“6. It would be appropriate to notice at this stage that the application for dissolution of marriage was filed before the amendment by Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 had come into force. But by the time the suit was heard and disposed of, the amended provisions had come into force. Before amendment, one of the conditions for dissolution of marriage was that the “spouse was living in adultery”, but by the amendment in question a marriage could be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party has after the solemnization of the marriage had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse. The sole question for consideration, therefore, is whether on the materials produced in this case, it can be said that the plaintiff has been able to establish that defendant No. 1 had voluntary sexual intercourse with defendant No. 2, as alleged. A comparison of both the provisions, namely the provision prior to amendment and subsequent to amendment, would indicate that the rigour of establishing “living in adultery” has been lessened by requiring to prove that the spouse had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse. It is well settled that direct proof of adultery is not imperative and Courts, therefore, have stated that it would be unreasonable to expect direct evidence and such evidence if brought before the Court must be suspect and is apt to be disbelieved. It must, therefore, be accepted as a rule that circumstantial evidence is all that can normally be expected in proof of the charge and the circumstances must be such as lead to it by fair inference as a necessary conclusion. In Mulla's Hindu Law, it has been stated that it is impossible to state those circumstances
