Arnav Saviraj Chauhan Vs State of Hp

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2026:HHC:28395

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MP(M) No. 1098 of 2026

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Reserved on : 13.7.2026 Decided on: 14.7.2026

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Arnav Saviraj Chauhan …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent

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Coram

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*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthl*	a,*Judge.*
*Whether approved for reporting?*¹	*No.*
For the Petitioner :	Mr Ankit Dhiman	, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State :	Mr Jitender Additional Advoc	Sharma, ate General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge (oral)

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The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 204 of 2025, dated 22.09.2025, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the NDPS Act’) at Police Station Sundernagar, District Mandi, H.P.

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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It has been asserted that the petitioner is a law student aged 20 years. He is a permanent resident of Shimla, having roots in the society. The petitioner was arrested in F.I.R. No. 204 of 2025 and was unable to appear in his examination because of his incarceration. The petitioner was arrayed as an accused because of his presence in the vehicle from which 1 kg 174 grams of charas was recovered. Co-accused Kashin Kashyap, Ayansh and Srivastav were the financiers of the purchase. Kashin Kashyap transferred ₹50,000/- through Google Pay, and Ayansh transferred ₹14,200/- through UPI to Rewat Ram, who was subsequently arrested. The police have also filed the charge sheet. The petitioner has remained in prison for more than five months. No recovery is to be effected from the petitioner. Money transactions do not connect the petitioner to any of the coaccused. The mobile phone of Kashin Kashyap was also found in the laptop bag, which connects him to the commission of the crime. As per the prosecution’s case, the petitioner had not visited Kullu, H.P. He was not seen in CCTV footage and had not purchased the charas. He was the only occupant of the vehicle and was not connected to the charas. The other co-accused has

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been released on bail, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the

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principle of parity. The petitioner has been in custody since 22.09.2025. The prosecution has cited 49 witnesses, which shows that the trial is likely to take a considerable time before its conclusion. The charges have not yet been framed. The petitioner is a young student, and his continued incarceration would adversely affect his career prospects. The grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner. The co-accused Nakul Mittal has been released on bail by the Court, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police had set up a nakka at Pungh four-lane and were checking the vehicles on 22.09.2025. They intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. UP-16AX-2143. The driver and occupants of the vehicle got frightened after seeing the police. The police associated Kuldeep Kumar and Mukesh Kumar as independent witnesses. The police inquired about the names of the occupants of the vehicle. The driver identified himself as Devayas Patel, the person sitting beside him identified himself as

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Nakul Mittal, and the persons sitting in the rear seat, identified themselves as Arnav Chauhan (present petitioner), Saksham Bharti and Rohit Kumar. The police searched the vehicle and recovered a carry bag containing 1.174 kilograms of charas. The police seized the charas and arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The charas was sent to SFSL, Junga, and as per the report of analysis, it was confirmed to be a sample of charas. The occupants revealed during interrogation that they had handed over ₹5000/- each to Kashin Kashyap, who had also accompanied the accused on his motorcycle. They identified the room where they had stayed in Kullu. The petitioner had gone to Kullu from Solan to purchase Charas on 21.09.2025, but had stayed in a hotel at 9 miles Pandoh, with his friends Nakul Mittal, Rohit Kumar and Aditya Kumar. Petitioner waited for his friends at Pandoh. He boarded the vehicle bearing registration no. UP16AX-2143. The police completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet before the Court of learned Special Judge, Mandi, on 17.01.2026. Hence, the status report.

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I have heard. Mr Ankit Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate for the respondent/State.

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Mr Ankit Dhiman, learned counsel for the petitioner,

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submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. He had not gone to Kullu and had stayed at Pandoh. His mere presence in the vehicle is not sufficient to connect him to the commission of the crime. The co-accused Nakul Mitttal has also been released on bail by this Court, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner has failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was dismissed by this Court. A subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the circumstances. The petitioner has failed to show any change in the circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given a considerable thought to the

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submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It is understood that the petitioner had filed a bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 293 of 2026 and was dismissed on 30.03.2026. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that a subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the circumstances. It was held in the State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed:

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“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or

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selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.

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Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.

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Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held:

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“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.”

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A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,

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(2005) 8 SCC 380 , wherein it was observed:

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9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.

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11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit

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v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458 , wherein it was observed:

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30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.

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It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of

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Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed:

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7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail applications need to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail

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application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognised principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.”

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The Court had held earlier that the petitioner was travelling in the vehicle from which the recovery was effected and he was, prima facie, found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas. This consideration has not changed.

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It was submitted that the police have filed a charge sheet before the Court, which amounts to a change in the circumstances. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Virupakshappa Gouda v. State of Karnataka, (2017) 5 SCC 406: (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 542: 2017

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SCC OnLine SC 295 that the filing of a charge sheet does not

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amount to a change in circumstances. It was observed:

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“12. On a perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Judge, we find that he has been swayed by the fact that when a charge sheet is filed, it amounts to a change of circumstance. Needless to say, the filing of the charge sheet does not in any manner lessen the allegations made by the prosecution. On the contrary, filing of the charge sheet establishes that after due investigation, the investigating agency, having found materials, has placed the charge sheet for the trial of the accused persons.”

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Thus, the petitioner cannot claim bail on the ground that the charge sheet has been filed.

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It was submitted that the co-accused Kashin Kashyap and Nakul Mittal have been enlarged on bail, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on the principle of parity. The submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sagar v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2584 , that a person cannot be released on bail after applying the principle of parity without examining his role. It was observed:

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“14. What flows from the above judgments, which have been referred to, only to the limited extent indicated above, is that the High Courts speak in one voice that parity is not the sole ground on which bail can be granted. That, undoubtedly, is the correct position in law. The word ‘parity’ is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as “ equality, especially of pay or position.” When weighing an application on parity, it is the ‘ position ’ that is the clincher. The requirement of ‘ position ’ is not met only by involvement in the same offence. Position means what the

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person whose application is being weighed, his position in crime, i.e., his role, etc. There can be different roles played - someone part of a large group, intending to intimidate; an instigator of violence; someone who throws hands at the other side, instigated by such words spoken by another, someone who fired a weapon or swung a machete - parity of these people will be with those who have performed similar acts, and not with someone who was part of the group to intimidate the other by the sheer size of the gathering, with another who attempted to hack away at the opposer's limbs with a weapon.”

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Kashin Kashyap was not found on the spot, and he

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was arrested during the investigation based on a disclosure statement and the financial transaction, whereas the petitioner was apprehended on the spot. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim parity with Kashin Kashyap. The co-accused, Nakul Mittal, rode the motorcycle with the petitioner and the co-accused. He was scheduled to leave on the motorcycle and not in the vehicle. However, the co-accused, Kashin Kashyap, told him at the last moment that he would ride the motorcycle and Nakul Mittal should travel in the vehicle. Therefore, this fortuitous circumstance put him in the vehicle, otherwise he would have ridden the motorcycle. The Court held in these circumstances that he could not be construed to be in possession.

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The petitioner's case is entirely different. He had travelled with the co-accused from Solan in the vehicle from which the recovery was effected. He was returning in the same

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vehicle with the co-accused from Pandoh. Thus, the petitioner’s case is clearly distinguishable from the case of Nakul Mittal, and the petitioner cannot claim bail on the principle of parity.

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It was submitted that the petitioner had not gone to Kullu from where the charas is stated to have been purchased. He had only stayed at Pandoh, and this circumstance is similar to Nakul Mittal. This submission will not help the petitioner. The Court had already considered this circumstance and held that it was not sufficient to, prima facie, hold that the petitioner is not involved in the possession of a commercial quantity of charas. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1070, that it is impermissible to review the earlier order of bail in the subsequent bail petition, and the Court can only consider the change in circumstances. It was observed at page 676:

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8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. Successive bail applications are indeed permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law, as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [(2001) 1 SCC 169: 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments.

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Therefore, it is impermissible to hold that the petitioner has not committed the crime in the present proceedings when the Court had earlier held that, prima facie, material existed against the petitioner for the commission of the crime.

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The petitioner is primarily involved in the possession of a commercial quantity of charas, and he has failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Therefore, he cannot be released on bail.

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It was submitted that the petitioner remained in custody for about one year, and his trial has not commenced. The trial is not likely to conclude soon. Therefore, the petitioner's right to a speedy trial is being violated. The submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025: INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the ground of prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: -

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“17. The High Court then, on the strength of those premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and

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likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion of this nature, if returned without addressing the prosecution’s assertions of operative control and antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of the trial court at first instance.

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This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing. Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated 22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the present complaint, nor do they engage with the prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the consignments. The omission to consider these factors bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by Section 37(1)(b).”

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A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo

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Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025, wherein it was observed:

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“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four months, and charges have not been framed, yet the allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is the recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the contraband.

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Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is made out in the present matter.”

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This position was reiterated in State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 671 , wherein it was

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observed: -

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9. It is well-settled that in matters involving recovery of contraband in commercial quantity, the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act are mandatory and entail no relaxation merely on the ground that the accused has undergone prolonged incarceration during the pendency of trial. The provision casts upon the Court a duty to record, before enlarging an accused on bail, its satisfaction on two cumulative conditions, first, that there exist reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged; and second, that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The recording of such satisfaction is not a mere formality but a mandatory precondition, the non-observance of which vitiates the grant of bail. This Court, in Kashif (supra), has held in no uncertain terms that the recording of satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37 is mandatory and not merely directory, and that an order granting bail without such recorded satisfaction stands vitiated and cannot be sustained. The same view stands reiterated in Lalrintluanga Sailo (supra).

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10. The impugned order, on its own showing, does not record the satisfaction mandated under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the

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NDPS Act. Far from recording such satisfaction, the High Court has gone on to observe that ‘the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial.’ Such an approach is plainly contrary to the settled law laid down by this Court and deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. The right to speedy trial, rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution, is undoubtedly a precious Constitutional right. That said, in matters governed by a special enactment such as the NDPS Act, particularly where the recovery is of a commercial quantity, the said right under Article 21 must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the ground of delay to override it. The constitutional right under Article 21 and the special provision of law under Section 37, NDPS Act, are to be read harmoniously and not placed in opposition to each other. The High Court, by failing to record its satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37, has, in this Court's view, committed an error.

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9. The position of law on the grant of bail in matters involving the recovery of a commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act is well settled. Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act is cast in mandatory terms. Where the Public Prosecutor opposes the bail application, the Court can enlarge an accused on bail only upon recording its satisfaction on two cumulative conditions: first, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence; and second, that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The recording of such satisfaction is not a mere formality but a jurisdictional requirement. This Court in Kashif (supra) has held, in plain terms, that the non-recording of the twin satisfaction, being mandatory in nature, renders an order granting bail unsustainable. A similar view has been expressed in Lalrintluanga Sailo (supra) and Ajay Kumar Singh (supra).

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10. When the impugned order is tested against that settled position, it becomes apparent that paragraph 8 of the impugned order, which carries the weight of the reasoning, does not contain a finding on either of the twin conditions prescribed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. What the High Court has, instead, proceeded on is the proposition that “the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind the

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right to a speedy trial”. The right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is undoubtedly a valuable constitutional guarantee, but in the context of a special statute such as the NDPS Act dealing with commercial quantity, that right has to be read alongside, and not in displacement of, the mandate of Section 37. The omission to record the twin satisfaction prescribed by the statute, it appears, may have escaped the attention of the High Court.

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Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim bail because of the

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violation of his right to a speedy trial.

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It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the petitioner, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission is only stated to be rejected. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356 that the communication of the grounds of the arrests in all the offences would apply prospectively from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. It was observed:

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“58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or binding requirement mandating the written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern arrests henceforth .” (Emphasis supplied)

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27. This judgment was followed by a co-ordinate bench

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of this Court in Kabir Khan vs State 2025:HHC:39246, wherein it was observed:

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“7. In light of the fact that in the said judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to clearly hold that as previously there existed no consistent or binding requirements mandating written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the offences, the ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure as affirmed shall govern arrests henceforth, this means that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to make directions issued therein prospective.”

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This Court held in Arvind Kumar @Chahna vs State of

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HP CrMP (M) no. 2329 of 2025, decided on 13.11.2025, that the requirement of providing the grounds of arrests is prospective . This judgment was unsuccessfully assailed in Arvind Kumar @Chahna vs State of HP SLP (Criminal) no. 797 of 2026. Therefore, the petitioner cannot get bail because the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him.

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A reference was made to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Rajinder Rajan vs. Union of India and anr, SLP Criminal 3326 of 2026, decided on 01.04.2026 , however, in the said case, it has been nowhere stated that the provisions of supplying the grounds of arrest laid down in Mihir Rajesh Shah vs

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State of Maharashtra, SLP (Crl.) 17132 of 2024 , would be retrospective, therefore, no advantage can be derived from the cited judgment.

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No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

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The observation made hereinbefore shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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14th July, 2026 (Chander)

Arnav Saviraj Chauhan v. State of Hp

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Arnav Saviraj Chauhan v. State of Hp

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