Dismissed

State of Hp v. Jaram singh

Himachal Pradesh HC10 Jul 2024CR.A/254/2013

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In a criminal appeal filed by the State against an acquittal in a murder case, the High Court re-evaluated the evidence which was primarily circumstantial. The Court found significant flaws in the prosecution's case, including the failure to prove ownership of the accused's clothes, the absence of a blood match between the weapon and the deceased, and the lack of established motive. Upholding the

What did the court decide?

The appeal was dismissed; the acquittal of the accused was upheld; bail bonds were discharged.

State of Hp Vs Jaram singh — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Himachal Pradesh HC (2024)

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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:4847 )

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

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	*Cr. Appeal No.* *Reserved on:*	*254 of 2013* *03.07.2024*
	*Decided on:*	*10.07.2024*
______________________ State of Himachal Pradesh Jaram Singh	__________________ Versus …	____________ …..Appellant. …Respondent.
_______________________ Coram	__________________	____________

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The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge. 1 Whether approved for reporting? No.

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_____________________________________________________ For the appellant/State: Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General, with Ms. Sharmila Patial, Mr. Navlesh Verma, Additional Advocates General, and Mr. J.S. Guleria, Deputy Advocate General. For the respondent: Mr. Vinay Thakur, Advocate.

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Sushil Kukreja, Judge.

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The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the impugned judgment dated 22.12.2012, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kangra, at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., in Sessions Case No. 8-J/VII/12, whereby the accused (respondent herein) was acquitted for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”).

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The facts giving rise to the present appeal, as per the

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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2 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:4847 )

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prosecution story, can be summarized as under:

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The accused had solemnized marriage with Raj Dulari and out of their wedlock two daughters were born. The accused was willing to transfer his property in favour of his brother Maghar Singh and his sons, but the wife of the accused used to object for this. Often the accused used to beat his wife and even in the Gram Panchayat a compromise was effected. On 09.10.2011, around 10:00 p.m., when the accused returned from a marriage party, he telephonically informed Shri Balwant Singh, father of Raj Dulari (complainant), and informed that Raj Dulari was found dead on the cot inside the house. The complainant reached the house of the accused around 11:00 p.m. and found the corpse of the Raj Dulari (deceased) lying on the cot and she had suffered injury on her neck with sharp edged weapon. The police were informed and on 10.10.2011 statement of the complainant under Section 154 Cr.P.C. was recorded, whereupon FIR was registered and the investigation commenced. During the course of the investigation, police prepared the spot map, recorded the statements of the witnesses and effected relevant recoveries. On completion of the investigation, police presented the challan in the learned Trial Court.

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The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined

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thirteen witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The accused examined no witness in his defense.

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The learned Trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated 22.12.2012 acquitted the accused for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC, hence the instant appeal preferred by the appellant/State.

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The learned Advocate General contended that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is wrong on fact as well as on law and the same is based on hypothetical reasoning, surmises and conjectures, thus the same is liable to set-aside. He further contended that the learned Trial Court appreciated the evidence in a slip-shod and perfunctory manner and failed to appreciate the evidence in its proper perspective, therefore, the instant appeal be allowed, by setting-side the judgment of the learned Trial Court and the accused be convicted.

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Conversely, the learned counsel for the accused/respondent contended that the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is the result of proper appreciation of the material on record and the same was passed after appreciating the evidence and law to its right and true perspective. He has further contended that there are major contradictions in the statements of

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the prosecution witnesses and benefit of the same goes to the accused. Lastly, it is prayed that the instant appeal, which sans merits, be dismissed.

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We have heard the learned Advocate General for the appellant/State, learned counsel for the accused/respondent and carefully examined the entire records.

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It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.

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The scope of power of appellate court in case of appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex

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Court in case titled Muralidhar alias Gidda & another vs. State

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of Karnatka reported in (2014)5 SCC 730 , which read as under :-

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"10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup[1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years.

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11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed,

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"7...........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons.

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12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu[3], Madan Mohan Singh[4], Atley[5] , Aher Raja Khima[6], Balbir Singh[7], M.G. Agarwal[8], Noor Khan[9], Khedu Mohton[10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade[11], Lekha Yadav[12], Khem Karan[13], Bishan Singh[14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai[15], K. Gopal Reddy[16], Tota Singh[17], Ram Kumar[18], Madan Lal[19], Sambasivan[20], Bhagwan Singh[21], Harijana Thirupala[22], C. Antony[23], K. Gopalakrishna[24], Sanjay Thakran[25] and Chandrappa[26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following:

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(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial

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6 Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:4847 )

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court,

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(ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal,

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(iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified.

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Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and

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(iv) Merely because the appellate court on reappreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court.”

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10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs.

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State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 Supreme Court Cases 471,

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observed as under:

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“31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows:

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31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of

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Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:4847 )

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the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir 1991 Supp (1) SCC 35

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31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows:

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31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse;

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(a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of

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U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489]

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(b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980)

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(c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393]

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(d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297]

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(e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99]

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(f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and

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capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610]

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(g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445]

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31.2.2. Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice;

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(a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502]

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(b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610]”

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11. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka,

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(2023) 9 Supreme Court Cases 581, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

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has observed that the appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after reappreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant portion of the above judgment is

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as under:

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“8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an

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appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows:

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8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;

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8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

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8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

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8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.

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9. Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After reappreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court’s view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after reappreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken.”

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Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the

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effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court.

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By applying the abovesaid principles in the case on hand, we are of the considered opinion that the view taken by the trial Court while acquitting the accused is a reasonable view based on the evidence on the record and the same cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record.

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Admittedly, in the present case there is no direct

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evidence against the accused and the case is based upon circumstantial evidence. It is a well settled law that where there is no direct evidence against the accused and the prosecution rests its case on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused. In

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other words, there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with

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the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused. All the links in the chain of circumstances must be complete and should be proved through cogent evidence.

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In the case of Harishchandra Ladaku Thange vs. State of Maharashtra, reported at AIR 2007 SC 2957, the

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Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:

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“8. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. (See Hukam Singh v.State of Rajasthan 1977CriLJ639, Eradu v. State of Hyderabad 1956CriLJ559, Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors. 1985CriLJ1479, Balwinder Singh alias Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab, 1987CriLJ330 and Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. 1989CriLJ2124. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab AIR1954SC621 it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable doubt.”

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16. In another case titled as Sanatan Naskar and Anr. v.

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State of West Bengal, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 249, it was

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observed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court as follows:

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"27. There cannot be any dispute to the fact that it is a case of circumstantial evidence as there was no eye witness to the occurrence. It is a settled principle of law that an accused can be punished if he is found guilty even in cases of circumstantial evidence provided, the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt complete chain of events

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and circumstances which definitely points towards the involvement and guilt of the suspect or accused, as the case may be. The accused will not be entitled to acquittal merely because there is no eye witness in the case. It is also equally true that an accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence subject to satisfaction of accepted principles in that regard. "

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To examine the guilt of the appellant, we must appreciate the evidence adduced by the prosecution. As per the prosecution case, accused Jaram Singh committed murder of his wife by blow of axe on 09.10.2011, at about 10:00 p.m., and after committing the offence, he washed away the blood stains on the axe and on his wearing clothes, i.e., Kurta and pyajama, to destroy the evidence. The further case of the prosecution is that the accused had made disclosure statement, Ex.PW-11/A, which was recorded by the police on 12.10.2011 pursuant to which the axe was got recovered which was concealed by him in the store of his

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house.

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So far as the recovery of axe pursuant to the disclosure statement allegedly made by the accused, no reliance can be placed upon the same as the accused admittedly remained in custody of the police w.e.f. 10.10.2011 and no disclosure statement was recorded upto 12.10.2011. The axe was allegedly recovered from the store of the house of the accused, vide memo,

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Ex. PW-3/D, in front of independent witness, who appeared in the witness-box as PW-3. In her deposition before the Court PW-3

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categorically admitted that on 10.10.2011 as well as on 11.10.2011 the police had searched the house and premises of the accused, but no incriminatory article or any weapon was found there and no

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axe was recovered from the house of the accused on 10.10.2011 and 11.10.2011. She also admitted that the accused was in police custody since 09.10.2011. She further admitted in her crossexamination that no statement of the accused regarding the recovery of the weapon was recorded in her presence. Even the I.O. (PW-13) had admitted in his cross-examination that he had searched the house and premises of the accused on 10.10.2011 and 11.10.2011, but no weapon of offence was found there. Thus, the prosecution has failed to explain as to how the weapon of offence came in the house of the accused on 12.10.2011, despite that there was no weapon of offence upto 11.10.2011.

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As per the story of the prosecution, there were blood

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stains on the axe and it was washed away by the accused in order to destroy the evidence. PW-3 also admitted that she saw some blood stains on the axe. If the axe was washed than the story of the prosecution becomes doubtful that there were blood stains on the axe. Even if it is presumed that the axe was having blood stains, but in RFSL report, Ex. PY, it has not been mentioned that human blood was detected on axe. Dr. Raman, Medical Officer

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while appearing in the witness-box, categorically deposed that no human blood was detected on axe, though blood stains were there.

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20. In Sattatiya alias Satish Rajanna Kartalla vs. State

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of Maharashtra, (2008) 3 SCC 210, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:

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"26.

…
…
… The credibility of the evidence
relating to recovery is substantially dented by
the fact that even though as per the chemical
examiner’s report the bloodstains found on
the shirt, pants and half blade were those
human blood, the same could not be linked
with the blood of the deceased. Unfortunately,
the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the
High Curt overlooked this serious lacuna in
the prosecution story and concluded that the
presence of human bloodstains on the clothes
of the accused and half blade were sufficient
to link him with the murder.”

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In the instant case also, the prosecution has failed to prove that the blood on the axe was that of the deceased, which is a serious lacuna in the prosecution story as such it cannot be said that the axe was used by the accused to kill the deceased. Therefore, the disclosure statement as well as the recovery of weapon of offence, i.e. axe in pursuance to the disclosure statement allegedly made by the accused becomes doubtful.

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Learned Advocate General next contended that there

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were blood stains on the kurta of the accused, which was recovered by the police on the date of the occurrence and

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there was no occasion of blood stains appearing on the kurta of the accused, had he not committed the murder of the deceased. However, this contention of the learned Additional Advocate General is not acceptable, as the prosecution has failed to lead any evidence to prove that Kurta, Ex. PW-2/F, and pajama, Ex. PW-2/G, belonged to the accused. The accused came to his house in the night of 09.10.2011 and no witness had deposed that he was wearing the same kurta and pajama at the time of the occurrence, which were allegedly recovered by the police. The prosecution has failed to examine any person of the house where the accused had gone to marriage party on the day of occurrence to prove that the accused was wearing same kurta and pajama at the time of the occurrence.

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22. In K. Sukumaran vs. State of Kerala, (2000) 10 SCC

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365 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is to be established that the alleged clothes of the accused on which blood of the same group as of deceased was found, actually belonged to the accused, which were having blood stains and allegedly recovered by the police. In the instant case, as observed earlier, the prosecution has failed to prove that Kurta, Ex. PW-2/F, and pajama, Ex. PW-2/G, belonged to the accused. Moreover, RFSL report, Ex, PY, demonstrates that no human blood was found on

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pajama, Ex. PW-2/G. If the pajama was of the accused and he was wearing the same at the time of the occurrence, the blood stains would have definitely appeared on the pajama also, but no human blood was detected on the pajama of the deceased, as per the RFSL report, Ex. PY. Therefore, the prosecution has clearly failed to prove that kurta, Ex. PW-2/F, and pajama, Ex. PW-2/G, belonged to the accused.

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Learned Additional Advocate General further contended that the relations between the accused and the deceased were not cordial as the accused used to beat his wife, i.e., Raj Dulari (deceased) and in this respect a report was made to Gram Panchayat Haar, where compromise, Ex.PW-7/A, was effected. However, complainant-Shri Balwant Singh (PW-7), who is the father of the deceased and Smt. Sushma (PW-4), who is the daughter of the deceased, have stated that neither any complaint nor any case was filed by the deceased against the accused. PW4, the daughter of the deceased also admitted in her crossexamination that the accused used to give money to the deceased. Shri Jagdeep Singh (PW-3), who was the then vice President of Gram Panchayat Haar also admitted that after the year 1998 no complaint was filed by the deceased against the accused. Moreover, the prosecution has not produced any independent

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witness including a neighbour or a close relative of the deceased to show that they were having frequent fights and their relation was not cordial. Therefore, from the entire evidence on record, the prosecution has failed to prove that there was any dispute between the accused and the deceased which instigated the husband of the deceased to eliminate her.

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Since the case is based on the circumstantial evidence, motive plays a vital role in determining the guilt of the accused, thus, the prosecution has to establish motive for the crime. The test for proving a case of circumstantial evidence stands entirely on a different footing than a case of direct evidence. The law relating to the role of motive in cases of circumstantial evidence is very clear as laid down in a catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Apex Court in the case of Surinder

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Pal Jain vs. Delhi Administration reported in 1993 Supp. (3)

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SCC 681 , observed as under:

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"11. There is no motive established in this case by the prosecution for the appellant to commit murder of his wife and the evidence of Tara Chand father of the deceased as well as the sister of the deceased and the tenants living in the same house disclosed that the relations between the husband and wife were cordial. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes pertinent significance as existence of the motive is an enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning in such a case. The absence of motive, however, puts the court on its guard to scrutinise the circumstances more carefully to ensure that suspicion and conjecture do not take place of legal proof."

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25. In Niranjan Panja vs. State of West Bengal, 2010 (6) SCC

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525, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that motive is an important circumstance in the cases based on circumstantial evidence. Admittedly, in the present case there is no direct evidence against the accused and the case is based upon circumstantial evidence, therefore, motive assumes significance and is an important circumstance to be proved by the prosecution.

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In the present case we find that the accused was the husband of the deceased and to prove the involvement of the appellant, who was the husband of the deceased, motive will assume significance. As per the case of the prosecution, since the accused wanted to transfer his property in the names of his brother and nephew, the deceased used to object to the same, therefore he eliminated the deceased. However, the statements of PW-3, Smt. Sunita Devi, the then President, Gram Panchayat, Haar, and PW-7, Shri Balwant Singh, father of the deceased, nowhere suggest that the property was transferred by the accused in the name of his brother and nephew. No other witness from the village of the accused has been examined by the prosecution to prove this fact. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to attribute any motive to the accused that he eliminated his wife with a motive to

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transfer his property in favour of his brother and nephew.

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In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, no

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interference in the judgment of acquittal, rendered by the learned Trial Court, is required, as the same is the result of proper appreciation of evidence and law. The appeal, which is devoid of merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged.

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Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s) disposed of.

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( Tarlok Singh Chauhan ) Judge

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( Sushil Kukreja ) Judge

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10^th July, 2024 (virender)

State of Hp v. Jaram singh

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State of Hp v. Jaram singh

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