii) It has been stated that from the Gopalichak Colliery Cooperative Credit Society, loan amount worth Rs.8,10,000/- has been recovered and paid to the Dhanbad Cooperative Bank although the same had not been adjusted in the Account of the Cooperative Bank and for which Nand Kishore Mishra and Ramod Narayan Jha are held responsible.

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iii) The then Managing Director Sri Ramod Narayan Jha and Sheshnath Singh on the basis of forged documents have given loan amount totaling to Rs. 40 lacs.

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iv) The Senior Accounts Officer, Dhanbad had not audited the accounts of Gopalichak Colliery Credit Society and with respect to Bhutgarhia, HarladihBoragarh and Tisra Colliery, Audit has been done till 2001-03, 1996-2003 and 2001-03 respectively which did not mention about the illegalities committed by Sri Tantra Nath Jha.

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6. It has further been stated that for Gopalichak Colliery Credit Cooperative Society an amount of Rs.85,91,310/-, North Tisra Colliery an amount of Rs.63,25,278/- and for Bhutgarhia-Harladih Colliery an amount of Rs.10,22,053/ and for Boragarh Colliery an amount of Rs.60,78,841/-totaling to Rs.2,20,17,482/- has been misappropriated by submitting forged documents.

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7. It has therefore, been held that the Officers who have sanctioned and approved the loan amount, the then Block Cooperative Extension Officer, the Block Cooperative Officer and the then Branch Manager and the Managing Director (Present petitioner Akhilesh Kumar) etc. are involved in the payment of sanctioned loan by way of forged and fabricated documents.

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8. The names of the Officers who had been posted since 2003-09 are as under:-

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(a) Sri Ghanshyam Mandal the then Block Cooperative Extension Officer.

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(b) Sri Binod Kumar the then Block Cooperative Officer.

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(c) Sri Akhilesh Kumar (present petitioner) the then Managing Director, Central Cooperative Bank, Dhanbad at present his services has been transferred to Bihar State Co-operative Office.

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(d) Sri Nand Kishore Mishra the then Managing Director, Central Cooperative Bank, Dhanbad.

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(e) Sri Ramod Narayan Jha the then Managing Director, Central Cooperative Bank, Dhanbad.

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(f) Sri Sheshnath Singh the then Block Cooperative Extension Officer.

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(g) Sri Tantra Nath Jha the then Senior Audit Officer, Dhanbad.

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(h) Sri Parshuram Chauhan BCCL employee and the Loan Recovery Agent of Gopalichak Cooperative Credit Society and Treasurer of North Tisra Colliery who had fabricated documents for the purposes of disbursement of loan and on the basis of forged and fake documents disbursed and paid loan amount causing loss of Rs. 2,20,00,000/- to the State Exchequer.

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9. It was, therefore, requested that FIR be registered against the said persons for the offence under section 406/409/420/467/468/471/477/120B of the IPC and under section 13(2) read with 13(i)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

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10. Accordingly, Dhanbad ACB PS Case No.45(A)/2013 corresponding to GR Case No.42/2023, u/s 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B of the IPC and Sec. 13(2) r/w 13(i)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act had been registered.

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11. The investigation of the case has been concluded and accordingly charge sheet 02/22 dated 12.05.2022 was submitted. Thereafter the learned Trial Court took cognizance of the offence vide order dated 01.06.2022 under sections 406/409/420/467/468/471/477/120B of the I.P.C and under section 13(2) read with 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act

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12. Consequently, the application for discharge being Misc. Criminal Application no.18 of 2024 under the provision of Section 239 of the Cr.P.C has been filed by the petitioner by taking the ground that upon considering the evidence, no offence in connection with Vigilance P.S. Case No. 45(A)/2013 corresponding to G.R. No. 42/2013 registered for the offence u/s 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B of the IPC and Sec. 13(2) r/w 13(i)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is being made as against the petitioner.

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13. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party had submitted that all the miscarriage of justice in the matter of grant and disbursement of loan has been done under the management of Akhilesh Kumar (present petitioner).

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14. Taking into consideration the aforesaid submission of the parties, the learned Special Judge, ACB, Dhanbad, has dismissed the said application vide order dated 29.11.2024 and directed the petitioner to remain physically present on the date fixed for charge.

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15. The present petition has been filed against the order dated 29.11.2024 by which discharge application has been dismissed with direction to frame the charges against the present petitioner.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner:

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16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there is no allegation that the petitioner has made any financial gain or obtained any illegal gratification and further, there is neither legal evidence nor even the facts that has transpired during investigation as against the petitioner to make out a prima-facie case against the petitioner.

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17. It has also been contended that the petitioner was posted as Managing Director, Dhanbad District Central Cooperative Bank from 04.01.2000 to 30.06.2005 and he had performed his duties and functions as Managing Director with utmost honesty and sincerity and there had been no complaints regarding the working of the petitioner by the loanees and he has been implicated in the instant case without any fault.

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18. It has been submitted that the petitioner, being the Managing Director, has general control over the administration of the Bank and he has negligible role in the matter of sanction of loans which are put up through proper channel and after verification before the Managing Committee which sanctions and passes the loan amount for disbursement.

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19. It has further been contended that all the four Cooperative Credit Societies namely Gopalichak Colliery,

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Bhootgarhia-Harladih Colliery, North Tisra Colliery and Borragarh Colliery, which had been granted loan are societies of BCCL employees and none of the loanees have complained regarding and kind of forgery in the matter of disbursement of loan.

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20. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned court ought to have considered that in order to constitute an offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, the dishonest intention must be shown to exist at the time of making the inducement and the failure, if any, to keep up promise cannot be presumed as an act leading to cheating and in the instant case the allegations do not constitute an offence of forgery as the petitioner cannot be said to have created any false document with any intention or knowledge.

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21. It has been submitted that the essential ingredients to constitute an offence punishable under Section 13(2) r/w section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is also lacking as the prosecution had not found any criminal misconduct on the part of the Petitioner in discharge of his official duty

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22. It has been contended that the learned court has failed to appreciate that charges under Sections 406/409/420/467/468/ 471/120B of the of I.P.C. are not being made out as against the petitioner as there is neither

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any deception by the petitioner nor creation of documents or forgery committed by the Petitioner. The petitioner has neither committed criminal breach of trust nor has conspired or instigated for hatching a criminal conspiracy. 23. It is submitted that the guidelines provide that the loan amount be directly credited in the saving accounts of the loanee who all are employees of Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. which is a Government of India Undertaking. The credentials of the applicants seeking loan are verified by the Employer and hence, upon assurance by the B.C.C.L., the loan are disbursed and the petitioner being the Managing Director had only supervisory roles in this regard and he has diligently performed his duties.

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24. Learned counsel for the petitioner, based upon the aforesaid premise, has submitted that the petitioner is innocent and has not done any criminality as has been alleged in the instant cases, as such, it is a fit case where the impugned order needs to be interfered with.

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Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent:

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25. While on the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that no interference is required by this Court as the Special Judge has fully applied his mind before rejecting the discharge application and from perusal of the materials collected during investigation, it is

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apparent that the petitioner-accused is fully involved in the alleged commission of crime.

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26. The learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that in the Preliminary Enquiry being 38/2009, it transpired that the office bearers of Dhanbad Central Cooperative Bank had connived with the outsiders in the matter of grant of loan and have embezzled crores of rupees and in view of that criminality is made out against the present petitioner and, as such, the learned court has rightly not discharged the petitioner and framed charge against the petitioner.

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27. It has been submitted that there is direct allegation against the petitioner that the petitioner in the capacity of Managing Director had sanctioned Rs.20,00,000/- (Twenty Lakhs only) on 26.09.2003, Rs.10,00,000/-(Ten Lakhs only) on 24.11.2003, Rs.10,00,000/- (Ten Lakhs only) on 28.02.2004 and Rs.10,00,000/- (Ten Lakhs only) on 05.03.2004, to the new members, i.e. total 50,00,000/-, (Fifty Lakhs only). From the report itself it transpired that the Branch Manager has commented that out of the 60,00,000/-(Sixty Lakhs only) sanctioned loan, a sum of Rs.50,00,000/-(Fifty Lakhs only) has been paid, whereas the entry of disbursement loan 40,00,000/- (Forty Lakhs) was found in the loan ledger of the society. The Entry of the remaining disbursed loan of Rs. 10,00,000/-(Ten Lakhs) is

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not there in the ledger, which is doubtful and unaccounted for.

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28. He further submits that the petitioner who is Managing Director and other officials such as Branch Manager and others are involved in the payment of sanctioned loan by way of forged and fabricated documents to the fake person.

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29. It has been submitted that in course of investigation the re-statement of informant has also been recorded and further statement of other witnesses were also recorded in the case diary who all supported the allegations levelled against the petitioner as well as other co-accused persons in the FIR.

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30. It has further been submitted that the petitioner, namely Akhilesh Kumar, was the Managing Director and he had the supervisory role over the banking work which also includes the work of disbursement of Loan amount. Thus, the petitioner is also guilty in view of the principle of Vicarious Liability as the crores of amount had been disbursed in the name of loan amount to the fake persons on the basis of fabricated and forged document.

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31. Based upon the aforesaid premise the learned counsel for respondent submits that there is sufficient material on record for constituting prima facie case against the petitioner and as such the learned special Judge has

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rightly rejected the discharge application, therefore it requires no interfere.

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Analysis

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32. This Court has heard the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material available on record including the charge-sheet.

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33. In the background of the factual aspect stated hereinabove, the issues which require consideration are—

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(i) Whether the order dated 29.11.2024 by which the application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been dismissed, can be said to suffer from an error?

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(ii) Whether on the basis of the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation, prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not?

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34. Since both the issues are interlinked as such, they are being taken up together.

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35. At this juncture it would be appropriate to consider the ambit and scope of the powers of the Court at the time of considering the discharge application.

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36. It is well settled that at the time of framing of charge meticulous examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that a prima

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facie case is made out for framing charge to proceed in the case.

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37. Further, the trial Court is not required to discuss the evidence for the purpose of conducting a trial but the discussion of the materials on record is required to reflect the application of judicial mind for finding that a primafacie case is made out against the petitioner.

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38. It is settled connotation of law that at the stage of framing of charge, the probable defence of the accused is not to be considered and the materials, which are relevant for consideration, are the allegations made in the First Information Report/complaint, the statement of the witnesses recorded in course of investigation, the documents on which the prosecution relies and the report of investigation submitted by the prosecuting agency. The probative value of the defence is to be tested at the stage of trial and not at the stage of framing of charge and at the stage of framing of charge minute scrutiny of the evidence is not to be made and even on a very strong suspicion charges can be framed.

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39. Further, it is settled position of law that at the stage of framing the charge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and marshal the material available on record as to whether there is sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in conviction.

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The Court is prima facie required to consider whether there is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is sufficient for framing the charge, the guilt or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the time of conclusion of the trial after evidence is adduced and not at the stage of framing the charge and, therefore, at the stage of framing the charge, the Court is not required to undertake an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the material. 40. The issue of discharge was the subject matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamilnadu, by Inspector of Police in Vigilance and AntiCorruption v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 , wherein at paragraphs no. 29, 32.4, 33 and 34 the Hon'ble Apex Court has been observed as under:—

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“29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the

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ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.

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32.4. While passing the impugned orders [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 22 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)], [State v. K. Ponmudi, (2007) 1 Mad LJ (Cri) 100], the court has not sifted the materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but whether that would warrant a conviction. We are of the opinion that this was not the stage where the court should have appraised the evidence and discharged the accused as if it was passing an order of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation itself cannot be a ground for discharge. In our opinion, the order impugned [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)] suffers from grave error and calls for rectification.

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Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing on the trial. The surviving respondents are directed to appear before the respective courts on 3-22014. The Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage of charge in accordance with law and make endeavour to dispose of the same expeditiously.

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In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the order of discharge with the aforesaid observations.

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41. It has been further held in the case of Asim

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Shariff v. National Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC

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148 , that mini trial is not expected by the trial court for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record at the time of framing of charge. It has been held at paragraph no. 18 of the said judgment as under:—

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“18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.”

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42. It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be a ground of discharge. A

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reference may be made to the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191 . For ready reference Paragraph no. 11 of the said judgment are quoted below:—

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“11. While considering the legality of the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the law on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to. 11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

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11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526)

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“25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721], adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29)

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‘29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.’”

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43. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for framing of charge in the case of Onkar

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Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) wherein at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 it has been held as under:—

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“11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.

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In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasised.

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In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [(2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to several previous decisions held that : (SCC p. 342, para 7)

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“7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider

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whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.”

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44. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Palwinder Singh v. Balvinder Singh, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 850 has been pleased to hold that charges can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshaling and appreciation of the evidence is not in the domain of the court at that point of time.

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45. Further, it is pertinent to mention here that power to discharge an accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him. If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course. Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face. The opinion on any matter may differ

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depending upon the person who views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal

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Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715.

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46. Further, the difference between the approach with which the Court should examine the matter in the discharge has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 , in the following words:—

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“17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the “record of the case” and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the

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language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.

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We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has used the expression “there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence”. This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste. A Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to the meaning of the word “presume” while relying upon Black's Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean “to believe or accept upon probable evidence”; “to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming”. In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the accused

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is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence.

¶148

47. Thus, it is evident that the law regarding the approach to be adopted by the court while considering an application for discharge of the accused person is that the

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Court has to form a definite opinion, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. However, while framing charges, the Court is not required to form a definite opinion that the accused is guilty of committing an offence. The truth of the matter will come out when evidence is led during the trial. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exist, the court would presume that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly and the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution.

¶152

48. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC. The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para 21 as under:

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“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:

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(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

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(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

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(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

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(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

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(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

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(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

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(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the

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accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”

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49. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of M.E.

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Shivalingamurthy v. CBI , reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768 , the above principles have been reiterated in para 17, 18, 28 to 31 and the Hon'ble supreme court has explained as to how the matters of grave suspicion are to be dealt with. The aforesaid paragraphs of the report are quoted as under:

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“17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and discern the following principles:

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17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.

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17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.

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17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court.

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17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”.

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17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion.

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17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.

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17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true.

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17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.

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The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar). The expression, “the record of the case”, used in Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi).

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It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC. The principle established is to take the materials produced by the prosecution, both in the form of oral statements and also documentary material, and act upon it without it been subjected to questioning through cross-examination and everything assumed in favour of the prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no

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offence, as alleged, is made out against the accused, it, undoubtedly, would ensure to the benefit of the accused warranting the trial court to discharge the accused.

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It is not open to the accused to rely on the material by way of defence and persuade the court to discharge him.

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However, what is the meaning of the expression “materials on the basis of which grave suspicion is aroused in the mind of the court's”, which is not explained away? Can the accused explain away the material only with reference to the materials produced by the prosecution? Can the accused rely upon material which he chooses to produce at the stage?

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In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused can only rely on the materials which are produced by the prosecution, it must be understood that the grave suspicion, if it is established on the materials, should be explained away only in terms of the materials made available by the prosecution. No doubt, the accused may appeal to the broad probabilities to the case to persuade the court to discharge him.”

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50. In the case of Asim Shariff v. NIA, (2019) 7 SCC 148 , it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the words ‘not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and

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probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.

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51. Recently, the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool

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Magrey, (2022) 12 SCC 657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and has held in paragraph 27 which reads as under:

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“ 27. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge 14 and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice.

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Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173 CrPC, the court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution.”

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52. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for framing of charge. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to

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frame the charge against him and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused.

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53. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

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54. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of framing of the charge and / or considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.

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55. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this Court is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the conclusion as to whether the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation and has been brought on record, as would be available in the impugned order prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not?

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56. It appears from the record that the prosecution case was registered on the basis of written report of Jitendra Kumar (Informant), Police Inspector, Vigilance Bureau, Ranchi which is registered upon the letter received from Cabinet Vigilance Department Government of Jharkhand vide Letter No. 1055 dated 22.08.2009 which includes the Report of Preliminary Enquiry being 38/2009.

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57. In the Preliminary Enquiry being 38/2009, it transpired that the office bearers of Dhanbad Central Cooperative Bank had connived with the outsider in the matter of grant of loan and have embezzled crores of rupees.

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58. It has further been alleged that the petitioner who is Managing Director and other officials such as Branch Manager and others are involved in the disbursement of sanctioned loan by way of forged and fabricated documents to the fake person.

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59. It is evident that on the aforesaid written information of the informant, the FIR registered under Sections 406/409/420/467/468/471/477/120Bof the I.P.C and under section 13(2) read with 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act has been lodged against accused persons including the present petitioner.

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60. Thereafter, investigation proceeded and accordingly charge sheet 02/22 dated 12.05.2022 was submitted.

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Thereafter the learned Trial Court took cognizance of the offence vide order dated 01.06.2022 under sections 406/409/420/467/468/471/477/120B of the I.P.C and under section 13(2) read with 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

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61. Consequently, the application for discharge being Misc. Criminal Application no. 18/2024 has been filed by the petitioner but the learned Spl. Judge, (ACB) Dhanbad had dismissed the said application vide order dated 29.11.2024 and directed to petitioner to present physically on the date fixed for charge. Against the order dated 29.11.2024 present petition has been preferred.

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62. It needs to refer herein that during investigation the role of petitioner has been mentioned in the charge-sheet which has been referred in the counter affidavit also. During investigation it has come that the petitioner in the capacity of Managing Director had sanctioned Rs.20,00,000/- (Twenty Lakhs only) on 26.09.2003, Rs.10,00,000/-(Ten Lakhs only) on 24.11.2003, Rs.10,00,000/- (Ten Lakhs only) on 28.02.2004 and Rs. 10,00,000/- (Ten Lakhs only) on 05.03.2004 to the new members, i.e. Total Rs.50,00,000/- (Fifty Lakhs only). In the report itself it transpired that the Branch Manager has commented that out of Sanctioned loan of Rs.60,00,000/(Sixty Lakhs only) to the Boragarh Colliery Employees

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Cooperative Society, a sum of Rs. 50,00,000/-(Fifty Lakhs only) has been paid, whereas the entry of disbursement loan 40,00,000/- (Forty Lakhs) was found in the loan ledger of the society. The Entry of the remaining disbursed loan of Rs. 10,00,000/-(Ten Lakhs) is not there in the ledger, which is doubtful and unaccounted for.

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63. It is evident that in course of investigation the re-statement of informant was also recorded (para 03 of the case diary). The statement of other witnesses were also recorded (Para 8, 9, 13, 20, 23 of the case diary), who all supported the allegations levelled against the petitioner as well as other co-accused persons in the FIR.

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64. It has further come in the investigation that in order to verify the loanee, the investigating officer of the case called for the list of persons to whom loan was sanctioned and disbursed from the authorities of Central Cooperative Bank Limited Dhanbad, which was accordingly provided (para 161, 162 of the case diary) and the statement of the loanee was also recorded by the I.O. of the case and all have stated that they have returned some amount but due to tenure of the committee has ended the rest amount was not returned.

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65. Further, against the present petitioner, the investigating officer of the case had sought for Prosecution Sanction order from the Secretary, Cooperative Society

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Limited on 26.06.21 and the same has been accorded and was duly received on 06.12.2021. (Para 15 of the Supplementary Case Diary.)

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66. Thus, in view of above-mentioned facts and reasons, prima facie it appears that the petitioner, being the Managing Director, has great control over the administration of bank and while using his post, the petitioner was involved in misappropriation and embezzlement of government money by disbursing the amount in the name of loan to some fake persons, therefore the culpability of the present petitioner cannot be easily brushed aside.

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67. Further, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that petitioner has never conspired with any Bank officials and at the relevant time, being the Managing Director, he has just a supervisory role and he was nowhere connected with the loan disbursement.

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68. In the aforesaid context, it is pertinent to reiterate that conspiracy is not an open affair, therefore, the prosecution has to rely upon evidence pertaining to the acts of various parties to prove such an agreement of conspiracy on the basis of circumstantial evidence which can be inferred by necessary implication.

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69. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in plethora of decisions has observed that for an offence punishable under Section

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120B of the IPC, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the propagators expressly agree to do or carried to be done an illegal act and such agreement may be proved by necessary implication to be determined from the circumstantial evidence brought on record.

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70. Further, offence of criminal conspiracy is complete even though there is no agreement as to the means by which the purpose is to be accomplished. It is the unlawful agreement, which is the gravamen of the crime of conspiracy. The unlawful agreement which amounts to a conspiracy need not be formal or express, but may be inherent in and inferred from the circumstances, especially declarations, acts and conduct of the conspirators. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of T.N. through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT

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Petitioner v. Nalini and others; (1999) 5 SCC 253. 71. In Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1965 SC 682) a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the offence of conspiracy can be established either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence and the section will come into play only when the Court is satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, that is to say, there should

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be prima facie evidence that a person was a party to that conspiracy.

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72. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Sheetla Sahai (2009) 8 SCC 617 has held as follows:—

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“Criminal conspiracy is an independent offence. It is punishable separately. Prosecution, therefore, for the purpose of bringing the charge of criminal conspiracy read with the aforementioned provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act was required to establish the offence by applying the same legal principles which are otherwise applicable for the purpose of bringing a criminal misconduct on the part of an accused.”

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73. Thus, from the aforesaid settled proposition of law that offence of conspiracy can be established either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence but Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code will come into play only when the Court is satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired to commit an offence or an actionable wrong.

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74. Applying the aforesaid underlying principle in the fact of instant case, it is evident that irregularities in disbursement of loan was happened during regime of present petitioner Akhilesh Kumar and further there is also allegation of conspiracy for misappropriation of account and since the petitioner being the Managing Director has general control over the administration of bank and as

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such prima facie the involvement of the present petitioner in the alleged crime can not be easily washed out and it requires further appreciation of evidence which can only be possible at the stage of trial when the respective parties will lead their evidences.

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75. The learned counsel further submitted that in the instant case the allegations do not constitute an offence of forgery as the Petitioner cannot be said to have made any false document with any intention or knowledge.

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76. It needs to refer herein that as per Section 467 IPC whoever makes any false documents [or false electronic record] or part of a document [or electronic record,] with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.

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77. Thus, Section 463 IPC defines offence of forgery, while Section 464 Indian Penal Code substantiates the same by providing answer as to when a false document could be said to have been made for the purpose of committing offence of forgery under Section 463 IPC. A close scrutiny of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that, Section 463 IPC defines the offence of forgery, while Section 464 IPC substantiates the same by providing an

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answer as to when a false document could be said to have been made for the purpose of committing an offence of forgery under Section 463 IPC. Therefore, we can safely deduce that Section 464 IPC defines one of the ingredients of forgery i.e. making of a false document. Further, Section 465 IPC provides punishment for the commission of the offence of forgery. In order to sustain a conviction under Section 465, first it has to be proved that forgery was committed under Section 463 IPC, implying that ingredients under Section 464 IPC should also be satisfied. 78. Further, as per section 467 IPC whoever forges a document which purports to be a valuable security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal, interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any money, movable property, or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security, shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

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79. At this juncture, in the light of the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it needs

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to refer herein that whether the suspicion is strong enough to support the impugned charges framed or not is a question of degree of complicity which cannot be decided at this early stage since this exercise is to be left alone for the trial Court to be conducted after collection and marshalling of evidence. Herein the plea of petitioner cannot be considered at this stage in view of the prima facie case to have been made out and the petitioners will be at liberty to take these pleas during trial.

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80. So far, the applicability of Section 13(1)d of the Act 1988 is concerned, dishonest intention is sine qua non to attract the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. Mere conduct and action of the accused contrary to rules and departmental norms would not amount to criminal misconduct by a public servant.

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81. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of N.V. Subba Rao v. State through Inspector of Police, CBI/SPE, Visakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 2 SCC 162 at

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paragraph 42 has held as under:

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“42. Insofar as the charge under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act is concerned, the ingredients of that offence are viz. : (a) that the accused should be a public servant; (b) that he should use some corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abuse his position as a public servant; (c) he should not have obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; and (d) for himself or any other person, and we have already noted the

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materials placed by the prosecution to substantiate the abovesaid offence.”

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82. A reading of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act 1988 would reveal that a public servant can be prosecuted only if he has abused his position as a public servant and obtained for himself or any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. The intention of the legislation is not to punish a public servant for erroneous decision, but to punish for corruption. To fall within the four corners of sub-clause (ii) of Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the PC Act, the decision/conduct of the public servant must be dishonest, amounting to corruption.

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83. To attract the term ‘abuse’ as contained in Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, the prosecution has to establish that the official concerned used his position for something which is not intended. The sum and substance of the discussion is that dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

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84. Thus, dishonest intention is the crux of the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The Hon’ble Apex Court in C.K. Jaffer Sharief v. State [(2013) 1 SCC 205] has observed as under:

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“If in the process, the rules or norms applicable were violated or the decision taken shows an extravagant display of redundance it is the conduct and action of the appellant which may have been improper or contrary to departmental norms. But to say that the same was actuated by a

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dishonest intention to obtain an undue pecuniary advantage will not be correct. That dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under Section 13(1)( d ) is implicit in the words used i.e. corrupt or illegal means and abuse of of position as a public servant

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85. In the present case, the investigation records reveal that the petitioner who is Managing Director and other officials such as Branch Manager and others are involved in the payment of sanctioned loan by way of forged and fabricated documents to the fake persons.

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86. Further, there is direct allegation against the petitioner that the petitioner, in the capacity of Managing Director, had sanctioned Rs. 20,00,000/- (Twenty Lakhs only) on 26.09.2003 Rs. 10,00,000/-(Ten Lakhs only) on 24.11.2003, Rs. 10,00,000/(Ten Lakhs only) on 28.02.2004 and Rs. 10,00,000/- (Ten Lakhs only) on 05.03.2004, i.e. Total 50,00,000/- (Fifty Lakhs only) to the new members. From the report itself, it transpired that the Branch Manager has commented that out of Rs.60,00,000/-(Sixty Lakhs only) sanctioned load to the Boragarh Colliery Employees Cooperative Society, a sum of Rs. 50,00,000/-(Fifty Lakhs only) has been paid, whereas the entry of disbursement loan 40,00,000/- (Forty Lakhs) was found in the loan ledger of the society. The Entry of the remaining disbursed loan of Rs. 10,00,000/-(Ten Lakhs) is

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not there in the ledger, which is doubtful and unaccounted for.

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87. Thus, in the backdrop of the aforesaid, it cannot be stated that prima facie offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act has not been established.

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88. Further, it needs to refer herein the settled proposition of law that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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89. The law on the aforesaid point is succinctly stated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sajjan Kumar v. CBI (supra) wherein after referring to Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (supra) and Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra 2002) 2 SCC 135 the Hon’ble Apex has Court observed in para 19 which reads as under:

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“19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully

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accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.”

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90. For the foregoing reasons and having regard to facts and circumstances, as has been analyzed hereinabove, the petitioner has failed to make out a special case for exercise of power for discharge, as such, no interference is required in the impugned order dated 29.11.2024 by which application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been rejected by the trial court.

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91. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis and considering the principles of discharge which have been discussed hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs and also taking note of the alleged culpability of the petitioner, this Court is of the view that there is no infirmity in the impugned order dated 29.11.2024 passed by the Special Judge ACB, Dhanbad, to warrant interference by this Court, accordingly the instant petition is hereby dismissed.

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92. Before parting with the order, it is made clear that the findings so recorded at by this Court are restricted only for the purpose of dealing with the matter of discharge, as such, the trial Court will not be prejudiced by any of the observations so recorded by this Court, during trial.

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93. Pending Interlocutory Applications stand disposed

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