Sanjeev Kumar Vs State of Hp

The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 02.06.2015 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra (HP) (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment of conviction dated 11.08.2011 and order of sentence dated 12.08.2011, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra (learned Trial

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Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

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Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that Samangala Devi (PW2) and her sister-inlaw Gayatri Devi (PW3) were going towards Rait Bazar on 20.12.2006. A Bus bearing registration No. HP68-0289, owned by Ravi Bus Service, hit Gayatri Devi (PW3) at about 4:10 pm. Gayatri Devi fell. The accused, Sanju, was driving the bus at the relevant time. The accident occurred due to the high speed of the bus and the negligence of the accused. The injured was taken to the hospital, intimation was given to the police, and an entry (Ext.PW7/C) was recorded in the Police Station. SI/SHO Mohinder Singh (PW11) and the other police officials went to the hospital to verify the correctness of the information. The informant, Samangala Devi, made a statement (Ext.PW1/A) which was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW7/A) was registered. SI/SHO Mohinder Singh (PW11) investigated the matter. He called Rajan Chauhan (PW6),

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who took the photographs (Ext.PW6/A to Ext.PW6/F) of the spot. Inspector Mohinder Singh (PW11) prepared the site plan (Ext.PW11/A). He seized the bus bearing registration No. HP 680289 vide memo (Ext.PW5/A). HHC Inderjeet (PW10) mechanically examined the bus and found that there was no defect in it which could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext.PW10/A). Dr Tarun Sharma (PW1) examined the injured Gayatri Devi (PW3) and found that she had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused within ½ to 1 hour in a Motor Vehicle Accident. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW1/A). Gayatri Devi (PW3) was referred to Dr Rajendra Prasad Govt. Medical College and Hospital, Dharamshala, for further treatment. Treatment summary (Mark ‘X’) was obtained. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case. Dr Tarun Sharma (PW1) medically examined the injured Gayatri Devi. Samangala Devi (PW2) is the informant and an eyewitness. Gayatri Devi (PW3) is the victim. Swatantar Singh (PW4) did not support the prosecution’s case. Varinder Katoch (PW5) is the witness to the recovery of the bus. Rajan Chauhan (PW6) took the photographs. ASI Parvesh Kumar (PW7) signed the FIR. Manohar Lal (PW8) is an eyewitness but did not support the prosecution’s case. ASI Onkar Nath (PW9) carried the injured to the hospital and recorded the statement of Samangala Devi (PW2). HHC Inderjeet (PW10) mechanically examined the bus. Inspector Mohinder Singh (PW11) investigated the matter.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was employed as a driver in the bus bearing registration No. HP68-0289. He denied the rest of the prosecution’s case. He stated that no accident had occurred with his bus, and he was falsely implicated. He initially stated that he wanted to produce defence evidence, but subsequently made a statement that he did not want to lead any evidence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the accused admitted that

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he was the driver of the bus bearing registration No. HP68-0289. The suggestions made to the witnesses during the crossexamination show that the accused had not disputed his presence on the spot. Hence, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that the bus of the accused was involved in the accident were to be accepted as correct. The witnesses stated that the accused was driving the bus at a high speed. Gayatri Devi (PW3) was standing by the side of the road when the bus had hit her, which showed the negligence of the accused. The site plan (Ext.PW11/A) and the photographs (Ext.PW6/B and Ext.PW6/E) showed the skid marks, which corroborate the prosecution’s version that the bus was being driven at a high speed and it dragged for a certain distance after the application of the brakes. Gayatri Devi (PW3) had sustained multiple injuries in the accident. Hence, the accused was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC and was sentenced as under:

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*Sections*	*Sentences*
279 of IPC	The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of
	₹1,000/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to

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	undergo further simple imprisonment for 15 days.
337 of IPC	The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of ₹500/-, and in default of payment of the fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for 15 days.

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It was ordered that both the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharmshala, District Kangra, H.P. (Learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the bus, which had caused the accident. The witnesses stated that the accused was driving the bus at a high speed, which was corroborated by the photographs and the site plan showing the skid marks on the road. There was no mechanical defect in the bus, which could have led to the accident. The injured had sustained injuries in the accident, and the accused was rightly convicted and sentenced by the learned Trial Court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

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Being aggrieved by the judgments and the order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused/petitioner has filed the

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present petition asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. It was wrongly held that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, which led to the accident. Gayatri Devi (PW3) was negligent and struck the bus due to her own negligence. The bus was being driven towards its own side. The site plan (Ext. PW11/A) shows that the driver had applied the brakes to save the injured’s life. This is also apparent from the skid marks shown in the photographs (Ext.PW6/A to Ext. PW6/F). Material contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses made the prosecution’s case doubtful. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.

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Mr Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. There was no evidence of the rashness or negligence of the accused. The mere use of the term ‘high speed’

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is not sufficient to infer rashness or negligence. The learned Courts below did not appreciate this aspect. He relied upon the judgments of Deep Raj vs. State of H.P. 2025:HHC:19449, State of Karnataka vs. Satish (1998) 8SCC 493 and Manish Kumar vs. State of NCT Delhi in CRL. Rev. P. 873/2022 decided on 01.04.2025 in support of his submission.

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Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was driving the bus at a high speed. This is evident from the site plan and the photographs of the spot, wherein the skid marks are visible. These marks show that the accused was unable to control the vehicle due to the high speed, which led to the accident. The learned Courts below had rightly held that the rashness or negligence of the accused led to the accident. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by learned Courts below. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:-

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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

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Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

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1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this

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provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

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13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case

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substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

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“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275 , while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

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5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross

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miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

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13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19 . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

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“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

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This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

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“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

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17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

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The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The witness Gayatri Devi (PW3) stated that she and the informant Samangala Devi (PW2) were returning from their field at about 4 pm. When they reached near the B.Ed college and were standing towards the edge of the road, a bus came at high speed and hit her on the roadside. The bus was owned by Ravi Bus Service. She sustained injuries and remained unconscious for one week. She stated in her cross-

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examination that her statement was recorded after she had regained her consciousness. She was not aware who was driving the bus at the time of the accident or whose negligence led to the accident. She denied that her negligence led to the accident. She admitted that the place of the accident was a national highway and many vehicles crossed the road.

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The statement of this witness in the crossexamination that she was not aware of the fact whose negligence led to the accident will not assist the defence. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed :

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“It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.”

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20. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj

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2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held:

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“It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.”

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Therefore, the testimony of this witness that she

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was not aware of the negligence of the person will not make the prosecution’s case suspect.

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The accused admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he was driving the bus bearing registration No. HP68-0289, therefore, the fact that the accused was a driver of the bus is not disputed, and no advantage can be derived from the cross-examination of the injured that she did not know the name of the driver of the bus.

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The injured Gayatri Devi (PW3) categorically stated that the bus had hit her on the edge of the road. This is corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW11/A) wherein the place of accident is shown at place ‘D’ where the blood was spilt and Gayatri Devi (PW3) was lying. This is shown to be towards the

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edge of the road and corroborates the testimony of the injured that she was standing on the edge of the road where the bus had hit her.

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The site plan (Ext.PW11/A) shows the skid marks to the extent of 30 feet at point ‘C’. The skid marks are also visible in the photographs (Ext.PW6/D, Ext. PW6/B and Ext.PW6/E). The fact that the bus was dragged for 30 feet after the incident shows that the accused was unable to bring the bus to a stop immediately after the application of the brakes, which corroborates the testimony of the injured that the accused was driving the bus at a high speed and he could not control it. It was laid down by this Court in State of H.P. versus Dinesh Kumar, 2008 Cr. L.J 2024 that the skid marks of 74 feet on the road indicated that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed, and the accused could not control it, which amounts to the negligence of the accused. It was observed:

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Once again reverting to the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A, the skid marks on the road were 74 feet in length. For the vehicle going from Hamirpur to the Nadaun side point 'A' shown in the spot map Ext. P.W. 10/A is on the extreme right side. It is not the case that the accident took place on the left side of the road for a vehicle going from Hamirpur to Nadaun, or even in the middle of the road. The skid marks of 74 feet on the road are

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clear to show that the jeep was being driven at high speed. The respondent could not control the jeep due to his rash or negligent driving and high speed, and the jeep went from the left side to the right side and crushed the girl at point 'A'.”

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Therefore, the presence of the skid marks in the present case would corroborate the prosecution’s version that the accused was negligent while driving the vehicle.

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The informant, Samangala Devi (PW2), stated that she and Gayatri Devi (PW3) were going towards Rait at about 4 pm. A bus owned by Ravi Bus Service hit Gayatri Devi (PW3) on the roadside. The bus dragged her for some distance, and she became unconscious. She identified the driver of the bus as Sanju, who was present in the Court. She stated in her cross-examination that the land owned by her was towards the left side of the road, and her house was towards the right side of the road. She admitted that a B.Ed. college was located at some distance. The college time was over, and students and teachers had boarded the bus. The bus remained at the spot, but the driver ran away from the spot. The police had not caught the driver identified by her. She had not known the driver before the accident. She admitted that the place of the accident was located on a national highway and many vehicles

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crossed the spot. She denied that Gayatri Devi (PW3) had suffered injury from another vehicle.

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The statement of this witness corroborates the statement of the injured. The fact that she did not know the accused and had seen the accused for the first time on the date of the incident will not be material because the accused admitted that he was employed as a driver of the bus in the statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C..

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Her testimony shows that the college was also located at the place of the incident, and college time was over. She admitted that the teachers and students had boarded the bus. The fact that a college was located near the place of the incident required the accused to drive the vehicle at a slow speed to avoid injury to any person walking on the road. However, the accused failed to do so, which is evident from the fact that skid marks were visible on the road. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle.

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Swatantar Singh (PW4) did not support the prosecution’s case. He stated that he had not seen any person

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being hit by the bus. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that the accused was changing the cassette and could not control the vehicle. He denied that the bus had hit Gayatri Devi (PW3), who was taken to the hospital. He denied the previous statement, Mark ‘A’ recorded by the police.

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Inspector Mohinder Singh (PW11) specifically stated that he had written the portion Mark A to A of the statement Mark ‘A’ (Ext.PW11/C) according to the version of Swatantar Singh. This was not challenged during crossexamination, and a general suggestion was made that he had recorded witnesses' statements at his convenience, which he denied. A denied suggestion does not constitute proof and cannot be used to disprove the prosecution’s case. Therefore, Swatantar Singh is shown to have made two inconsistent statements — one before the police, claiming the accused was changing the cassette and could not control the vehicle, and another before the Court, asserting that there was no negligence on the part of the accused. These two statements cannot both be true, and as a result, the credibility of this witness was impeached under Section 155(3) of the Indian

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Evidence Act, and his testimony cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s case.

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It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the previous statement, his statement cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with some portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed:

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“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally

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discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.”

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This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman

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versus. State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed: -

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“12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been called by the prosecution is permitted to be crossexamined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support for the view we have taken from the various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400 , the Apex Court observed:

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"It is now well settled that when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to discredit this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony".

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Manohar Lal (PW8) stated that he saw a woman

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lying on the left side of the road and a bus parked nearby. The woman had sustained injuries to her head. He did not know the name of the driver, and he had not identified the driver on the spot. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that he had disclosed the registration number of the bus as HP-68-0289 or that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused and the high speed of the bus. He denied that the name of the driver was found to be Sanju. He

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denied the previous statement Mark ‘M’ recorded by the police.

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Inspector Mohinder Singh (PW11) proved that he had recorded the statement of Manohar Lal (PW8), Mark ‘M’ (Ext.PW11/D), as per his version. As already stated, there is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of Mohinder Singh (PW11) to this effect. Thus, the credibility of Manohar Lal (PW8) was impeached, and no reliance could have been placed on his testimony to discard the prosecution’s case.

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The judgment in Deep Raj (supra), Satish (supra) and Manish (supra) will not help the accused because it was held by the Courts that mere use of the term ‘high speed’ without any other evidence is sufficient to infer the rashness or negligence of the accused. In the present case, the prosecution is not only relying upon the use of the term ‘high speed’ by the witnesses but also on the fact that the skid marks were found on the spot, which corroborated the statements of the witnesses regarding the bus being driven at a high speed. Therefore, the cited judgments will not apply to the present case.

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Dr Tarun Sharma (PW1) proved that Gayatri Devi (PW3) had sustained injuries which could have been caused in a Motor Vehicle accident. He stated in his cross-examination that injuries are possible by way of a fall on a hard surface. However, that is merely an alternative hypothesis and will not make the prosecution’s case suspect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai , (2003) 12 SCC 395: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 1086 that when the testimonies of the witnesses are found credible, the medical evidence pointing to alternative possibilities is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. It was observed at page 404:

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“22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative

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value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.”

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Therefore, the prosecution’s case cannot be rejected due to alternative possibilities in the medical evidence.

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HHC Inderjeet Singh (PW10) mechanically examined the bus and did not find any defect in it which could have led to the accident. Thus, the accident is not attributable to any mechanical defect.

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Therefore, it was duly proved on record that the accused was driving the bus at a high speed, could not control it, and the bus hit Gayatri Devi (PW3) on the edge of the road. Hence, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the bus and his negligence led to the accident, causing injuries to Gayatri Devi (PW3). Therefore, the accused was rightly convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC.

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The learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for one month each for the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 279

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and 337 of the IPC. This sentence cannot be said to be excessive; rather, the same is lenient, and no interference is required with it.

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