Suresh Sharotri and Others Vs State of Hp and Others

2025:HHC:37075

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No. 860 of 2025 Reserved on: 17.09.2025 Date of Decision: 06.11.2025

Suresh Sharotri & others	...Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. & others	...Respondents

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting? No

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For the Petitioners	: Mr Anuj Nag, Advocate.
For the respondents No. 1 to 3/State	: Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General.
For the respondent No.4	: Ms Tanu Sharma, Advocate.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of the Case No. 02/2023 titled Shilpi Sharma versus Sandeep and others pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. IV, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Trial Court). (Parties shall hereinafter

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be referred to in the same manner as they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that a Domestic Incident Report was filed before the learned Trial Court claiming various reliefs under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (DV Act). It was asserted that the informant was being taunted on trivial matters. When it was found that the informant was sick, she was asked to conceal the illness. She was not permitted to serve at Hamirpur and was not allowed to go out of her matrimonial home. Obstructions were being created in meeting the informant’s relatives. Her name was not recorded in the Ration Card. She was asked to carry out the work after she had undergone an operation, even though her health did not allow her to carry out the work. The informant’s husband listened to his parents, and the informant’s parents-in-law interfered with her life. She was left in Hamirpur on 30.10.2007. She was not allowed to sit in the courtyard. Her stridhan, articles and health record were with the respondents, and she required the health record for further treatment. The informant had to carry out the private job, and no maintenance was provided to her. Her mobile number was

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also blocked by her husband. Hence, it was prayed that the action be taken against the respondents and various reliefs be provided to her.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to issue summons to the respondents.

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Being aggrieved by the petition filed before the learned Trial Court, the respondents have filed the present petition for quashing the complaint and the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court. It was asserted that petitioners No. 1 and 2 are parents of Sandeep Sharotri, the informant’s husband and petitioner No. 3 is the sister of Sandeep Sharotri. The marriage between the informant and her husband was solemnised on 19.11.2015. It was agreed between the parties that there would be no exchange of dowry. Sandeep Sharotri, his parents and the informant left for Gurugram, where he was serving. Petitioners No.1 and 2 returned after 15 days and settled the informant and her husband in their new home. The informant and her husband resided happily in Gurugram. The petitioner No.3 visited Gurugram in March 2016 for her studies at AIIMS. She informed Sandeep Sharotri that the informant was suffering from a severe backache and should be

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taken to the hospital. Various tests were conducted, and it was found that the informant had a tumour. The informant told her husband and his relatives not to disclose this fact to her parents. The informant was taken to PGI, Chandigarh, where she underwent an operation. The informant was taken to the hospital for follow-up treatment. The informant started behaving strangely after her surgery. She withdrew herself from the household chores, social obligations and marital duties. She started saying bad things about her husband and his family members. She left the home suddenly after arguments with her husband. Sandeep Sharotri suggested that he would drop her off at her parents' home, and he dropped the informant off at her parents’ home. Efforts were made to take her to a matrimonial home, but the informant stated that she was serving in a school and would leave for Gurugram only if she got a job. The informant had herself withdrawn from the society of her husband. A divorce petition is pending before the learned District Judge, Kangra. The present proceedings were initiated as a counterblast to the proceedings for divorce. The informant has not been residing in her matrimonial home since 2017, and the complaint under the Domestic Violence Act is barred by

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limitation. The complaint can only be filed against the male members, and the complaint filed against petitioners No.2 and 3, who are females, is not maintainable. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed.

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The petition is opposed by filing a reply by respondent No.3, making a preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability. It was asserted that the petitioners interfered with the family life of the informant. Hence, they were included as respondents in the proceedings before the learned Trial Court. The informant tried to contact her husband through mobile, WhatsApp and his relatives, but she was unsuccessful. She was abandoned by the respondents (present petitioners). The case of domestic violence was made out; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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The informant also filed a separate reply taking a preliminary objection regarding the lack of maintainability. She asserted that the petitioners had abandoned her. She tried to contact the petitioners but was unable to do so. She was forced to work, which she was unable to do because of her illness. She was left in her parental home. She had to take a job to survive.

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The petitioners and the informant’s husband snapped all contact with the informant, and she was unable to reach them. She had no option but to file a complaint under the DV Act. The domestic violence is continuing, and the petition is not barred by limitation. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have heard Mr Anuj Nag, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents No.1 to 3/State and Ms Tanu Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.4/informant.

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Mr Anuj Nag, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petition against the female members is not maintainable under the DV Act. No specific allegations were made against the petitioners, and a complaint containing general and vague allegations against the petitioners is not maintainable. The informant left her matrimonial home in the year 2017, and she filed a complaint under the Domestic Violence Act before the learned Trial Court in the year 2021. Hence, the petition was barred by limitation. The continuation of the proceedings before the learned Trial Court amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, he prayed that the

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present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of Geddam Jhansi and another vs. State of Telangana and others 2025 SCC Online SC 263 in support of his submission .

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Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondents No.1 to 3/State, submitted that the informant made a complaint to the police regarding the domestic violence. The complaint was referred to the Protection Officer, who investigated it and submitted a Domestic Incident Report before the learned Trial Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not interfere with the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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Ms. Tanu Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent No.3/informant, submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court struck down the provision of Domestic Violence, which excluded the female members in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora , (2016) 10 SCC 165, and the plea that the complaint is not maintainable against the female members is not sustainable. The domestic violence is continuing wrong and no limitation applies to it. The allegations in the domestic

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incident reports are sufcient to show that the petitioners had fi committed domestic violence against the informant. This Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in the present matter. Hence, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1158, that the High Court should have a hands-off approach under the DV Act and should interfere only when there is gross illegality or abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed:

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“35. When it comes to the exercise of power under Section 482 of the CrPC in relation to an application under Section 12(1), the High Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005, is a welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women who suf f er from domestic violence and to prevent acts of domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrP C for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-of approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 48 2 of the CrP C while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated.”

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Section 2(q) of the DV Act defines the respondent as any adult male person who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under the Act. It was submitted that since the term respondent means only an adult male person, therefore, the complaint could not have been filed against petitioners No.2 and 3, who are females and not covered under the provisions of Section 2(q). This submission cannot be accepted. The Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of Section 2(q) in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165 : (2017) 1 SCC (Cri) 1 : (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 468: 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1118 and held that Section 2(q) has to be read down and the words adult male person are to be struck out because they are contrary to the object of protecting women who have sufered from the domestic violence of any f kind. It was observed at page 197:

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“39. A conspectus of these judgments also leads to the result that the microscopic difference between male and female, adult and non-adult, regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act, is neither real nor substantial nor does it have any rational relation to the object of the legislation. In fact, as per the principle settled in Subramanian Swamy [Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682: (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 42: (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 36] judgment, the words “adult male person” are

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contrary to the object of affording protection to women who have suffered from domestic violence “of any kind”. We, therefore, strike down the words “adult male” before the word “person” in Section 2( q ), as these words discriminate between persons similarly situated, and far from being in tune with, are contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the 2005 Act.”

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14. Therefore, the submission that a complaint under the Domestic Violence Act is not maintainable against a female cannot be accepted, and the complaint cannot be held to be bad against the petitioners, Nos. 2 and 3.

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15. It was submitted that the complaint is barred by limitation because the informant had left her matrimonial home in the year 2017. This submission will not help the petitioners. The Domestic Incident Report shows that no maintenance was being provided to her, and she was not permitted to reside in a shared household. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the informant that these were continuing wrongs and there would be no period of limitation for fling the complaint. It was laid down by the Punjab and i Haryana High Court in Geeta Kapoor v. State of Haryana , 2013 SCC OnLine P&H 21779: ILR (2014) 2 P&H 293 that a petition under the DV Act can be fled at any time during the subsistence of i

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marriage and no period of limitation applies to it. It was observed at page 297:

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“(6) The case law, Inderjit Singh Grewal's case (supra), is not applicable to the case in hand. In the cited case, there was a decree of divorce between the parties. The relationship came to an end between the parties in the cited case law. The correct view is that in the case of a decree of divorce, the limitation to file proceedings is only a year. But in this case still the relationship of husband and wife is alive. The object of the D.V. Act is to provide effective protection of the rights of women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. So, it is held that in the case of a subsisting relationship of husband and wife, there is no limitation. Meaning thereby that the complaint under the D.V. Act can be filed at any time, as the physical and mental harassment within the family is a continuing offence.”

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16. It was laid down by the Allahabad High Court in

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Trilochan Singh vs. Manpreet Kaur and Ors. (23.10.2021 - ALLHC):

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MANU/UP/3561/2021 that the petition under Section 12 of the D V Act does not disclose an ofence and the period of limitation f provided under Section 468 of does not apply to it. It was observed:

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5. Section 468 Cr.P.C. speaks about taking of "cognizance of an of f ence" and the acts of domestic violence described in the D.V. Act are not of f ences under the D.V. Act, hence taking of the cognizance of of f ence is out of question, therefore, applicability of Section 468 Cr.P.C. for acting upon the applications moved under Section 12 of the D.V. Act does not seem just and legal. In other words, Section

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468 Cr.P.C. has no application as far as the applications under Section 12 of the D.V. Act are concerned.

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17. It was further held that the proceedings are of a civil

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nature, but the Limitation Act does not apply to them. It was observed:

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90. Hence, at the cost of repetition, since the D.V. Act is a benefcial legislation providing remedies of a civil nature i for ensuring ef f ective protection to women against domestic violence. The legislature in its wisdom has provided no limitation for moving an application under its Section 12, so the rigour of provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall not apply, and the application so moved cannot be turned down in limine on the ground of limitation alone. The best approach would be to apply the criteria of within 'reasonable period', and what will be the 'reasonable period' will be decided on the basis of 'factual matrix' of each case, keeping in mind the principle of 'equity, justice and good conscience’.

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18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan , (2022) 15 SCC 50: 2022 SCC

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OnLine SC 446 that a petition under Section 12 of the DV Act does

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not disclose any of f ence and no limitation applies to it. It was

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observed at page 71:

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“19. Let us now consider the applicability of these principles to cases under the Act. The provisions of the Act contemplate the filing of an application under Section 12 to initiate the proceedings before the Magistrate concerned. After hearing both sides and taking into account the material on record, the Magistrate may pass an appropriate order under Section 12 of the Act. It is only the breach of such an order which constitutes an offence, as is clear

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from Section 31 of the Act. Thus, if there be any offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act, the limitation prescribed under Section 468 of the Code will apply from the date of commission of such offence. By the time an application is preferred under Section 12 of the Act, there is no offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act, and as such, there would never be a starting point for limitation from the date of application under Section 12 of the Act. Such a starting point for limitation would arise only and only after there is a breach of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act.”

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19. This judgment was followed by the Jammu, Kashmir

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and Ladakh High Court in Mudasir Ahmad Dar vs. Mashooka and Ors. (20.05.2024 - JKHC) : MANU/JK/0434/2024, and it was observed:

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“8. So far as the contention of the petitioner that the petition under Section 12 of D.V.Act f i led by respondent No.1 is barred by time is concerned, the same is also without any substance. This question has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in the Kamatchi case (supra), and it has been held that it is not necessary that an application under Section 12 of the Act ought to be f i led within a period of one year when the alleged acts of domestic violence have taken place. The contention of the petitioner is therefore without any substance.

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20. This position was reiterated in Tilak Raj v. Darshana

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Devi, 2025 SCC OnLine J&K 855, wherein it was observed:

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“17. In such a situation of the matter, when the bar of limitation is not applicable to a complaint/application under Section 12 or under Section 23 of the DV Act, the plea raised with regard to limitation is not tenable in the case, as the provision under Section 468 CrPC regarding limitation can be made applicable to a complaint under

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penal provisions of Sections 31 and 33 of the DV Act, and not to any other application under the DV Act.”

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21. Hence, the plea that the complaint be quashed

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because it was fled beyond the period of limitation cannot be i accepted.

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22. It was submitted that the allegations against the petitioners are false. The petitioners have cooperated with the informant, and she has left the matrimonial home without any reason. This submission will not help the petitioners. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction does not go into the validity or otherwise of the allegations and has to treat them as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: -

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“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.”

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It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed : -

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“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) .

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14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060 :

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“ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

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“ 16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge sheet, documents, etc. or not.

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Once the contents of the Domestic Violence Act are taken to be correct, they show the economic, physical, verbal and emotional abuse and prima facie satisfy the requirement of domestic violence. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the proceedings.

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It was submitted that the allegations are vague. Reliance was placed upon the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court, Geddam Jhansi (supra). This submission will not help the petitioners because the judgment in Geddam Jhansi (supra) dealt with the commission of an offence punishable under Section 498A, which is criminal in nature, whereas the proceedings under the DV Act are civil in nature. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi (supra) wherein it was observed:

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“28.1 Thus, there is no doubt that, notwithstanding the penal provisions in the form of Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter V, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act, 2005, are predominantly of a civil nature.”

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In the present case, the domestic incident report

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contains sufficient allegations to inquire into the matter, and the allegations are to be elaborated during the trial by leading the evidence. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the complaint on the ground that sufficient details were not given by the informant.

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It is undisputed that the matter is pending before the learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed:

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“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such

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discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.”

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