Onkar Chander Vs State of Hp

2026:HHC:28397

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No: 738 of 2022. Reserved on: 30.06.2026. Date of Decision: 14.07.2026.

Onkar Chand		….Petitioner
	Versus
State of H.P.		...Respondent

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.

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Whether approved for reporting?¹ Yes

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For the Petitioner	: Mr Adv	Hamender ocate.	Singh Chandel,
For the Respondent	: Mr Adv	Lokender Kut ocate General.	lehria, Additional

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of the order dated 21.05.2022 passed by the learned Special Judge Shimla, H.P. in case No. 2-5/7 of 2013 titled State vs. Sunil Kumar and Ors vide which the learned Trial Court ordered the framing of charges against the petitioner.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that short-term loans were provided to the members

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Safai Karamchari under the NSKFTC Yojana. The beneficiaries failed to return the loans. When enquiries were made about the guarantors, it was found that many of them were not residing at the address furnished by them in their affidavits and work certificates. Some of the guarantors expressed their ignorance regarding the furnishing of the guarantee. The signatures of the DDOs and the certificates issued by them were found to be forged. The police investigated the matter and found that there were various discrepancies in the names of the borrowers and guarantors. Fake documents were produced to secure the loans. The persons who were shown as guarantors had never furnished the guarantees. Many of them were not found serving at the address mentioned in the guarantee deed. The petitioner, Onkar Chand, was the head of the committee constituted for identifying the beneficiaries. 1,487 families were identified. No member of the committee was present at the time of the verification. The family of Madan Lal did not fall within the definition of a scavenger. Madan Lal was a government employee and was posted in the Government of India Press as a head Clerk. His wife, Kamla, was a homemaker who was not engaged in manual scavenging. His sons Raj Kumar, Tilak and

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Dinesh Kumar were also not engaged in the work of manual scavenging. However, the petitioner, Onkar Chand, mentioned their names to benefit them and himself. He caused a wrongful loss to the Government. The names of Raj Kumar, Tilak Raj and Dinesh Kumar were entered at Sl. No. 1042 of the list. The members of the committee stated that they had never joined the petitioner, Onkar Chand, in the survey. The salary certificate of Madan Lal was also obtained. In this manner, Onkar Chand had committed the offences punishable under Section 120B of the IPC and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act). The prosecution sanction was sought. However, the Director of Social Justice and Empowerment declined to grant the prosecution sanction vide letter dated 27.05.2011. Hence, the police filed a charge sheet against the petitioner for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 120B of the IPC.

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The petitioner filed an application seeking his discharge, which was opposed by the State. Learned Trial Court held that Onkar Chand was a non-Gazetted Officer in the rank of Tehsil Welfare Officer appointed by the Director of Social Justice and Empowerment. He was not appointed by the Government or by the State. Therefore, no prosecution sanction was required to

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prosecute him for the commission of offences punishable under Section 420 of the IPC, read with Section 120B of the IPC. Hence, it was ordered that charges be framed against the petitioner for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 and 120B of the IPC.

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Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Trial Court, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the petitioner was appointed as the chairperson of the committee constituted to survey the manual scavengers. The data was supplied by Balmiki Sabha and was compiled by the committee. Various beneficiaries applied for the loan based on the data. The petitioner was arrayed as an accused on the ground that proper process was not followed for the identification of the families of the scavengers. The director had not found any prima facie case against the petitioner and had refused a sanction. However, the charge sheet was filed for the commission of offences punishable under Section 120B of the IPC, which was not permissible. The learned Trial Court erred in framing charges for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC. Once the sanction was refused, it was not permissible for the prosecution to split the offences and file the charge sheet only for

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the commission of the offences punishable under the IPC and drop the offence covered under the PC Act. The other members were not arrayed as accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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A status report reproducing the contents of the reply and the details of the investigation conducted by the police was filed. It was asserted that Onkar Chand had surveyed 1,487 scavenger families. The names of Madan Lal and his family members were wrongly included. A loan of ₹3,30,000/- was approved in favour of Raj Kumar for purchasing the vehicle. A loan of ₹33,000/- was approved for the purpose of shuttering, and a loan of ₹75,000/- was approved for the purchase of materials for the Karyana shop. This was facilitated by the report prepared by the petitioner. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have heard Mr Hamender Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/state.

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Mr Hamender Singh Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in passing an order to frame the charges against the petitioner. The prosecution sanction was refused in respect of the offences committed under the PC Act. The challan was wrongly filed before the Court for the commission of offences punishable under Section 120B of the IPC. The learned Trial Court erred in framing charges. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed, the order passed by the learned Trial Court and the proceedings pending against the petitioner be quashed.

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Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/state, submitted that the petitioner had prepared a false report showing the name of Madan Lal and his family members. They obtained the loan and failed to repay it on demand. The advancement of the loan benefited the persons named in the report. Learned Trial Court had rightly framed the charges, and there is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

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8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

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In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

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Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

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This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

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Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

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“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

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9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court.

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The grounds for quashing, inter alia , contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides ; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 )

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The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The charge sheet mentions that the names of the family members of Madan Lal were mentioned as Sl. No. 1042. However, when the record of the learned Trial Court was inspected, no such names were found as Sl. No. 1042 and the names of Sukh Ram and his family members were found to have been recorded at Serial no.1042. The name of Madan Lal was found at Sl. No. 1200 of the list. The list mentions that Madan Lal was a government employee. His wife was a private Safai Karamchari, and nothing was mentioned against the names of Tilak Raj and Dinesh. It was mentioned in the column of remarks that they wanted to learn about computers.

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Therefore, the list does not mention that Madan Lal or his wife was a manual scavenger. It was specifically stated that Madan Lal was a government employee, and his wife was a private

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Safai Karamchari. Hence, there was no misrepresentation made by the petitioner in the list produced by him, and the learned Trial Court erred in holding that a misrepresentation was made regarding the status of Madan Lal and his family members. The list correctly reflected that Madan Lal was a government employee. Even his salary was mentioned as ₹65,000/-, and the income of his wife was mentioned as ₹45,000/-.

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The charge sheet does not mention that the petitioner had committed an offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC. The petitioner's name was mentioned at Sl No. 17, and it was mentioned that Onkar Chand had committed the offences punishable under Section 120B of the IPC and Section 13(2) of the PC Act. There was no evidence of the conspiracy because, as per the charge sheet, Raj Kumar, son of Madan Lal, had applied for purchasing a Mahindra jeep, Tilak Raj had applied for a shuttering material, and Dinesh Kumar had applied for a Karyana item. The list nowhere recommended the grant of a loan for these purposes and mentioned that Madan Lal and his family members wanted to learn computers. Therefore, there could not have been any conspiracy to help the family members of Madan Lal to take a loan for a vehicle, shuttering or karyana items. Thus, the contents of

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the charge sheet do not show that the petitioner had conspired with the family members of Madan Lal to secure a loan for them.

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It is undisputed that the competent authority had refused the sanction because no prima facie case was made out against the accused, Onkar Chand. It was laid down by the Bombay High Court in Atchut Mucund Alornekar v. CBI, 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 1256 , that once the sanction has been refused for the commission of an offence punishable under the PC Act, it is not permissible to file a charge sheet in respect of an offence punishable for the commission of an offence punishable under IPC. It was observed:

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“33. Admittedly, the F.I.R. was registered under sections 120-B r/w 420 of I.P.C. and sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. All the petitioners are public servants. Under section 19 of the P.C. Act, prior sanction of the appropriate authority was required to prosecute the petitioners. In the present case, the prior sanction had to be obtained from the C.V.C., New Delhi. The allegations are the same for offences under the IPC and under the P.C. Act. As already stated earlier, the C.V.C. had declined sanction, stating that the matter was not fit for the launching of prosecution. As has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, the offences punishable under sections 120-B r/w 420 of I.P.C. are inter-linked with the offences punishable under sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. The offences under section 120-B r/w 420 of the IPC are not separate or independent accusations. Therefore, once the sanction under section 19 of the P.C. Act was refused by the

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competent authority and the said competent authority found that the matter was not fit for launching prosecution, the respondent could not have laid a charge-sheet against the petitioners under section 120-B r/w 420 of I.P.C., by conveniently dropping section 13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act. Again, the petitioners, Nos. 15 and 16 are the public servants removable by the Central Government, though others are removable by the department. The allegation against them is that they abused their official position as public servants. The act or omission alleged to have been performed by the said petitioners is in the course of their service and as part of their duty and is official in nature. In the case of “ Sheetla Sahai ” (supra), the Apex Court has held that for the purpose of attracting Section 197 of Cr.P.C., it is not necessary that the public servants must act in their official capacity, but even where the public servants purport to act in their official capacity, the same would attract the provisions of Section 197. Therefore, prior sanction under section 197 of Cr.P.C. was required to be obtained insofar as the petitioners Nos. 15 and 16 are concerned.”

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17. A similar view was taken by the Jammu, Kashmir and

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Ladakh High Court in Sanjay Kumar Srivastava v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine J&K 539, wherein it was observed:

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15. From the forgoing enunciation of law on the subject, it is clear that once a particular set of facts is examined by Central Vigilance Commission whereafter it reaches the conclusion that on the basis of material put up before it, no criminal of f ence is made out against the accused public servant and the said opinion is accepted by the competent authority, it is not open to the investigating agency to f i le a challan on the same set of facts against the accused public servant by dropping the of f ences under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act and conf i ning the challan only to the of f ences under other penal provisions.

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19. Hon’ble Supreme Court also highlighted this issue, but

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left it open in A. Sreenivasa Reddy v. Rakesh Sharma , (2023) 8 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 952 . It was observed at page 733:

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62. Before we close this matter, we would like to observe something which this Court may have to consider sooner or later. The object behind the enactment of Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988, is to protect the public servants from frivolous prosecutions. Take a case wherein the sanctioning authority, at the time of declining to accord sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988, observes that the sanction is being declined because the prosecution against the accused could be termed as frivolous or vexatious. Then, in such circumstances, what would be its effect on the trial so far as IPC offences are concerned? Could it be said that the prosecution for the offences under the PC Act, 1988, is frivolous, but the same would not be for the offences under the IPC? We are not going into this question in the present matter as the sanction initially was not declined on the ground that the prosecution against the appellant herein is frivolous or vexatious, but the same was declined essentially on the ground that what has been alleged is mere procedural irregularities in the discharge of essential duties. Whether such procedural irregularities constitute any offence under the IPC or not will be looked into by the trial court. What we have highlighted may be examined by this Court in some other litigation at an appropriate time. 20. Therefore, the police could not have filed the charge

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sheet before the Court for the commission of the offences for which no sanction was required after the sanction was declined by the competent authority.

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Therefore, the learned Trial Court erred in taking cognisance and framing the charges. Hence, the present petition is allowed, and the order dated 21.05.2022 passed by the learned Special Judge, Shimla, H.P., is ordered to be set aside, and the proceedings are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioner. However, it is expressly made clear that this order will have no effect regarding the other co-accused.

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The present petition stands disposed of, and so are the miscellaneous applications, if any.

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The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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^th July, 2026 (Nikita)

Onkar Chander v. State of Hp

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Onkar Chander v. State of Hp

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