Anoop Kumar Vs State of Hp

For the Petitioner : Mr. Nimish Gupta, Advocate. For the Respondent: Mr Jitender K. Sharma, State Additional Advocate General. Victim in person with Mr. Vinod Gupta, Advocate.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition for

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seeking regular bail in FIR No.19/2025 dated 22.05.2025, registered at Women Police Station Chamba, Distt. Chamba, for the commission of offences punishable under Section 64

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(a) of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO Act).

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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It has been asserted that the FIR was registered at the instance of the Health Care Workers, Child Help Line, Chamba. The petitioner was arrested on 27.5.2025. The petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. The petitioner does not have any criminal antecedents. The investigation is complete, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner will abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, the petition.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police received information that the minor victim was married to the petitioner, Anup Kumar, on 22.05.2025. She was pregnant, and action should be taken. The police visited the spot and traced the victim. The petitioner appeared before the police, and the police arrested him. As per the record of Government Primary School, Parautha, the victim was born on 20.04.2008. The victim delivered a child. DNA profile obtained from the child matched the DNA profile of the petitioner. The police filed a charge sheet before the Court on 18.07.2025. The matter

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was listed for admission and denial of the documents on 27.11.2025. The petitioner would intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail. Therefore, it is prayed that the petition be dismissed.

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I have heard Mr. Nimish Gupta learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the State and the victim, who appeared in person with Mr. Vinod Gupta, Advocate before the Court.

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Mr Nimish Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner married the victim. She conceived and was taken to the hospital. She was a minor, and the matter was reported to the police. The petitioner is in custody, and there is no one to look after the victim and her child. The present case does not fall within the spirit of the POCSO Act, but exposes a harsh social reality, where minor married couples are exposed to the POCSO because of their lack of knowledge. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the victim is a minor, the legislature, in its wisdom, has made sexual intercourse with the minor a punishable offence. The petitioner is the biological father of the child delivered by the victim. Hence, he prayed that the petition be dismissed.

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The victim, who was present in person, stated that the petitioner had married her, and a child was born to her from the petitioner. She did not oppose the bail petition and had no objection in case the bail is allowed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The parameters for granting bail were considered

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by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P.,

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(2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it

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was observed at page 380: -

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( i ) Broad principles for the grant of bail

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In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

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“ 7 . It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

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8 . Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being . [ Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

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9 . Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of

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society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance .” (emphasis supplied)

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In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674 , this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

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“ 8 . The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge .” (emphasis supplied)

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This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 , speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

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“ 3 . Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter .” (emphasis supplied)

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In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 , this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

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In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765 , this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

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“ 9 . … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are :

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( i ) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence ;

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( ii ) nature and gravity of the accusation ;

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( iii ) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction ;

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( iv ) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail ;

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( v ) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused ;

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( vi ) likelihood of the offence being repeated ;

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( vii ) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

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( viii ) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail .” (emphasis supplied)

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xxxxxxx

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One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order ( Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857 ) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: ( Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170] ), SCC p. 511, para 35)

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“ 35 . While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital

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facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused .” (emphasis supplied)

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The present petition has to be decided as per

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the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The status report shows that the petitioner had married the victim. The victim became pregnant, and the matter was reported to the police by the Child Helpline. The victim present in the Court also admitted the relationship and the marriage with the petitioner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in K. Kirubakaran v. State of T.N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2307 that where the child was born as a result of love and not lust and the victim expressed her desire to live a peaceful and stable family life, the incarceration of the husband would disrupt the family unit and cause irreparable hardship to the victim, child and the social fabric. It was observed:

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“9. Per the law made by the legislature, the appellant, having been found guilty of a heinous offence, the proceedings in the present case on the basis of a compromise

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between the appellant and his wife cannot be quashed. But ignoring the cry of the appellant's wife for compassion and empathy will not, in our opinion, serve the ends of justice. Even the most serious offenders of the law do receive justice moderated by compassion from the courts, albeit in appropriate cases. Given the peculiar facts and circumstances here, a balanced approach combining practicality and empathy is necessary. The appellant and the victim are not only legally married, but they are also in their family way. While considering the offence committed by the appellant punishable under the POCSO Act, we have discerned that the crime was not the result of lust but love. The victim of crime herself has expressed her desire to live a peaceful and stable family life with the appellant, upon whom she is dependent, without the appellant carrying the indelible mark on his forehead of being an offender. Continuation of the criminal proceedings and the appellant's incarceration would only disrupt this familial unit and cause irreparable harm to the victim, the infant child, and the fabric of society itself.

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We are, thus, persuaded to hold that this is a case where the law must yield to the cause of justice.”

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This Court had also quashed the FIR registered

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under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, when the couple was married to each other in Manoj Kumar State of H.P

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2025:HHC:17169 .

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In the present case, the victim is aged 17 years. The status report shows that she had married the petitioner. Petitioner is in custody, and his continuous detention would disrupt the family and the social fabric as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. Kirubakaran

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(supra); therefore, the continuous detention of the petitioner is not justified.

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The police have already filed the charge sheet, and the custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not necessary.

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The status report mentions that the petitioner would influence the witnesses; however, the prosecution’s case is based upon the scientific evidence; therefore, the apprehension that the petitioner would intimidate the witnesses is not sufficient to deny bail to the petitioner, especially when the apprehension can be removed by imposing conditions.

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In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of 25,000/-₹ with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following conditions:-

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(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.

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(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.

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(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.

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(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and

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(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change.

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It is expressly made clear that in case of violation

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of any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail.

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The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Superintendent, District Jail Chamba, District Chamba, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.

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The observations made hereinabove are regarding

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the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the case's merits.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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09, December, 2025 (meera)

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Digitally signed SHAMSH by SHAMSH TABREZ TABREZ Date: 2025.12.09 18:47:09 +0545

Anoop Kumar v. State of Hp

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Anoop Kumar v. State of Hp

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