Revision against conviction under Section 138 NI Act for dishonour of a loan-repayment cheque issued to a cooperative bank. Courts below upheld conviction; accused claimed the cheque was security. The High Court held concurrent findings stood, presumptions were unrebutted, and dismissed the revision.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 185 of 2026
Reserved on: 22.06.2026 Date of Decision: 13.07.2026
Sudhir Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
Branch Manager Kangra Central Co.operative Bank
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr Jeet Singh, Advocate. For the Respondent : None.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 28.02.2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rampur Bushehar, District Shimla (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 23.04.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Anni, District Kullu, H.P (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience)
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filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for taking action as per the law.
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because a cheque issued as a security also attracts the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement of “insufficient funds”. The notice was duly served upon the accused, and he failed to repay the money despite the receipt of the notice. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for 1 year, pay a compensation of ₹1,67,000/(₹1,47,000/- cheque amount + ₹20,000 for suffering) and in default of payment of compensation to undergo simple imprisonment for two months.
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and there was nothing to rebut the presumption. The cheque issued as security also attracted the provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement “insufficient funds”, and the notice was duly served upon the accused. All the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied. Learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, and no interference was required with the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.
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an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207-
“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh
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Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”
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“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275] , while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)
5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
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13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is nonconsideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)
“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”
309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
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“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”
5.1.1. In K.R. Indira v. Dr. G. Adinarayana (2003) 8 SCC 300 , this Court enlisted the components, aspects and the acts, the concatenation of which would make the offence under Section 138 of the Act complete, to be these (i) drawing of the cheque by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker, for payment to another person from out of that account for discharge in whole/in part of any debt or liability, (ii) presentation of the cheque by the payee or the holder in due course to the bank, (iii) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank for want of sufficient funds to the credit of the drawer or any arrangement with the banker to pay the sum covered by the cheque, (iv) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of information by the payee from the bank regarding
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the return of the cheque as unpaid demanding payment of the cheque amount, and (v) failure of the drawer to make payment to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, of the amount covered by the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.
Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. that a loan of ₹3,00,000/- was sanctioned in his favour. He admitted his signature on the cheque and the issuance of the cheque. He claimed that the cheque was issued as security. Therefore, the taking of the loan, issuance of the cheque and signature on the cheque are not disputed. Learned Courts below had rightly held that once issuance of the cheque and signatures on the cheque are admitted, a presumption would be triggered that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724 , that when the issuance of a cheque and signature on the cheque are not disputed, a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability. It was observed: -
“9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and considering the fact that the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for the second time
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after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of course, such a presumption is rebuttable. However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was required to lead evidence that the full amount due and payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The story put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of security is not believable in the absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and considering the presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial court and the High Court have committed an error in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence.”
Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873 , wherein it was held as under:
“6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt or liability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable, meaning they can be rebutted by the accused by raising a probable defence.”
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19. This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.
Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069 , wherein it was observed:
“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED, PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT ARISE
the cheque was issued in discharge of the liability for consideration, and the burden is upon the accused to rebut this presumption.
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“9. Submission of learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the revisionist that the cheque in question was issued to the complainant as security, and on this ground, the criminal revision petition is rejected as being devoid of any force for the reasons hereinafter mentioned. As per Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, if any cheque is issued on account of other liability, then the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 would be attracted. The court has perused the original cheque, Ext. C-1 dated 30.10.2008, placed on record. There is no recital in the cheque Ext. C-1, that cheque was issued as a security cheque. It is well-settled law that a cheque issued as security would also come under the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. See 2016 (3) SCC page 1 titled Don Ayengia v. State of Assam & another . It is wellsettled law that where there is a conflict between former law and subsequent law, then subsequent law always prevails.” 22. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao vs. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited 2016(10) SCC 458 that issuing a cheque toward security will also attract the liability for the commission of
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an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was
observed: -
“10. We have given due consideration to the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant as well as the observations of this Court in Indus Airways Private Limited versus Magnum Aviation Private Limited (2014) 12 SCC 53 with reference to the explanation to Section 138 of the Act and the expression “for the discharge of any debt or other liability” occurring in Section 138 of the Act. We are of the view that the question of whether a post-dated cheque is for “discharge of debt or liability” depends on the nature of the transaction. If on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the Section is attracted and not otherwise .
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agreement, as against the case of Indus Airways (supra), where the purchase order had been cancelled, and a cheque issued towards advance payment for the purchase order was dishonoured. In that case, it was found that the cheque had not been issued for the discharge of liability but as an advance for the purchase order, which was cancelled. Keeping in mind this fine, but the real distinction, the said judgment cannot be applied to a case of the present nature, where the cheque was for repayment of a loan instalment which had fallen due, though such a deposit of cheques towards repayment of instalments was also described as “security” in the loan agreement. In applying the judgment in Indus Airways (supra), one cannot lose sight of the difference between a transaction of the purchase order which is cancelled and that of a loan transaction where the loan has actually been advanced, and its repayment is due on the date of the cheque.
Jharkhand, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1002: AIR 2021 SC 5732 , and it was held that a cheque issued as security is not waste paper and a complaint under section 138 of the NI Act can be filed on its dishonour. It was observed:
“17. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction cannot be considered a worthless piece of paper
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under every circumstance. 'Security' in its true sense is the state of being safe, and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of the amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such a presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of the NI Act would flow.
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not the intention of the statute. When a cheque is issued even though as 'security' the consequence flowing therefrom is also known to the drawer of the cheque and in the circumstance stated above if the cheque is presented and dishonoured, the holder of the cheque/drawee would have the option of initiating the civil proceedings for recovery or the criminal proceedings for punishment in the fact situation, but in any event, it is not for the drawer of the cheque to dictate terms with regard to the nature of litigation.”
by taking a plea that he had issued a signed cheque in the complainant’s favour.
“20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these
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documents in support of his complaints and recorded the statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the appellant recorded her statement under Section 313 of the Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the presumption in support of her defence available under Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code is not substantive evidence of defence, but only an opportunity for the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution's case against the accused. Therefore, there is no evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration ." (Emphasis supplied)”
that the bank had taken the cheque as security at the time of advancing the loan. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof. Hence, the complainant’s evidence was not sufficient to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque. There was no other evidence to establish that the cheque was issued as security by the accused to the complainant, and the learned Courts below had rightly rejected the defence taken by the accused that he had issued the cheque as security to the complainant.
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cannot be believed that the complainant would have no financial capacity to advance the loan. Further, the accused admitted to taking a loan in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., and the advancement of the loan was not disputed.
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“insufficient funds”. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore , (2010) 3 SCC 83: (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 625: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 155 that the memo issued by the Bank is presumed to be correct and the burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 95:
“24. Section 146, making a major departure from the principles of the Evidence Act, provides that the bank's slip or memo with the official mark showing that the cheque was dishonoured would, by itself, give rise to the presumption of dishonour of the cheque, unless and until that fact was disproved. Section 147 makes the offences punishable under the Act compoundable.”
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“6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments, including cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable instruments such as cheques
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without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.”
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there needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest @ 9% p.a. [ R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260, para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520 ] ”
38 . Thus, the compensation of ₹ 20,000/- on an amount of ₹1,67,000/- cannot be said to be excessive.
“26. From the above line of cases, it becomes very clear that a sentence of imprisonment can be granted for default in payment of compensation awarded under Section 357(3) CrPC. The whole purpose of the provision is to accommodate the interests of the victims in the criminal justice system. Sometimes the situation becomes such that there is no purpose served by keeping a person behind bars. Instead, directing the accused to pay an amount of compensation to the victim or affected party can ensure the delivery of total justice. Therefore, this grant of compensation is sometimes in lieu of sending a person to bars or in addition to a very
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light sentence of imprisonment. Hence, in default of payment of this compensation, there must be a just recourse. Not imposing a sentence of imprisonment would mean allowing the accused to get away without paying the compensation, and imposing another fine would be impractical, as it would mean imposing a fine upon another fine and therefore would not ensure proper enforcement of the order of compensation. While passing an order under Section 357(3), it is imperative for the courts to look at the ability and the capacity of the accused to pay the same amount as has been laid down by the cases above; otherwise, the very purpose of granting an order of compensation would stand defeated.”
“29. The idea behind directing the accused to pay compensation to the complainant is to give him immediate relief so as to alleviate his grievance. In terms of Section 357(3), compensation is awarded for the loss or injury suffered by the person due to the act of the accused for which he is sentenced. If merely an order directing compensation is passed, it would be totally ineffective. It could be an order without any deterrence or apprehension of immediate adverse consequences in case of its nonobservance. The whole purpose of giving relief to the complainant under Section 357(3) of the Code would be frustrated if he is driven to take recourse to Section 421 of the Code. An order under Section 357(3) must have the potential to secure its observance. Deterrence can only be infused into the order by providing for a default sentence. If Section 421 of the Code puts compensation ordered to be paid by the court on a par with the fine so far as the mode of recovery is concerned, then there is no reason why the court cannot impose a sentence in default of payment of
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compensation, as it can be done in case of default in payment of a fine under Section 64 IPC. It is obvious that in view of this, in Vijayan [(2009) 6 SCC 652: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 296] , this Court stated that the abovementioned provisions enabled the court to impose a sentence in default of payment of compensation and rejected the submission that the recourse can only be had to Section 421 of the Code for enforcing the order of compensation. Pertinently, it was made clear that observations made by this Court in Hari Singh [(1988) 4 SCC 551: 1988 SCC (Cri) 984] are as important today as they were when they were made. The conclusion, therefore, is that the order to pay compensation may be enforced by awarding a sentence in default.
30. In view of the above, we find no illegality in the order passed by the learned Magistrate and confirmed by the Sessions Court in awarding a sentence in default of payment of compensation. The High Court was in error in setting aside the sentence imposed in default of payment of compensation.
42. No other point was urged.
(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge
13th July, 2026 (Nikita)
3 issues framed by the court
Whether a cheque issued as security for a loan attracts liability under Section 138 of the NI Act when dishonoured?
Whether the accused could rebut the presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 NI Act without leading defence evidence beyond a Section 313 denial?
Whether the sentence and default imprisonment imposed by the trial courts were lawful and adequate?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
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Rajesh Anchan v. K.B. SureshDistinguished¶28
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Vardhineedi Sri Ramanjaneyulu v. Yeeda SasibhushanDistinguished¶29
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Brij Mohan v. Virendra BhandariReferred
Brij Mohan vs. Virendra Bhandari 2017 Supreme(Raj) 2105
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of ChhattisgarhRelied on¶11
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204 · Who else cites this
State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh RaoRelied on¶12
State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688 · Who else cites this
Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh ChanderApplied¶12
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Kishan Rao v. ShankargoudaRelied on¶13
Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165 · Who else cites this
Bir Singh v. Mukesh KumarRelied on¶35
Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 · Who else cites this
Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen NoorulRelied on¶16
Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2019 · Who else cites this
APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion LinkersRelied on¶17
APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724 · Who else cites this
N. Vijay Kumar v. Vishwanath Rao N.Relied on¶18
N. Vijay Kumar v. Vishwanath Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873 · Who else cites this
Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. BorcarRelied on¶19
Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069 · Who else cites this
Hamid Mohammad v. Jaimal DassRelied on¶21
Hamid Mohammad Versus Jaimal Dass 2016 (1) HLJ 456
Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency LimitedRelied on¶22
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Sripati Singh v. State of JharkhandRelied on¶23
Sripati Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1002 · Who else cites this
Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab IndustriesRelied on¶25
Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries, (2022) 15 SCC 689 · Who else cites this
Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. ThakoreRelied on¶31
Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83 · Who else cites this
Kalamani Tex v. P. BalasubramanianRelied on¶37
Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283 · Who else cites this
K.A. Abbas v. Sabu JosephRelied on¶39
K.A. Abbas v. Sabu Joseph, (2010) 6 SCC 230 · Who else cites this
R. Mohan v. A.K. Vijaya KumarRelied on¶40
R. Mohan v. A.K. Vijaya Kumar, (2012) 8 SCC 721 · Who else cites this
5 provisions across 3 enactments
Sudhir Kumar
Branch Manager Kangra Central Co-operative Bank
Rakesh Kainthla
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
