Mohan Lal Vs State

The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 29.08.2012 and order of sentence dated 31.08.2012, passed by learned Special Judge, Una, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the appellant (accused before the learned Trial Court) was convicted and sentenced as under: -

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Under Section 7 of the To suffer rigorous imprisonment for

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Prevention of Corruption Act.	one yea i (₹Two T of payme i simple months.	r, pay a fine of ₹2,000/- housand only), and in default nt of fine, to further undergo imprisonment for three
Under Section 13(2) o Prevention of Corruption Act.	f To suffer one yea i (₹Two T of payme i simple months.	f rigorous imprisonment for r, pay a fine of ₹3,000/- housand only), and in default nt of fine, to further undergo imprisonment for three
Both the sentences of imp concurrently	risonment	were ordered yo be run

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(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act). It was asserted that the father of the informant, Amit Mankotia (PW1), had expired one year before the incident. He had taken a loan, and Amit Mankotia (PW1) repaid it. He asked the Patwari (the accused) to make an entry regarding the repayment of the loan, but the Patwari declined and demanded ₹500/-. The informant paid the

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money. The informant requested the accused to enter the mutation in his favour, but the accused demanded ₹3,000/- for it. The informant asked the accused to reduce the money, and the accused told him that the amount could not be reduced. He asked the informant to pay the money by the evening and promised him to carry out the mutation. The informant made a complaint (Ext.PW1/A) to the police. The police registered the FIR (Ext. PW13/A). Dy. SP Surender Sharma (PW13) investigated the matter. He associated Vivek Mahajan (PW2) as a witness. He demonstrated the mixing of phenolphthalein powder with sodium bicarbonate powder to Vivek Mahajan (PW2), Sanjeev Kumar (PW3), and Amit Mankotia (PW1). He prepared a memo (Ext.PW1/B). The informant produced six currency notes of ₹500/- each and Dy. SP Surender Sharma (PW13) treated them with phenolphthalein powder. He handed them over to the informant after noting down their numbers in the memo (Ext.PW1/C). He sent the informant and the shadow witness to Patwarkhana with the direction that money should be delivered only on demand. The police followed the informant and the shadow witness. However, the accused was not found in the Patwarkhana. The informant telephoned the accused, who

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revealed that he had gone to Patwarkhana at Panjawar. The informant and the shadow witness went to the Panjawar, where the accused was present. The informant went to the accused, and the police party remained outside. The accused asked the informant to come out in the verandah, where the informant handed over ₹3000/- to the accused. The accused counted the currency notes and kept them in his pocket. The shadow witness signalled the police, and the police reached the spot. Constable Anant Kumar and Constable Jitender Kumar caught the wrists of the accused. The hands of the accused were washed. A solution of Sodium bicarbonate was prepared and added to the hand wash, and the solution turned pink. Memo (Ext.PW1/D) was prepared. The hand wash was put in a nip (Ext.P1), and the nip was sealed. The police associated Badal Singh and Tilak Raj. The accused took out ₹3000/- (Ext.P2 to Ext.P7) from the plastic Nawar of the cot lying in the verandah. Their serial numbers were tallied and were found to be the same. These were put in a paper envelope (Ext.P8), and the paper was sealed with seal impression ‘M’. Memo (Ext.PW1/E) was prepared. The specimen seal impressions (Ext.PW1/F and Ext.PW2/A) were obtained on separate pieces of cloth. The accused produced the death

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certificate and other documents, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW4/A). Dy.SP Surender Sharma (PW13) prepared the site plan (Ext.PW13/C). He arrested the accused vide memo (Ext.PW13/D). The solutions were sent to SFSL, and the result of the analysis (Ext.PX) was issued, mentioning that phenolphthalein and sodium bicarbonate were detected in the nips of demonstration and hand wash. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

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Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the PC Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined 14 witnesses to prove its case. Amit Mankotia (PW1) is the informant. Vivek Mahajan (PW2) is the independent witness. Sanjeev Kumar (PW3) is the shadow witness. Tilak Raj (PW4) was present in the patwarkhana and was associated as a witness. Constable Kuldip Singh (PW5) carried the nip from the police station to RFSL

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Dharmshala. MHC Sushma Rani (PW6) was working as an MHC with whom the case property was deposited. Krishan Pal Singh (PW7) proved that the informant’s father had raised a loan, and the entire amount was paid. Shiv Kumar (PW8) proved the death certificate of the informant’s father. Rai Singh (PW9) is the witness to the hand wash and the recovery. Rajender Kumar (PW10) proved the prosecution sanction. Constable Jatinder Kumar (PW12) was a member of the raiding party and had caught the wrist of the accused. Vijay Saklani (PW11) and Dy. SP. Surinder Sharma (PW13) investigated the matter. K.R. Bharti (PW14) granted the prosecution sanction.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was posted as a Patwari, Narender Singh, father of the informant, had died on 28.11.2008. He had taken a loan, and the loan was repaid by the informant. He denied the rest of the prosecution’s case. He stated that Amit Mankotia (PW1) alone had visited his room, where Tilak Raj and Wattan Chand were present. The informant had shaken hands with him. He was apprehended inside the office. He admitted that the solution of hand wash turned pink, but claimed that he was not aware of what was added to it. He admitted that the

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documents were seized and that he was arrested. He stated that Amit Mankotia (PW1) had visited him on 10/11.01.2010. He produced a vacation of charge report and demanded that the entry be recorded on the same day. He promised Amit Mankotia (PW1) to make the entry within 2-3 days because he had the charge of two patwarkhanas. He had entered the proceedings in the daily diary on 13.01.2010. Amit Mankotia (PW1) again visited his office and asked him to enter the mutation qua succession. He (the accused) demanded a death certificate, and the informant produced the certificate. He had made the entry on the same day. He examined Harwinder Singh, Patwari (DW1).

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Learned Trial Court held that the informant’s statement was duly corroborated by independent witnesses. There was nothing in their cross-examination to show that they had any motive to depose against the accused. The recovery of tainted money was effected from the accused, which corroborated the informant’s version that the accused had demanded the money from him. The minor contradictions in the statements of the witnesses were not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. The prosecution sanction was proper. Hence, the accused was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the instant appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The prosecution’s evidence is full of contradictions, and the learned Trial Court erred in accepting the statements of the prosecution’s witnesses. The shadow witness categorically stated that Patwarkhana was not visible from the road. The currency notes were recovered from the Nawar of the cot lying in the verandah and not from the personal search of the accused. There is no evidence of demand and acceptance, and the learned Trial Court erred in holding otherwise. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Athrav Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant/accused and Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State.

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Mr Athrav Sharma, learned counsel for the appellant/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The informant’s

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statement, even if accepted as correct, does not mention demand and acceptance, which is an essential requirement of Section 7 of the P.C. Act. The informant claimed that the accused had kept the money in his pocket, but the money was recovered from the Nawar of the cot lying outside the Patwarkhana. It was possible for the complainant to keep the money in the Nawar and falsely implicate the accused. The accused had already entered the charge vacation report, and he had no justification for demanding the bribe. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgments of K. Shanthamma vs. The State of Telangana (2022) Live Law (SC) 192, P. Satyanarayana Murthy vs. District Inspector of Police State of Andhra Pradesh and another (2015) 10 Supreme Court Cases 152, C.M. Girish Babu vs. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kerala (2009) 3 SCC 779 and Satvir Singh vs. State of Delhi (2014) 13 SCC 13 in support of his submission.

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Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the minor contradictions are not sufficient to discard the prosecution case. The informant categorically

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stated that the accused had demanded money from him and he had paid ₹500/- to the accused on an earlier occasion. The informant’s testimony is corroborated by the fact that the accused had called him to another Patwarkhana. The informant’s testimony also established the demand before the incident. There is no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The police have presented the present challan for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The ingredients of Section 7 were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab , (2025) 4 SCC 493: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488 at page 498:

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11. Thus, in an offence under Section 7 of the 1988 Act, the points requiring proof are:

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( i ) that the accused at the time of the offence was, or expected to be, a public servant;

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( ii ) that he accepted or retained or agreed to accept, or attempted to obtain from some person a gratification;

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( iii ) that such gratification was not a legal remuneration due to him;

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( iv ) that he accepted such gratification as a motive or reward, proof of which is essential for

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( a ) doing or forbearing to do an official act, or

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( b ) showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to someone in the exercise of his official functions, or

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( c ) rendering or attempting to render any service, or disservice to someone, with the legislative or executive government, or with any public servant.

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The informant Amit Mankotia (PW1) stated that he

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had handed over the clearance in the mini Secretariat, which was to be forwarded to the Patwari concerned. He kept on going to the patwari, Mohan Lal, who told him that he had not received the clearance. He was informed by the office that clearance was forwarded to the Patwari. He approached Patwari through many persons to get his work done, but the accused failed to do the work. Mohan Lal (Patwari) told him to pay money. The informant paid ₹500/- to the accused. He demanded ₹5000/- for attestation of the mutation. He asked the accused to reduce the money, and the accused demanded ₹3000/-. He contacted Sanjeev and arranged ₹3000/-. He also contacted the police official. The police registered the FIR and gave the demonstration. He (informant) handed over six currency notes

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of ₹500/- to Vigilance officials, who applied some powder to the currency notes and told him not to shake hands with anybody. He kept the currency notes in his pocket. He went to Patwarkhana, but Patwarkhana was locked. He contacted the accused, who told him to visit another Patwarkhana at Panjawar. He went to Panjawar. The police remained outside, and he went inside. Mohan Lal was present inside the Patwarkhana. He told Mohan Lal about the arrangement of ₹3000/-, and he should come out of the room. The accused came out of the room into the verandah, where he handed over ₹3000/- to the accused. The accused counted the currency notes and put them in the pocket. Sanjeev signalled the Vigilance official. He again corrected to say that he had not put the currency notes in the pocket. The police came to the spot and washed the hands of the accused. The police added some powder, and the hand wash turned pink. The currency notes were not recovered from the accused, and these were recovered from a cot lying in the verandah.

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Sanjeev Kumar (PW3) was associated as a shadow witness. He stated that he and the informant went inside the room, and some people were found sitting in the room. The

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informant talked to Patwari about the money and handed over ₹3000/- to Patwari, and they came out. Amit Mankotia (PW1) signalled the raiding party by moving over the head. The police party came inside and asked the accused about the currency notes. The Patwari took out the currency notes from Nawar of the cot in the verandah. The hands of Patwari were washed. Some powder was added, and the hand wash turned pink.

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The statements of these witnesses are mutually contradictory. The informant stated that the money was paid outside the room in the verandah, whereas Sanjeev Kumar stated that the money was paid inside the room. The informant stated that the police had washed the hands of the accused before the recovery of the money, whereas Sanjeev stated that the hands were washed after the recovery. The informant stated that Sanjeev had signalled the police, whereas Sanjeev stated that the informant had signalled the police. Learned Trial Court held that these contradictions were not significant. This conclusion cannot be sustained. The contradictions related to the place where the money was given and where the money was kept. These are the material circumstances surrounding the recovery, and if the witnesses are not unanimous regarding the place

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where the money was paid or where the money was kept, the whole of the prosecution case regarding the payment of money would become suspect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnan v. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1577: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 756 that the evidence of the prosecution must be tested for its inherent consistency: consistency with the account of other witnesses and consistency with undisputed facts. It was observed:

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“21. …. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful, independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts, the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation, etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.”

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It was held in David Piper vs Mark Hales 2013 EWHC B1

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(QB) that the Court has to see whether the statement of the witness is consistent or not. It was observed: -

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The guidance about how courts approach this is given in the extra-judicial writing of the late Lord Bingham of

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Cornhill, approved by the courts, and is apposite. In "The Judge as Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual Issues ", published in " The Business of Judging ", Oxford 2000, reprinted from Current Legal Problems, vol 38, 1985, p 1-27 , he wrote:

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". . . Faced with a conflict of evidence on an issue substantially affecting the outcome of an action, often knowing that a decision this way or that will have momentous consequences on the parties' lives or fortunes, how can and should the judge set about his task of resolving it? How is he to resolve which witness is honest and which dishonest, which reliable and which unreliable?

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The normal first step in resolving issues of primary fact is, I feel sure, to add to what is common ground between the parties (which the pleadings in the action should have identified but often do not) such facts as are shown to be incontrovertible. In many cases, letters or minutes written well before there was any breath of dispute between the parties may throw a very clear light on their knowledge and intentions at a particular time. In other cases, evidence of tyre marks, debris or where vehicles ended up may be crucial. To attach importance to matters such as these, which are independent of human recollection, is so obvious and standard a practice, and in some cases so inevitable, that no prolonged discussion is called for. It is nonetheless worth bearing in mind, when vexatious conflicts of oral testimony arise, that these fall to be judged against the background not only of what the parties agree to have happened but also of what plainly did happen, even though the parties do not agree.

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The most compendious statement known to me of the judicial process involved in assessing the credibility of an oral witness is to be found in the dissenting speech of Lord Pearce in the House of Lords in Onassis v Vergottis [1968] 2 Lloyds Rep 403 at

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p 431. In this, he touches on so many of the matters which I wish to mention that I may perhaps be forgiven for citing the relevant passage in full:

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''Credibility' involves wider problems than mere 'demeanour', which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. Credibility covers the following problems. First, is the witness a truthful or untruthful person? Secondly, is he, though a truthful person, telling something less than the truth on this issue, or though an untruthful person, telling the truth on this issue? Thirdly, though he is a truthful person telling the truth as he sees it, did he register the intentions of the conversation correctly and if so, has his memory correctly retained them? Also, has his recollection been subsequently altered by unconscious bias, wishful thinking or by too much discussion of it with others? Witnesses, especially those who are emotional and who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes, the memory becomes fainter, and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason, a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. And lastly, although the honest witness believes he heard or saw this or that, is it so improbable that it is on balance more likely that he was mistaken? On this point, it

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is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness. And motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems compendiously are entailed when a Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process. And in the process, contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part."

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Every judge is familiar with cases in which the conflict between the accounts of different witnesses is so gross as to be inexplicable save on the basis that one or some of the witnesses are deliberately giving evidence which they know to be untrue . . .. more often dishonest evidence is likely to be prompted by the hope of gain, the desire to avert blame or criticism, or misplaced loyalty to one or other of the parties. The main tests needed to determine whether a witness is lying or not are, I think, the following, although their relative importance will vary widely from case to case:

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(1) the consistency of the witness's evidence with what is agreed, or clearly shown by other evidence, to have occurred;

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(2) the internal consistency of the witness's evidence;

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(3) consistency with what the witness has said or deposed on other occasions;

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(4) the credit of the witness in relation to matters not germane to the litigation;

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(5) the demeanour of the witness.

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The first three of these tests may, in general, be regarded as giving a useful pointer to where the truth lies. If a witness's evidence conflicts with what is clearly shown to have occurred or is

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internally self-contradictory, or conflicts with what the witness has previously said, it may usually be regarded as suspect. It may only be unreliable and not dishonest, but the nature of the case may effectively rule out that possibility.

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The fourth test is perhaps more arguable. . . ."

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The following guidance of Lord Goff in Grace Shipping v. Sharp & Co [1987] 1 Lloyd's Law Rep. 207 at 2156 is also helpful.

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"And it is not to be forgotten that, in the present case, the Judge was faced with the task of assessing the evidence of witnesses about telephone conversations which had taken place over five years before. In such a case, memories may very well be unreliable, and it is of crucial importance for the Judge to have regard to the contemporary documents and the overall probabilities. In this connection, their Lordships wish to endorse a passage from a judgment of one of their number in Armagas Ltd v. Mundogas S.A. (The Ocean Frost), [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1 , when he said at p. 57: -

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"Speaking from my own experience, I have found it essential in cases of fraud, when considering the credibility of witnesses, always to test their veracity by reference to the objective facts proved independently of their testimony, in particular by reference to the documents in the case, and also to pay particular regard to their motives and the overall probabilities. It is frequently very difficult to tell whether a witness is telling the truth or not, and where there is a conflict of evidence, such as there was in the present case, reference to the objective facts and documents, to the witnesses' motives , and the overall probabilities, can be of very great assistance to a Judge in ascertaining the truth." [emphases added].

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That observation is, in their Lordships' opinion, equally apposite in a case where the evidence of the witnesses is likely to be unreliable, and it is to be remembered that in commercial cases, such as the present, there is usually a substantial body of contemporary documentary evidence."

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In that context, he was impressed by a witness described in the following terms.

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"Although, like the other main witnesses, his evidence was a mixture of reconstruction and original recollection, he took considerable trouble to distinguish precisely between the two, to an extent which I found convincing and reliable."

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That is so important and so infrequently done."

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This approach to fact-finding was amplified recently by Lady Justice Arden in the Court of Appeal in Wetton (as Liquidator of Mumtaz Properties) v. Ahmed and others [2011] EWCA Civ 610 , in paragraphs 11, 12, & 14:

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By the end of the judgment, it is clear that what impressed the judge most in his task of fact-finding was the absence, rather than the presence, of contemporary documentation or other independent oral evidence to confirm the oral evidence of the respondents to the proceedings.

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There are many situations in which the court is asked to assess the credibility of witnesses from their oral evidence, that is to say, to weigh up their evidence to see whether it is reliable. Witness choice is an essential part of the function of a trial judge, and he or she has to decide whose evidence and how much evidence to accept. This task is not to be carried out merely by reference to the impression that a witness made by giving evidence in the witness box. It is not solely a matter of body language or the tone of voice or other factors that might generally be called the 'demeanour' of a witness. The judge should consider what other

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independent evidence would be available to support the witness. Such evidence would generally be documentary, but it could be other oral evidence, for example, if the issue was whether a defendant was an employee, the judge would naturally consider whether there were any PAYE records or evidence, such as evidence in texts or e-mails, in which the defendant sought or was given instructions as to how he should carry out work. This may be particularly important in cases where the witness is from a culture or way of life with which the judge may not be familiar. These situations can present particular dangers and difficulties to a judge.

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In my judgment, contemporaneous written documentation is of the very greatest importance in assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant not only where it is present, but the oral evidence can then be checked against it. It can also be significant if written documentation is absent. For instance, if the judge is satisfied that certain contemporaneous documentation is likely to have existed were the oral evidence correct, and that the party adducing oral evidence is responsible for its non-production, then the documentation may be conspicuous by its absence, and the judge may be able to draw inferences from its absence.

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Contemporaneity, consistency, probability and motive are key criteria and more important than demeanour, which can be distorted through the prism of prejudice: how witnesses present themselves in a cramped witness box surrounded for the first time with multiple files can be distorted, particularly elderly ones being asked to remember minute details of what happened and what was said, and unrecorded, nearly 4 years later as here. Lengthy witness statements prepared by the parties' lawyers long after the events also

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distort the accurate picture, even though they are meant to assist the court.”

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In the present case, the inconsistencies made the

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prosecution’s case suspect that the accused had accepted the money from the informant.

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It is undisputed that the money was recovered from a Nawar of the cot lying outside the patwarkhana in the verandah. The possibility of the informant keeping the currency while going inside the Patwarkhana or coming out of it cannot be ruled out. This recovery is to be read with the informant’s statement that the accused had kept the money in his pocket after recovering it, which also appears to be probable because the person would normally keep the money with himself and not in a drawer of the cot lying outside the office. Thus, the recovery from the Nawar made the prosecution’s case suspect.

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The incident occurred on 23.01.2010. Harwinder (DW1) proved the daily diary (Ext.DW1/A) in which an entry No. 208 was made on 14.01.2010 regarding the cancellation of the mortgage after the repayment of the loan. This entry was made much before the date of the incident. It was laid down in Kanhaiyalal v. State of Rajasthan, 1998 SCC OnLine Raj 342: 1998

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Cri LJ 3155, that when no work was pending with the accused, no bribe could have been given to him. It was observed at page 3159:

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“13… It is proved by this negative evidence that no such verification was made by the patwari. Hence form to obtain a subsidy for Rukmani could not have been and was not presented to the accused appellant. So no work was pending, and the demand of Rs. 100/- could not have been made by the accused appellant. When it is proved beyond doubt from the record that no such application form was submitted, it cannot be held that any work was pending with the accused and any demand could be made by him in relation to the sanction to be made with regard to the deepening of the well. P.W. 1 Radhey Shyam has himself admitted that he did not pay the money for the purpose. According to him, instead, the amount was paid to the accused appellant for the work which had already been done and for which there is no charge against the accused appellant .” (Emphasis supplied)

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In Suryabhan v. State of Maharashtra, 1994 SCC OnLine

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Bom 428: (1996) 1 Bom CR 46: 1995 Cri LJ 107, mutation was already entered by the accused, which was certified and approved before the alleged demand of a bribe. It was held that the essential ingredient that the money was demanded as a motive or reward for doing an official act was missing. It was observed at page 52:

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“12. ..The copy of the extract of the mutation register (Exh. 67) shows that the mutation has been effected in the mutation register on 2-1-1986 itself. The said mutation was made on 2-1-1986, and it is recorded that the concerned persons were intimated on 2-1-1986. It is

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further apparent from the said document that the mutation, which was effected in the names of Shankar Ingole (P.W. 11), Dayaram Ingole (P.W. 7) and Bhaiya Ingole (P.W. 9), was certified by the Revenue Inspector on 31-1-1986. Both Shankar Ingole (P.W. 11) and his brothers Bhaiya Ingole (P.W. 9) and Dayaram (P.W. 7) are shown to be present at the time of verification and certification by the Revenue Inspector. It is recorded in the said register that the persons named Bhaiya (P.W. 9), Dayaram (P.W. 7) and Shankar (P.W. 11) were present and on verification of the will deed, they admitted that Bhagirathibai has died. On that, the mutation which was effected on 2-1-1986 by the accused was certified on 31-1-1986. When the mutation was effected on 2-1-1986 by the accused - appellant and it was duly certified by the Revenue Inspector on 31-1-1986 in the presence of Shankar Ingole (P.W. 11), Dayaram (P.W. 7) and Bhaiya Ingole (P.W. 9), it becomes unbelievable and in any case highly doubtful that the accused demanded the sum of Rs. 200/- in May, 1986. It will be further seen from the statement of P.W. 7 Dayaram Ingole that the agricultural field was partitioned amongst the brothers, namely, Dayaram (P.W. 7), Bhaiya (P.W. 9) and Shankar (P.W. 11) in February 1986. It is thus clear that after the mutation was effected on 2-1-1986 and duly certified on 31-1-1986, the partition of agricultural land took place between the three brothers and thus it can be inferred that Shankar Ingole (P.W. 11), Bhaiya Ingole (P.W. 9) and Dayaram Ingole (P.W. 7) knew that the mutation was effected on 2-1-1986 and was duly certified on 31-1-1986 by the Revenue Inspector. The statement of these three brothers, namely, P.W. 7 Dayaram, P.W. 9 Bhaiya and P.W. 11 Shankar, to the contrary that they were not present on 31-1-1986 before the Revenue Inspector cannot be believed. This is further fortified from the fact that on 5-5-1986 one of the brothers Bhaiya (P.W. 9) has sold his share of agricultural land to Ishwar Raut by the registered sale-deed (Exh. 98). If the mutation had not been effected on 2-1-1986 and certified on 31-1-1986 and was not in the knowledge of

¶136

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these three brothers as alleged, Bhaiya could not have sold his share on 5-5-1986 much before the date of incident on 16-5-1986. From this evidence, it can be inferred that the prosecution’s case that Rs. 200/- was demanded by the accused - appellant from Madhukar Ingole (P.W. 1) as gratification as a motive or reward for effecting the entries in the mutation register in favour of Shankar and his brothers does not inspire confidence and cannot be believed. On the face of the facts that the mutation was already effected by the accused - appellant on 2-1-1986, which was certified by the Revenue Inspector on 31-1-1986 and the post conduct of Shankar Ingole and his brothers of partition of their respective shares in February, 1986 and the sale of share by one of the brothers Bhaiya (P.W. 9), the prosecution story about the demand of Rs. 200/- by the accused - appellant from Madhukar Ingole (P.W. 1) as gratification as a motive or reward for effecting entries in the mutation register in favour of Shankar and his brothers becomes highly improbable and can be said to be suffering from inherent improbabilities . There is no reason to doubt the correctness and genuineness of the entries recorded in the mutation register on 2-1-1986 and 31-1-1986 respectively….” (Emphasis supplied)

¶139

21.

¶140

Similar is the judgment in Chandrasen v. State of

¶141

Maharashtra, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 277, wherein it was observed:

¶142

“36. Therefore, going through the entire evidence brought on record and more particularly, the evidence of P.W.1 Laxman complainant, it is clear that the complainant and his two sons were released on bail in the police station and on the next day their bail was accepted in the Chapter Case in Tahsil Office at Beed. This fact is also corroborated by P.W.2 Vasant, who has proved Exh. 19/1 to 19/7. These documents would show that in Chapter Case No. 1/91, the complainant and his sons were released on furnishing P.R. bond of Rs. 500/- on 2.1.1991, and in Chapter Case No. 3/91, they were released on furnishing

¶143

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P.R. bond of Rs. 2000/- on 4.1.1991 by accepting surety. Therefore, P.W.1 himself has stated that they were released on bail six days prior to the date of the trap. Therefore, one of the essential ingredients of section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, that the amount of Rs. 300/- was received by the accused/appellant from Laxman Arey P.W.1 as gratification as a motive or reward for releasing him on bail, has not been proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.”

¶146

In S.D. Amalraj vs. State Cr.A. no. 490 of 2002, decided

¶147

on 25.1.2008 (Madras High Court), the order was passed and placed on file for issuing a license. It was held that the demand of bribe for issuing the license was not probable. It was observed:

¶148

“10. When the accused has already passed an order to issue a licence and sent the file to A.4 clerk even on 24.8.1998, nothing remains to be done by the accused thereafter. It is the duty of A.4 Clerk to wait for three days or one week, whether the applicant (P. W.2) comes and gets the licence or otherwise, A.4 Clerk should have sent the licence to the applicant by post. P. W.1 Collector himself has admitted as follows: -... (vernacular matter omitted).

¶149

Therefore, the payment of a bribe after completion of the official favour is a serious lacuna in the prosecution case, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of U. P. Vs. Jagdish Singh Malhotra, 2003 SCC(Cri) 1008 . In the present case, on the facts, there is no official favour persisted at all when already the appellant has ordered for an issue of a licence.

¶150

In Ram Smugh Mourya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2002 2 CurCriR 169 , the Madhya Pradesh High Court has held as follows:-

¶151

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¶153

"17. In the present case, the purpose for which the money was demanded as illegal gratification by the appellant was already served much prior to the alleged demand of Rs.100/- to the appellant for releasing the complainant and his son Mohan. Complainant Rajaram was also given notice for appearance before the Court for filing the charge sheet. In the circumstances, it would be difficult to believe that the appellant was demanding money for the work which had already been done. If the money was not paid by the complainant, after his release on surety, Deokaran (PW.5) was never called and asked for the payment of money because, as per the prosecution case, on his assurance, the complainant Rajaram and his son were released on bail. This fact is also tilting the balance of innocence in favour of the appellant. "

¶154

In S. Suryanarayana Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, 2000 CrLJ 2377 , the Karnataka High Court has held as follows:-

¶155

. . . Unless there is corroboration by other materials, it is difficult to hold that the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt that there was demand and acceptance. Moreover, another hole in the jacket of the prosecution is that the file was left on 22.7.1986 itself with P. W2 to conduct the survey. In view of these facts and circumstances of the case, naturally, the doubt arises as to the genuineness of the prosecution’s story. Hence, the benefit of the doubt is extended to the appellant"

¶156

14 In M. K. Shanmugasundaram Vs. The Inspector of Police, V and AC, Salem, 2007 1 LW(Cri) 199 , this court held that.

¶157

"Like every other criminal case, a case of bribery is subject to the rule that the accused is presumed innocent and that the burden to discharge the said innocence is paramountly on the prosecution. However strong the suspicion against the accused,

¶158

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¶160

if every reasonable possibility of innocence has not been excluded, he is entitled to an acquittal. If, therefore, the evidence regarding the demand and acceptance of a bribe leaves room for doubt and does not displace the presence of innocence wholly, the charge cannot be said to have been established.

¶161

Similar is the judgment in Basavaraj I. v. State of

¶162

Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 1084, wherein it was observed:

¶163

“13. According to the case of PW 1, on 23-3-2000, he visited the appellant's of fi ce to request her to issue a fnal i assessment order. According to his case, at that time, initially, the appellant reiterated her demand of Rs. 3000. But she scaled it down to Rs. 2000. Admittedly, on 15-32000, the said Society was served with a notice informing the said Society that an exemption had been granted from payment of commercial tax to the said Society. Therefore, the said Society was not liable to pay any tax for the year 1996-1997. The issue of the f i nal assessment order was only a procedural formality. Therefore, the prosecution's case about the demand of bribe made on 23-3-2000 by the appellant appears to be highly doubtful.”

¶164

In the present case, the appellant/accused had made

¶165

an entry in the rapat roznamcha much before the demand of a

¶166

bribe. Therefore, the prosecution’s case regarding the demand of bribe would become suspect.

¶167

The informant has not stated anything about the demand of money by the accused on the date of incident. The statement of Sanjeev Kumar (PW3) also does not mention that the accused had demanded any bribe from the informant in his

¶168

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presence. He only stated that the informant went to Patwari and talked about the money. He gave ₹3000/- to Patwari, and both of them came out. Thus, his statement is silent regarding any demand of bribe having been made by the accused. It was laid down by this Court in State of H.P. v. Kishan Dev, 2009 SCC OnLine HP 907, that the shadow witness is supposed to see and overhear what happened. He provides corroboration to the informant’s testimony. It was observed:

¶171

In Meena (SMT) W/o Balwant Hemke v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 5 SCC 21, the Supreme Court observed:

¶172

“Law has always favoured the presence and importance of a shadow witness in the trap party, not only to facilitate such a witness to see but also to overhear what happens and how it happens also.”

¶173

Thus, his testimony tarnishes the very basis of the prosecution’s case.

¶174

xxxx

¶175

The need to include independent, disinterested and reputable persons of the area and locality for evidencing the trap has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 91, in the following terms:

¶176

“We must take this opportunity of impressing on the officers functioning in the Anti-Corruption Department to insist on observing this safeguard as zealously and scrupulously as possible for the protection of public servants against whom a trap may have to be laid. They must seriously endeavour

¶177

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¶179

to secure really independent and respectable witnesses so that the evidence in regard to the raid inspires confidence in the mind of the court and the court is not left in any doubt as to whether or not any money was paid to the public servant by way of a bribe.

¶180

Further, in State of H.P. v. Tej Ram 1989 (2) Shim. L.C. 9 of this court, relied upon by the learned trial court, held:

¶181

“It is the duty of the prosecution to join independent and disinterested persons in the raiding party…. The prosecution could have easily, while on the way to the place of the accused, included independent, disinterested and respectable persons of the area and locality for evidencing the trap”

¶182

In Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211 in para-20, the apex court held:

¶183

“We must not forget that in a trap case the duty of the officer to prove the allegations made against a government officer for taking bribe is serious, and therefore, the officers functioning in the Vigilance Department must seriously endeavour to secure really independent and respectable witnesses so that the evidence in regard to raid inspires confidence in the mind of the court and the court is not left in any doubt whether or not any money was paid to the public servant by way of bribe. It is also the duty of the officers in the Vigilance Department to safeguard the protection of public servants against whom a trap case may have been laid.”

¶184

This position was reiterated in Prithvi Raj v. State of

¶185

H.P., 2015 SCC OnLine HP 1933 , wherein it was observed: -

¶186

24. The apex Court in Meena (Smt) w/o Balwant Hemke v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 5 SCC 21 has held that “Law has always favoured the presence and importance of a

¶187

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¶189

shadow witness in the trap party, not only to facilitate such witness to see but also to overhear what happens and how it happens”. The Court further held that “The Corroboration essential in a case like this for what actually transpired at the time of the alleged occurrence and acceptance of a bribe is very much wanting in this case”.

¶190

25. Also, the apex Court in Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1762 has held as under:-

¶191

… … The corroboration must be by independent testimony confirming in some material particulars not only that the crime was committed but also that the appellant committed it. It is not necessary to have corroboration of all the circumstances of the case or every detail of the crime. It would be sufficient if there was corroboration as to the material circumstances of the crime and of the identity of the accused in relation to the crime. These principles have been settled in R. v. Baskerville, (1916) 2 KB 658 , which has rightly been considered as the locus classicus of the law of approver's evidence and has been followed by courts in India.”

¶192

xxxxx

¶193

27. It is also a settled principle of law that shadow witnesses must overhear the conversation of the demand of bribe and unequivocally depose to such fact in court. In this regard, reliance can be sought on the following observations made by the apex Court in Bal Krishan Sayal v. State of Punjab, (1987) 2 SCC 647 as under:-

¶194

“3. Two outsider witnesses had been examined in the case, being Khazan Singh and Ram Chander, in support of the case. Khazan Singh, as noticed by the High Court, did not speak as to what transpired in the conversation between the bribe giver and the appellant. The other witness, too, was not very clear as to what talk preceded the passing of the two

¶195

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¶197

currency notes. The High Court took the view that even if the prosecution had not indicated what exactly the conversation was, once the passing of the two currency notes was accepted, it was for the appellant to explain the circumstances under which the same had been received. Another contention which had been raised before the High Court was that the total penal rent due from Gurcharan Ram was Rs. 102/-, and to obtain a waiver of this, it was unlikely that Gurcharan would have agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 100/- as a bribe. We wanted to find out exactly how much of the penal rent was due and, therefore, sent for the record. From the record, it is apparent that the demand was of Rs. 102/-, which Gurcharan Ram wanted to be waived. There is no material to show whether there was a likelihood of any additional demand to be raised against him. Taking the unsatisfactory character of the prosecution evidence in regard to the conversation preceding the passing of the currency notes and the feature that for waiver of Rs. 102/-, the bribe of Rs. 100/- was offered, we are inclined to take the view that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt and the appellant is entitled to this benefit of this situation. The appeal is allowed, and the convictions and the sentences are set aside.”

¶198

In the present case, the testimony of the shadow witness does not establish the demand for the bribe.

¶199

Sanjeev Kumar (PW3) categorically stated that the currency notes could not be traced. The Patwari took out currency notes from the Nawar of the cot. The police seized the currency notes and got the hands of the accused washed. He was

¶200

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¶202

put forward as a witness of truth. His testimony that the accused had taken out the money from the cot explains the handwash turning pink. Hence, the fact that the hand wash had turned pink cannot be used against the accused.

¶203

It was submitted that the other witnesses specifically stated that the hands were washed before effecting the recovery, and the testimony of shadow witness Sanjeev Kumar is to be ignored. This submission cannot be accepted. It is trite to say that when two versions are appearing on record, the version in favour of the accused has to be preferred to the version in favour of the prosecution. In the present case, touching of currency notes by the accused before the hand wash is in favour of the accused and has to be preferred to the touching of currency notes after the hand wash.

¶204

It was submitted that the recovery of currency notes at the instance of the accused is sufficient to implicate him. This submission will not help the prosecution. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Banarsi Dass Vs. State 2010 (4) SCC 450 that in the absence of demand and acceptance, the accused cannot be held liable. It was observed:-

¶205

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¶207

“23. To constitute an offence under Section 161 of the IPC, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that there was a demand of money and the same was voluntarily accepted by the accused. Similarly, in terms of Section 5 (1) (d) of the Act, the demand and acceptance of the money for doing a favour in the discharge of its official duties is the sine qua non to the conviction of the accused.

¶208

In the case of M.K. Harshan v. State of Kerala 1996 (11) SCC 720 , this Court, in somewhat similar circumstances, where the tainted money was kept in the drawer of the accused who denied the same and said that it was put in the drawer without his knowledge, held as under :

¶209

“...It is in this context that the courts have cautioned that, as a rule of prudence, some corroboration is necessary. In all such cases of bribery, two aspects are important. Firstly, there must be a demand, and secondly, there must be acceptance in the sense that the accused has obtained the illegal gratification. Mere demand by itself is not sufficient to establish the offence. Therefore, the other aspect, namely, acceptance, is very important, and when the accused has come forward with a plea that the currency notes were put in the drawer without his knowledge, then there must be clinching evidence to show that it was with the tacit approval of the accused that the money had been put in the drawer as an illegal gratification. Unfortunately, on this aspect in the present case, we have no other evidence except that of PW-1. Since PW-1's evidence suffers from infirmities, we sought to find some corroboration but in vain. There is no other witness or any other circumstance that supports the evidence of PW-1 that this tainted money, as a bribe, was put in the drawer, as directed by the accused. Unless we are satisfied on this aspect, it is difficult to hold that the accused tacitly accepted the illegal gratification or obtained the same within the meaning of Section 5(1) (d) of the Act, particularly when the version of the accused appears to be probable.

¶210

34

¶211

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¶212

Reliance on behalf of the appellant was placed upon the judgment of this Court in the case of C.M. Girish Babu (supra), wherein the facts of the case, the Court took the view that mere recovery of money from the accused by itself is not enough in the absence of substantive evidence for demand and acceptance. The Court held that there was no voluntary acceptance of the money knowing it to be a bribe and giving an advantage to the accused of the evidence on record, in Para 18 and 20 of the judgment, held as under :

¶213

"18. In Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1979 (4) SCC 725, this Court took the view that (at SCC p. 727, Para 2) mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused, in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of a bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe.

¶214

A three-Judge Bench in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P. 2001 (1) SCC 691 while dealing with the contention that it is not enough that some currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make it acceptance of gratification and prosecution has a further duty to prove that what was paid amounted to gratification, observed: (SCC p. 700, Para 24)

¶215

"24. ... we think it is not necessary to deal with the matter in detail because in a recent decision rendered by us, the said aspect has been dealt with at length. (Vide Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra 2000 (8) SCC 571 ). The following statement made by us in the said decision would be the answer to the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel: ( Madhukar case, SCC p. 577, Para 12 )

¶216

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¶217

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¶218

The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said premise is established, the inference to be drawn is that the said gratification was accepted "as a motive or reward" for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Therefore, the word "gratification" need not be stretched to mean reward because the reward is the outcome of the presumption, which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other, like "gratification or any valuable thing". If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act, the word "gratification" must be treated in the context to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who received it."

¶219

In fact, the above principle is no way derivative but is a reiteration of the principle enunciated by this Court in Suraj Mal case (supra), where the Court had held that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of prosecution against the accused in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money. Reference can also be made to the judgment of this Court in Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan 1975 (2) SCC 227 , where a similar view was taken.”

¶220

Similar is the judgment in B. Jayaraj vs. State of A.P.

¶221

2014(13) SCC 55, where it was observed as under:-

¶222

“7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal

¶223

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¶224

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¶225

gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. (2010) 15 SCC 1 and C.M. GirishBabu v. CBI (2009) 3 SCC 779 .”

¶226

This position was reiterated in the State through the

¶227

Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Dr Anup Kumar Srivastava 2017(15) SCC 560 wherein it was observed:-

¶228

“7. The essential ingredients of Section 7 are:

¶229

(i) that the person accepting the gratification should be a public servant;

¶230

(ii) that he should accept the gratification for himself and the gratification should be as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official function, favour or disfavour to any person.

¶231

Insofar as Section 13 (1) (d) of the Act is concerned, its essential ingredients are:

¶232

(i) that he should have been a public servant;

¶233

(ii) that he should have used corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abused his position as such a public servant and

¶234

(iii) that he should have obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or for any other person.

¶235

In the case of C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Government of India 1997 (9) SCC 477 , this Court had an occasion to consider the word "obtained" used in Section 5(1)(d) of

¶236

37

¶237

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¶238

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (now Section 13(1) (d) of Act, 1988), and it was held:

¶239

"12. The position will, however, be different so far as an offence under Section 5(1) (d) read with Section 5(2) of the Act is concerned. For such an offence prosecution has to prove that the accused "obtained" the valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as a public servant and that too without the aid of the statutory presumption under Section 4(1) of the Act as it is available only in respect of offences under Section 5(1)(a) and (b) -- and not under Section 5(1)(c), (d) or (e) of the Act. "Obtain" means to secure or gain (something) as the result of request or effort (Shorter Oxford Dictionary). In case of obtainment the initiative vests in the person who receives and in that context a demand or request from him will be a primary requisite for an offence under Section 5(1) (d) of the Act unlike an offence under Section 161 IPC, which, as noticed above, can be, established by proof of either "acceptance" or "obtainment."

¶240

The legal position is no more res integra that the primary requisite of an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act is proof of a demand or request of a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage from the public servant. In other words, in the absence of proof of demand or request from the public servant for a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage, the offence under Section 13(1) (d) cannot be held to be established .” (Emphasis supplied)”.

¶241

A similar view was taken in Aman Bhatia v. State (NCT

¶242

of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013, wherein it was observed:

¶243

52. It is well-settled that mere recovery of tainted money, by itself, is insufficient to establish the charges against an accused under the PC Act. To sustain a conviction under

¶244

38

¶245

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¶246

Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act, respectively, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the public servant voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe. The courts have consistently reiterated that the demand for a bribe is sine qua non for establishing an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act.

¶247

53. A five-Judge Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731 , categorically held that an offer by bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. Mere acceptance of illegal gratification without proof of offer by the bribe-giver and demand by the public servant would not make an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the PC Act. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:

¶248

“ 88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

¶249

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without there being any demand from the public servant, and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

¶250

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification, which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

¶251

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¶253

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant, respectively, have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively, of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is accepted by the public servant, which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶254

54. It was further explained by this Court in P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152 , as follows:

¶255

“ 23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act and in the absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶256

55. From the above exposition of law, it may be safely concluded that mere possession and recovery of tainted currency notes from a public servant, in the absence of proof of demand, is not sufficient to establish an offence

¶257

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¶259

under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, respectively. Consequently, without evidence of demand for illegal gratification, it cannot be said that the public servant used corrupt or illegal means, or abused his position, to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage in terms of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

¶260

56. The present case is not one of an “ offer to pay by the bribe-giver ” where, in the absence of any demand from the public servant, the mere acceptance of illegal gratification would constitute an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. The expression “offer” indicates that there is a conveyance of an intention to give, which must be communicated and understood by the recipient, leading to the meeting of minds. Consequently, the offer is accepted. For such an acceptance to constitute an offence under Section 7, there must be clear and cogent evidence establishing that the public servant was aware of the offer and accepted it voluntarily, knowing it to be illegal gratification. In other words, even where there is no express demand, the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker must be shown to have been ad idem as regards the factum of the offer of a bribe.

¶261

In the present case, the money was not even

¶262

recovered from the possession of the accused but from a cot lying outside the patwarkhana in a verandah. Therefore, mere recovery of the currency notes is not sufficient to fasten the liability.

¶263

Learned Trial Court held that the currency notes were recovered at the instance of the accused and that was sufficient to fasten him with the liability, which is contrary to the record.

¶264

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¶265

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¶266

Vivek Mahajan (PW2) stated that the police party tried to trace the currency notes, but they could not be found. The raiding party noticed the currency notes between the Nawar of the plastic. Mohan Lal (patwari) was shown the same, and one of the Vigilance officials took out the currency notes. Hence, as per this version, the currency notes were not recovered at the instance of the accused but were noticed by the members of the raiding party.

¶267

Tilak Raj (PW4) stated that a Vigilance official searched the room where the members of the raiding party were sitting while other officials with the accused recovered, six currency notes from the Nawar of the cot lying in a standing position. Mohan Lal, Patwari, took out the currency notes. He has also not stated that the currency notes were recovered at the instance of the accused. Hence, his testimony does not establish the fact that the money was recovered at the instance of the accused.

¶268

In the present case, the Investigating Officer did not verify the demand for a bribe and associated Sanjeev as a shadow witness who is the informant’s friend. It was laid down

¶269

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by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mir Mustafa Ali Hasmi v. State of A.P. , (2024) 10 SCC 489: (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 86: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1689 that where the Investigating Officer did not verify the demand of bribe before laying the trap and associated a close friend of the informant, the prosecution case is suspect. It was observed at page 503:

¶272

“32. It is the settled convention in such cases that the Trap Laying Officer makes efforts to verify the factum of the demand of a bribe by the public servant before initiating the trap proceedings. The factum of the demand for a bribe can also be verified by recording the telephonic conversation between the decoy and the suspect public servant. Often, a recording device is secretly placed on the person of the decoy to record the conversation that would transpire during the course of acceptance of a bribe by the public servant. However, no such steps were taken by the DSP (PW 10), who straight away organised the trap without making any effort whatsoever to verify the factum of demand attributed to the appellant (AO-1) and AO-2.

¶273

33. It is relevant to mention here that PW 2 was the only witness associated by the DSP/TLO (PW 10) to accompany the complainant (PW 1) for witnessing the transaction of demand and acceptance of a bribe. Evidently, thus, PW 2 was kept as a shadow witness in the case. During the course of the trial, the complainant (PW 1) and PW 2 both admitted that they were close friends. The complainant (PW 1) and PW 2, being close friends, it can safely be assumed that PW 2 was an interested witness. Hence, it is also manifested that TLO/DSP (PW 10) did not make any effort whatsoever to associate an independent person to act as a shadow witness in the trap proceedings. It is recorded in the memorandum of the pre-trap

¶274

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proceedings (Ext. P-4) that it was the DSP (PW 10) who summoned PW 2 and asked him to act as a shadow witness to oversee and overhear the transaction of acceptance of illegal gratification. However, this fact is totally contradicted by the version as set out in the evidence of the complainant (PW 1) and PW 2. Both categorically stated that it was the complainant (PW 1) who asked PW 2 to accompany him during the trap proceedings scheduled to take place on the morning of 23-1-2003.

¶277

34. In normal course, before proceeding to the stage of trap, it was incumbent upon the DSP (PW 10) to get an independent verification done of the alleged demand which fact assumes prominence considering the circumstance that the accompanying shadow witness, Ramesh Naidu (PW 2) is a close friend of the complainant (PW 1) who himself bore a grudge against the appellant (AO-1) on account of the fine of Rs 50,000 imposed on the sawmill.”

¶278

Therefore, the evidence led by the prosecution is highly discrepant, and the prosecution’s witnesses contradicted each other on a material aspect. Learned Trial Court erred in accepting such evidence. Therefore, the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court cannot be sustained.

¶279

In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed, and the judgment and order dated 29.08.2012 and 31.08.2012 passed by the learned Trial Court are set aside, and the accused is acquitted of the charged offences. The fine amount be refunded to the accused after the expiry of the period of

¶280

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limitation, in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, it be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

¶283

In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the appellant/accused is directed to furnish personal bond in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the appellant/accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

¶284

A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.

¶285

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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17^th December, 2025 (Nikita)

Mohan Lal v. State

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Mohan Lal v. State

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