Basant Kumar Nande Vs Bishmdev @ Vedprakash Nande

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2026:CGHC:15973

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NAFR

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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SA No. 433 of 2016

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SHOAIB Digitallysigned bySHOAIBANWAR ANWAR Date:2026.04.0917:07:59+0530

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Basant Kumar Nande S/o Late Shankar Nande, Aged About 57 Years Caste- Brahmin,, Occupation- Agriculture And Purohiti, R/o- VillageLahangapali, Midmida, Tahsil- Pussour, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh, Details Of The Parties Mentioned As Per The Certified Copy Of Appellate Judgment,......Plaintiff., Chhattisgarh

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... Appellant

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versus

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1 - Bishmdev @ Vedprakash Nande S/o Late Krishnaram Nande, Aged About 25 Years R/o- Beladula, Raigarh, Tahsil And DistrictRaigarh, Chhattisgarh

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2 - Chandramani Nande, S/o Late Shanker Nande, Aged About 41 Years Occupation- Agriculture And Purohiti, R/o- VillageLoharsingh, Tahsil- Pussour, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.,

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3 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through District Collector, Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.,

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4 - Smt. Jayanti Nande, W/o Shri Basant Kumar Nande, Aged About 50 Years Occupation- Agriculture And House Work, R/o- Village-

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Lahangapali Midmida, Tahsil- Pussour, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh,

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... Respondent(s)

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(Cause title taken from CIS)

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For Appellant : Shri Kaushal Yadav, Advocate appears on behalf of Shri C. Jayant K. Rao, Advocate For Respondent/State : Shri Lekhram Dhruv, Panel Lawyer

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Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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08.04.2026

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By the present appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellant/plaintiff challenges the impugned common judgment and decree dated 02.05.2016 passed by the learned Third Additional District Judge, Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 16-A/2012, arising out of the common judgment and decree dated 27.01.2012 passed by the learned Second Civil Judge, Class-II, Raigarh in Civil Suit No. 9-A/2008 (Basant Kumar Nande vs. Bhismdev & Others). For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as per their status before the learned Trial Court.

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It is noteworthy that the counter-claim filed by respondent No.

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4 was also dismissed by the learned Trial Court vide the

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aforesaid judgment and decree dated 27.01.2012. Against the said judgment and decree, both the appellant/plaintiff as well as respondent No. 4 preferred separate appeals before the First Appellate Court.

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The learned First Appellate Court, by the impugned common judgment and decree dated 02.05.2016, dismissed both the appeals filed by the appellant/plaintiff as well as respondent No. 4.

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The plaintiff has instituted the suit seeking declaration of title over the suit land admeasuring 1.691 hectares described in Schedule ‘A’, along with a declaration that the sale deeds dated 10.06.1981, 28.04.1982, 21.06.1982 and 16.04.1983 executed in favour of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are null and void, and further seeking permanent injunction restraining interference with his possession.

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The Defendant No. 4, wife of the plaintiff, has filed a counterclaim claiming title and possession over part of the suit land admeasuring 1.205 hectares (Khasra Nos. 761, 763, 872, 873, 775 and 811), asserting the same to be her stridhan property, and similarly seeking declaration and injunction against the plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2.

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It is an admitted position that the parties belong to the same Hindu joint family and that the suit lands stand recorded in the names of the plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. It is also admitted that earlier partition proceedings initiated by Defendant No. 1 before the Revenue Court were dismissed. The plaintiff’s case is that the lands were purchased from his self-earned income and by selling his wife’s ornaments, and that the inclusion of the names of his brothers in the sale deeds was out of love and by mistake. He claims exclusive possession for over 22 years and denies any right of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. He further admits the claim of Defendant No. 4 in respect of her counter-claim.

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The Defendant No. 1, on the other hand, contended that the suit property was acquired from joint family income and thus constitutes joint family property, denying the plaintiff’s exclusive ownership as well as the alleged mortgage and other assertions, and also disputing the claim of Defendant No. 4.

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The Defendant No. 4, in her counter-claim, has pleaded that she had sold her ornaments i.e. 6 tolas of gold and 15 tolas of silver, for a sum of Rs. 9,000/- and Rs. 1,500/- respectively and

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from the said sale proceeds, purchased land admeasuring 1.205 hectares by virtue of sale deeds dated 10.06.1981 and 21.06.1982. It is her case that although the said land was intended to be purchased in her name, the same was not recorded accordingly. She has further asserted that she has been in possession of the said land through her husband and son since the date of its purchase. It is also contended that the said property constitutes her stridhan, and therefore, the plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have no right, title or interest therein. She has further pleaded that, being a lady not conversant with legal and revenue matters, she became aware only recently that her name was not reflected in the revenue records.

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After appreciating the evidence available on record and after framing the issues, the learned trial Court by judgment and decree dated 27.01.2012 dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that that the plaintiff failed to prove exclusive ownership or that the impugned sale deeds were invalid. It was further held that no partition of the suit property was established on record. Accordingly, the suit land was held to be the joint property of the plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and

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2, with possession deemed to be on behalf of all co-owners. By the same judgment and decree, the counter claim of defendant No.4 has also been dismissed. Thereagainst, two separate Civil Appeals preferred by the plaintiff as also the defendant No.4, which have been dismissed vide common impugned judgment and decree by the learned First Appellate Court. The present appeal preferred by the plaintiff.

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Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submits that the learned Trial Court and the learned First Appellate Court have committed grave errors of law in dismissing the suit by refusing to declare the impugned sale deeds as null and void, despite the same being merely nominal transactions not executed in substance by the concerned defendants. It is further submitted that the dismissal of the suit on the ground of limitation is erroneous, as the cause of action arose only upon dismissal of the partition proceedings by the revenue authorities. Learned counsel contends that the appellant had proved by cogent evidence that the suit property was purchased from his self-acquired funds, however, the Courts erroneously shifted the burden of proof upon the appellant and wrongly presumed the property to be joint family

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property without any legal basis. It is thus urged that the impugned findings suffer from illegality and perversity, warranting interference in second appeal, and that such other substantial questions of law as deemed fit may also be framed.

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I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the material available on record.

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Upon due consideration of the entire material available on record, it is found that the learned Trial Court has meticulously appreciated both oral and documentary evidence and has rightly disbelieved the plaintiff’s plea regarding the alleged family arrangement of the Loharsingh land. The certificate (Ex. P-7) relied upon by the plaintiff remained unproved as the author thereof was not examined, and the statements of supporting witnesses were found unreliable due to lack of personal knowledge. Further, from perusal of the observation made by the learned trial Court in its judgment at para 30, it is manifest that the document (Ex. P-8) shows that the land recorded in the name of the temple, thereby not supporting the plaintiff’s claim of inheritance. The Trial Court has also rightly held that the plaintiff failed to

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prove that the impugned sale deeds were nominal or liable to be declared null and void, and further failed to establish exclusive ownership or any prior partition of the suit property. Consequently, the suit property was correctly held to be joint property of the plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, and possession of the plaintiff was treated as that of a co-owner.

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The learned First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence, has affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court, and the same are concurrent findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence on record. No perversity, illegality or misapplication of law has been demonstrated by the appellant so as to warrant interference in second appeal.

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It is well settled that in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, interference is permissible only when a substantial question of law arises. In the present case, the findings recorded by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence, are neither perverse nor contrary to law, and do not give rise to any substantial question of law.

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Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

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In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.

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The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding.

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In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637 , reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.

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Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well

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as First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no

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illegality and infirmity at all.

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