Dismissed¶¶73

Serveshwar v. Mandul

Chhattisgarh HC7 Apr 2026SA/594/2016

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Chhattisgarh High Court, Bilaspur; SA No. 594 of 2016; second appeal under Section 100 CPC dismissed at motion stage; substantial question of law; concurrent findings of fact not interferable unless perverse; declaration of title and permanent injunction; registered sale deed dated 06.02.1968 (Ex. P/2) not conferring title without possession; vendor Nageshwar Sao's admissions; 33-year delay in mutation; defendants' adverse possession plea failed; non-interference with concurrent findings; State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal (2019) 8 SCC 637 relied on; Surguja; Serveshwar v. Mandul.

What did the court decide?

None; the second appeal was dismissed at the motion stage itself and the judgments and decrees of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court stand upheld. ¶¶73

Serveshwar Vs Mandul — Chhattisgarh HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None; the second appeal was dismissed at the motion stage itself and the judgments and decrees of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court stand upheld.

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Issue for consideration

Whether the second appeal involves a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC permitting interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below that the plaintiffs failed to prove title and possession over the suit land. +2 more

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Court's answer

In a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, interference is permissible only when a substantial question of law arises; concurrent findings of fact recorded by both courts cannot be interfered with unless shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

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Ratio / Principle

Endorsing the courts below, mere execution of a sale deed is not sufficient to confer title unless it is supported by lawful possession; the Trial Court minutely examined the registered sale deeds (Ex. P/2 and Ex. P/4) relied upon by the plaintiffs and rightly so held.

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Key takeaways

The vendor Nageshwar Sao's cross-examination admissions — that Siyambar was not present and gave no consent to the sale, that neither Siyambar nor Patisonar was in possession, and that he resold the land within about three months — materially weaken the plaintiffs' case and clearly indicate absence of possession with the vendor.ratio¶¶58
The unexplained delay of about 33 years in seeking mutation creates serious doubt regarding the genuineness of the plaintiffs' claim; the finding that the sale deed relied upon does not confer valid title is a well-reasoned and plausible conclusion based on evidence.ratio¶¶59

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC – dismissed at the motion stage itself. Plaintiffs sought declaration of title and permanent injunction over 7 plots admeasuring 2.47 acres at Village Bakela, claiming under a registered sale deed dated 06.02.1968 from Nageshwar Sao; mutation ordered in 2002 was upset in appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer. Trial Court (judgment dated 19.10.2010) dismissed the suit, treating the sale deed as a sham and holding that the plaintiffs proved neither title nor possession, while the defendants, though found in possession, failed to prove adverse possession; the First Appellate Court affirmed (31.08.2016). Held, endorsing the concurrent findings: mere execution of a sale deed does not confer title without lawful possession; the vendor's own admissions (no consent of co-owner Siyambar, no possession, resale within about three months) and the unexplained 33-year delay in seeking mutation destroyed the plaintiffs' claim; the failure of the defendants' adverse possession plea does not aid the plaintiffs, who had to independently prove title and possession. The questions raised amounted only to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact, giving rise to no substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC (relying on State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal, (2019) 8 SCC 637); appeal dismissed.

2026:CGHC:15974

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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SA No. 594 of 2016

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Digitally signed by SHOAIB SHOAIB ANWAR ANWAR Date: 2026.04.08 17:22:06 +0530

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Serveshwar S/o Late Bharosa, Aged About 42 Years Caste- Kanwar, Occupation- Agriculturist, R/o Village- Semardih, P.S. Dhourpur, Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh ...............Plaintiff No.1, Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant

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versus

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1 - Mandul S/o Siyamber Aged About 52 Years R/o Village- Bakila, P.S. And Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Shivprasad S/o Siyamber, Aged About 51 Years R/o VillageBakila, P.S. And Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh

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3 - Luxmi S/o Siyamber, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village- Bakila, P.S. And Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh

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4 - 1 Tijo W/o Late Ram, Aged About 38 Years R/o Village- Bakila, P.S.

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And Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh

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4.1 - Chuni W/o Late Ram, Aged About 36 Years R/o Village- Bakila, P.S. And Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh

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4.2 - Permila D/o Late Ram, Aged About 18 Years R/o Village- Bakila, P.S. And Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh

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4.3 - Ajay Kumar S/o Late Ram, Aged About 24 Years R/o VillageBakila, P.S. And Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh

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4.4 - Urmila D/o Late Ram, Aged About 20 Years W/o Chainu Ram,r/o Village- Bhaphouli, Post- Parsa, Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh

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4.5 - Suraj Kumari D/o Late Ram, Aged About 6 Years Minor Through Natural Guardian Mother Tijo W/o Late Ram, R/o VillageBakila, P.S. And TahsilLundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh .................Defendants

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5 - Kanwal Sai S/o Dhaneshwar Kanwar, Aged About 60 Years Occupation- Agriculturist, R/o Village- Bakila, P.S. And TahsilLundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh Died Through Lrs, Chhattisgarh

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5.1 - Sushila @ Nani D/o Kanwal Sai, Aged About 35 Years W/o Manik Sai, R/o Village- Bulga, P.S. And Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh ................Plaintiff No.2

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5.2 - Dhaniyaro D/o Kanwal Sai, Aged About 45 Years W/o Indersai, R/o Village- Padali, P.S. And Tahsil Lundra Distt. Surguja,

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Chhattisgarh

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5.3 - Keli Bai D/o Kanwal Sai, Aged About 39 Years W/o Nandu Ram, R/o Village- Bakila, P.S. And Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh

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5.4 - Keshwari D/o Kanwal Sai, Aged About 42 Years W/o Sherveshwar, R/o Village- Semardih, P.S. And Tahsil- Lundra, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh

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6 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through- Collector Surguja Ambikapur, Distt. Surguja, Chhattisgarh, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent(s)

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(Cause title taken from CIS)

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For Appellant : Shri A.N. Pandey, Advocate

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Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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08.04.2026

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By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellant/plaintiff challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 31.08.2016 passed by the Learned First Additional District Judge Ambikapur district- Surguja (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 212-A/2011 arising out of the judgment and decree dated 19.10.2010 passed by the learned 4^th Civil Judge,

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Class- II, Ambikapur District- Surguja (C.G.), in Civil Suit No.79A/2008 (Bharosa & Others vs. Mandul & Others). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court.

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The plaintiffs have instituted the present suit for declaration of title over the land described in Schedule ‘A’ appended to the plaint (hereinafter referred to as the “suit land”) and for grant of permanent injunction against the defendants.

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The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, is that they are the owners and in possession of the suit land situated at Village Bakela, comprising 7 plots admeasuring 2.47 acres. The plaintiffs purchased the said suit land from Nageshwar Sao by a registered sale deed dated 06.02.1968. However, due to lack of knowledge, they failed to get their names mutated in the revenue records. Plaintiff No.1, who belongs to the Kanwar community (Scheduled Tribe), upon acquiring knowledge, filed a revenue case before the Assistant Settlement Officer seeking mutation of the suit land in his favour. By order dated 19.07.2002, the competent authority directed mutation of the plaintiffs’ names in the revenue records on the basis of the said sale deed.

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Aggrieved by the said order, the defendants preferred an appeal, which was allowed by the Sub-Divisional Officer. Thereafter, the defendants started continuously threatening to dispossess the plaintiffs from the suit land. It is further pleaded that the plaintiffs had jointly purchased the suit land along with Kanwar Sai and are in joint possession and cultivation thereof. The order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer is stated to be illegal and contrary to law. The cause of action arose from the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer and the continuous threats of dispossession by the defendants.

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(a) The Defendants No.1 to 4 have filed their joint written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and have, inter alia, contended that the father of plaintiff No.1, late Bharosa, had filed an application before the Tehsildar, Lundra, alleging that the land purchased by him had been wrongly recorded in the names of the defendants and seeking restoration of the same in his name. It is contended that if the plaintiffs had in fact purchased the suit land, they ought to have taken steps to get their names mutated during the

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lifetime of the defendants’ father, late Siyambar, which they failed to do.

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(b) It is further pleaded that the entire suit land stood recorded in the name of Siyambar during his lifetime and, after his death, was duly recorded in the names of the defendants in the revenue records. The defendants further stated that the suit land, along with other properties, was partitioned among them by order dated 24.02.1995 passed by the Tehsildar, Dhawarpur, in Mutation Case No. 3, and they have been in peaceful possession of their respective shares since then without any objection from the plaintiffs. By virtue of such continuous and hostile possession, the defendants claim to have perfected their title by adverse possession.

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(c) The defendants further contend that the suit land was originally purchased by their father Siyambar from Lalo and Devanath, sons of Jangsai, and possession was delivered to him. It is also pleaded that no person by the name of “Patisunar” ever resided in Village Bakela, and therefore, any alleged sale deed executed by such person in favour of Nageshwar Sao is forged and fabricated, conferring no right or title. It is further contended that neither Nageshwar Sao

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nor the plaintiffs ever remained in possession of the suit land or took steps for mutation, and thus no title accrued in their favour. The defendants asserted that they have been in possession of the suit land since the lifetime of Siyambar. The suit is further stated to be barred by limitation and not maintainable, as the plaintiffs are not in possession and have not sought relief of possession. It is also contended that part of the suit land bearing Khasra Nos. 161/01 (0.065 ha), 166 (0.036 ha), and 167/2 (0.023 ha) has fallen to the share of Ramdhari in partition and stands recorded in his name, but he has not been impleaded as a party to the suit, and therefore, the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary party.

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After appreciating the evidence available on record and after framing the issues, the learned trial Court by the judgment and decree dated 19.10.2010 dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove title and possession, and their sale deed was treated as a sham. The defendants were found in possession but could not prove adverse possession. Hence, the suit for declaration and injunction was dismissed. Thereagainst, the Civil Appeal preferred by the plaintiff, which has been dismissed vide the impugned

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judgment and decree by the learned First Appellate Court. Thus, this appeal by the plaintiff.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment and decree is wholly illegal, perverse and contrary to the settled principles of law, as the learned appellate court has failed to properly appreciate the registered sale deed dated 06.02.1968 (Ex. P/2) executed by Nageshwar Sao in favour of the plaintiff’s predecessor, which clearly establishes the appellant’s title over the suit property. It is contended that material oral as well as documentary evidence on record has been ignored, and findings have been recorded without proper consideration thereof. It is further urged that in absence of any counter-claim seeking cancellation of the said sale deed, the validity of the document could not have been doubted, and the conclusions drawn regarding ownership and possession are therefore manifestly erroneous. Hence, the impugned judgment, being based on misappreciation of evidence and giving rise to substantial questions of law, deserves to be set aside.

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I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the material available on record.

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Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the entire record, this Court finds that the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings against the plaintiffs after proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. The Trial Court has minutely examined the registered sale deeds (Ex. P/2 and Ex. P/4) relied upon by the plaintiffs and has rightly held that mere execution of a sale deed is not sufficient to confer title unless it is supported by lawful possession.

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From the evidence on record, particularly the statements of the plaintiffs’ own witnesses, it is evident that the plaintiffs have examined their vendor, Nageshwar Sao, as a witness. The said witness has admitted in his cross-examination that at the time of execution of the sale deed, Siyambar was not present and had not given any consent to sale the land to Nageshwar Sao. It is further noteworthy that the alleged transaction is stated to be a joint purchase wherein Siyambar was also a co-owner, yet no such consent was obtained. The witness has further admitted that neither Siyambar nor Patisonar was in possession of the suit land and that he himself did not take any steps to obtain possession, as he sold

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the land within a short period of about three months. These admissions materially weaken the plaintiffs’ case and clearly indicate absence of possession with the vendor.

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The Trial Court has also taken into consideration the material contradictions in the testimony of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, including admissions that the defendants and their predecessor Siyambar were cultivating the suit land. The unexplained delay of about 33 years in seeking mutation further creates serious doubt regarding the genuineness of the plaintiffs’ claim. In such circumstances, the finding that the sale deed relied upon by the plaintiffs does not confer valid title is a well-reasoned and plausible conclusion based on evidence.

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The First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence, has affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court, thereby giving rise to concurrent findings of fact. Although the defendants have failed to establish their plea of adverse possession, the same does not improve the case of the plaintiffs, who were required to independently prove their title and possession, which they have failed to do.

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It is well settled that in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, interference is permissible only when a substantial question of law arises. In the present case, the findings recorded by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence, are neither perverse nor contrary to law, and do not give rise to any substantial question of law.

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Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

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In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.

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The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the

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meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding.

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In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637 , reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.

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Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These

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questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all.

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Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed at the motion stage itself.

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Sd/-

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(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge

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Shoaib/Gowri

Serveshwar v. Mandul

Case brief

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What did the court decide?

Serveshwar v. Mandul

Case brief

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