State of Hp Vs Balbir Singh

The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.07.2014 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rajgarh, District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 447 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 26 of the Indian Forest Act. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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1______________ . Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Section 447 of the IPC and Section 26 of the Indian Forest Act. It was asserted that the accused had encroached upon more than 10 bighas of land bearing Khasra Nos.745/641//641/7, 765/734/642/1, and 745/641/6 measuring 5-07 bighas located in Penkuffar forest. A complaint (Ext.PW-1/A) was made to the police. The police registered the F.I.R. (Ext.PW-7/A). HC Balbir (PW-9) investigated the matter. Yoginder Sain (PW-8) demarcated the land and found that there was an encroachment on Khasra Nos. 745/641/7, 765/734/642/1 and 745/641/6 to the extent of 5-07 bighas. He issued the demarcation report(Ext.PW-8/A) and Tatima(Ext.PW-3/A). HC Balbir Singh prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-9/A). He obtained a copy of a Musabi (Ext.PW7/B). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences

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punishable under Section 447 of the IPC and Section 26 of the Indian Forest Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Amar Singh (PW-1) sent an application to the Police. Jai Singh (PW-2) detected the encroachment. Kali Dass Field Kanungo (PW-3) verified the Tatima. MC Sandeep (PW-4) issued the certificate regarding the registration of F.I.R. SI Rajinder Singh (PW-5) prepared the challan, Roop Lal (PW-6) was present at the time of demarcation. ASI Rajesh Pal (PW-7) signed the F.I.R. Yogender Sen (PW-8) demarcated the land. HC Balbir Singh (PW-9) investigated the matter.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that the land was occupied by his ancestors. He tendered documents in his defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the report of the demarcation was not as per the law. The notification issued by the Government showed that lopping of trees was allowed in Mushtarka forest land, and a right holder was permitted to remove grass from it. Therefore, the act of the accused of

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removing the grass did not constitute any offence. The witnesses admitted that the the accused was not in possession of the land since the time of his forefather, and the illegal possession does not constitute an offence punishable under Section 447 of the IPC. Hence, the accused was acquitted of the charged offences.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the instant appeal

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asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The reasoning of the learned Trial Court was manifestly unreasonable and unsustainable. The prosecution witnesses proved that the accused had encroached upon the Forest land. Yogender Sain conducted the demarcation and found the encroachment to the extent of 5-7 bighas. No prejudice was caused to the accused by not fixing three permanent points. The continuation of an illegal possession constituted an offence punishable under Section 447 of the IPC. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Surjeet, learned vice counsel representing the respondent.

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Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved by the statements of prosecution witnesses that the accused had encroached upon the Forest land. The learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused on the ground that the demarcation was not conducted properly. The accused never disputed his possession, and the demarcation was not material. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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Mr Surjeet, learned vice counsel representing the respondent/accused, supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that the demarcation was essential to prove the encroachment on the Forest land. The accused admitted his possession of the land, but not of the Forest land. Learned Trial Court rightly held that possession of the accused since the time of his ancestors did not constitute an

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offence punishable under Section 447 of IPC; hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440:

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“11. Recently, in the case of Babu SahebagoudaRudragoudarv.State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035 , a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:

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“ 38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.

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39. This Court in Rajesh Prasadv.State of Bihar[Rajesh Prasadv.State of Bihar,(2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the

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field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)

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“ 29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: ( Chandrappa case[Chandrappav.State of Karnataka,(2007) 4 SCC 415:(2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325 ], SCC p. 432, para 42)

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‘ 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

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(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law.

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(3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

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(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly , the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly , the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

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40. Further, in H.D. Sundarav.State of Karnataka[H.D. Sundarav.State of Karnataka,(2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)

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8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence.

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8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence.

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8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record.

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8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

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41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

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41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity.

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41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

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41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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The present appeal has to be decided as per the

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parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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It is the specific case of the prosecution that the

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accused had encroached upon 5-7 bighas of land. This Court held in Param Dev v. State of H.P. 22015: HHC236 that the directions were issued to institute/lodge FIRs against the encroachers who had encroached upon more than 10 bighas of Government land; where the encroachment was less than 10 bighas, the FIR could not be lodged. It was observed: -

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The FIR aforesaid was lodged against the bail applicant for the purported commission of penal acts constituted under the aforesaid statutory provisions, in pursuance of the directions rendered by this Court in Cr.MP(M) No. 1299/2008. This Court had rendered peremptory directions to the respondent to institute/lodge FIRs. against those encroachers who had encroached upon more than 10 bighas of Government/forest land. Obviously, given the fact that the petitioner herein has purportedly encroached upon Government/forest land to the extent of an area measuring 8-6-17 bighas, as such, when the Government/forest land purportedly encroached upon by the petitioner herein constitutes an area less than 10 bighas, naturally then when FIRs were directed to be lodged against encroachers upon Government/forest land, who have encroached therein beyond 10 bighas, which is not the extent of the area of Government/forest land purportedly encroached upon by the petitioner herein/accused, no FIR in pursuance to the directions of this Court was either lodgable or instituteable against the petitioner herein. In sequel, when the FIR as lodged against the petitioner was unlodgable against him, obviously then its being lodged against the petitioner in sequel whereof a Notice of Accusation put to him, constitutes an infraction of the directions issued by this Court in Cr.MP(M) No.

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1299/2008, rendering it to be interferable and quashable.”

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Amar Singh(PW-1) admitted in his cross-

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examination that, as per the Government instructions, the F.I.R. is filed if more than 10 bighas of land are encroached. Therefore, he was aware of the fact that the F.I.R. cannot be lodged in respect of encroachment of less than 10 bighas of land, but still he had lodged the F.I.R., which is impermissible.

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Section 4 of the Indian Forest Act provides that whenever it has been decided to constitute any land a reserved forest, the State Government shall issue a notification in a Government Gazette declaring that it has been decided to constitute such land a reserved Forest and specifying as nearly as possible its situation and limits.

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Section 6 of the Indian Forest Act provides that when a notification is issued under Section 4 of the Act, the Forest Settlement Officer shall publish a proclamation specifying as nearly as possible the situation and limits of the proposed forest in the local vernacular in every town and village in the neighbourhood of the land comprised therein. While dealing with a similar provision of the Forest Act in Chapter IV, this Court held in State of H.P. vs. Amin Chand1992 (2) Shim.LC

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169 that the issuance of the notification and its publication are necessary to attract the provisions of Section 33 of the Indian Forest Act. It was observed:-

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“7. Sections 29 to 39 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (shortly hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') are material. The procedure of declaring protected forest is laid down in section 29 of the Act, which provides that the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette declare the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act applicable to any forest land or wasteland which is not included in a reserved forest, but which is the property of Government, or over which the Government has proprietary rights, or to the whole or any part of the forest produce of which the Government Is entitled. The forest land comprised in such notification is referred to in the Act as a protected forest. Sub-section (3) of section 29 of the Act provides for certain inquiries to be made before declaring a forest as the 'protected forest'. Under section 30, the State Government is authorised inter-alia to declare any trees or class of trees in protected forest to be reserved from the date to be fixed by notification or to prohibit from a date fixed for the removal of any forest produce and the breaking up or clearing for cultivation of any land in a protected forest for such terms, not exceeding thirty years as the State Government thinks fit. Resultantly, the rights of private persons, if any, over such portion shall stand suspended during such term, provided that the remainder of such forest be sufficient and, in a locality, reasonably convenient, for the due exercise of the rights suspended in the portion so closed. The Collector then is required under section 31 to cause translation into the local vernacular of every such notification issued under section 30 to be affixed in a conspicuous place in every town and village in the neighbourhood of the forest comprised in the notification. Section 32 entitles the State Government to make rules to regulate the forest matters set out in the said section, including "clearing or breaking up of land for cultivation or other purposes in such

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forest". Section 33 provides penalties for acts in contravention of a notification under section 30 or for rules under section 32.

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Apart from it, even if the aforesaid copy of the notification is assumed to be a legal and valid notification for the sake of argument, the requirement of section 31 of the Act has not been proved. Admittedly, as per the prosecution evidence, the land of the accused adjoins that of the alleged encroached land. Section 31 referred to above envisages that the Collector shall cause a translation into the local vernacular of every notification issued under section 30 to be affixed in a conspicuous place in every town and village in the neighbourhood of the forest comprised in the notification Here neither oral nor documentary evidence has been adduced to show whether notification (Mark X) was translated in the local vernacular and whether its copy was affixed in a conspicuous place in the neighbouring villages as envisaged therein This procedure is meant only so that the respondents of the neighbouring villages, much less the accused, may acquire knowledge as to the declaration of a particular forest into demarcated protected forest, In the absence of such procedure having not been followed by the appellant, ii would be against the principle of natural Justice to permit the subject of a Slate including the accused to be punished or penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, have acquired any knowledge Natural justice requires that before a law can become operative it must be promulgated or published It must be broadcast in some recognisable way so that all persons may know what it is ; or at the very least, there must be some special rule or regulation or some other way or customary channel by or through which such knowledge can be acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable diligence. In the absence thereof, a law cannot come into being by merely issuing a notification without giving it due publicity in accordance with the mandatory provisions of law.”

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18. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Ravi

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Kumar 2008 HLJ 363 , wherein it was observed: -

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“10. The prosecution has failed to prove that ten pine trees were cut by the respondent from the land in question. There is no evidence on record to link the trees allegedly cut by the respondent to the land in question. No demarcation of the land from where the trees were allegedly cut has been proved on record. There is nothing on record that the forest in question is a notified protected forest. The notification declaring the Forest in question as a protected forest has not been placed on record. There is no evidence of circulation of notification, under Sections 32, 33, read with Sections 30 and 31 of the Act, in the vernacular in the locality. The alleged confessional statements, Ex. PA and Ex. PW 2/A are of no help to the prosecution for want of proof of notification, under Sections 32, 33, read with Sections 30 and 31 of the Act and its publication in the vernacular in the locality…” 19. In the present case, no notification published in the

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Gazette was passed on the record to show that the area where

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the land was located was declared a reserved forest. The defence placed on record a list of reserved and protected forests (Ext. DW-1/D), but it only mentions the area in acres and does

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not specify the situation and the limits. Therefore, this document is insufficient to conclude that the area where the land is located was a reserved forest.

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Amar Singh (PW-1) and Jai Singh (PW-2) admitted

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in their cross-examinations that the land of the accused and other villagers is located adjacent to the forest. Therefore, it was

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essential to prove that the land occupied by the accused was forest land.

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Yogender Sain (PW-8) demarcated the land. He stated that he conducted the demarcation of the land and found that Khasra Nos.745/641/7, 765/734/642/1 and 745/641/6 measuring 5-07 bighas were owned by the State of H.P. He issued the report (Ext.PW-8/A). The report mentionsthat Khasra Nos745/641/7, 765/734/642/1 and745/641/6 measuring 5-07 bighas were owned by the State of H.P. and possessed by Balbir Singh. The boundary of the above Khasra numbers was fixed with reference to the fields by laying ‘Battar’, and the area was shown to the representation of forest and police departments.

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The process of demarcation was explained by this Court in State of H.P. v. Laxmi Nand, 1992 SCC OnLine HP 41= 1992(2) Sim. L.C. 307, wherein after considering the instructions issued by the Financial Commissioner, it was held:-

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“17. It is the admitted case of the parties that in so far as the three revenue estates are concerned, the maps prepared during the last settlement were not on the square system. Accordingly, the determining officer was required to relay the boundaries of the fields sought to be demarcated from the Shajra (village map), prepared at the last settlement. He was required to locate three permanent points on three different sides of the area

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sought to be demarcated. The three points so selected and to be taken as a basis must be those which are admitted to have remained undisputed from the last settlement. The officer is thereafter required to chain these three points on the spot and then compare the result with the distance given as per the scale on the Shajra. It is only when the distances so compared agree that the Revenue Officer can proceed with further work of measurement. A pencil line is supposed to be drawn joining these three permanent points and thereafter perpendiculars are supposed to be drawn from these lines to each of the points, which are required to be located on the spot, in order to enable him to find out the exact distance from these points to the point sought to be demarcated, and then tally the result with the help of the scale on the Shajra, which can be drawn only with the help of the scale on the Shajra, which can be drawn only with the help of a crossed staff. The result is to be finally checked by measuring with the help of a scale on the Shajra. Since this report of demarcation is liable to scrutiny, by way of evidence, it is required that the report of the concerned officer on the face of it must explain the details and the manner as to how he made his measurements, which report must accompany a copy of the relevant portion of the Field Book of current settlement of the village showing KaruKans (dimensions) of the fields of which he took measurements as also a map showing therein the three permanent points, the fields measured and the boundary in dispute. As per the instructions, this is one of the necessary requirements to enable the Court to follow the method adopted and also in order to find out the veracity of the proceedings. The other requirement, while submitting the report, is to record the statements of interested parties before taking the three permanent points to the effect that all of them agreed and accepted the three points as permanent points on three different sides of the property. In case any objection is raised as to the manner in carrying out the demarcation, the said objection is required to be reduced into writing, so as to avoid the possibility of raising any question specifically

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and also to enable the Court to decide such objections. In case an objection is raised on the spot, the demarcating officer is also required to submit his opinion on such objections. In case, while carrying out the demarcation, any discrepancy is noticed in the area of the fields abutting on the boundary in dispute as recorded in the last settlement and the one arrived at as a result of the actual measurement on the spot, the report is required to incorporate the same with an explanation as to the cause of increase or decrease, if any, discovered on the spot. All these requirements, in our opinion, have been incorporated in the instructions with the ultimate object of ascertaining that while carrying out the demarcation correct method was adopted and no mistake was committed.”

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The Court considered a similar report in Laxmi Nand

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(supra), and held that when the detail of the process adopted in the demarcation was not given, such a report is not admissible and cannot be used for convicting the accused. It was observed:

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“8. Now, in case reference is made to the three reports of demarcation alleged to have been carried out by Kewal Ram, Sadar Kanungo, namely, Exs. PO, PO/1 and PO/2, it can be seen that, as a matter of fact, they are not the demarcation reports but are only certificates to the effect that he carried out the demarcation of the fields mentioned therein. There is nothing on record that such demarcation was carried out by Kewal Ram as per the aforementioned instructions. There are copies of ShajraExs. PP and PR of revenue estate Gwalath appended to these certificates, but neither is there any mention of the three permanent points on these copies, nor do these contain the result of demarcation, namely, drawing of perpendicular lines or depicting the location of stumps on any portion of the government land. There are two other copies appended to these certificates, but apparently, the same are of subsequent date, namely, Ex.

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PT dated January 28, 1978 and Ex. P-4 dated January 24, 1978, but there is also no such endorsement on the copies. In the absence of there being any report of demarcation, it is not possible to place reliance upon these certificates issued by Kewal Ram, which form the basis of lists Exs. PH, PK and PL, which are stated to have been prepared by Magni Ram, PW3, according to whom none of the accused was present at the time of carrying out demarcation by Kewal Ram. He was also not in a position to state whether any proper method was adopted by Kewal Ram while carrying out demarcation, since he was also not conversant with the demarcation work of lands. As such, the Special Judge was perfectly justified in concluding that no reliance could be placed upon the certificates issued by Kewal Ram or as to the correctness of lists Exs. PH, PK and PL, which admittedly had been prepared as a result of the certificated issues by Kewal Ram and the same could not be used for forming the basis while holding that any tree was felled by the accused-respondents Nos. 7 and 8 from the government land comprised in Khasra Nos. 8 and 68 in Mauza Gwalath and Khasra No. 2 in jungle Mihani.

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Hence, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that

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it was impermissible to rely upon the report of the demarcation.

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It was submitted that the accused did not dispute the possession, and the report of the demarcation was not material. This submission is only stated to be rejected. It has come in evidence that the Forest land and the land of the accused are located adjacent to each other; therefore, the prosecution was required to prove that the land in possession of the accused was forest land. The accused never admitted that he had encroached upon the forest land. He only admitted his possession of the

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land. Hence, the prosecution’s case cannot be relied upon in the absence of a report of the demarcation.

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Section 441 of the IPC defines criminal trespass as an entry upon the property in possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person from possession of such property. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mathri v. State of Punjab , 1963 SCC OnLine SC 180: AIR 1964 SC 986 that the prosecution has to prove that the aim of the accused was to insult, intimidate or annoy and merely because the insult, intimidation or annoyance was caused by the entry is not sufficient. It was observed:

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18. We think, with respect, that this statement of law, as also the similar statements in Laxaman Raghunath case[26 Bombay 558] and in Sellamuthu Servaigaran case[ILR 35 Mad 186], is not quite accurate. The correct position in law may, in our opinion, be stated thus: In order to establish that the entry on the property was with the intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the aim of the entry; that it is not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult, and that this likely consequence was known to the persons entering; that in deciding whether the aim of the entry was the causing of such annoyance, intimidation or insult, the Court has to consider all the relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge that its natural consequences would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability of something else than the

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causing of such intimidation, insult or annoyance, being the dominant intention which prompted the entry.

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This position was reiterated in Rajinder v. State of

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Haryana , (1995) 5 SCC 187: 1995 SCC (Cri) 852, wherein it was observed at page 198:

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“21. It is evident from the above provision that unauthorised entry into or upon property in the possession of another or unlawfully remaining there after lawful entry can answer the definition of criminal trespass if, and only if, such entry or unlawful remaining is with the intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy the person in possession of the property. In other words, unless any of the intentions referred to in Section 441 is proved, no offence of criminal trespass can be said to have been committed. Needless to say, such an intention has to be gathered from the facts and circumstances of a given case…”

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In the present case, the complaint (Ext.PW-1/A) only

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mentioned that the accused had made encroachment of more than 10 bigahs of land; hence, an action should be taken against him. There is no averment that the accused had encroached

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upon the land with an intent to commit an offence or intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession; therefore, the ingredients of Section 447 of IPC were not satisfied.

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Kali Dass (PW-3) stated that the accused had raised crops, constructed a house and a cowshed. This is contrary to the demarcation report (Ext.PW-8/A) and statement of Yogender Sain (PW-8) that the accused was cutting the grass

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and lopping the branches of trees. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that as per the notification (Ext.DW-1/C), the cutting and lopping of trees, removal of ‘Dhavlu’ grass were permitted; therefore, the act of the accused did not constitute the violation of the notification issued by the State Government.

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Thus, the learned Trial Court has taken a reasonable view based on the material on record, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

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No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present appeal fails and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

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In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

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A copy of the judgment, along with records of the

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learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) 06^th November, 2025. Judge (ravinder)

State of Hp v. Balbir Singh

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State of Hp v. Balbir Singh

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