Ram Das (Died) Through Lrs Vs Bisani and another

1 - Bisani And Another S/o Ramkhilawan, Aged About 63 Years R/o Village Janakpur Tehsil Bharatpur, District Korea, Chhattisgarh .................Plainti8, Chhattisgarh

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2 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Collector Korea Baikunthpur,

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District Korea, Chhattisgarh .................Defendant No.3, District : Koriya (Baikunthpur), Chhattisgarh

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... Respondent(s)

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(Cause title taken from CIS)

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For Appellant	: Shri Pavas Sharma,Advocate
For Respondent No. 1	: Shri Manjul Pal, Advocate appears on
	behalf of Shri Jai Prakash Shukla,
	Advocate
For Respondent No. 2	: Shri Anand Gupta,Dy. Govt. Advocate.

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Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge

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Judgment on Board

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07.04.2026

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By the present appeal under Section 100 of the CPC, the appellant/defendant challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 20.06.2016 passed by the Learned First Additional District Judge Manendragarh District Korea (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2014 arising out of the judgment and decree dated 28.06.2014 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Class- II, Janakpur, District Korea (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 75-A/2009 (Bisani vs. Ramdas & Others). For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court.

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(a) The civil suit has been instituted in respect of agricultural lands situated at Village Patwahi, Tehsil Bharatpur, District Korea (C.G.), bearing various Khasra numbers, as detailed in the plaint. The suit has been Bled seeking declaration of title over half share (1/2) of the suit lands, permanent injunction, and for declaring the sale deed dated 30.11.1992/01.01.1993 executed in favour of defendant No.1 as illegal, null and void.

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(b) It is an admitted position that plainti8 is a resident of Janakpur. Defendant No.2 and deceased Ganga are the children of late Ramkhilawan and Jagta. The plainti8 was brought up by Jagta. Ramkhilawan died in 1952; Raghuvar died in 1953; Ganga died issueless in 1958–59; and Smt. Jagta died in 1993. It is also admitted that no partition of the properties of late Ramkhilawan had taken place during the lifetime of Ganga.

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(c) The plainti8 has set up a genealogical tree stating that Ramkhilawan had two brothers namely; Sampat and Nachkau. Jagta was initially married to Sampat and, after his death, to Nachkau, from whom a son Bhullu was born. After Nachkau’s death, Jagta started residing with Ramkhilawan. The plainti8 claims to be the son of Ramkhilawan and his legally wedded

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wife Raghuvar and asserts that the suit lands are ancestral and coparcenary properties recorded in the name of Ramkhilawan.

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(d) It is further pleaded that after the death of Ramkhilawan, the names of the plainti8 and defendant No.2 were recorded in the revenue records. The plainti8 claims possession and cultivation over half share of the suit lands. Though a partition order was passed by the Tahsildar, the same was set aside by the Sub-Divisional OGcer, Manendragarh, vide order dated 26.10.2007. Thereafter, defendant No.2 allegedly started denying the plainti8’s title and attempting to dispossess him.

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(e) The plainti8 has also alleged that with respect to certain Khasra numbers, defendants No.1 and 2, in collusion, got a fraudulent sale deed executed in the name of Jagta. It is contended that Jagta was not the legally wedded wife of Ramkhilawan and had no right or title over the suit lands, and thus no valid title could pass to defendant No.1. The sale deed is further challenged on the ground that Jagta, being about 90 years of age at the time, was not in a sound disposing state of mind.

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(f) According to the plainti8, the cause of action arose on 26.10.2007 when the Sub-Divisional OGcer set aside the partition order and defendant No.2 denied the plainti8’s title. Accordingly, the suit has been Bled seeking declaration, permanent injunction, and cancellation of the impugned sale deed.

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(A) The Defendants No.1 and 2 have jointly Bled their written statement and pleaded that late Ramkhilawan had brought Jagta as his wife according to customary rites, and they lived together as husband and wife throughout their lives. It is denied that Raghuvar was the legally wedded wife of Ramkhilawan, and it is further denied that the plainti8 is his son. It is alleged that the plainti8, by illegal means, got his name recorded in the revenue records along with Jagta and Jamuna without their knowledge. It is further pleaded that the plainti8 had earlier Bled a partition application in the year 1988, which was dismissed by the Tahsildar holding that the plainti8 was not the son of Ramkhilawan. Thereafter, suppressing the said order, the plainti8 again Bled a partition application in 2006, in which the Tahsildar passed a partition order without proper hearing, which was subsequently set

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aside by the Sub-Divisional OGcer, Manendragarh, vide order dated 20.10.2007.

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(B) It is further pleaded by defendants No.1 and 2 that the sale deed executed by Smt. Jagta is valid, as she was the wife of late Ramkhilawan and had a share in the suit lands. On the basis of the said sale deed, defendant No.1 is the lawful owner of Khasra Nos. 421, 447 and 448. It is contended that the plainti8 has no right, title or possession over the suit lands and is not entitled to institute the suit. It is also pleaded that the suit is barred by limitation. Hence, it is prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs.

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After appreciating the evidence available on record and after

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framing the issues, the learned trial Court by the judgment and decree dated 28.06.2014 allowed the suit of the plainti8 holding that the plainti8 successfully proved that he is the son of late Ramkhilawan on the basis of old revenue records and school documents, which remained unrebutted. It further held that the suit property is ancestral in nature, and therefore the plainti8 is entitled to half share along with defendant No.2. The impugned sale deed dated 01.03.1993 was held to be illegal and not binding, and accordingly the

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suit was decreed in favour of the plainti8. Thereagainst, the Civil Appeal preferred by the defendant, which has been dismissed vide the impugned judgment and decree by the learned First Appellate Court. Thus, this appeal by the defendant.

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Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court are contrary to law and facts on record. It is contended that the suit Bled by the plainti8 for declaration and permanent injunction was barred by limitation, as the cause of action had arisen in the year 1989 when the Tahsildar dismissed the plainti8’s application for partition and directed him to approach the competent civil court, whereas the suit was instituted only in the year 2008. It is further submitted that the plainti8 has failed to prove by any admissible evidence that he is the son of late Ramkhilawan, and the learned courts have erred in placing reliance upon revenue entries, which do not constitute proof of relationship or paternity. It is also argued that the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court erred in holding the sale deed dated 01.03.1993 to be illegal on the

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ground of fraud, in absence of any speciBc pleading or evidence, ignoring that a registered sale deed carries a presumption of validity. Hence, it is prayed that the impugned judgments and decrees be set aside.

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I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the material available on record.

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Upon hearing learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record, this Court Bnds that the learned Trial Court, on proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, has rightly held that the plainti8 has proved that he is the son of late Ramkhilawan. The Bnding is based on the school certiBcate, admission register and the old revenue records of the year 1954–55, which carry a presumption of correctness, and the defendants have failed to rebut the same by any cogent evidence. The learned Trial Court has also correctly observed that the Bnding of the revenue authorities regarding paternity is not binding, as they lack jurisdiction to decide such issues.

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The learned Trial Court further held that the suit properties

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are ancestral and coparcenary in nature and that the plainti8, being the son of late Ramkhilawan, is entitled to half share

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therein along with defendant No.2. Though there was material to show that Jagta was residing with Ramkhilawan, the learned trial Court as well as learned Brst appellate Court have not accepted that she had any enforceable legal right in the coparcenary property so as to alienate the same. Consequently, it has been held that Jagta had no valid authority to execute the sale deed in respect of the suit lands.

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With regard to the sale deed dated 01.03.1993, the learned Trial Court has rightly held that the same was not proved in accordance with law, as the original document was not produced, there were apparent discrepancies in the certiBed copy, and no attesting witness was examined. The surrounding circumstances, including the advanced age of the executant, further cast doubt on its genuineness. Therefore, it was held that no valid title passed to defendant No.1.

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The learned First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, has aGrmed the Bndings recorded by the learned Trial Court and has dismissed the appeal Bled by the defendants. The concurrent Bndings so recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence and do not su8er from any perversity, illegality or material irregularity.

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The submissions advanced by learned counsel for the

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appellant with regard to limitation, lack of proof of paternity, and invalidity of the Bndings concerning the sale deed are essentially questions of fact, which have been concurrently decided by both the courts below. No substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present case within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent Bndings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such Bndings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.

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In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded Bndings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant failed to establish their case by placing cogent and suGcient material. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the Bndings so recorded.

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The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent Bndings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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It is well established that when there is a concurrent Bnding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said Bnding.

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In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637 , reiterating the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent Bnding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.

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Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being ‘substantial question of law’ within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These

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questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well as First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and inBrmity at all.

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Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby

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dismissed at the motion stage itself.

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Sd/-

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(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge

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Shoaib/Gowri

Ram Das (Died) Through Lrs v. Bisani and another

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Ram Das (Died) Through Lrs v. Bisani and another

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