Partly allowed

State v. Manohar Lal

Himachal Pradesh HC10 Jul 2024CR.A/492/2011

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

High Court dismissed the State's appeal and disposed of the accused's appeal as having been compromised. While Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable, the Court exercised inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings where the specific charge was not proven and parties had settled.

What did the court decide?

Criminal Appeal No. 492 of 2011 dismissed; Criminal Appeal No. 288 of 2011 disposed of as compromised with conviction set aside.

State Vs Manohar Lal — Quashing and FIR | Himachal Pradesh HC (2024)

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( 2024:HHC:4990-DB )

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.

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Cr. Appeal No. 492 of 2011 a/w Cr. Appeal No. 288 of 2011 Decided on: 10^th July, 2024

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Criminal Appeal No. 492 of 2011

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State of Himachal Pradesh .......Appellant Versus Manohar Lal ...Respondent Criminal Appeal No. 288 of 2011 Manohar Lal .......Appellant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent

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Coram

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The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹

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For the appellant: Mr. I.N. Mehta, Sr. Addl. A.G with Ms. Sharmila Patial and Mr. Navlesh Verma, Addl. A.Gs and Mr. Raj Negi, Dy. A.G. for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 492 of 2011 and for the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 288 of 2011. For the respondent: Mr. Tara Singh Chauhan, Advocate for the respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 492 of 2011 and for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 288 of 2011.

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1 Whether the reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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2 ( 2024:HHC:4990-DB )

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Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge (Oral)

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Appellant Manohar Lal, in Criminal Appeal No. 288 of 2011 was charge sheeted for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 326, 323, 324, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’), in FIR No. 62 of 2009 dated 08.04.2009 registered with Police Station, Barmana, District Bilaspur, H.P.

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The learned trial Court after a full fledge trial, acquitted the appellant of the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, but convicted him for the offences under Section 326, 324 and 506 IPC and sentenced him to undergo 3 years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- under Section 326 IPC and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for 3 months, under Section 324 of IPC, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month and under Section 506 IPC, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment and in addition, the appellant was directed to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month.

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3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, appellant Manohar Lal filed Criminal Appeal No. 288 of 2011 before this Court, while the State being aggrieved by the acquittal of Manohar Lal under Section 307 IPC has filed Criminal Appeal No. 492 of 2011.

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4. The FIR in question i.e. 62 of 2009 was registered against the appellant at the instance of Sh. Dharam Pal son of late Sh. Dila Ram and Smt. Shakuntla Devi widow of late Sh. Dila Ram, both residents of village Khalota, Post Office Namhol, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh.

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5. During the pendency of these appeals, joint application came to be filed on behalf of Manohar Lal and the complainants Dharam Pal and Shakuntla Devi for compounding the offence. It was averred that the parties are residents of the same village and closely related to each other as Smt. Shakuntla Devi is ‘Tai’ (aunt) of appellant Manohar Lal, whereas, Dharam Pal is cousin brother of Manohar Lal. These facts have also come in evidence.

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6. It was further averred in the application that with the intervention of the common relatives, the parties have amicably settled the matter between themselves and a compromise to this effect has also been entered into between the parties. A copy of the compromise has also been placed on

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record as Annexure A-1 and joint affidavit executed by both the complainants Shakuntla Devi and Dharam Pal has also been placed on record as Annexure A-2.

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7. It was also averred that the parties are living with peace for over a period of time and developed good relations with each other and the appellant does not have any criminal history. Since the matter has now been amicably settled between the parties, hence, it would be in the interest of justice, equity and fair play to compound the offence.

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8. The application came up for consideration before a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court on 09.05.2024 and the following order came to be passed:-

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“ C r.M.P. No. 406 of 2018 in Cr. Appeal No. 288 of 2011

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This application has been filed jointly by appellant as well as complainant/victim. The application was filed in April 2018 claiming that dispute between the parties stands compromised in terms of compromise deed dated 3.4.2017, placed on record with the application. Joint affidavit of Shakuntla and Dharam Pal as well as affidavit of Manohar Lal, have also been placed on record with this application.

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We are of the opinion that before taking into consideration averments made in the application and contents in the compromise deed, it would be appropriate to record statements of complainant as well as victim/injured on oath in this regard.

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Mr.Tara Singh Chauhan, Advocate submits that victim Shakuntla is 71 years old and she may have to face extreme difficulty to attend the Court at Shimla for deposing and, therefore, he requests to get the statements of the parties recorded by the Trial Court/Magistrate at Bilaspur.

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Taking into consideration aforesaid facts and submissions of learned counsel, we direct Chief Judicial Magistrate,

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Bilaspur to record statements of parties, i.e. complainant, injured/victim as well as accused Manohar Lal on oath with respect to alleged compromise entered between the parties. Parties shall remain present before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur on 20th May, 2024 for deposition, on which date Chief Judicial Magistrate shall record the statement of parties present before him and remit the same to the Registry of this High Court immediately. In case of absence of any party, adverse inference shall be drawn.

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At this stage, Mr.Tara Singh Chauhan, Advocate submits that original compromise deed and affidavits have been filed alongwith this application and for recording statements of parties original documents will be required to be produced before the Magistrate for exhibiting and, therefore, he requests to direct the Registry to supply the original documents to him after obtaining true photocopies of these documents from him. His prayer is allowed. Registry shall do the needful within two days.

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List on 27^th May, 2024.

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Copy of order be transmitted to Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur for information and compliance.

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Parties are permitted to produce downloaded copy of this order from the Webpage of High Court of Himachal Pradesh before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur and the said Magistrate shall not insist for production of certified copy.”

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9. In compliance to the aforesaid orders, learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bilaspur has recorded the statements of the parties i.e. Manohar Lal, who along-with his statement has also placed on record his affidavit Ext.C/C, Shakuntla Devi in addition to her statement has placed on record compromise deed Ext.C/A and the statement of Dharam Pal, who alongwith his statement has also placed on record the joint affidavit sworn by all the three persons vide Ext.C/B.

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10. The learned Magistrate has further certified that the parties have voluntarily made their statements in the open Court under his dictation, supervision and in his presence.

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11. Having gone through the documents, we are of the firm view that the parties indeed have compromised the matter. 12. Now, the question remains as to what would be the further course of action. There can be no doubt that Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’) does not encapsulate Sections 324 and 307 IPC under its list of compoundable offences, given the unequivocal language of Section 320(9) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly prohibits any compounding except as permitted under the said provision. Therefore, it would not be possible to compound this offence.

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13. Any such attempt by the Court would amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C. which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket of 'compoundable' offences which have been consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against

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7 ( 2024:HHC:4990-DB )

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invoking inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.

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The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very object of the administration of criminal justice.

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The legal position in this regard has been elucidated with eloquence in Ramgopal and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2022) 14 SCC 531 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court in para No. 19 has laid down the legal position, as under:-

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“19. We thus sum up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 CrPC where the Court is squarely guided by

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8 ( 2024:HHC:4990-DB )

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the compromise between the parties in respect of offences "compoundable" within the statutory framework, the extraordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 CrPC or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 CrPC. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercised carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind:

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19.1. Nature and effect of the offence on the conscience of the society;

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19.2. Seriousness of the injury, if any;

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19.3 Voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim: &

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19.4 Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.”

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Adverting to the instant case, as observed above,

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the offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable and it also falls within the category of heinous and serious offence and to be treated as crime not against an individual and normally the proceedings cannot be quashed on the ground that the parties arrived at a compromise and has resolved the matter amongst themselves as held by the three Judge Bench

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of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs.

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Laxmi Narayan and others (2019) 5 SCC 688 .

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However, that does not mean that the Court is entirely helpless in such a situation, given the fact that Monohar Lal though was charged under Section 307 IPC, but has been acquitted of the same, therefore, this Court is not to

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be influenced of the mere fact that there is mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision, it cannot order the compromise, as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmi Narayan’s case (supra) that it is always open to the High Court to examine as to whether the incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence. Thus, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of the injury sustained.

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Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it would be noticed that appellant Manohar Lal was charged with offence under Section 307 IPC only because of the injury sustained by Kunta Devi @ Shakuntla Devi on her left temporal region. As per PW-2 Dr. Anant Ram, the same was grievous in nature and the injury could be life threatening. For convicting the accused for the commission of offence punishable under Section 307 IPC, though, opinion evidence of a doctor is entitled to some weight and value, yet for adjudging the criminality of the accused, the Court has to apply tests which are innate in the ingredients of Section 307 IPC. The Court must judge the murderous assault from the act of the accused, the manner in which it was executed, the surrounding circumstances as also the result achieved together with the

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intention of the accused. The law enjoins on the Court a duty to examine such a case intent-oriented. With regard to the medical experts, it can safely be held that their opinion is mere evidence, but the ultimate judgment is of the Court in the case.

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The learned trial Court has further rightly held that the intention is to be gathered from the nature of weapon, the parts of the body where the injury is inflicted, the nature of injuries inflicted, and the opportunity available with the accused. The legal position has been correctly summed up that to constitute an offence under Section 307 IPC, the intention or knowledge must be such as is necessary to constitute murder and no conviction is legally permissible unless the prosecution proves the ingredients of Section 300 IPC of which intention or knowledge play a vital rule.

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Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law, it would be noticed that the appellant Manohar Lal had only inflicted one injury with darat on Kunta Devi on her temporal region and did not try to inflict any other injury. The doctor did not opine that the injury present on the person of Kunta Devi was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause her death.

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There is otherwise no evidence on record to prove that the appellant was having an intention or knowledge to

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cause death by causing such injury and the act committed by the appellant is not an act capable of causing death in the natural and ordinary course of things. Therefore, Section 307 IPC, as rightly held by the learned trial Court, is not attracted in the present case.

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Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 492 of 2011 titled as State of H.P vs. Manohar Lal is dismissed, whereas, Criminal Appeal No. 288 of 2011 titled as Manohar Lal vs. State of H.P. is disposed of as having been compromised and the judgment of conviction and sentence, as recorded by the learned trial Court, vide its judgment dated 20.08.2011, is ordered to be set aside.

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Both the appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending applications if any.

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Record be sent down.

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( Tarlok Singh Chauhan ) Judge

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July 10, 2024 ( Sushil Kukreja ) (naveen) Judge

State v. Manohar Lal

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

State v. Manohar Lal

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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