Surjit Kumar Vs State of Hp

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2025:HHC:44351

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. Revision No.215 of 2015 Reserved on: 27.11.2025 Date of Decision: 18.12.2025

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Surjit Kumar ....Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ....Respondent

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Coram

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*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.* *Whether approved for reporting?¹Yes*
For the Petitioner : Mr. Arvind Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent/ : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy
State Advocate General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 02.06.2015 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra at Dharamshala, Camp at Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which judgment of conviction dated 28.04.2008 and order of sentence dated 05.05.2008, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. II, Dehra, District Kangra, H.P., (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall

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Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

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hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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Briefly stated, the facts leading to the present revision are that the police filed a challan against the accused for committing the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act). It was asserted that informant Prem Chand (PW-2) was waiting for the bus on 24.10.2005 outside his home. A tractor bearing registration No. HP-36A-0212 came from Jawalamukhi at a high speed and hit the informant. The informant fell and sustained multiple injuries. The driver of the tractor reversed it and went to Jawalamukhi. The injured person was taken to the hospital. Intimation was given to the police. An entry No. 6 was recorded in the Police Station. HC Babu Ram (PW-8) went to the hospital for verification. He recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW-2/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW8/A) was registered. Dr Salinder Verma (PW-1) examined the injured and found that he had sustained simple and grievous injuries, which could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. He issued MLC (Ext.PW-1/A). Dr

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A.K. Kaundal (PW-9) treated the informant and issued the case summary (Ext.PW-9/A). HC Babu Ram (PW-8) seized the tractor bearing registration No. HP-36A-0212 vide memo (Ext.PW-5/A). Hansraj (PW-6) produced the documents of the tractor, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PA). Kuldeep Singh (PW7) mechanically examined the tractor and found that there was no defect in it, which could have led to the accident. He issued his report (Ext.PW7/A). Statements of the prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version. The challan was prepared after completing the investigation and submitted before the learned Trial Court.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC and Section 187 of the M.V. Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Salinder Verma (PW-1) medically examined the informant/victim. Prem Chand (PW-2) is the

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informant/victim. Vikaram Jit Singh (PW-3) and Hansraj (PW-4) are eyewitnesses. Sanjay (PW-5) and Hans Raj (PW-6) witnessed various recoveries. Kuldeep Singh (PW-7) mechanically examined the vehicle. HC Babu Ram (PW-8) investigated the matter. Dr A.K. Kaundal (PW-9) treated the informant.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He claimed that he was falsely implicated, and witnesses deposed falsely against him. He did not produce any evidence in defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s testimony was duly corroborated by Vikram Jit Singh (PW-3) and Hans Raj (PW-4). The site plan showed that the tractor had hit the informant on the unmetalled portion of the road. The medical evidence proved that the informant had sustained injuries that could have been caused in a motor vehicle accident. Driving the tractor towards the unmetalled portion of the road amounted to negligence. The eyewitnesses identified the accused as the driver of the tractor. Therefore,

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the learned Trial Court convicted the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 of IPC and Section 187 of M.V.Act and sentenced him as under:

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Offences u/s	Imprisonment		Fine	In defau	lt
279 of IPC	Simple imprisonment three months	for	₹500/-	Simple for one	imprisonment month
337 of IPC	Simple imprisonment three months	for	₹300/-	Simple for one	imprisonment month
338 of IPC	Simple imprisonment one year	for	₹500/-	Simple for one	imprisonment month
187 of M.V. Act			₹300/-	Simple for 15 da	imprisonment ys.

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All the substantive sentences of imprisonment were ordered to run concurrently.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Kangra, at Dharamshala, Camp at Dehra, District Kangra H.P. (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was driving the vehicle on the date of the accident, and the tractor had hit the informant on the unmetalled portion of the road. Driving the

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tractor on an unmetalled portion of the road amounted to negligence. Learned Trial Court had imposed an adequate sentence, and no interference was required with the sentences. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.

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Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present petition, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. The identity of the accused as the driver of the vehicle was not established. No person named the accused as the driver of the tractor, and it was a case of no evidence. Learned Courts below erred in convicting and sentencing the accused; therefore, it was prayed that the revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Arvind Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

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Mr Arvind Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. The

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prosecution witnesses had not named the accused as the driver of the vehicle, and the learned Courts below erred in holding that the accused was driving the tractor at the time of the accident. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below have concurrently held that the accused was driving the tractor at the time of the accident. Hans Raj (PW-6), owner of the vehicle, categorically stated that he had employed the accused as driver of the tractor. Thus, the identity of the accused as the driver of the vehicle was established. The accused drove the tractor towards the unmetalled portion of the road and hit the informant. This constituted negligence on the part of the accused. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the revision be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:-

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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the

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merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

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Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

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1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 , where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be

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invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8

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SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

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“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court.

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In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275 , while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

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5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

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13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavanv. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely

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on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

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“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

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This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

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Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at

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page 205:

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“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

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17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Servicesv.Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

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This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v.

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Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:

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“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Servicesv.Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH,(2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

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28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.

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The present revision has to be decided as per the

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parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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It was specifically mentioned in the statement

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(Ext.PW-2/A) that the informant did not know the name of

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the tractor driver. Thus, the initial version disclosed to the police did not mention the name or identification of the driver. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 1 SCC 702: 2002 SCC (Cri) 256: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1243 that when the identity of the accused is not known, the Investigating Officer needs to prove how he picked up the accused. It was observed at page 713:

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“26. Before parting with the case, we would like to place on record an observation of ours, touching on an aspect of the case. There are clueless crimes committed. The factum of a cognizable crime having been committed is known, but neither the identity of the accused is disclosed nor is there any indication available of the witnesses who would be able to furnish useful and relevant evidence. Such offences put to the test the wits of an investigating officer. A vigilant investigating officer, well-versed with the techniques of the job, is in a position to collect the threads of evidence, finding out the path that leads to the culprit. The ends, which the administration of criminal justice serves, are not achieved merely by catching hold of the culprit. The accusation has to be proved to the hilt in a court of law. The evidence of the investigating officer given in the court should have a rhythm explaining step by step how the investigation proceeded, leading to the detection of the offender and the collection of evidence against him. This is necessary to exclude the likelihood of any innocent person having been picked up and branded as a culprit, and then the gravity of the offence arousing human sympathy, persuading the mind to be carried away by doubtful or dubious circumstances, treating them as of “beyond doubt” evidentiary value.

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HC Babu Ram (PW-9) investigated the matter. He did not mention in his statement how he found out about the identity of the driver. He only mentioned that the driver had sped away from the spot. Similarly, the charge-sheet filed under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. also does not mention how the identity of the driver was ascertained. Thus, the record is silent regarding the identity of the accused as a driver.

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Prem Chand (PW-2) stated that one boy was driving the tractor. He stated in his cross-examination that he did not know the person who was driving the tractor before the incident. Vikram Jit Singh (PW-3) stated in his crossexamination that he was not aware who was driving the tractor at the time of the accident. Therefore, the testimonies of these witnesses did not establish that the accused was driving the tractor on the date of the accident.

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The informant did not identify the accused in the Court as the person who was driving the tractor at the time of the accident. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tukesh Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1110, that the identification of the accused sitting in the Court

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by the witnesses is highly important, and the statement of a witness naming the accused is not sufficient. It was observed:-

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“21. In a case where there are eyewitnesses, one situation can be that the eyewitness knew the accused before the incident. The eyewitnesses must identify the accused sitting in the dock as the same accused whom they had seen committing the crime. Another situation can be that the eyewitness did not know the accused before the incident. In the normal course, in case of the second situation, it is necessary to hold a Test Identification Parade. If it is not held and if the evidence of the eyewitness is recorded after a few years, the identification of such an accused by the eyewitness in the Court becomes vulnerable. Identification of the accused sitting in the Court by the eyewitness is of utmost importance. For example, if an eyewitness states in his deposition that “he had seen A, B and C killing X and he knew A, B and C”. Such a statement in the examination-in-chief is not sufficient to link the same to the accused. The eyewitness must identify the accused A, B and C in the Court. Unless this is done, the prosecution cannot establish that the accused are the same persons who are named by the eyewitness in his deposition. If an eyewitness states that “he had seen one accused assaulting the deceased with a sword, another accused assaulting the deceased with a stick, and another accused holding the deceased to enable the other accused to assault the deceased.” In such a case, the eyewitness must identify the accused in the open Court who, according to him, had assaulted the accused with a stick, who had assaulted the deceased with a sword and who was holding the deceased. Unless the eyewitnesses identify the accused present in the Court, it cannot be said that, based on

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the testimony of the eyewitnesses, the guilt of the accused has been proved.

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22. In the present case, in the case of two eyewitnesses, in the cross-examination, it is brought on record that the accused persons named by them were sitting in the Court. However, they did not identify a particular accused by ascribing him a role. None of the eyewitnesses has specifically identified any of the accused in the Court.

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23. In this case, the failure of the eyewitnesses to identify the accused in the court as the accused they had seen committing the crime is fatal to the prosecution's case...”

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Hence, the informant’s testimony does not

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establish the identity of the driver.

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Hans Raj (PW-4) stated that the accused was

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driving the tractor at the time of the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that he was running a shop and 2-3 people were sitting in his shop at the time of the accident. He did not know about the driver, and the police had informed him that the accused was driving the tractor.

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It is apparent from the cross-examination of this witness that his testimony regarding the identity of the accused is not satisfactory. He was working in the shop and came out after the accident. Therefore, he had no opportunity to see the driver and identify him. He admitted that he did

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not know about the driver and was told by the police that the accused was driving the tractor, clearly showing that his testimony regarding the identity of the driver cannot be trusted.

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It was submitted that he had identified the accused in the Court, and it was sufficient to prove that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. This submission will not help the prosecution. He admitted in his cross-examination that the accused was not known to him before the incident. His testimony also shows that he did not have any opportunity to carefully look at the driver and identify him. Therefore, in these circumstances previous Test Identification Parade was necessary, and identification of the accused in the Court for the first time will not help the prosecution’s case. Professor Rupert Cross has stated in his celebrated treatise, Cross on Evidence , Fifth Edition, Butterworths, that identification of the accused for the first time in the dock is highly suspect. He observed:

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"It might be thought that in criminal cases there could not be better identification of an accused than that of a witness who goes into the box and swears that the man in the dock is the one he saw coming out of a house at a

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particular time, or the man who assaulted him. Nevertheless, such evidence is suspect where there has been no previous identification of the accused by the witness, and this is because its weight is reduced by the reflection that, if there is any degree of resemblance between the man in the dock and the person previously seen by him. The witness may very well think to himself that the police must have got hold of the right person, particularly if he has already described the latter to them, with the result that he will be inclined to swear positively to a fact of which he is by no means certain.

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People have mistakenly identified friends and relations well known to them with sufficient frequency to make them question the propriety of convicting an accused person on nothing more than the visual identification of a single witness who may only have had a fleeting glance of him in poor light."

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It has been stated in Halsbury's Laws of England 4^th

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Edition Volume 2 that the identification of the accused for the

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first time in the Court is improper and the witness should be asked to identify the accused in a prior test identification parade. It has been observed in para 363:

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“It is undesirable that a witness should be asked to identify the defendant for the first time in the dock at his trial; and as a general practice, it is preferable that he should have been placed previously in a parade with other persons, so that potential witnesses may be asked to pick him up.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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P. Sasikumar v. State of T.N., (2024) 8 SCC 600: (2024) 3 SCC

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(Cri) 791: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1652 that when the accused were not known to the witnesses on the date of the incident, their identification in the dock is not acceptable. It was observed at page 605:

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“17. The admitted position in this case is that the test identification parade (hereinafter referred to as “TIP”) was not conducted. All the prosecution witnesses who identified the accused in the Court, such as PW 1 and PW 5, were not known to the present appellant, i.e. Accused 2. They had not seen the present appellant before the said incident. He was a stranger to both of them. More importantly, both of them have seen the appellant/Accused 2 on the date of the crime while he was wearing a “green-coloured monkey cap”!

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21. It is well settled that TIP is only a part of the police investigation. The identification in TIP of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence. The substantive piece of evidence, or what can be called evidence, is only dock identification, that is, identification made by a witness in court during the trial. This identification has been made in court by PW 1 and PW 5. The High Court rightly dismisses the identification made by PW 1 for the reason that the appellant i.e. Accused 2 was a stranger to PW 1 and PW 1 had seen the appellant for the first time when he was wearing a monkey cap, and in the absence of TIP to admit the identification by PW 1 made for the first time in the court was not proper.

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23. We are afraid the High Court has gone completely wrong in believing the testimony of PW 5 as to the identification of the appellant. In cases where the accused is a stranger to a witness, and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be very cautious while

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accepting the dock identification by such a witness (see: Kunjumon v . State of Kerala , ( 2012) 13 SCC 750: (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 406] ).

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27. In the facts of the present case, the identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP, which has not been done. The emphasis of TIP in a given case is of vital importance, as has been shown by this Court in the recent two cases of Jayanv. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 and Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 9 SCC 402: (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 404 .

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28. In Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 , this Court disbelieved the dock identification of the accused therein by a witness, and while doing so, this Court discussed the aspect of TIP in the following words: ( Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 , SCC p. 44, para 18)

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“ 18 . It is well settled that the TI parade is a part of the investigation, and it is not substantive evidence. The question of holding a TI parade arises when the accused is not known to the witness beforehand. The identification by a witness of the accused in the Court who has, for the first time, seen the accused in the incident of the offence is a weak piece of evidence, especially when there is a large time gap between the date of the incident and the date of recording of his evidence. In such a case, the TI parade may make the identification of the accused by the witness before the Court trustworthy.”

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In the present case, no Test Identification Parade

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was conducted, and the testimony of this witness regarding the identity of the accused cannot be accepted.

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Learned Trial Court held that Hans Raj (PW-6) had not said anywhere that the accused was not driving the tractor, which is a strange reasoning because Hans Raj was supposed to say that the accused was driving the tractor and not that the accused was not driving the tractor. The burden to prove all the ingredients of the commission of an offence is always on the prosecution, and it cannot be relieved of the burden by assuming certain things and then holding that the prosecution witnesses had not denied the assumption; therefore, the reasoning of the learned Trial Court cannot be accepted.

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Learned Trial Court relied upon the identification made by Hans Raj (PW-6) and conveniently ignored the fact that Hans Raj (PW-6) admitted that he did not know about the driver and was told about the name of the driver by the police. Thus, his identification could not have been relied upon. Further, the learned Trial Court failed to notice that identification of the person in the Court for the first time is worthless and no reliance can be placed upon it.

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There is no other evidence regarding the identity of the accused, and learned Courts below erred in holding that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident; therefore, the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below cannot be sustained.

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No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present revision is allowed, and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are ordered to be set aside, and the accused is ordered to be acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC and Section 187 of M.V. Act. The fine amount, if deposited by the petitioner/accused, shall be refunded to him after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case of no further appeal, and in case of appeal, it be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court.

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In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which

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2025:HHC:44351

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shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

¶152

The present petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.

¶153

A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith.

¶154

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

¶155

18^th December, 2025 ( ravinder)

Surjit Kumar v. State of Hp

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Surjit Kumar v. State of Hp

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