It is the case of the petitioners that the licence was being renewed from time to time and there was no complain whatsoever from any corner. However, the petitioners were served with a notice dated 10.9.2014 as contained in Memo No. 278, in which the petitioners were directed to submit a reply as to why licence granted to the society, of which the petitioners were the President and Secretary, be not suspended. A show cause reply was duly submitted and pursuant thereto impugned order dated 29.9.2014 was passed cancelling the licence granted to the Society. In the counter affidavit, it has been mentioned about certain irregularities, which have been committed by the members of the Society with respect to distribution of foodgrains. Infact the counter affidavit has also brought on record the inspection report dated 4.9.2014 wherein an inspection was conducted by the B.D.O., Taljhari. Although, inspection report is a part of the counter affidavit but the same does not find place in the impugned order dated 29.9.2014 and there is also no specific statement in the counter affidavit that enquiry/inspection report was duly served upon the petitioners-Society. Infact, in the impugned order dated 29.9.2014, reference has been made to Memo No. 278 dated 10.09.2014, by which show cause reply was demanded from the petitioners. However, the respondent no. 2 has misconstrued the said show cause notice dated 10.09.2014 as being a show cause prior to cancellation of the licence as the same reveals that it was a show cause only with respect to the fact as to why licence granted to the petitioners be not suspended. It, therefore appears from perusal of the order dated 29.9.2014 that principles of natural justice have not been followed by respondent no. 2 as neither petitioners were asked to submit a show cause reply nor the inspection report dated 4.9.2014, which was the backbone of the order dated 29.9.2014 was served upon the petitioners. This Court is conscious of the fact that against the impugned order dated 29.9.2014, the petitioners have an alternative remedy to prefer an appeal before the Deputy Commissioner, Sahibganj in terms of clause 28 of the Bihar Trade Articles (Licences Unification) Order 1984 but considering the fact that the principles of natural justice have not at all been followed by the respondent no. 2 in stead of directing the petitioners to prefer an appeal in terms
