Rajinder Kumar Vs State of Hp

2025:HHC:41840

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No.153 of 2014 Reserved on: 14.11.2025 Date of Decision:04.12.2025

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Rajinder Kumar	....Petit	ioner
	Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh	....Resp	ondent
Coram
*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh K* *Whether approved for report*	*ainthla, Judge.* *ing?¹No.*
For the Petitioner	: Mr. Abhinav Goel, Legal Aid Counsel.	Advocate,
For the Respondent/ State	: Mr. Jitender K. Additional Advocate	Sharma, General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 19.04.2014 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 29.08.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur, H.P., were partly upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the

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Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

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same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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Briefly, the facts leading to the present revision are that the police filed a challan against the accused for committing the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act). It was asserted that a truck bearing registration No. HP11-3710 fell on the official residence on 26.02.2025 at 12:00 a.m. Extensive damage was caused to the house. A complaint (Ext.PW-1/A) was made to the police. F.I.R. (Ext.PW-8/B) was registered. SI Ram Nath (PW-9) investigated the matter. He prepared a site plan (Ext.PW-9/A). He seized the vehicle bearing registration No.HP11-3710 vide memo (Ext.PW-3/A). He also seized the registration certificate and insurance of the truck vide memo (Ext.PW-3/B). The accused Rajinder Kumar produced his driving license, which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW-6/A). HC Dev Raj (PW-7) conducted the mechanical examination of the truck and found that the body of the truck was extensively damaged because of the accident, but there was no mechanical defect in the vehicle that could have led to the

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accident. The photographs of the spot (Ext.PW-9/B to Ext.PW-9/G), whose negatives are Ext.PW-9/H to Ext. PW9/M were taken. Roop Lal (PW2) prepared an estimate of the damage (Ext.PW-2/A and Ext.PW-2/B). Statements of the prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their accounts, and after completing the investigation, the challan was prepared and submitted before the learned Trial Court

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 & 427 of the IPC and Section 187 of the M.V. Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined ten witnesses to prove its case. Garja Ram (PW-1) is the informant. Roop Lal (PW-2) prepared the estimates of damage. Khalith Ram (PW-3), Prakash Chand (PW-4), and Daulat Ram (PW-6) are the witnesses to various recoveries. Kanhaiya Ram (PW-5) is the owner of the truck. HC Dev Raj (PW-7) mechanically examined the truck. ASI Deep Ram (PW-8) signed the F.I.R. SI

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Ram Nath (PW-9) investigated the matter. Krishan Singh (PW-10) took photographs.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He did not produce any evidence in defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution witnesses had not seen the truck falling on the road, and they came to the spot after the accident. Therefore, they could not depose about rashness or negligence of the accused. It was duly proved that the accused was driving the truck. He has not explained how the truck went off the road and fell on a house. A damage of ₹68,862/- was caused. The accused did not report the matter to the police. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 427 of the IPC and 187 of the MV Act and sentenced as under:-

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Sections Sentences 279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 427 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month

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187 of M.V. Act The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month.

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It was ordered that all the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently.

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7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and

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order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the prosecution had proved that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. The non-examination of Manoj Kumar, the cleaner of the truck, was not material. The report of the mechanic showed that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicle that could have led to the accident. The photographs showed that the road was straight. The truck left the road and fell off the road. The principle of res ipsa loquitur would apply to the present case, and the burden would shift to the accused to explain the accident. He had not provided any explanation, and he was rightly convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC. Section 427 of the IPC required an intentional act. The prosecution

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had come with a specific case that the accused was acting rashly or negligently. Therefore, his act was not intentional. The essential ingredients of Section 427 of the IPC were not satisfied. Learned Trial Court erred in convicting the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 427 of the IPC. The sentences imposed by the learned Trial Court were adequate, and no interference was required with them. Hence, the appeal was partly allowed. The conviction of the accused for committing an offence punishable under Section 427 of IPC was set aside, whereas, conviction of the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 of IPC and 187 of M.V Act was upheld.

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Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. There was no evidence that the driver of the truck was at fault. The mechanic also did not specify how the accident had occurred. None of the prosecution’s witnesses stated that the accused was driving the truck in a rash or negligent manner or at a high speed. The possibility of the accident occurring due to a

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mechanical fault could not be ruled out. Hence, it was prayed present revision be allowed, and the judgments and order of the learned Courts below be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Abhinav Goel, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

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Mr Abhinav Goel, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. There is no eyewitness to the accident, and the learned Court below erred in holding that the principle of res ipsa loquitur would apply to the present case. The prosecution’s version that the accused was driving the truck is falsified by the fact that the petitioner had not sustained any injury. Learned Trial Court had imposed an excessive sentence; therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that

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the truck had fallen off the road. The truck does not leave the road unless someone is negligent. The Learned Courts below had rightly applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur to the present case. The accused failed to provide any explanation for the accident, and the learned Courts below had rightly held the accused to be guilty. There is no infirmity in the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:-

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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise

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the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

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Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

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1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 , where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any

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proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8

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SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC

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OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

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“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275] , while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

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5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

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13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19 . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

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“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

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This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

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Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC

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(Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at

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page 205:

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“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

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17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

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This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v.

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Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was

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observed:

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“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

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28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset

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the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.

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The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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Kanhaiya Ram (PW-5) stated that he had employed the accused as a driver on the truck. The accused had loaded clinker on the date of the incident. Manoj Kumar telephoned Kanhaiya Ram and informed him that the truck had fallen off the road. He went to the spot and saw that the truck had fallen on a house. The accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident. He produced the documents for the vehicle. He stated in his cross-examination that he had not seen the accident taking place, and he could not say who was driving the truck at the time of the accident.

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Mr Abhinav Goel, learned Legal Aid Counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the prosecution has not proved who was driving the truck at the time of the accident, and the identity of the driver has not been established. This submission will not help the accused. Kanhaiya Ram categorically stated that he had employed the accused as the driver of the vehicle. The accused had loaded the clinker on

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the date of the accident. There is a presumption of the continuity of things under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act; therefore, it has to be presumed that once the accused had loaded the clinker on the truck and was driving the truck, he would continue to do so unless there is evidence to the contrary.

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The accused did not say in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he had handed over the truck to some other person. It was not suggested to Kanhaiya Ram (PW-5) that he had also employed any other person as a driver. Thus, the only inference that could have been drawn from the statement of Kanhaiya Ram was that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident.

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It was submitted that the accused had not sustained any injury, which shows that he was not driving the vehicle. This submission will not help the petitioner/accused. The accused was arrested on 02.03.2005, whereas the incident occurred on 26.02.2005; therefore, much time had lapsed since the incident and the absence of the injuries would not be material.

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Garja Ram (PW-1) stated that the truck bearing registration No. HP-11-3710 had fallen off the road onto the house. Roop Lal (PW-2) stated that the truck bearing registration No. HP-11-3710 had fallen on the house. Khalithi Ram (PW-3) stated that the truck that had fallen on the house was seized vide memo (Ext.PW-3/A).

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SI Ram Nath (PW-9) stated that he visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-9/A). The site plan shows the place of the incident, and the truck had fallen on the house. It was not suggested to any of the witnesses that the truck had not fallen off the road onto the house. It was suggested to SI Ram Nath (PW-9) that there was a sharp curve at the place of the accident or that the accident had taken place due to a mechanical defect, which means that the accused had not denied the accident.

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Photograph (Ext.PW-9/G) shows that the truck had fallen on the house, and its roof was damaged. Thus, it is duly proved on record that the truck having fallen on the roof of the house. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the State that the vehicles do not usually leave the road unless there is

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negligence of the driver. Therefore, a principle of res ipsa locutor can be applied to the present case. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Syed Akbar versus State of Karnataka 1980 (1) SCC 30 , that the burden of proving everything essential to establish the charge against the accused rests on the prosecution. However, where the facts of the accident are such that the accident could not have been caused except for the negligence of the accused, the principle of res ipsa loquitor can be applied. It was observed:-

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“29. However, shorn of its doctrinaire features, understood in the broad, general sense, as by the other line of decisions, only as a convenient ratiocinative aid in the assessment of evidence, in drawing permissive inferences under S. 114, Evidence Act, from the circumstances of the particular case, including the constituent circumstances of the accident, established in evidence, with a view to come to a conclusion at the time of judgment, whether or not, in favour of the alleged negligence (among other ingredients of the offence with which the accused stands charged), such a high degree of probability, as distinguished from a mere possibility has been established which will convince reasonable men with regard to the existence of that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Such harnessed, functional use of the maxim will not conflict with provisions and the principles of the Evidence Act relating to the burden of proof and other cognate matters peculiar to criminal jurisprudence.

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Such simplified and pragmatic application of the notion of res ipsa loquitur, as a part of the general

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mode of inferring a fact in issue from another circumstantial fact, is subject to all the principles, the satisfaction of which is essential before an accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone. There are: Firstly, all the circumstances, including the objective circumstances constituting the accident, from which the inference of guilt is to be drawn, must be firmly established. Secondly, those circumstances must be of a determinative tendency pointing unerringly towards the guilt of the accused. Thirdly, the circumstances should make a chain so complete that they cannot reasonably raise any other hypothesis save that of the accused's guilt. That is to say, they should be incompatible with his innocence and inferentially exclude all reasonable doubt about his guilt.”

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In Keshavamurthy versus State 2002 Cri. L.J 103, a car

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left the road and hit a tree. It was held that the accident prima facie showed that the driver was negligent, and he had to explain the circumstances leading to the accident. It was observed: -

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“It could therefore be seen that, at about 1.00 a.m. in the night, on a road of a total width of 19ft with 6ft kacha road on either side, with no other vehicles in the area, the car hits the roadside tree. As the Supreme Court points out in Mohammed Aynuddin @ Miyam v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2000 (3) Crimes 119 (2000 Cri LJ 3508 (SC)) , an accident of such a nature would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption, and in such a case, the driver has to explain how the accident was for a reason other than his negligence. This is what the Supreme Court states in paragraph 6 of the judgment:-

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"It is a wrong proposition that for any motor accident, negligence of the driver should be presumed. An accident of such a nature as would prima facie show that it cannot be accounted to anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle may create a presumption, and in such a case, the driver has to explain how the accident happened without negligence on his part."

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In light of this ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court, the facts of the present case could be seen. Here is a car proceeding from Bangalore to Shimoga. At the place concerned, there are no other vehicles on the road. There is no obstruction. The road is of a width of 19 ft. of cement and tar road, with 6 ft. kacha road on either side. Still, the vehicle hits a roadside tree. Added to that, there is a report of IMV Inspector at Ex.P5 to the effect that the accident is not due to any mechanical defect in the vehicle. In such a situation, an accident of this nature would prima facie show that the same could not be accounted for anything other than the negligence of the driver of the vehicle, i.e., the petitioner. A presumption in that regard thus arises. In such a case, as pointed out by the Supreme Court, it was for the petitioner driver to explain how the accident occurred without negligence on his part. What the petitioner has done in the course of his examination under S.313 Cr. P.C. is simply denying everything. He does not say anything, and even to the general question that is asked at the end as to whether he has got anything to say, he did not choose to say anything, nor did he care to explain the manner in which the accident occurred, i.e., in order to rebut the above said presumption as regards the accident occurring due to his negligence, and in order to show that accident occurred for a particular reason not attributable to his negligence. This was, therefore, an appropriate case wherein, based on a presumption that

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the Supreme Court was speaking about a conviction that could be based on.

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In Thakur Singh versus State of Punjab (2003) 9 SCC 208, the accused admitted that he was driving the bus, which left the road and fell into the canal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the principle of res ipsa loquitur will apply and the burden will shift upon the accused to explain how the accident had taken place. It was observed:-

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“4. It is admitted that the petitioner himself was driving the vehicle at the relevant time. It is also admitted that the bus was driven over a bridge, and then it fell into the canal. In such a situation, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play, and the burden shifts onto the man who was in control of the automobile to establish that the accident did not happen on account of any negligence on his part. He did not succeed in showing that the accident happened due to causes other than negligence on his part.”

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Thus, in view of the binding precedents of the

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Hon’ble Supreme Court, where the facts speak for themselves, and there can be no explanation for the accident except the negligence of the accused, the Court can apply the principle of res ipsa loquitur, and the burden will shift upon the accused to show how the accident took place.

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It was submitted that there was a mechanical defect in the vehicle, which is evident from the report

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(Ext.PW-7/A). This submission will not help the accused. The report (Ext.PW-7/A) mentions that the damage was caused to the vehicle after the accident, and there was no mechanical defect, which could have led to the accident. Thus, the mechanical report does not prove that the accident occurred due to a mechanical defect.

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HC Dev Raj (PW-7) denied in his crossexamination that the spring leaves of the vehicle were damaged. The accused did not state in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that the spring leaves were damaged before the accident, which led to the accident. Thus, it cannot be presumed that the spring leaves were damaged before the accident. Hence, the plea that the mechanical defect led to the accident is not acceptable.

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In the present case, the accused did not provide any explanation as to how the truck had left the road and fallen on the roof of the house; therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in holding that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle, which led to the accident.

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It was submitted that the cleaner of the vehicle was

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not examined, and an adverse inference has to be drawn against the prosecution. This submission will not help the accused. The prosecution has based its case upon the fact that the vehicle had left the road and fallen on the house. This was independently proved. The cleaner could not have added anything to it. Therefore, non-examination of the cleaner will not help the accused.

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Therefore, it was duly proved that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, and his negligence led to the accident. He had not reported the accident to the police. Hence, he was rightly convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Section 279 of the IPC and Section 187 of the MV Act.

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The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for one month each for the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 279 and 427 of the IPC and Section 187 of the M.V. Act. This is not excessive. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that a

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deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving. It was observed:

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“11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country", the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision thus :

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"Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces."

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In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine.

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Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence

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to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.”

¶140

A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v.

¶141

Balwinder Singh , (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held: -

¶142

“13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this

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25

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2025:HHC:41840

¶145

Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208] .

¶146

Similarly, the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015

¶147

SCC OnLine SC 278 , wherein it was observed at page 196:

¶148

“25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.”

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Therefore, the sentence of one month is not excessive, and no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court.

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Consequently, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

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The records of the learned Courts below be returned alongwith the judgment of this Court.

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( Rakesh Kainthla ) Judge

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04^th December, 2025 (ravinder)

Rajinder Kumar v. State of Hp

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Rajinder Kumar v. State of Hp

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