Gurvinder Singh Vs the Central Bureau of Investigation

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr. Revision No.143 of 2025

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Gurvinder Singh, S/o Jaswant Singh Sandhu, aged about 47 years, R/o C2, 256, First Floor Janakpuri, PS Janakpuri, PO-Janakpuri B-1, District-New Delhi West, New Delhi …. …. Petitioner

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Versus Central Bureau of Investigation .... .... Opp. Party

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CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

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------ For the Petitioner : Mr. Rishi Sood, Advocate (Through V.C.) Mr. Shailesh Poddar, Advocate For the CBI : Mr. Prashant Pallav, Spl. PP to CBI Ms. Shivani Jaluka, AC to Spl. PP to CBI ------ CAV on 09.05.2025 Pronounced on 13/06/2025

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Prayer

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1. The instant revision application filed under Sections 438 and 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 assailing the order dated 05.08.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI-cum-Addl. Sessions Judge-III, Dhanbad, in Misc. Criminal Application No.1407 of 2024, in connection with R.C. Case No.02(A)/2014-(D), registered for the offence under Sections 120B, 420, 468 & 471 of the IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988, whereby and whereunder, the prayer for discharge from criminal prosecution, has been rejected.

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Factual Matrix

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2. The brief facts, as per the pleading made in the instant revision petition, read as under: -

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(i) A note-cum-proposal dated 13.11.2007 mentioning therein that a Steel processing Unit (SPU) was being set up at Betiah (Bihar) and around 15 personnel were required to be recruited for the job of co-ordination/liaising with different government departments/agencies and others at New Delhi and a recommendation was made for creation of total 10 posts (04 posts of S-3 grade and 06 posts of S- 1 Grade) on 13.11.2007.

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(ii) Thereafter, on 19.11.2007 a recommendation was made therein for issue of notification to the Local Employment Exchange and an advertisement in a local Press. The District Employment Exchange, New Delhi informed vide letter dated 30.11.2007 informed that no application was received for the said posts though the last date for the receipt of application was 15.12.2007.

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(iii) It has been alleged that an advertisement was published in The Statesmen (New Delhi edition dated 01.12.2007) with heading as situation vacant without any logo or name of Bokaro Steel Plant. Thereafter, a three-member committee was formulated which conducted the interview on 07.01.2008 at Hotel Florence Inn, New Delhi. A total 07 candidates were interviewed for 06 posts of Attendant (Coordination) whereas only 03 candidates were interviewed for 04 posts of Assistant (Co-ordination). 06 out of the 07

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candidates for the posts of Attendant (Co-ordination) and all the 03 candidates for the posts of Assistant (Coordination) were found suitable by them and were recommended for selection without any written test.

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(iv) Accordingly, offer letters dated 12.01.2008 were sent by registered post to those 09 selected candidates with a direction to report at Bokaro Steel Limited, Bokaro by 28.01.2008. The candidates were subsequently posted in Bokaro offices and Ranchi offices of Bokaro Steel Plant and none of them were ever posted at Steel Processing Unit at Betiah (Bihar) or at New Delhi for which the recruitment was said to have been intended, proposed and approved.

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(v) It has further been alleged that the Petitioner dishonestly and fraudulently issued false/forged experience certificate in the favor of several accused candidates and which was used as genuine by the said accused candidates for obtaining job in Bokaro Steel Plant.

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(vi) It has been alleged that several office holders of Bokaro Steel Plant entered into a criminal conspiracy during 200708 with a criminal intent to cheat Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro (a Govt. of India undertaking under Steel Authority of India Limited) and in furtherance thereof several candidates were selected & appointed illegally in the

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Bokaro Steel Plant through a fraudulent/dishonest recruitment process, without giving due & equal opportunity to all eligible/desirous candidates, and thereby causing wrongful loss of Rs. 1 Crore (approx.) to Bokaro Steel Plant.

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(vii) The Investigating Agency, on completion of the investigation, has submitted a Charge sheet No. 08/2015 dated 31.08.2015 under Sections 120B, 420, 468, 471 of IPC and Sec 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of P.C Act, 1988 against the present Petitioner and other co-accused in which cognizance was taken vide order dated 09.11.2016 under sections 120B, 420, 468, 471 of IPC and Sec 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of P.C Act, 1988.

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(viii) Thereafter, Petitioner herein preferred a discharge application being Misc. Criminal Application No.1407 of 2024 which was dismissed vide order dated 05.08.2024 by the learned Special Judge CBI- Cum Addl. Sessions Judge-III Dhanbad rejecting the prayer for discharge.

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(ix) Being aggrieved with the aforesaid impugned order dated 05.08.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge CBICum Addl. Sessions Judge-III Dhanbad in Misc. Criminal Application No.1407 of 2024, the present revision application has been filed.

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Argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner

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3. Mr. Rishi Sood, learned counsel for the petitioner (through V.C.) assisted by Mr. Shailesh Poddar, has taken the following grounds in assailing the order impugned by which the prayer for discharge has been rejected: -

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(i) That no case is being made out even if the entire document will be taken into consideration in entirety to be accepted.

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(ii) The petitioner has been made victim since if the accusation as has been alleged against the accused nos.7 and 10 will be taken into consideration, who are the beneficiary, the blank signed letter head of the petitioner has been found in their possession.

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(iii) There is no direct evidence implicating the petitioner and there is no direct evidence of his participation in the alleged conspiracy.

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(iv) The name of the petitioner has not come in the First Information Report.

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(v) It has been submitted that the petitioner has not committed any offence since no any ingredient has been found in course of investigation.

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(vi) The petitioner was neither an employee nor associated with Bokaro Steel Plant in any manner nor related to any of the alleged applicants/accused persons selected during the

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alleged recruitment process.

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4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is a fit case where the petitioner is liable to discharge from criminal prosecution, hence, the order impugned needs to be interfered with.

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Argument advanced on behalf of the Opposite Party-CBI

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5. Per Contra, Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned counsel appearing for the Opp. Party-CBI has taken the following grounds in defending the order impugned: -

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(i) It has been submitted by referring to the charge-sheet wherein the document said to be the letter head duly been signed by the petitioner in which the experience certificate was issued, has been sent to the expert for its examination and the signature of the petitioner has been found to be genuine.

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(ii) The argument which has been advanced on behalf of the petitioner that he has been made victim of the circumstances, cannot be adjudged at this stage, rather, the same is to be taken into consideration at the appropriate stage, i.e., at the stage of trial.

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(iii) There are sufficient materials as available on record to frame the charge against the petitioner.

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(iv) The accused persons along with the present petitioner, namely, Gurvinder Singh conspired among

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themselves during the relevant period, i.e., 2007-2008 and in pursuance of the said conspiracy, the accused public servants dishonestly and fraudulently by using their official position initiated and processed the note sheet with an intention to select the favoured/desired accused candidates.

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6. Learned counsel for the Opp. Party-CBI, on the aforesaid premise, has submitted that it is not a fit case where the petitioner is liable to discharge from criminal prosecution and as such, the order impugned may not be interfered with.

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Analysis

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7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the rival submissions made on their behalf as also the material available on record.

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8. In the background of the factual aspect stated hereinabove, the issues which require consideration are;

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(i) Whether the order dated 05.08.2024 by which the application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been dismissed, can be said to suffer from an error?

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(ii) Whether on the basis of the evidence which has been collected in course of investigation, prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not?

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9. Since both the issues are interlinked, as such, they are taken up together.

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10. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to consider the ambit and scope of the powers of the Court at the time of considering the discharge application.

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11. It is well settled that at the time of considering discharge, meticulous examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out for framing charge to proceed in the case. Further the trial Court is not required to discuss the evidence for the purpose of conducting a trial but the discussion of the materials on record is required to reflect the application of judicial mind for finding that a prima-facie case is made out against the petitioner.

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12. Further, it is settled connotation of law that at the stage of framing of charge, the probable defence of the accused is not to be considered and the materials, which are relevant for consideration, are the allegations made in the First Information Report/complaint, the statement of the witnesses recorded in course of investigation, the documents on which the prosecution relies and the report of investigation submitted by the prosecuting agency. The probative value of the defence is to be tested at the stage of trial and not at the stage of framing of charge and at the stage of framing of charge minute scrutiny of the evidence is not to be made and even on a very strong suspicion charges can be framed.

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13. Further, it is settled position of law that at the stage of considering discharge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and marshal the material available on record as to whether there is sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in conviction. The Court is prima facie required to consider whether there is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is sufficient for framing the charge, the guilt or innocence of the accused has to be determined at the time of conclusion of the trial after evidence is adduced and not at the stage of framing the charge and, therefore, at the stage of considering discharge, the Court is not required to undertake an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the material.

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14. The issue of discharge was the subject matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu, by Inspector of Police in Vigilance and Anti-Corruption v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 , wherein, at paragraphs nos. 29, 32.4, 33 and 34, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under:—

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“29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out

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whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 32.4. While passing the impugned orders [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 22 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)], [State v. K. simthe materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but whether that would warrant a conviction. We are of the opinion that this was not the stage where the court should have appraised the evidence and discharged the accused as if it was passing an order of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation itself cannot be a ground for discharge. In our opinion, the order impugned [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)] suffers from grave error and calls for rectification.

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33. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing on the trial. The surviving respondents are directed to appear before the respective courts on 3-22014. The Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage of charge in accordance with law and make endeavour to dispose of the same expeditiously.

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34. In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the order of discharge with the aforesaid observations.”

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15. It has been further held in the case of Asim Shariff v. National

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Investigation Agency, (2019) 7 SCC 148 , that mini trial is not expected by the trial court for the purpose of marshalling the evidence on record at the time of framing of charge. It has been held at paragraph no.18 of the said judgment, as under: —

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“18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been made out or not. It is true that in

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such proceedings, the court is not supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.”

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16. It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be a ground of discharge. A reference may be made to the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, (2021) 11 SCC 191 . For ready reference, paragraph no.11 of the said judgment is being quoted hereinbelow: —

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“11. While considering the legality of the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the law on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to. 11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at the time of framing of the charge and/or considering the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while exercising its judicial mind to

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the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

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11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath [State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has observed and held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526) “25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the material which has been brought on the record by the prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721], adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held : (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29)

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‘29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have

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committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.’”

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17. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for framing of charge in the case of Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) , reported in (2008) 2 SC 561 , wherein, at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 it has been held as

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under: —

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“11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. 12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As framing of charge affects a person's liberty substantially, need for proper consideration of material warranting such order was emphasised.

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14. In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [(2000) 6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to several previous decisions held that : (SCC p. 342, para 7)

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“7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.”

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18. Further, it is pertinent to mention here that power to discharge an accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by the arduous trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and experience in criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel for the accused and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him. If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its own course. Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face. The opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there are courts but it is no ground for the

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High Court to interdict the trial. It would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715.

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19. Further, the difference between the approach with which the Court should examine the matter in the discharge has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 , in the following words: —

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“17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the “record of the case” and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should

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form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.

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30. We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has used the expression “there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence”. This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste. A Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to the meaning of the word “presume” while relying upon Black's Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean “to believe or accept upon probable evidence”; “to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming”. In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence.”

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20. Thus, it is evident that the law regarding the approach to be adopted by the court while considering an application for discharge of the accused person the Court has to form a definite opinion, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. However, while framing charges, the Court is not required to form a

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definite opinion that the accused is guilty of committing an offence. The truth of the matter will come out when evidence is led during the trial. Once the facts and ingredients of the Section exist, the court would presume that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly and the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution.

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21. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 368 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of discharge. The principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para-21, as under:

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“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:

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(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

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(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

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(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

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(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

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(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal.”

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22. In the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the

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case of M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI , reported in (2020) 2 SCC 768 , the above principles have been reiterated at para-17, 18, 28 to 31 and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has explained as to how the matters of grave suspicion are to be dealt with. The aforesaid paragraphs are being quoted as under: -

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“17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and

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discern the following principles:

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17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.

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17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution.

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17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court.

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17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”.

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17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion.

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17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.

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17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true.

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17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.

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18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar). The expression, “the record of the case”, used in Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the

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documents and the articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi).

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28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227 CrPC. The principle established is to take the materials produced by the prosecution, both in the form of oral statements and also documentary material, and act upon it without it been subjected to questioning through cross-examination and everything assumed in favour of the prosecution, if a scenario emerges where no offence, as alleged, is made out against the accused, it, undoubtedly, would ensure to the benefit of the accused warranting the trial court to discharge the accused. 29. It is not open to the accused to rely on the material by way of defence and persuade the court to discharge him.

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30. However, what is the meaning of the expression “materials on the basis of which grave suspicion is aroused in the mind of the court's”, which is not explained away? Can the accused explain away the material only with reference to the materials produced by the prosecution? Can the accused rely upon material which he chooses to produce at the stage?

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31. In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused can only rely on the materials which are produced by the prosecution, it must be understood that the grave suspicion, if it is established on the materials, should be explained away only in terms of the materials made available by the prosecution. No doubt, the accused may appeal to the broad probabilities to the case to persuade the court to discharge him.”

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23. In the case of Asim Shariff v. NIA, (supra) , it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the words ‘not sufficient

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ground for proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.

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24. Recently, the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey, (2022) 12 SCC 657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and has held at paragraph-27, which reads as under:

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“ 27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the time of framing of charge and should not act as a mere post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet presented by the police as it is without applying its mind and without recording

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brief reasons in support of its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the material which is required to be evaluated by the court at the time of framing charge should be the material which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution. The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to presume that the accused has committed an offence. Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly, apart from the material that is placed before the court by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms of Section 173 CrPC, the court may also rely upon any other evidence or material which is of sterling quality and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by the prosecution.”

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25. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions, it can be safely inferred

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that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if, after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge.

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26. Therefore, the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for framing of charge. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to sift

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and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he will discharge the accused.

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27. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial starts.

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28. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not because at the stage of considering the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.

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29. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this Court is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the conclusion as to whether the evidence which has been

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collected in course of investigation and has been brought on record, as would be available in the impugned order prima facie case against the petitioner is made out or not?

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30. It is evident from record that after completion of investigation, Police has submitted charge-sheet and on the basis of material available on record, vide order dated 09.11.2016 cognizance of the offence under Sections 120B, 420, 468, 471 of IPC and Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C Act, 1988 has been taken by the learned Court against the present petitioner.

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31. It has been alleged in the written report, basis upon which, FIR was instituted that the Petitioner dishonestly and fraudulently issued false/forged experience certificate in the favour of several accused candidates and which was used as genuine by the said accused candidates for obtaining job in Bokaro Steel Plant.

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32. It has further been alleged that several office holders of Bokaro Steel Plant entered into a criminal conspiracy during 2007-08 with a criminal intent to cheat Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro (a Govt. of India undertaking under Steel Authority of India Limited) and in furtherance thereof, several candidates were selected & appointed illegally in the Bokaro Steel Plant through a fraudulent/dishonest recruitment process, without giving due & equal opportunity to all eligible/desirous candidates, and

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thereby causing wrongful loss of Rs. 1 Crore (approx.) to Bokaro Steel Plant.

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33. It is evident from the record that the charge-sheet No. 08/2015 dated 31.08.2015 has been submitted under Sections 120B, 420, 468, 471 of IPC and Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C Act, 1988 against the present Petitioner and other coaccused, in which, cognizance was taken vide order dated 09.11.2016 under sections 120B, 420, 468, 471 of IPC and Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C Act, 1988.

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34. The learned counsel has contended that no offence has been made out if the entire factual aspects will be taken into consideration, reason being that, petitioner has never conspired with anyone.

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35. In this context, it is pertinent to reiterate the settled legal proposition that in cases of conspiracy to commit a crime, usually it is very difficult for the prosecution to adduce direct evidence since conspiracy is not an open affair, therefore, the prosecution has to rely upon evidence pertaining to the acts of various parties to prove such an agreement of conspiracy on the basis of circumstantial evidence which can be inferred by necessary implication.

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36. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in plethora of decisions has observed that for an offence punishable under Section 120B of

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the IPC, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the propagators expressly agree to do or carried to be done an illegal act and such agreement may be proved by necessary implication to be determined from the circumstantial evidence brought on record.

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37. Further, Offence of criminal conspiracy is complete even though there is no agreement as to the means by which the purpose is to be accomplished. It is the unlawful agreement, which is the gravamen of the crime of conspiracy. The unlawful agreement which amounts to a conspiracy need not be formal or express, but may be inherent in and inferred from the circumstances, especially declarations, acts and conduct of the conspirators. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of T.N. through Superintendent of Police CBI/SIT Petitioner v. Nalini and others; (1999) 5 SCC 253.

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38. In Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1965 SC 682) a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the offence of conspiracy can be established either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence and the section will come into play only when the Court is satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired to commit an offence or an

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actionable wrong, that is to say, there should be prima facie evidence that a person was a party to that conspiracy.

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39. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. v. Sheetla

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Sahai, (2009) 8 SCC 617 has held as follows: —

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“Criminal conspiracy is an independent offence. It is punishable separately. Prosecution, therefore, for the purpose of bringing the charge of criminal conspiracy read with the aforementioned provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act was required to establish the offence by applying the same legal principles which are otherwise applicable for the purpose of bringing a criminal misconduct on the part of an accused.”

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40. It needs to refer herein that “cheating” punishable under Section 420 IPC. The “Cheating” has been dealt with under Section 415 of IPC. For ready reference, the Section 415 is being quoted as under:

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“415. Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’.

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Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section.”

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41. Further, it needs to refer herein that Section 420 IPC is with regard to cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property to the following effect:

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“420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. —

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Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

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42. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar , (2000) 4 SCC 168 has considered the ingredients of the Sections 415 and 420 of the IPC. The relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:

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“ 14. On a reading of the section it is manifest that in the definition there are set forth two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first place he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver any property to any person. The second class of acts set forth in the section is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but not fraudulent or dishonest.

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15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the

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intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed.”

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43. Thus, it is evident that in order to constitute an offence under Section 420 it requires firstly, cheating; secondly , dishonest inducement to deliver or to make, alter, or destroy any valuable security or anything which is capable of being converted into a valuable security and thirdly , mens rea on the part of the accused at the time of the said inducement.

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44. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled legal position, this Court is now adverting to fact as well as merit of the case.

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45. The present petitioner has been arraigned as accused no.19 in the charge-sheet which has been annexed as Annexure-2 to the instant petition. Further, the complicity of the present petitioner in the alleged commission of crime has been referred in the said charge-sheet. For ready reference, the same is being quoted as under:

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“Shri Gurvinder Singh: He dishonestly and fraudulently issued the false forged experience certificate in the favour of accused Rathesh Kumar, Mukesh Kumar Singh and Md. Shamim Bajak and the same were used as genuine by the said accused candidates and that by obtained the job in BSL on the basis of said experience certificate, in pursuance of conspiracy. He also provided blank signed letter head of M's IH Engineers and Mis Sandinu Heat treatment to accrued Shri Rajesh Kumar Singh. Said Shri Rajesh Kumar Singh used the said blank signed letter pad of Mis Sandhu Heat Treatment by preparing the forged experience certificate and the same was and by him as genuine and thereby obtained the job on the basis of said certificate in pursuance of conspiracy. Shri Rajesh Kumar Singh was prepared experience certificate of Mis H Engineers where the said letter pad was provided by Gurvinder Singh, however the said certificate purported to be issued by M's IH Engineers, was not used by Shed Rathesh Kumar but the same was found from his possession during search. Opinion of expert and witness proves that these letter pads of Ms I H Engineers was signed by said Shri Gurvinder Singh (Proprietor of this firm was his father namely Shri Jashwant Singh Sandhu and said Shri Gurvinder Singh became the partner of this firm in July 2008 but he dishonestly and fraudulently have blank fetter pads under his signature to said Rajesh Kumar Singh purportedly on direction of Shri Ravindra pandita in December 2007/January 2008 with malafide intention.

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------- ------ ------- -------- ------- -------- ------- ---

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The aforesaid facts and circumstances prima facie constitute commission of offence punishable U/S 120-5 r/w 420, 455 & 471 od IPC and 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of PC Act 1988 on the part of accused persons namely S/Shri V K Srivastava (A-1), the then MD, AK Mehreta (A-2), the then DGM(MM)/chairman of selection committee, RK

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Narula(A-3), the then GM(P&A), A S Hemrom (A-4), the then AGM(Pers/Rectt), RN Jha(A-5), the then AGM(O&M), A K Singh(A-6), the then DGM/Chief Project Manager, BR&UP, Santosh Kumar(A-7), Biswadeep Sahani(A-6), Kumar(A-9), Anant Kumar Paswan(A-10), Rajesh Kumar Singh(A-11), Sanjay Kumar Mist A-12, Asim Kumar Gope(A-13), Mukesh Kumar Singh(A-14) and Md. Shamim Rajak(A-15), Ravindra Pandita (A-16), the then Jr. Manager, BSL, New Delhi office, S K Dutta(A-17), the then Sr. Manager(P-R), Jeevesh Mishra(A-18), the then ED(P&A) & Gurvinder Singh(A-19), Partner of M/s IH Engineers.”

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46. From perusal of the charge-sheet, it appears that this case was registered by Central Bureau of Investigation, Dhanbad on 16.01.2014 u/s 120Br/w 420, 468 & 471 of IPC & u/s 13 (2) r/w 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 on the basis of reliable source of information. It has been stated that Virendra Kumar Srivastava, the then Managing Director, Bokaro Steel Plant (BSP), Bokaro and others entered into a criminal conspiracy amongst themselves during 2007-08 with a criminal intent to cheat Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro and in furtherance thereof, through a fraudulent/dishonest recruitment process, without giving opportunity to all eligible candidates, illegally conducted the selection and appointment of candidates and thus caused an undue wrongful loss of rupees one crore approx. to BSP/SAIL and corresponding wrongful gain to themselves.

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47. It has come in investigation that in pursuance of the criminal

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conspiracy among the aforesaid accused persons during 200708, a note was initiated by A.K. Singh, the then Chief Project Manager (BR & UP), Steel Processing Unit, BSL for recruitment of personnel at SPU Bettiah for liaisoning and co-ordination work at New Delhi and accordingly sanction for creation of 10 posts was dishonestly sanctioned by V.K. Srivastava, the then Managing Director, BSL. Bokaro on recommendation of N.K. Jha, the then ED (Project), A.K. Gupta, the then DGM (O&M), Jeevesh Mishra, the then ED (P&A), R.N. Jha AGM (O&M) and R.K. Narula, the GM (P&A) and A.S. Hemrom, the then AGM (P&A).

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48. It has been revealed that the aforesaid accused public servants, accused candidates and present petitioner namely Gurvinder Singh conspired among themselves during the relevant period of 2007-08 and in pursuance of the said conspiracy, the accused public servants dishonestly and fraudulently by abusing their official positions initiated and processed the note sheet with an intention to select the favoured desired accused candidates.

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49. In order to select the aforesaid favoured candidates, approval of MD was obtained, notification to employment exchange and press advertisement was dishonestly published without any logo even under the heading situation vacant in the classified column in violation of the provisions of recruitment manual as well as inconsistent to the established procedure prevalent in BSL,

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Bokaro in this regard. The period for receipt/invitation of applications for the said posts was dishonestly restricted 15 days instead of statutory period of 4 weeks with dishonest intention to restrict the number of candidates and to select the aforesaid selected accused candidates.

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50. The recruitment process was dishonestly and fraudulently undertaken at Delhi office of BSL instead of recruitment section of BSL, Bokaro and the interview was conducted without any scrutiny of applications/documents in violation of recruitment manual.

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51. It further appears that the interview committee was not proper as there were only three members instead of five members which was done under conspiracy. Accused Pandita, the then Jr. Manager, BSL, Delhi office conspired with V.K. Srivastava, the then MD and other aforesaid accused persons including Gurvinder Singh (petitioner) and thereby obtained fake/forged experience certificates which were used as genuine for the selection of the accused candidates.

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52. The present petitioner Gurvinder Singh was a partner in M/s I H Engineers, Mayapuri, Phase-1, New Delhi who had issued fake experience certificate in favour of candidates. It further reveals that due to his aforesaid criminal acts 03 candidates were illegally selected and appointed to the post of Assistant Coordinator and 06 candidate to the post of Attendant-co-

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ordination through a fraudulent recruitment process and thereby caused wrongful loss of Rs. 2,08,29,679/- approximately to Bokaro Steel Plant/SAIL by way of paying emoluments and other benefits etc. to them/accused candidates.

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53. Thus, On the basis of material available on record prima facie, it appears that case against present petitioner is made out for the offence u/s 120-B, 420, 468, 471 of I.P.C. and u/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

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54. It needs to refer herein the settled proposition of law that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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55. The law on the aforesaid point is succinctly stated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sajjan Kumar v. CBI (supra ) wherein after referring to Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (supra) and Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra 2002) 2 SCC 135, the Hon’ble Apex has Court observed at para-19 which reads as under:

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“19. It is clear that at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial

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or not. If the evidence which the prosecution proposes to adduce proves the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.”

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56. For the foregoing reasons, having regard to facts and circumstances, as has been analysed hereinabove, the petitioner failed to make out a special case for exercise of power for discharge as such no interference is required to interfere with the order dated 05.08.2024 by which application for discharge filed by the petitioner has been rejected by the trial court.

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57. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis and considering the principles of discharge which have been discussed hereinabove in the preceding paragraphs and also taking note of the alleged culpability of the petitioner as referred in the charge-sheet, this Court is of the view that there is no infirmity in the impugned order dated 05.08.2024 to warrant interference by this Court.

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58. This Court, in view of the aforesaid, is of the view that the present revision petition deserves to be dismissed.

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59. In the result, the instant revision petition fails and is, dismissed.

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60. In consequence thereof, pending Interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

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61. It is made clear that the findings so recorded by this Court are restricted only for the purpose of dealing with the matter of discharge,

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