State of Hp Vs Anant Ram Negi — Himachal Pradesh HC (2025) — LawSathi Research

State of Hp Vs Anant Ram Negi — Himachal Pradesh HC (2025) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

Issue for consideration

Whether the learned Trial Court's judgment of acquittal of the respondent for offences under Sections 451, 354 and 323 IPC was liable to be interfered with in the State's appeal, judged by the Supreme Court's parameters for reversing an acquittal. +1 more

Court's answer

The appeal had to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court governing interference with judgments of acquittal.

Ratio / Principle

The informant's husband (PW3) admitted the room had been handed over to the accused and that a civil suit over the house and land was pending; therefore possession stood delivered to the accused, the prosecution version that the accused entered the house and threw the articles became doubtful, and the husband's statement corroborated the defence version of forcible possession by the informant and her son.

Key takeaways

Note 3 of the site plan (Ext.PW9/A) prepared by ASI Prakash Chand (PW9) recorded that a labourer employed by the accused was residing in the house; this entry falsified the prosecution version that the informant's husband was in possession and showed the rooms were in the accused's possession.ratio¶¶74
Phulma Devi (PW5), the informant's sister-in-law, was a chance witness whose timely presence at the spot was a coincidence; she neither tried to save the informant nor shouted for help, and her name was absent from the complaint (Ext.PW2/A); her presence on the spot was suspect and her statement required utmost care and caution.ratio¶¶107

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Acquittal under Sections 451, 354 and 323 IPC upheld; State's appeal dismissed. The informant's husband (PW3) admitted the room had been handed over to the accused and that a civil suit over the house and land was pending, and note 3 of the site plan (Ext.PW9/A) recorded that a labourer employed by the accused resided in the house — establishing possession with the accused and rendering the prosecution version doubtful. Phulma Devi (PW5), a related chance witness whose name was absent from the complaint (Ext.PW2/A), neither intervened nor raised alarm; Madan Singh (PW6) deposed that the accused was collecting the articles claiming they belonged to him, supporting the defence; the informant and her son had a case pending against them over the same incident and their testimonies required corroboration; the son's version contradicted the informant's on the number of assailants and introduced an agreement-to-sell story deposed to by no one; the medical evidence (superficial abrasions by blunt weapon, no chest injury, no mention of a stick) did not corroborate beating with a stick. The Trial Court had taken a reasonable view possible on the evidence; applying the parameters in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176, no interference with the acquittal was warranted even if another view was possible.

2025:HHC:41677

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Appeal No. 252 of 2014 Reserved on: 08.10.2025 Date of Decision: 04.12.2025

State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Anant Ram Negi ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No For the Appellant/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr Y.P. Sood, Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 08.07.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First

Class, Theog, District Shimla (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 354 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 354 and 323 of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant (name withheld to protect her identity) had visited her home on 22.08.2009 at about 6:00 P.M. Accused Anant Ram came to her home with 4-5 persons and gave beatings to the informant (PW2) and her son (PW4). The accused threw the informant’s articles outside the home. When the informant took the articles inside the home, the accused and two other persons threw her from the verandah of the house. The accused Anant Ram tore her Salwar and molested her. The other persons gave beatings to the informant’s son, who rescued himself and saved the informant. The accused had also threatened the informant before this incident. She sustained injuries in the incident. She filed an application (Ext.PW2/A) before the police. The police registered the FIR (Ext.PW1/A) and applied for the informant’s medical examination. Dr Seema Rani (PW7) medically examined the informant and found that she had sustained simple injuries that could have been inflicted by a blunt weapon. She issued the MLC (Ext.PW7/A). Dr Preeti Kapila (PW8) went through the

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informant’s X-rays and found no evidence of fracture. ASI Prakash Chand (PW9) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW9/A). The informant produced her shirt (Ext.P4) and salwar (Ext.P3). ASI Prakash Chand put them in a cloth parcel, sealed the parcel with seal ‘M’, obtained the seal impression (Ext.P2) on a separate piece of cloth, and handed over the seal to Shamsher after use. He seized the parcel vide memo (Ext.PW2/B). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 354 and 323 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

The prosecution examined 9 witnesses to prove its case. ASI Kundan Singh (PW1) proved the FIR and partly investigated the matter. The informant (PW2) and her son (PW4) narrated the incident. The informant’s husband (PW3) was told about the incident. Phulma Devi (PW5) and Madan Singh (PW6)

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are the eyewitnesses. Dr Seema Rani (PW7) medically examined the informant. Dr Priti Kapila (PW8) went through the X-ray and issued the report. ASI Prakash Chand (PW9) investigated the matter.

The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that he was innocent. He tendered a copy of the judgment in defence.

Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution’s version was not believable. There were material improvements and contradictions in the statements of witnesses, which made them highly doubtful. The informant’s husband and the accused had a civil dispute over the house. The informant’s son admitted that the accused had kept one labourer in the room, and the informant had taken out household articles of the labourer to oust him. The genesis of the incident was suspect. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 451, 323 and 354 of the IPC.

Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court did not properly appreciate

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the evidence on record. The victim, her son and the eyewitnesses proved the prosecution’s version. The medical evidence also corroborated the fact that the victim had sustained injuries. The accused tore the victim’s salwar and the shirt, and he outraged her modesty. He trespassed into the informant’s house. The prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Y.P. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondent/accused.

Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved by the statements of the informant, her son and the eyewitnesses that the accused had trespassed into the informant’s house with 4-5 persons and gave beatings to her. He tore her shirt and salwar and outraged her modesty. This was duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the recovery of the torn shirt and salwar. Learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Therefore, he

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prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

Mr Y.P. Sood, learned counsel for the respondent/ accused, submitted that there is a civil dispute between the accused and the informant’s husband. The informant’s husband had delivered the possession to the accused. The informant went to the house and threw the articles of the labourer residing in it. The learned Trial Court had rightly held that the genesis of the incident was withheld by the prosecution, which made the prosecution’s case highly suspect. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court should interfere with a judgment of acquittal if the judgment is patently perverse or is based on a misreading of the material evidence, and no reasonable person could have recorded

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the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed:

11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035 , a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:

“ 38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.

This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)

“ 29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: ( Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325 ], SCC p. 432, para 42)

‘ 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the

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exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly , the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly , the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’”

Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748, this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against

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acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)

8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence.

8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent

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perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The informant’s husband (PW3) admitted in his cross-examination that the accused had taken the room on rent in 2009. The accused had kept a labourer for 1-2 months. He corrected to say that the room was handed over to the accused, but no labourer was residing in the room. He admitted that a civil suit was pending regarding the house and the land.

The statement of the informant’s husband clearly shows that the possession of the house was delivered to the accused. Therefore, the prosecution’s version that the accused entered the house and threw the articles lying inside the house would become doubtful. If the accused was in possession, there was no justification for him to throw any article lying inside the house. The statement of the informant's husband would corroborate the defence version that the informant and her son had gone to the house to take forcible possession by throwing the articles lying inside the house.

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ASI Prakash Chand (PW9) investigated the matter. He went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW9/A). He mentioned in note 3 that Mark C was the house of the informant’s husband, in which one labourer employed by the accused, Anant Ram, was residing. The articles of the accused were kept in another room. This entry in the site plan falsifies the prosecution’s version that the informant’s husband was in possession, and the accused had thrown the articles belonging to him; rather, it shows that the rooms were in possession of the accused.

Phulma Devi (PW5) is the informant’s sister-in-law. She stated that she had gone to her parental home. She got off the bus and was waiting for the bus when she heard the noise. The informant also stated that she had visited the village on the date of the incident; otherwise, she was residing at Shimla. It is apparent that the incident had taken place suddenly, and it was too much of a coincidence that Phulma Devi (PW5) got off the bus, the very moment the incident took place, and she is also related to the informant. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harbeer Singh v. Sheeshpal, (2016) 16 SCC 418: (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 503: 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1164 that the chance

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witnesses have a habit of appearing suddenly at the place of the incident and thereafter disappearing. Their testimonies should be seen with due care and caution. It was observed at page 427:

23. The defining attributes of a “chance witness” were explained by Mahajan, J., in Puran v. State of Punjab, (1952) 2 SCC 454: AIR 1953 SC 459: 1953 Cri LJ 1925 . It was held that such witnesses have the habit of appearing suddenly on the scene when something is happening and then disappearing after noticing the occurrence about which they are called later on to give evidence.

24. In Mousam Singha Roy v. State of W.B., (2003) 12 SCC 377: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 429 , this Court discarded the evidence of chance witnesses while observing that certain glaring contradictions/omissions in the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 and the absence of their names in the FIR has been very lightly discarded by the courts below. Similarly, Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579 and Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107 are authorities for the proposition that deposition of a chance witness, whose presence at the place of incident remains doubtful, ought to be discarded. Therefore, for the reasons recorded by the High Court, we hold that PW 5 and PW 6 were chance witnesses and their statements have been rightly discarded.

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150 that the testimony of a chance witness is to be seen with

due care and caution and his presence on the spot should be satisfactorily established. It was observed:

“Chance witness

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29. A chance witness is one who happens to be at the place of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the said place. A person walking on a street witnessing the commission of an offence can be a chance witness. Merely because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed, though a little more scrutiny may be required at times. This again is an aspect that is to be looked into in a given case by the court. We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid position of law which has been clearly laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy [State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy, (2003) 12 SCC 660: 2005 SCC (Cri) 817] : (SCC pp. 665-66, paras 12-13)

“ 12 . Criticism was levelled against the evidence of PWs 4 and 9, who are independent witnesses, by labelling them as chance witnesses. The criticism about PWs 4 and 9 being chance witnesses is also without any foundation. They have clearly explained how they happened to be at the spot of occurrence, and the trial court and the High Court have accepted the same.

13 . Coming to the plea of the accused that PWs 4 and 9 were “chance witnesses” who have not explained how they happened to be at the alleged place of occurrence, it has to be noted that the said witnesses were independent witnesses. There was not even a suggestion to the witnesses that they had any animosity towards any of the accused. In a murder trial, by describing the independent witnesses as “chance witnesses”, it cannot be implied thereby that their evidence is suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If a murder is committed in a street, only passers-by will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere “chance witnesses”. The expression “chance witness” is

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borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle, and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite an unsuitable expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of explaining their presence.”

30. The principle was reiterated by this Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107: (SCC p. 725, paras 21-23)

“ 21 . In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 105, this Court, while considering the evidentiary value of the chance witness in a case of murder which had taken place in a street and a passer-by had deposed that he had witnessed the incident, observed as under:

If the offence is committed in a street, only a passer-by will be the witness. His evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly or viewed with suspicion on the ground that he was a mere chance witness. However, there must be an explanation for his presence there.

The Court further explained that the expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle, and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite an unsuitable expression in a country like India, where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of explaining their presence.

22 . The evidence of a chance witness requires very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence ( Satbir v. Surat Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 192: 1997 SCC (Cri) 538, Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 11 SCC 253: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 28, Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 241 and Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 : (2009) 1

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SCC (Cri) 188 ) . Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of the incident remains doubtful should be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579 ).

23 . Conduct of the chance witness, subsequent to the incident, may also be taken into consideration, particularly as to whether he has informed anyone else in the village about the incident (vide Thangaiya v. State of T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1284 ). Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) met the informant Darshan Singh (PW 4) before lodging the FIR, and the fact of conspiracy was not disclosed by Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) or Darshan Singh (PW 4). The fact of a conspiracy has not been mentioned in the FIR. Hakam Singh, the other witness on this issue, has not been examined by the prosecution. Thus, the High Court was justified in discarding the part of the prosecution’s case relating to conspiracy. However, in the fact situation of the present case, the acquittal of the said two co-accused has no bearing, so far as the present appeal is concerned.”

The complaint (Ext.PW2/A) does not mention the

name of Phulma Devi (PW5). Therefore, her statement is required to be seen with utmost care and caution.

Phulma Devi (PW5) stated that one person was beating the informant’s son. This is contrary to the informant’s statement that three persons were beating her son. The informant or Phulma Devi (PW5), did not say that Phulma Devi (PW5) had tried to save the informant or even shouted for help. This would have been a natural conduct of a person who had

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found that a person known to him was being beaten. The fact that Phulma Devi (PW5) remained silent and did not do anything would make her presence on the spot suspect.

Madan Singh (PW6) stated that he saw many people around the house of the informant’s husband. He went to the spot. 3-4 labourers and 2-3 local persons, along with Anant Ram, were picking up articles. The informant came to the spot, and her salwar was torn. The accused was saying that the articles belonged to him, and the informant had nothing to do with them.

The testimony of this witness does not support the prosecution’s version. He stated that the accused Anant Ram was collecting the articles. This is contrary to the prosecution’s version that he had thrown the informant’s articles. If the articles belonged to the informant, she would have collected them, and not the accused. Further, the statement made by the accused that the articles belonged to him corroborates the defence version that the articles of the accused were thrown out

of the house. Thus, the testimony of this witness makes the prosecution’s case highly doubtful.

The informant (PW2) stated in her cross-examination that a case was pending against her regarding the same incident.

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Her son also admitted this fact in his cross-examination. Therefore, they have an interest in shifting the blame to the accused to save themselves from the punishment, and their testimonies cannot be relied upon without any corroboration.

The informant had initially stated in the complaint (Ext.PW2/A) that the accused and two other persons caught hold of her arm and threw her from the verandah. She stated in the Court that the accused and three other persons came inside the house and threw the articles out of the house. The accused Anant Ram molested her and gave her beatings with a stick. Her son saved himself and rescued her. She did not depose before the Court that the accused and two persons had thrown her from the verandah.

The informant’s son (PW4) stated that Anant Ram and four persons came to the spot. Anant Ram asked why the informant had visited the house when he was in possession. The informant replied that the house belongs to her. The accused said that the informant’s husband had agreed to sell the house to him (the accused). This led to a scuffle. The accused tried to misbehave with the informant and tore her clothes. He was in the fields and went to the spot after hearing the cries. However, two

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pushes pushed him from the verandah, and he fell. Those people also gave him beatings. When he enquired about the reason, they replied that the accused Anant Ram had paid money to them. He went to the room and saw that the accused was dragging the informant and beating her with the stick. The accused also tore the informant’s clothes.

The statement of this witness is contrary to the informant’s statement. The informant claimed that the accused came to the spot with three persons, whereas this witness stated that the accused came to the spot with four persons. He further clarified that 2 persons were local and 2 persons were Nepali, thus ruling out any mistake in the number of persons. He stated that the labourers had thrown him from the verandah, whereas the prosecution version was that the accused and 2 labourers had thrown the informant from the verandah. He stated that the accused claimed ownership by way of an agreement to sell, which led to the scuffle. This fact was never deposed by any witness. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in discarding his testimony.

Dr Seema Rani (PW7) found multiple superficial abrasions on the left and right thigh, and multiple superficial

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abrasions on the back. These injuries could have been caused by means of a blunt weapon within 12 hours of the examination. She clarified that there was no external injury to the chest of the informant. She has nowhere stated that the injuries could have been caused by means of a stick. Therefore, the testimony of a Medical Officer does not corroborate the prosecution’s version that the accused had given beatings to the informant with the help of the stick.

There is no other evidence to corroborate the prosecution’s version. Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view which could have been taken based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. No interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed and so are the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.

Records be sent back forthwith alongwith copy of the judgment.

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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4^th December, 2025 (Nikita)