Umesh Kumar Dewangan Vs Paramjeet Singh

1 - Umesh Kumar Dewangan S/o Harprasad Dewangan Aged About 30 Years R/o Ward No. 06, Village- Lofandi, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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... Petitioner(s)

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versus

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1 - Paramjeet Singh S/o Harnam Singh Aged About 62 Years R/o Adarsh Colony, Behind Old High Court, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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2 - Harjeet Kaur W/o Paramjeet Singh Aged About 61 Years R/o Adarsh Colony, Behind Old High Court, Bilaspur, Tahsil And District Bilaspur (C.G.)

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3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Bilaspur, Tahsil And DistrictBilaspur (C.G.)

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... Respondent(s)

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	(cause title taken from CIS)
For Petitioner(s)	: Mr. Keshav Dewangan, Advocate
For Respondent No. 1 and 2	: Mr. Rajeev Shrivastava, Sr. Advocate along with Ms. Samidha Karambelkar and Ms. Anu Mishra, Advocate

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Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Order on Board

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08.07.2026

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1. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioner assailing the order dated 25.04.2026 passed by the learned 9th District Judge, Bilaspur, in Misc. Civil Appeal

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No. 62/2025, whereby the miscellaneous appeal preferred by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has been allowed and the order dated 24.07.2025 passed by the learned 9th Civil Judge, Junior Division, Bilaspur, in Civil Suit No. 204-A/2025 has been set aside.

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2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is the plaintiff, while respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are defendant Nos. 1 and 2 before the learned trial Court. The petitioner instituted Civil Suit No. 204-A/2025 seeking a declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property bearing Khasra No. 54/171, Diversion Sheet No. 9, Plot No. 168, admeasuring 2400 sq. ft. (0.0220 hectare), situated at Village Lingiadih, Tahsil and District Bilaspur. The case of the plaintiff is that he purchased the suit property from its owner, Smt. Snehal Arora, by a registered sale deed dated 31.03.2022 and pursuant thereto, came into possession of the suit property. In the plaint, the plaintiff has also traced the chain of title by narrating the successive transfers of the property from its earlier owners, culminating in the execution of the registered sale deed in his favour. It is further pleaded that on 24.05.2025, upon being informed by the neighbouring residents that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had commenced construction of a boundary wall over the suit land, he immediately approached the revenue authorities and thereafter instituted the present suit on 01.07.2025. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Sections 94 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking the grant of a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession over the

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suit property or raising any construction thereon during the pendency of the suit.

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3. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed their reply and contested the claim of the plaintiff. It was pleaded that their son Gurvin Singh had purchased land bearing Khasra No. 54/168, situated at Village Lingiadih, from its owner, Shri B.P. Agrawal, by a registered sale deed dated 25.07.2007. After the demise of Gurvin Singh, the names of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were mutated in the revenue records as his legal heirs. It was further pleaded that they have raised a boundary wall over the said land and have been in peaceful possession thereof. The defendants further pleaded that the property purchased by Gurvin Singh was described in the sale deed with the following boundaries: road towards the east and south, land of Nanak Gurunani towards the north, and land of Gulaba Dewangan towards the west. According to them, the very same boundaries have also been mentioned in the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff. It was, therefore, pleaded that although the plaintiff claims to have purchased land bearing Khasra No. 54/171, he is, in fact, asserting possession over the land belonging to the defendants, namely Khasra No. 54/168. It was also pleaded that the defendants have remained in continuous possession of the land since the year 2007 and that such possession had never been questioned by any previous owner before the plaintiff purchased Khasra No. 54/171. On these premises, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience and the likelihood of irreparable injury are also in their favour. Consequently, they prayed for dismissal of the application for temporary injunction.

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4. After hearing the parties and considering the material available on record, the learned trial Court, by order dated 24.07.2025, allowed the plaintiff's application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and granted a temporary injunction restraining defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over land bearing Khasra No. 54/171 or raising any construction thereon during the pendency of the suit. Aggrieved by the said order dated 24.07.2025, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 preferred Misc. Civil Appeal No. 62/2025 before the learned Appellate Court. Upon hearing the parties, the learned Appellate Court, by the impugned order dated 25.04.2026, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of temporary injunction passed by the learned trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has preferred the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

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5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner/plaintiff is in lawful possession of the suit property bearing Khasra No. 54/171, whereas defendant Nos. 1 and 2 claim title and possession over a different parcel of land, namely Khasra No. 54/168. It is submitted that the plaintiff acquired title to the suit property through a registered sale deed dated 31.03.2022 executed by its recorded owner and, pursuant thereto, was put in possession of the land. The possession of the plaintiff had never been questioned by the defendants until the present dispute arose. It is further submitted that the learned trial Court, after a detailed consideration of the pleadings, documents and the facts and circumstances, rightly recorded a finding regarding the plaintiff's possession and consequently granted

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temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over the suit property. It is argued that the learned trial Court rightly observed that, in the absence of clear identification of the boundaries and the exact location of the respective lands, the controversy essentially relates to disputed questions of fact, which can only be adjudicated upon after the parties adduce evidence during the trial. He would further submit that the demarcation report dated 26.06.2025 cannot be treated as conclusive, as it neither records the actual physical measurements of the respective lands nor establishes the physical possession of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 over the suit property. According to him, the report is founded merely upon the statements of adjoining landowners and is, therefore, insufficient to displace the plaintiff's prima facie case. It is lastly submitted that the learned Appellate Court has mechanically interfered with a wellreasoned discretionary order passed by the learned trial Court without assigning cogent reasons for upsetting the findings on the three settled ingredients governing the grant of temporary injunction. It is further submitted that if defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are not restrained from interfering with the plaintiff's possession, the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury by being deprived of the peaceful enjoyment of the property purchased by him under a valid registered sale deed. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned order dated 25.04.2026 passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside and the order dated 24.07.2025 passed by the learned trial Court granting temporary injunction be restored.

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6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2/defendant Nos. 1 and 2 opposed the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submitted that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are in lawful possession of land bearing Khasra No. 54/168, the boundaries whereof are specifically described in their registered sale deed. It is submitted that the possession of the defendants over the land comprised within the said boundaries has remained undisputed since its purchase and has never been questioned by any of the previous owners in the chain of title of the plaintiff's land. It is further submitted that, as per the plaint itself, the plaintiff claims title through a registered sale deed dated 31.03.2022 executed by Smt. Snehal Arora. The said Smt. Snehal Arora had purchased the property from Smt. Kanti Upadhyay by a registered sale deed dated 19.03.2021; Smt. Kanti Upadhyay had purchased it from Shri Shyam Rao Shendey by a registered sale deed dated 23.06.2020; Shri Shyam Rao Shendey had acquired it from Shri K.K. Ganjiwale by a registered sale deed dated 12.05.1992; and Shri K.K. Ganjiwale had, in turn, purchased it from Shri Balram Kashyap by a registered sale deed dated 17.04.1989. It is submitted that none of the aforesaid sale deeds has been produced by the plaintiff to establish the boundaries of the property conveyed under those documents. It is further submitted that a comparison of the registered sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff with the sale deed of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 reveals that both documents describe the property with identical boundaries, although they mention different Khasra numbers. This clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff is attempting to claim possession of the land belonging to the defendants under the guise of Khasra No. 54/171. It is also submitted that the sale

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deed in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 has never been challenged, their names have been duly mutated in the revenue records, and they have remained in continuous possession of the property. He also placed reliance upon the demarcation report dated 26.06.2025, submitting that the said report records the possession of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on the basis of information furnished by the adjoining landholders and supports their claim of possession. It is, therefore, submitted that the learned Appellate Court, upon a meticulous examination of the pleadings and documents produced by the parties, rightly concluded that the defendants had a stronger prima facie case and that the balance of convenience as well as the likelihood of irreparable injury also lay in their favour. The impugned order, being well reasoned and in accordance with law, does not warrant interference in the limited supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, it is prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents annexed to the petition.

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8. From perusal of the registered sale deed dated 31.03.2022 executed in favour of the plaintiff (Annexure P/2) and the registered sale deed dated 25.07.2007 executed in favour of late Gurvin Singh Chhabda, the predecessor-in-interest of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 (annexed at page 62 of the petition), reveals that the plaintiff claims title over land bearing Khasra No. 54/171, whereas defendant Nos. 1 and 2 claim title over land bearing Khasra No. 54/168. Significantly, although the Khasra numbers mentioned in the two sale deeds are different, the

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boundaries described therein are identical. It is also evident that the predecessor-in-interest of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 acquired the property under the registered sale deed dated 25.07.2007, whereas the plaintiff purchased Khasra No. 54/171 much later by the registered sale deed dated 31.03.2022. Both parties thereafter sought demarcation of their respective lands, and the demarcation reports, annexed at pages 106 and 111 of the petition, along with the corresponding demarcation panchnamas, prima facie indicate that both parties are laying claim to the same parcel of land notwithstanding the difference in the Khasra numbers. Further, the demarcation report dated 26.06.2025, annexed at page 111 of the petition, which pertains to the application for demarcation submitted by defendant Nos. 1 and 2, records that the adjoining landowners identified the disputed land as being in the possession of defendant Nos. 1 and 2. Taking into consideration the rival sale deeds, the identical boundary descriptions contained therein, as well as the material contained in the demarcation reports, the learned Appellate Court arrived at a prima facie conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to establish the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience, or likelihood of irreparable injury in his favour. Accordingly, the learned Appellate Court allowed the appeal preferred by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and set aside the order of temporary injunction passed by the learned trial Court.

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9. This Court also finds that the dispute between the parties is not merely with respect to the Khasra numbers but relates to the identity and location of the land claimed by them. While the plaintiff asserts title over Khasra No. 54/171 on the strength of the registered sale deed

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dated 31.03.2022, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 claim title and possession over Khasra No. 54/168 through a registered sale deed dated 25.07.2007 executed in favour of their predecessor-in-interest. Significantly, despite the difference in the Khasra numbers, both the sale deeds describe the property with identical boundaries. The demarcation reports placed on record, particularly the report dated 26.06.2025, also indicate that both parties are claiming the same parcel of land and further record that the adjoining landholders identified the possession of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 over the disputed property. At the interlocutory stage, the Court is not expected to finally adjudicate the question of title or identity of the property, as the same can be determined only after the parties lead evidence. However, while considering an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court is required to assess whether the applicant has established a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. In the present case, having regard to the earlier registered sale deed in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of defendant Nos. 1 and 2, the identical boundary descriptions contained in the rival sale deeds, and the material reflected in the demarcation report, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Appellate Court cannot be said to have committed any jurisdictional error or patent perversity in holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case warranting grant of temporary injunction. The view taken by the learned Appellate Court is a plausible one based on the material available on record and does not call for interference in the limited supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

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10. With respect to the scope of interference under the jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “ Shalini Shyam Shetty and another v. Rajendra Shankar Patil ” 2010 (8) SCC 329 held that:

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“40. Same principles have been followed by this Court in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala @ Bharucha (deceased) through Lrs. & others vs. Phiroz N. Bhatena and others etc. reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141, wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior Court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court or tribunal has come to. This Court made it clear that except to this `limited extent' the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact (see para 18, page 149-150). In coming to the above finding, this Court relied on its previous decision rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447. The decision in Chandavarkar (supra) is based on the principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh (supra) and Nagendra Nath (supra) discussed above.

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To the same effect is the judgment rendered in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and another vs.

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Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576. In paragraph 9, page 579 of the report, this Court clearly reminded the High Court that under Article 227 that it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law and justice.

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Same views have been taken by this Court in respect of the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227 in the case of Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat vs. Ramgiri Gosavi and another, reported in AIR 1968 SC 222, (see para 5 page 222234 of the report) and the decision of this Court in Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan and others reported in (1970) 2 SCC 717. The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh (supra) about the scope of Article 227 was again followed in Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand and others reported in (1972) 1 SCC 898.

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In a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others, reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675, a two judge Bench of this Court discussed the principles of interference by High Court under Article 227. Of course in Surya Dev Rai (supra) this Court held that a

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writ of Certiorari is maintainable against the order of a civil Court, subordinate to the High Court (para 19, page 668 of the report). The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another Division Bench of this Court in Radhey Shyam and another vs. Chhabi Nath and others [(2009) 5 SCC 616] and a request to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for a reference to a larger Bench is pending. But in so far as the formulation of the principles on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned, there is no divergence of views.

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In paragraph 38, sub-paragraph (4) at page 695 of the report, the following principles have been laid down in Surya Dev Rai (supra) and they are set out:

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"38 (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction."

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Sub-paras (5), (7) and (8) of para 38 are also on the same lines and extracted below:

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"38.(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.

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(6) xxx xxx

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(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction

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of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.

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(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character."

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On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated:

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(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different.

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(b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is

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substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above.

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(c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court.

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(d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court.

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(e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can

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interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, `within the bounds of their authority'.

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(f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them.

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(g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.

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(h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised.

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(i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India

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& others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful.

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(j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227.

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(k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu.

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(l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory.

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(m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not

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bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court.

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(n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above.

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(o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.”

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11. In the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 (4) SCC 181, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:-

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“15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the

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Constitution of India. The High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon which the determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.”

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12. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) and Garment Craft (supra) and also in view of the fact of the respective sale deeds of the parties and claim of their possession over the suit land, the demarcation report submitted by the revenue authorities, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner could not demonstrate any pulpable infirmity or jurisdictional error in passing the order by the learned Appellate Court, setting aside the order passed by learned trial Court.

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13. Consequently, finding no infirmity in the exercise of discretion by the learned appellate Court and no exceptional circumstance warranting invocation of the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, the present writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby

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dismissed .

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Sd/(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge

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sagrika

Umesh Kumar Dewangan v. Paramjeet Singh

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Umesh Kumar Dewangan v. Paramjeet Singh

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