Ashok Kumar Vs State of Hp and Others

2(i). For seeking condonation of delay, the case setup by the petitioner is that the judgment in question was rendered against the petitioner on 12.03.2018. Petitioner, within the limitation period, assailed the same by way of Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) No.12 of 2018. The aforesaid LPA was admitted and set down for hearing. It was on 01.07.2024, that LPA was dismissed on the ground of being not maintainable against the order passed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Liberty was reserved to the petitioner to avail appropriate remedy in accordance with law. According to the petitioner, he preferred instant Review Petition within the limitation period from the date of dismissal of his LPA. Therefore, delay deserves to be condoned.

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2(ii) Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submitted that it was in 1978 that in Ishwar Singh Vs. Smt. Ram Piari and Another³ , this Court had held that no LPA lies against the orders passed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the LPA was not maintainable the day it was filed. Prayer was made for dismissal of the application for condonation of delay.

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3 AIR 1978 HP 39

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3

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( 2026:HHC:6001 )

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2(iii) According to the petitioner, he had been bonafidely pursuing the LPA preferred against the judgment in question, whereas, stand of non-applicant/respondent is that the LPA preferred by the petitioner against the order/judgment rendered under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable on the day the LPA was instituted. This was the reason the LPA was finally dismissed as such on 01.07.2024. Therefore, Section 14 of the Limitation Act that provides exclusion of computation of time spent in pursuing it in a wrong Court will not be attracted.

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Heard learned counsel on both sides.

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The principles governing exclusion of period

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spent in bona-fidely pursuing remedies in wrong Court

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were summed up in Purni Devi & Anr. Vs. Babu Ram &

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Anr.⁴ as under:-

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“16. The Plaintiff has sought to place reliance on the judgment of this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principle Secy, Irrigation Department⁵ (3- Judge Bench) and M.P. Steel Corporation v. CCE⁶ (2-Judge Bench) wherein it was expounded that the provisions of Section14 of the Limitation Act are to advance the cause of justice and must be interpreted to do so rather than abort proceedings.

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4 Civil Appeal No.4633 of 2024 decided on 02.04.2024

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5 (2008) 7 SCC 169

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6 (2015) 7 SCC 58

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4

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( 2026:HHC:6001 )

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25. The relevant portion of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is extracted as under, for ready reference:

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“Section 14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. …

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(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.”

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27. On a perusal of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, which is also applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, it is evident that it carves out an exception excluding the period of limitation when the proceedings are being pursued with due diligence and good faith in a Court “which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it”.

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30. The principles pertaining to applicability of Section 14, were extensively discussed and summarised by this Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (Supra), wherein while holding the exclusion of time period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act to a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act it was observed:-

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“21. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service:

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(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party;

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(2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith;

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5

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(3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;

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(4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue; and

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(5) Both the proceedings are in a court.”

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31. This Court in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (2008) 7 SCC 169 further expounded that the provisions of this Section, must be interpreted and applied in a manner that furthers the cause of justice, rather than aborts the proceedings at hand and the time taken diligently pursuing a remedy, in a wrong Court, should be excluded.

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33. The only objection pointed out by the Respondent to the ingredients for invocation of Section 14, is that the Plaintiff have not approached this Court with clean hands and did not approach the Court of the Tehsildar diligently and in good faith.

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34. The judgment of this Court in M.P. Steel (Supra) discussed the phrases, “due diligence” and “in good faith” for the purposes of invocation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. While considering the application of Section 14 to the Customs Act, it was observed:

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“10. We might also point out that Conditions 1 to 4 mentioned in the Consolidated Engg. case [(2008) 7 SCC 169] have, in fact, been met by the Plaintiff. It is clear that both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party. The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith, as has been explained in Consolidated Engg. [(2008) 7 SCC 169] itself. These phrases only mean that the party who invokes Section 14 should not be guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction. Further, there should be no pretended mistake intentionally made with a view to

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6

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delaying the proceedings or harassing the opposite party.

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xxx xxx xxx

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49. ……. the expression “the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding” needs to be construed in a manner which advances the object sought to be achieved, thereby advancing the cause of justice.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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36. More recently, in Laxmi Srinivasa R and P Boiled Rice Mill v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (2-Judge Bench), this Court followed the dictum in Consolidated Engg. Enterprises (Supra) and M.P. Steel (Supra) to exclude the time period undertaken by the Plaintiff therein in pursuing remedy under Writ Jurisdiction, in the absence of challenge to the bona fides of the Plaintiff, in view of Section 14.

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37. No substantial averment has come on record to substantiate the claim that the predecessor in interest of the Plaintiff approached the Tehsildar with any mala fide intention, in the absence of good faith or with the knowledge that it was not the Court having competent jurisdiction to execute the decree. The object to advance the cause of justice, as well must be kept in mind.

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38. We do not find the reasoning given by the learned High Court in paragraph 9 while rejecting the plea for exclusion of time to be sustainable. On a perusal of the record, it is apparent that the Plaintiff has pursued the matter bonafidely and diligently and in good faith before what it believed to be the appropriate forum and, therefore, such time period is bound to be excluded when computing limitation before the Court having competent jurisdiction. All conditions stipulated

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7

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for invocation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are fulfilled."

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It is not in dispute that LPA No.12 of 2018 was instituted by the petitioner within the limitation period of 30 days. On the very first day of its listing i.e. 12.04.2018, interim relief was granted to petitioner and judgment passed on 12.03.2018 in Jallan Cooperative Agriculture Service Society Ltd² was stayed.

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The appeal was dismissed after about six years on the ground of maintainability. In the given facts, where appeal filled by the petitioner was within the limitation period, interim order was also passed therein, the appeal remained pending for six years and petitioner’s filing instant review petition immediately after the dismissal of appeal on ground of it being not maintainable, the delay as occurred in institution of review petition deserves to be condoned. It is a just case where benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act can be extended in favour of the petitioner for excluding the period spent in pursuing the Letters Patent Appeal. Ordered accordingly. Delay in institution of review petition stands condoned. Application to sand disposed of.

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8

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( 2026:HHC:6001 )

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3. Review Petition

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With consent of learned counsel for the parties, matter has been heard .

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3(i)(a) The present petitioner was serving as

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Secretary of the respondent-Society. He was booked on charge of accepting bribe and keeping liquor in the office. The society placed the petitioner under suspension on 19.02.2009 by passing a resolution. Charge-sheet was framed against him on 09.03.2009. Another charge-sheet was also prepared against the petitioner on 22.06.2010. The respondent-Society requested the Assistant Registrar to appoint an Inquiry Officer for inquiring into the charges. In the meanwhile, petitioner challenged his suspension before the Assistant Registrar. The suspension was revoked under order dated 04.10.2010. The Assistant Registrar directed the respondent-Society to take up the matter with the Vigilance Department. In view of order dated 04.10.2010, petitioner joined his duties as Secretary on 25.10.2010. The respondent-Society assailed the order passed on 04.10.2010 by the Assistant Registrar before the Additional Registrar. In the meanwhile, respondent-Society passed another resolution that the Assistant Registrar had not appointed the Inquiry Officer to look into the allegations

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9

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levelled against the petitioner, therefore, petitioner was dismissed and removed from the service.

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3(i)(b) Petitioner assailed the dismissal order before the

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Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority stayed the resolution passed by the respondent-Society vide order dated 28.02.2011. The respondent-Society assailed the aforesaid interim order in CMPMO No.72 of 2011 in this Court. The said CMPMO was decided on 21.09.2011, holding that though the General House of Society is the supreme body, but an employee cannot be dismissed, more so, in stigmatic manner, without holding an inquiry and without giving an opportunity of being heard. Petitioner’s termination order was set aside and Registrar was directed to appoint Inquiry Officer for inquiring into the charges levelled giant the petitioner in both the charge-sheets. The Registrar was also to take necessary action on the basis of inquiry report.

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3(i)(c) Pursuant to the directions, the Inquiry Officer furnished his report on 16.04.2012 to the Registrar. Based on this inquiry report, the Registrar on 28.5.2012, directed the respondent-Society to take further action within ten days being the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner. The Society was also directed to release admissible subsistence

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10

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( 2026:HHC:6001 )

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allowance to the petitioner with effect from the date of his suspension as Secretary of the Society.

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3(i)(d) The respondent-Society on 11.06.2012 made reference to the Assistant Registrar for approval to dismiss the petitioner from service. The Assistant Registrar did not give the necessary approval and kept the matter pending for eight months. Whereafter, the respondent-Society took a decision to dispense with petitioner’s services on 15.03.2013 without the approval of the Assistant Registrar. 3(i)(e) The order dated 15.03.2013, dispensing petitioner’s services was assailed by the petitioner before the Additional Registrar. The Additional Registrar decided the appeal on 24.07.2013 and the order dated 15.03.2013 dismissing petitioner from his service was set aside. Respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner in service and release all consequential benefits to him. Liberty, however, was reserved to the respondent to impose any other penalty upon the petitioner except penalty of dismissal and termination from service, by following due procedure.

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3(i)(f) Feeling aggrieved against the order dated 24.07.2013, the respondent-Society instituted CMPMO No. 4101 of 2013 invoking jurisdiction under Article 227 of the

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11

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( 2026:HHC:6001 )

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Constitution of India. The CMPMO was decided and allowed on 12.03.2018. The impugned order passed by the Additional Registrar on 24.07.2013 was set aside.

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As noticed earlier in earlier part of this judgment, petitioner had initially assailed the judgment dated 12.03.2018 by preferring LPA No. 12 of 2018. The same was dismissed as not maintainable on 01.07.2024. In view of the liberty reserved to the petitioner to avail appropriate remedy against the judgment dated 12.03.2018, rendered under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has now invoked review jurisdiction. 3(ii) The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there are errors apparent in the judgment. That provisions of Rule 43(3) of the Rules framed by the Respondent-Society under the Himachal Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1968, had not been properly appreciated by the Court. Hon’ble Co-ordinate Bench had wrongly held about there being no requirement for obtaining permission of Registrar in case of dismissal of the employee of the society. It has further urged that CMPMO preferred by the respondent-Society that was decided on 12.03.2018, was even otherwise not maintainable. Hon’ble Coordinate Bench had not even appreciated that appellant

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12

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( 2026:HHC:6001 )

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had not been given due notice before dismissal of his service.

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Submission of learned Senior counsel for the respondent are that parameters for seeking review are not met with in the case and prayed for dismissal of the petition.

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Guiding principles for exercise of review jurisdiction have been summarized as under by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sanjay Kumar Agrawal Vs. State

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Tax Officer (1) and Another⁷ :-

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“16. The gist of the afore-stated decisions is that: -

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16.2 A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.

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16.2 A judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so.

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16.3 An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review.

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16.4 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected.”

7 (2024) 2 SCC 362

13

( 2026:HHC:6001 )

16.5 A Review Petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.”

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16.6 Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to re-agitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.

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16.7 An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.

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16.8 Even the change in law or subsequent decision/ judgment of a co-ordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.”

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Further, in Malleeswari Versus K. Suguna

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and another,⁸ Hon’ble Apex Court held that review jurisdiction cannot be assumed unless it is conferred by law on the authority or the Court. Power of review is different from the appellate power. Following limitations were laid down for maintaining the finality of judicial decisions:-

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“15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC⁹ .

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15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court¹⁰ .

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8 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1927

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9 (1995) 1 SCC 170

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10 (1979) 4 SCC 389

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14

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( 2026:HHC:6001 )

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15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise¹¹ .

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15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits specified in the statute governing the exercise of power¹² .

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15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered. Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors¹³ .”

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It was further held that though through a review application, an apparent error of fact or law is intimated to the Court, but no extra reasoning is undertaken to explain the said error. The intimation of error at the first blush enables the Court to correct apparent errors instead of higher court correcting such errors. At both the stages, detailed reasoning is not warranted. Distinction between power of review and appellate power as also the power & scope of review jurisdiction was summed up as under:-

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“17.1 The ground of discovery of new and important matter or evidence is a ground available if it is demonstrated that, despite the exercise of due diligence,

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11 (1997) 8 SCC 715

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12 (2000) 6 SCC 224

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13 AIR (1963) SC 1909

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15

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( 2026:HHC:6001 )

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this evidence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by the party at the time, the original decree or order was passed.

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17.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record may be invoked if there is something more than a mere error, and it must be the one which is manifest on the face of the record¹⁴ . Such an error is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision¹⁵ . An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record¹⁶ .

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17.3 Lastly, the phrase ‘for any other sufficient reason' means a reason that is sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the other two categories.¹⁷ ”

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In the instant case, petitioner is not actually seeking review. Endeavour is to persuade the Court to sit as an Appellate Court over the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Coordinate Bench. Petitioner’s contentions pertaining to Rule 43 have been noticed in para-5 of the decision. Rightly or wrongly a view has been taken by the Hon’ble Coordinate Bench. It has also been noticed in the judgment that the show cause notice had been served upon the petitioner to which he had filed reply. It is not a case where errors are apparent from the judgment. It is a case where petitioner wants this Court to carry out a de novo

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14 (1955) 1 SCR 1104

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15 AIR (1954) SC 440

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16 AIR (1960) SC 137

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17 1922 SCC OnLine PC 11; AIR (1954) SC 526

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16

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( 2026:HHC:6001 )

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exercise for deciding his case on merits by rearguing the entire case. Such an exercise is impermissible in law. Settled parameters for reviewing a judgment are not made out.

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5. In view of aforesaid reasons, the review petition

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is dismissed.

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Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any,

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also to stand disposed of.

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Jyotsna Rewal Dua March 06, 2026 Judge R.Atal

Ashok Kumar v. State of Hp and Others

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Ashok Kumar v. State of Hp and Others

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