Yadav Singh Vs State of Hp

2025:HHC:44346

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No.237 of 2015 Reserved on: 20.11.2025 Date of Decision: 18.12.2025

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Yadav Singh	....Peti Versus	tioner
State of Himachal Pradesh	....Res	pondent
Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kain Whether approved for reporting	thla, Judge. ?¹No.
For the petitioner : For the Respondent/ State :	Mr. Anubhav Advocate. Mr. Lokender Additional Advoca	Chopra, Kutlehria, te General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 01.07.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu, District at Kullu, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which judgment of conviction dated 07.12.2012 and order of sentence dated 18.12.2012, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lahul Spiti, at Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. (learned Trial Court), were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 187 of Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that the informant Swarup Chand Negi (PW-1), his wife Devendra Devi and son Amit Kumar (since deceased) were returning to their home from Sheetla Mata Temple on 04.5.2004. Amit Kumar was walking ahead. A jeep bearing registration No. HP-33A-0795 hit Amit Kumar at about 10:15 a.m. while reversing. The accused Yadav Singh was driving the jeep at the time of the accident, who ran away from the spot. The injured person was taken to the hospital, where he was declared dead. An intimation (Ext.PW-5/A) was given to the police, and the police recorded an entry (Ext.PW4/A) in the daily diary. SI Dorje Ram (PW-5) went to the Hospital for verification. He recorded the informant’s statement (Ext. PW-1/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-5/B) was registered. He conducted an inquest on the dead body and prepared a report (Ext.PW-5/D). The post-mortem examination of the deceased was

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conducted, and it was found that the cause of the death was multiple injuries leading to shock and death. Post Mortem report (Ext.PA) was issued. SI Dorje Ram (PW-5) went to the spot, and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-5/E). He seized the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-33A-0795 along with documents vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). Padam Singh (PW-6) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle and found no mechanical defect in it, which could have led to the accident. He issued a report (Ext. PB). SI Dorje Ram (PW-5) took the photographs of the spot (Ext.P1 to P3) whose negatives are Ext.P4 to P6. Statements of the prosecution’s witnesses were recorded as per their version. The challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

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summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC and Section 187 of MV Act to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined six witnesses to prove its case. Swarup Chand (PW-1) is the informant. Keshav Ram (PW-2) is an eyewitness. Iqbal Singh (PW-3) is the owner of the vehicle. Netar Singh (PW-4) proved the entry in the daily diary. Dorje Ram (PW-5) investigated the matter. Padam Singh mechanically examined the vehicle.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated that he was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, and the driver belonged to Saharanpur. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

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The learned Trial Court convicted the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 & 304 of the IPC and acquitted him of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of the M.V. Act and sentenced him as under:

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Sections Sentences

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279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. 304A of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo

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The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹5000/- and in default of

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payment fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month.

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It was ordered that both the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed

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by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). The accused also filed an application for additional evidence, which was allowed, and the statement of Netar Singh (DW-1) was recorded. Learned Appellate Court remitted the matter to the learned Trial Court for deciding it afresh after considering the statement of Netar Singh.

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Learned Trial Court held that the identity of the

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accused was duly proved by the informant’s statement. Initially, the accused had not disputed his identity. He filed an application for recalling the witnesses, which was allowed. The accused disputed his identity in the cross-examination of the witnesses conducted after their recall. The accused tried to justify the accident by saying that the children had removed the stone from the parked vehicle. The vehicle moved and crushed the child. He also tried to project that the child had

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jumped out of the vehicle when it was reversing. Both these defences were contradictory and could not be believed. The accused failed to look through the side mirror or apply the brakes even if the child had jumped out of the vehicle. The failure to do so amounted to negligence; therefore, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304 A of IPC and Section 187 of M.V. Act and sentenced him as under:-

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Sections Sentences

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279 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months 304A of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year.

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187 of M.V. Act

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The accused was sentenced to pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for a period of seven days.

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It was ordered that both the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently

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Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which

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was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu, H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial

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Court that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Statement of informant Swarup Chand (PW-1) was duly corroborated by Keshav Ram (PW-2) regarding the identity of the accused. Iqbal Singh (PW-3) had earlier stated that the accused was driving the vehicle, but he contradicted himself when he was further cross-examined. The child was crushed under the rear tyre of the vehicle when it was being reversed. The accused failed to take care of the danger to any person before reversing the vehicle. The defence taken by the accused that the child suddenly jumped out of the jeep and was crushed under the rear tyre was not probable. An adequate sentence was imposed. There was no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, and the appeal was dismissed.

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Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material on record. Statement of Swarup Chand (PW-1) did not show any rashness or negligence. He admitted that the child's ‘Chappal’ was lying on the rear side of the vehicle. The

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possibility of the vehicle rolling down the hill could not be ruled out. It was duly proved on record that Yadav Chand was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Identification made by the witnesses for the first time, without a previous test identification parade, was not material. The genesis of the incident was suppressed by the prosecution. Keshav Ram (PW-2) was described as eyewitness, but he had reached the spot after ten minutes. Therefore, it was prayed that the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Anubhav Chopra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

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Mr Anubhav Chopra, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. There was no evidence of rashness or negligence. The defence taken by the accused that the child had jumped from the vehicle when it

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was being reversed was probable. The possibility of the vehicle getting rolled out back, without the driver, could not

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be ruled out. The statement of Netar Singh (DW-1) clearly proved that Yadav Chand and not the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. This statement was not appreciated by the learned Courts below; therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon judgments of this Court in State of H.P. vs. Ashwani Kumar 2025:HHC:4966 and Manoj Chahan vs. State of Himachal Pradesh 2025:HHC 33018 in support of his submission.

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Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the accused did not dispute his identity during the initial cross-examination of the witnesses. He sought the reexamination of the witnesses and disputed his identity. He had won over the witnesses, and they deposed in his favour. The initial statements made by the witnesses cannot be ignored. The accused had taken contradictory pleas that the vehicle had rolled because the child had removed the stone, and the child had jumped while reversing the vehicle. The accused failed to ensure that reversing the vehicle would not

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cause any danger to any person. Learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was guilty of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of IPC and Section 187 of the M.V. Act, and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:-

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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section

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397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

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Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

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1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 , where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a

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well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8

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SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC

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OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to

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reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

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“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275] , while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

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5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

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13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this

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Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

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“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

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This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

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Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at

page 205:

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“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

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17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

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A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore

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S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:

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“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

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28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.

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The present revision has to be decided as per the

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parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lahaul Spiti at Kullu, District Kullu, H.P., had acquitted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of the M.V. Act on 31.03.2010. No person challenged the acquittal of the accused recorded by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lahaul Spiti at Kullu, District Kullu, H.P. The accused assailed his conviction recorded under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC, and the learned Appellate Court remitted the matter for fresh adjudication after appreciating the statement of Netar Singh (DW-1). Learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of MV Act, after appreciating the evidence, however, it ignored the fact that the acquittal of the accused under Section 187 of MV Act had attained finality, and it was impermissible for the learned Trial Court to convict and sentence the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of M.V Act. The learned Appellate Court also failed to appreciate the significance of the acquittal earlier recorded by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the conviction and sentence of the accused for the

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commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of the M V Act cannot be sustained.

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Informant Swarup Chand Negi (PW-1) stated on 11.07.2006 that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused, who was present in the Court. He denied in his cross-examination that the vehicle slipped because the children had removed the stone kept behind the tyre, and the child was crushed under the rear tyre. He denied that the driver picked up the child and took him to the Police Station.

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It is apparent from the cross-examination of the informant that the identity of the accused as the driver of the vehicle was not disputed; rather, it was suggested that children were playing, who had removed the stone, which could fact not have been known to the accused if he was driving the vehicle.

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Keshav Ram (PW-2) stated that the name of the driver was Yadav. It was not suggested to him that the name of the driver was not Yadav Chand. Hence, his testimony that the accused was driving the vehicle was not challenged in the cross-examination.

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Iqbal Singh (PW-3) stated that he had employed the accused Yadav Singh as the driver of the vehicle. The accused had informed him telephonically about the accident. He (Iqbal Singh) got the vehicle released from the Court. He was not cross-examined at all, which means that his testimony was not disputed by the learned counsel for the accused.

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Thus, it was duly proved that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.

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The accused filed an application under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. for recalling the witnesses, asserting that Iqbal Singh (PW-3) and Netar Singh (PW-1) were not crossexamined, and relevant questions could not be asked from the Investigating Officer. The report of the mechanic could not have been accepted on the admission, and the witnesses were not confronted with their previous testimonies. This application was allowed, and the witnesses were recalled for cross-examination. Swarup Chand Negi (PW-1) admitted in his further cross-examination that he had not identified the accused in the Test Identification Parade. Iqbal Singh (PW-3)

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stated in his cross-examination that he had engaged Yadav Singh, a resident of U.P., who had run away and the accused was not employed by him as a driver. These statements were recorded after the lapse of more than 2-3 years from their initial statements. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab , (2015) 3 SCC 220: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 53 that the cross-examination of the witnesses after a prolonged time should not be encouraged. It was observed at page 246:

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“57.2. As has been noticed earlier, in the instant case, the cross-examination has taken place after a year and 8 months, allowing ample time to pressurise the witness and to gain over him by adopting all kinds of tactics.”

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The accused had never claimed in the application filed for recording the witnesses for cross-examination that he also wanted to dispute his identity as a driver, and this plea was taken by him for the first time after the witnesses were recalled for further cross-examination.

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Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that

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the failure to dispute the identity at the earliest point in time would make the plea of the accused doubtful that he was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.

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The accused examined Netar Singh (DW-1) before the learned Appellate Court. Iqbal Singh (PW-3) admitted in his further cross-examination that he had employed Netar Singh as a conductor. Netar Singh (DW-1) never appeared before the police as an eyewitness. He was the best person to depose about the accident, and when he had found that the accused was being falsely implicated, it would have been natural for him to protest, but nothing was done by him to this effect. Thus, it is difficult to place reliance upon the testimony of Netar Singh to hold that the accused was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.

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It was submitted that a Test Identification Parade of the accused was necessary, in the absence of which the identity of the accused cannot be established. This submission is not acceptable. The informant and Keshav Ram (PW-2) had sufficient time to see the accused. The incident had taken place during the daytime. The death of a child had taken place, which was a traumatic event for a father, and he would remember the face of the person who had caused the death of his son. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat , (2000) 1 SCC

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358: 2000 SCC (Cri) 113: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 1243 that when the injured were assaulted in the broad day light, the identity of the assailant would be imprinted in their mind and the identification in the Court cannot be doubted. It was observed at page 369:

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“20… But even assuming as submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the evidence of these two injured witnesses i.e. Bhogilal Ranchhodbhai and Karsanbhai Vallabhbhai identifying the accused in the Court may be treated to be of no assistance to the prosecution, the fact remains that these eyewitnesses were seriously injured and they could have easily seen the faces of the persons assaulting them and their appearance and identity would well remain imprinted in their minds especially when they were assaulted in broad daylight. They could not be said to be interested in roping in innocent persons by shielding the real accused who had assaulted them.”

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In Manoj Chauhan (supra) , the vehicle had not

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stopped on the spot, and the identity of the accused assumed significance. In Ashwani Kumar (supra), the witness was unable to identify the accused, and the question of identification became significant. In the present case, the informant identified the accused in the Court, and the owner of the vehicle also identified the person who was employed by him as the driver; therefore, these judgments do not apply to

the present case.

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Further, it was suggested to Iqbal Singh (PW3) and Keshav Ram (PW-2) that children had removed the stone from the rear tyre. Subsequently, when they appeared, it was stated that the child jumped from the vehicle and was crushed under the rear tyre. These suggestions show the presence of the accused on the spot; otherwise, he had no reason to know about the removal of the stone or the jumping of the child from the vehicle leading to the vehicle. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 that the suggestion put to the witness can be taken into consideration while determining the innocence or guilt of the accused. It was observed at page 382:-

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“34. According to the learned counsel, such suggestions could be a part of the defence strategy to impeach the credibility of the witness. The proof of guilt required of the prosecution does not depend on the satisfaction made to a witness.

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35. In Tarun Bora v. State of Assam [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568] , a threejudge Bench of this Court was dealing with an appeal against the order passed by the Designated Court, Guwahati, in TADA Sessions case wherein the appellant was convicted under Section 365IPC read with Sections 3(1) and 3(5) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.

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36. In Tarun Bora case [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568] , this Court, while considering the evidence on record, took note of a suggestion which was put to one of the witnesses and considering the reply given by the witness to the suggestion put by the accused, concluded that the presence of the accused was admitted. We quote with profit the following observations made by this Court in paras 15, 16 and 17, respectively, as under: ( Tarun Bora case [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568 ], SCC pp. 43-44)

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“ 15 . The witness further stated that during the assault, the assailant accused him of giving information to the army about the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). He further stated that on the third night, he was carried away blindfolded on a bicycle to a different place, and when his eyes were opened, he could see his younger brother Kumud Kakati (PW 2) and his wife Smt Prema Kakati (PW 3). The place was Duliapather, which is about 6-7 km away from his Village, Sakrahi. The witness identified the appellant, Tarun Bora, and stated that it was he who took him in an Ambassador car from the residence of Nandeswar Bora on the date of the incident.

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16 . In cross-examination, the witness stated as follows:

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‘Accused Tarun Bora did not blind my eyes, nor did he assault me.’

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17 . This part of the cross-examination is suggestive of the presence of the accused, Tarun Bora, in the whole episode. This will suggest the presence of the accused, Tarun Bora, as admitted. The only denial is that the accused did not participate in blindfolding the eyes of the witness, nor assaulted him.”

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37. In Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1987) 2 SCC 34: 1987 SCC (Cri) 256] , this Court was dealing with an appeal against the judgment of the High Court affirming the order of the Sessions Judge whereby the appellant and three other persons were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34IPC. While reappreciating the evidence on record, this Court noticed that in the crossexamination of PW 4 Sube Singh, a suggestion was made with regard to the colour of the shirt worn by one of the accused persons at the time of the incident. This Court, taking into consideration the nature of the suggestion put by the defence and the reply, arrived at the conclusion that the presence of the accused, namely, Dharam Vir, was established on the spot at the time of the occurrence. We quote the following observations made by this Court in paras 8 and 9, respectively, as under (SCC p. 36)

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“ 8 . PW 3, Bhagat Singh, stated in his examination-in-chief that he had identified the accused at the time of the occurrence. But curiously enough, he was not cross-examined as to how and in what manner he could identify the accused, as pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge. No suggestion was also given to him that the place was dark and that it was not possible to identify the assailants of the deceased.

¶147

9 . In his cross-examination, PW 4 Sube Singh stated that the accused, Dharam Vir, was wearing a white shirt. It was suggested to him on behalf of the accused that Dharam Vir was wearing a cream-coloured shirt. In answer to that suggestion, PW 4 said it is not correct that Dharam Vir, the accused, was wearing a shirt of a cream colour and not a white colour

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at that time.’ The learned Sessions Judge has rightly observed that the above suggestion at least proves the presence of the accused Dharam Vir on the spot at the time of occurrence.”

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38. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross-examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any manner, would definitely bind the accused, and the accused cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions against his client.

¶152

39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except for the concession on a point of law. As a legal proposition, we cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in any manner.”

¶153

It is undisputed that the vehicle was being reversed

¶154

at the time of the accident. Netar Singh (DW-1) stated that the child jumped from the vehicle as soon as the vehicle was reversed, and he was crushed under the tyres of the vehicle.

¶155

Rule 31 of the Rules of Road Regulations, 1989 provides that no driver of a motor vehicle shall cause the vehicle to be driven backwards without first satisfying himself that he will not thereby cause danger or inconvenience to any person. Thus, an obligation has been cast upon the driver of

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the motor vehicle to ensure that his reversing the vehicle does not cause any danger to any person. The accused should have noticed the child’s presence before reversing the vehicle. The failure to do so will constitute negligence on the part of the accused, and the learned Court below had rightly held it to be so.

¶159

It was suggested to Swarup Chand Negi (PW-1) and Keshav Ram (PW-2) that the child was going ahead of them, and this amounted to negligence on their part. This suggestion will not help the accused. Even if the child was alone, it did not justify his being crushed under the tyres of the vehicle, and no advantage can be derived from this suggestion.

¶160

Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle, which led to the accident, causing the death of the child.

¶161

The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for one year for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of the IPC and three months for the commission of an offence

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punishable under Section 279 of the IPC, which cannot be said to be excessive considering the fact that the life of a child was lost. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving. It was observed:

¶165

“11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus :

¶166

"Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces."

¶167

In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this

¶168

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Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine. 13. Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.”

¶171

A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v.

¶172

Balwinder Singh , (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held: -

¶173

“13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the

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potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208] .

¶177

Similarly, the judgment in State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015

¶178

SCC OnLine SC 278 , wherein it was observed at page 196:

¶179

“25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.”

¶180

Thus, no interference is required with the sentence

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imposed by the learned Trial Court as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court.

¶182

No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are partly sustainable. Consequently, the present petition is partly allowed, and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court convicting and sentencing the accused of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of the MV Act are set aside, while the rest of the judgment and order are upheld. The present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.

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A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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18^th December, 2025. (ravinder )

Yadav Singh v. State of Hp

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Yadav Singh v. State of Hp

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