Dayanand Paswan Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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CGHC010260282026

2026:CGHC:28353-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1763 of 2026

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Dayanand Paswan S/o Late Sushil Paswan Aged About 62 Years R/o Ganesh Nagar, Tifra Bilaspur P.S. Sirgitti, Tahsil -Bilaspur And District - Bilaspur (C.G.)

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... Petitioner

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versus

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1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer Tarbahar, District - Bilaspur (C.G.)

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2 - Mahendra Kumar Soni S/o Late Narmada Shankar Soni Aged About 54 Years R/o Kantinagar, Police Station Tarbahar, District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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... Respondents

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For Petitioner : Mr. Krishna Tandon, Advocate For State/ : Mr. Ashish Shukla, Additional Advocate General Respondent No.1

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge

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Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

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09.07.2026

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ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA

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1. Heard Mr. Krishna Tandon, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr.Ashish Shukla, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondent No.1.

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2. The present petition under Section 528 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has been filed with following prayers :-

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“i. This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash/set-aside the impugned first information report (F.I.R.) No. 240/2021 registered at Police Station Tarbahar, District Bilaspur (C.G.) dated 24.11.2021 for offences under section 420 of the Indian penal Code, 1860, in the interest of justice.

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ii. This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased quash/set-aside the entire Chargesheet No. 19/2023 Dated 06.05.2023 filed under section 420 of the Indian penal Code, 1860, against the present applicant, in the interest of justice.

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iii. This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash/set-aside the order taking cognizance dated 05.12.2023 by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur (C.G.)., in the interest of justice.

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iv. This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash/set-aside the entire criminal proceedings of the Criminal Case No. 8792/23 (State of C.G. vs Dayanand Paswan pending before Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur (C.G.), in the interest of justice.

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v. This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to setaside of discharge order dated 21.04.2025 passed by the JMFC, Bilaspur (C.G) in Criminal Case no.8792/2023 part of (Annexure A-1)”

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3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the complainant (NonApplicant No. 2), along with one Yatindra Nath Mishra, entered into an agreement for sale dated 25.07.2019 with the petitioner in respect of Plot No. 10 admeasuring 6000 sq. ft. situated in the layout known as "Paswan Weekend House" at Village Jali, Tehsil

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Kota (presently Beltara), District Bilaspur. It is alleged that the petitioner represented himself to be competent and authorised to sell the said plot and assured the complainant that the sale deed would be executed in their favour. Acting upon such representation, the complainant paid a sum of 7,00,000/- to the ₹ petitioner towards part of the sale consideration. According to the complainant, despite receipt of the said amount, the petitioner neither executed the sale deed nor returned the amount received. It is further alleged that the petitioner had no valid title or enforceable agreement in respect of the property and had dishonestly induced the complainant to part with money by making false representations from the very inception. On the basis of the said allegations, the FIR came to be registered for the offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC.

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4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned FIR and the consequential criminal proceedings constitute a clear abuse of the process of law and deserve to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS. It is contended that the entire dispute emanates from an agreement for sale of immovable property and is essentially contractual and civil in nature. Learned counsel submits that long before execution of the agreement with the complainant, the petitioner had entered into valid agreements with the original landowners and had paid substantial consideration through duly documented banking transactions. It is argued that the petitioner

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had a bona fide interest in the property and had disclosed all relevant facts to the complainant before execution of the agreement. It is further submitted that the sale deed could not be executed only because of the subsequent breach committed by Suresh Chandra Pandey, against whom the petitioner has already instituted a civil suit wherein the competent Civil Court has granted interim protection in his favour. Learned counsel further submits that the essential ingredient of the offence under Section 420 IPC, namely dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction, is completely absent from the allegations made in the FIR. It is also argued that the allegations relating to issuance of cheque Nos. 000163 and 000164 are demonstrably false inasmuch as the petitioner had already informed the Bank regarding loss of the said cheque leaves, which were subsequently destroyed, as confirmed by the Bank and supported by oral evidence of the Branch Manager in another judicial proceeding. Reliance has also been placed upon the testimony of the Branch Manager recorded in another judicial proceeding to contend that the said cheque leaves stood destroyed and could never have been issued by the petitioner to the complainant. According to the petitioner, the complainant has fabricated the allegations and has initiated criminal proceedings with an ulterior motive to exert pressure and recover money by converting a contractual dispute into a criminal prosecution. It is further stated that the petitioner had earlier been granted anticipatory bail by the

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Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel submits that the complainant has deliberately concealed material facts and has maliciously resorted to criminal proceedings with the sole object of exerting pressure upon the petitioner in a civil dispute. It is, therefore, prayed that the FIR, charge-sheet and all consequential proceedings be quashed.

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5. Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the petition and submits that the allegations contained in the FIR, coupled with the material collected during investigation, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. It is submitted that after conducting a detailed investigation, the Investigating Agency found sufficient material to prosecute the petitioner and accordingly filed the charge-sheet before the competent Court. Learned State counsel contends that the learned Magistrate, upon consideration of the police report, has taken cognizance and the criminal trial has already commenced. It is further submitted that the petitioner's application for discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C. has also been rejected by the trial Court after considering the material available on record. Learned State counsel argues that the defence sought to be projected by the petitioner, including the alleged agreements with the landowners, the banking transactions, the pending civil suit, the interim injunction and the controversy regarding the cheque leaves, all involve disputed questions of fact which cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under Section 528 of the BNSS. It is

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further submitted that the mere pendency of civil proceedings or the availability of a civil remedy does not bar criminal prosecution where the allegations prima facie disclose the ingredients of a criminal offence. The truthfulness or otherwise of the defence put forth by the petitioner can only be examined upon appreciation of evidence during trial. It is, therefore, submitted that no case for exercise of inherent jurisdiction is made out and the petition deserves to be dismissed. It has been further pointed out by learned State counsel that today the case is fixed before the learned trial Court for framing of charge.

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6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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7. The law relating to exercise of inherent jurisdiction for quashing criminal proceedings is no longer res integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal & Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604 , has illustratively laid down the categories of cases in which the extraordinary jurisdiction for quashing criminal proceedings may be exercised. The Court has consistently held that such power is to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and only in the rarest of rare cases. Unless the allegations made in the FIR or the material collected during investigation, taken at their face value, fail to disclose the commission of any offence or the proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides, the Court ought not to interfere.

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8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2021) 19 SCC 401 , after an exhaustive survey of the earlier precedents, has held that the High Court should not, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 BNSS), embark upon an enquiry into the reliability or genuineness of the allegations contained in the FIR or conduct a mini trial. The Court further held that where the allegations prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, the criminal proceedings should ordinarily be permitted to continue.

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9. Similarly, in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Arvind Khanna, (2019) 10 SCC 686 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while exercising inherent powers, the High Court cannot appreciate the defence of the accused or evaluate the evidentiary value of documents produced by him. Such disputed questions are required to be examined only during trial.

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10. Again, in Sau. Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2019) 14 SCC 350 , it has been held that quashing of criminal proceedings is an exception and not the rule. At the initial stage, the Court is only required to examine whether the complaint discloses the ingredients of the alleged offence. The defence of the accused cannot be considered while deciding a petition for quashing.

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11. Very recently, in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025,

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decided on 02.09.2025) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid principles and further held that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS), the High Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact or evaluate the evidentiary worth of the material collected during investigation. The Court reaffirmed the test laid down in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor and observed that criminal proceedings can be quashed at the threshold only when the material relied upon by the accused is of sterling and impeccable quality, completely demolishes the prosecution case, remains incapable of being refuted by the prosecution, and continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of Court. Unless all these parameters are cumulatively satisfied, the High Court ought not to interfere in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, leaving the parties to establish their respective cases before the trial Court in accordance with law.

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12. In the present case, the allegations contained in the FIR disclose that the petitioner represented himself to be competent to transfer the property, entered into an agreement to sell, received an amount of 7,00,000/- from the complainant and thereafter neither ₹ executed the sale deed nor refunded the amount. During investigation, the Investigating Agency collected material supporting the allegations and ultimately submitted the chargesheet before the competent Court. The learned Magistrate has already taken cognizance of the offence and, as pointed out by

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learned State counsel, the matter is listed today before the learned trial Court for consideration of framing of charge.

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13. The principal defence raised by the petitioner is that he had entered into valid agreements with the original landowners, had paid substantial consideration through banking transactions, that Suresh Chandra Pandey was merely a name lender, that a civil suit is pending in which an interim injunction has been granted, and that the allegations regarding issuance of cheque Nos. 000163 and 000164 are false. However, all these pleas involve disputed questions of fact requiring appreciation of documentary and oral evidence. The correctness of these assertions cannot be examined in proceedings under Section 528 BNSS.

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14. The contention that the dispute is purely civil in nature also cannot be accepted at this stage. It is well settled that merely because a civil remedy is available or civil proceedings are pending, criminal prosecution is not barred if the allegations prima facie disclose the commission of a criminal offence. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Others, (2006) 6 SCC 736 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a given set of facts may disclose both civil liability and criminal offence and merely because a civil remedy is available is not by itself a ground to quash criminal proceedings. Likewise, in Mohd. Ibrahim & Others v. State of Bihar & Another, (2009) 8 SCC 751 , it has been held that where the allegations disclose the ingredients of the alleged offence, criminal prosecution cannot be stifled merely on the ground that

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the dispute also has civil consequences.

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15. The petitioner has already availed the remedy of discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C., which has been rejected by the learned trial Court. At this stage, when the case is fixed for framing of charge, any detailed examination of the petitioner's defence or appreciation of the documents relied upon by him would amount to conducting a mini trial, which is impermissible in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

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16. This Court, therefore, finds that the allegations contained in the FIR, the material collected during investigation and the chargesheet disclose a prima facie case requiring adjudication during trial. None of the exceptional circumstances enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra) are attracted so as to warrant interference under Section 528 of the BNSS.

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17. Accordingly, the petition being devoid of merit is dismissed . It is clarified that the observations made herein are confined only to the adjudication of the present petition under Section 528 of the BNSS and shall not be construed as an expression on the merits of the prosecution case. The learned trial Court shall proceed with the matter, including consideration of framing of charge and the trial, independently and strictly in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observation contained in this order.

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Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice

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Chandra

Dayanand Paswan v. State of Chhattisgarh

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Dayanand Paswan v. State of Chhattisgarh

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