Pramod Singh Vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2026:CGHC:2367-DB

NAFR

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judgment is	judgment is
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-	15-01-2026	- 20-01-2026

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HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

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ACQA No. 431 of 2018

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Pramod Singh S/o Bindeshwar Singh Aged About 48 Years Occupation – Driver, R/o Village - Oatgan. Thana - Newra, Tahsil - Tilda, Civil And Revenue District - Raipur (C.G)

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--- Appellant

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versus

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1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate Raipur, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh.

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2 - Pintu Nishad S/o Shri Dhaniram Nishad Aged About 27 Years R/o Village - Oatgan, Thana - Newra, Tahsil - Tilda, Civil And Revenue District Raipur Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondents

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ACQA No. 234 of 2019

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State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police StationNewra, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh.

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--- Appellant

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Versus

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Pintu Nishad S/o Dhaniram Nishad Aged About 27 Years R/o VillageOatgan, Police Station- Newra, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh.

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--- Respondent

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For Appellant/complainant : Mr. Sumit Shrivastava, Advocate For Appellant/State : Ms. Nand Kumari Kashyap, Panel Lawyer

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For Respondent/accused : Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Pandey, Advocate.

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Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal, JJ

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Judgment on Board

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(15^th January, 2026)

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Per Rajani Dubey, J

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Since both these appeals arise out of the judgment dated 14.9.2018 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Raipur in Special ST No.369/2017 acquitting the respondent/accused of the charges under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.

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Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 19.10.2017 complainant/father of the prosecutrix lodged a report to the effect that at the time of Navratri, the respondent/accused had given a mobile phone to his minor daughter/prosecutrix, aged 14 years, in which he recorded the conversation with her and later took back the said mobile from her. Thereafter, he started threatening her of defaming by uploading the said voice recording in Whatsapp and Facebook and on this threat, he made forcible sexual intercourse with her twice. When he again insisted for physical relation, she informed about all this to her mother.

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During the course of investigation, statement of the prosecutrix was recorded, her school certificates were seized vide Ex.P/8, DakhilKharij register of the school was seized vide Ex.P/17 and her medical examination was done. After completing usual investigation, charge sheet under Section 376 of IPC and Sections 4 & 6 of POCSO Act was filed against the accused.

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Learned trial Court framed charges under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act against the accused which were abjured by him and he prayed for trial. In order to substantiate its case the prosecution examined 08 witnesses in all. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of CrPC wherein he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the

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prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. He examined one Uma Nishad as DW-1.

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After hearing counsel for the respective parties and appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court acquitted the respondent/accused of all the charges by the impugned judgment. Hence these appeals.

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Learned counsel for the appellant/State and learned counsel for the appellant/complainant jointly submit that the impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the material available on record. The prosecutrix in her statement u/s 164 of CrPC categorically stated about the forcible sexual intercourse by the accused knowing the fact that she is minor. Learned trial Court based on the basis of oral and documentary evidence though held the prosecutrix to be minor on the date of incident but despite that acquitted the accused of the charge under the POCSO Act. Learned trial Court committed an illegality in discarding the evidence of the prosecutrix which is duly supported by the evidence of her mother (PW-3), father (PW-2) and the doctor (PW4). Once the prosecutrix is held to be minor, her consent becomes inconsequential. However, the learned trial Court without appreciating the overall evidence on record, acquitted the respondent/accused of all the charges which is not legally sustainable. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside and the respondent/accused is liable

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to be held guilty of the charges leveled against him and sentenced accordingly.

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On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/accused supporting the impugned judgment submits that the learned trial Court having minutely examined the oral and documentary evidence rightly recorded a finding of acquittal in favour of the accused and there is nothing on record to suggest that the said finding is unjust or perverse. He submits that the prosecution has not proved in accordance with law that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age at the relevant time. Both these appeals being devoid of substance are liable to be dismissed.

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Reliance has been placed on the judgment dated 13.2.2024 of this Court in CRA No.1599/2022 in the matter of Hasib Khan Vs. State of Chhattisgarh .

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Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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It is clear from the record of learned trial court that the respondent/accused was initially charged under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(n) of IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act by the learned trial Court, however, subsequently vide order dated 10.9.2018, he was discharged of the charge u/s 363 & 366 of IPC for being wrongly

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framed and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence acquitted of all the charges by the impugned judgment.

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Prosecutrix (PW-1) states that she is 15 years of age. On the date of incident, at around 6-7 pm when she was alone at the house, the accused came there and had forcible physical relation with her twice. After return of her parents, she informed them about the incident and thereafter, her father took her to police station Nevra and lodged a report against the accused. She states that her statement was recorded before the Magistrate vide Ex.P/3 as also by the police.

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In cross-examination she admits the suggestion of the defence that there was a long affair between the accused and herself and she loves him. She admits that their affair was within the knowledge of her mother and family members of the accused. She states that though their family members tried to persuade them not to do so but they continued to meet secretly. In para 12 she states that upon coming to know about her affair with the accused, her father got enraged, scolded her and lodged a report against the accused despite their resistance. She admits that she still loves the accused and he also loves her. In para 11 she admits that she does not have any birth certificate of hers and it is also not got prepared. She admits that she knows only the date of birth that is written in her progress report and is not aware of her actual date of birth.

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PW-2 father of the prosecutrix states that date of birth of the prosecutrix is 26.2.2004. His wife informed him that the accused forcibly made physical relation with the prosecutrix and therefore, he lodged a report Ex.P/4 against the accused. In cross-examination he admits that he did not get birth certificate of the prosecutrix prepared. He admits that having heard about the affair of his daughter with the accused, he got very angry and scolded his daughter for this. He admits that when he failed to persuade the prosecutrix as also the parents of the accused, he lodged a report against the accused.

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PW-3 mother of the prosecutrix makes similar statement and states that date of birth of the prosecutrix is 26.2.2004 and that the accused established physical relation with the prosecutrix twice under threat. When the prosecutrix informed her about the incident, she narrated the same to her husband (PW-2) and then he lodged a report against the accused.

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In cross-examination she admits that when she went to admit the prosecutrix in school, she did not have her birth certificate. She admits that she did not give any document to the police relating to age of the prosecutrix and then volunteers that she gave only progress report of the prosecutrix to the police. In para 14 she admits that she was aware of affair of the prosecutrix with the accused, many a time she persuaded them not to do so but they did not understand. She admits that both of them used to meet secretly. She admits that when her

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husband came to know about this affair, he scolded the prosecutrix and immediately lodged a report against the accused.

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PW-4 Dr. Uma Paikra medically examined the prosecutrix and opined that sexual intercourse was done by him (Pintu Nishad) without her consent vide Ex.P/9. In cross-examination she admits that she did not find any internal or external injury on the body of the prosecutrix. She states that in her report she mentioned the name of the accused at the behest of prosecutrix.

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The police seized progress report of Class-V and marksheet of Class-VIII of the prosecutrix as per seizure memo Ex.P/8. The prosecution also filed copy of Dakhil-Kharij register vide Ex.P/24C. In these documents, the date of birth of birth of the prosecutrix is mentioned as 26.2.2004.

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PW-8 Smt. Praveen Kumari Mishra, Assistant Teacher, states that as per Dakhil-Kharij register (Ex.P/24), name of the prosecutrix is entered at S.No.978 and her date of birth recorded as 26.2.2004 and date of admission in the school as 16.6.2009. The police seized the said register as per seizure memo Ex.P/17 and handed over on Supurdnama vide Ex.P/25. In cross-examination she admits that she does not know as to who admitted the prosecutrix in the school. However, she volunteers that the said entry is in the handwriting of teacher Omprakash Dhruv. She admits that since the said entry was not made by her, she cannot tell whether any document such as birth

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certificate or Kotwari Register regarding age of the prosecutrix was produced at that time. However, the prosecution did not examine said Omprakash Dhruv before the learned trial Court.

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This Court in the matter of Hasib Khan (supra) while dealing with the age of the prosecutrix observed in paras 15, 16 & 17 of its judgment as under:

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“15. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602 , while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under:

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"33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows:

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33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be.

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33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised.

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33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side.

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33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry. the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance.

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33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case.

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33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the was a accused in support of the plea that he juvenile.

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33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the courtshould lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences.

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33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents.

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33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions.

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33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015."

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Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under:

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"14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e.. CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) (i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have

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been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.

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In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors . this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows:

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"20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof, (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year."

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Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that:

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"Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules

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of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category.”

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In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference."

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In light of above, in the present case also it is clear that no clinching and legally admissible evidence has been adduced by the prosecution to prove that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age on the date of incident. Learned trial Court after proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence rightly found that statements of the prosecutrix, her mother and father are not reliable and the medical report was also prepared at the instance of the prosecutrix, hence not reliable. It has come in the evidence of the prosecutrix and her mother that she was in love with the accused and used to meet him secretly which was not liked by her father and having come to know about their relationship, he got very angry, scolded her and immediately thereafter lodged a report against the accused. Thus, looking to the nature and quality of evidence as to the age of the prosecutrix and the overall conduct of the prosecutrix during the incident and subsequent thereto,

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this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, has held in para 36 as under:-

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“36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:-

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“(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive--inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary;

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(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

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(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

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(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

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(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

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(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.”

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19. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgment, considering the oral and documentary evidence on record, we do not find any good reason to interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court. Accordingly, both the appeals being devoid of any substance are

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hereby dismissed.

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Sd/ Sd/ (Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge

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Digitally signed MOHD by MOHDAKHTAR KHAN AKHTAR Date: KHAN 2026.01.2014:37:02 +0530

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Khan

Pramod Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh

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