State of Chhattisgarh Vs Manrakhan

1 - Manrakhan S/o Shri Santram Rohidas Aged About 55 Years R/o Dhapdhap, Police Station- Bankimongara, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh 2 - Sunil Kumar S/o Shri Manrakhan Rohidas Aged About 18 Years R/o Dhapdhap, Police Station- Bankimongara, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh 3 - Bisahin Bai W/o Shri Manrakhan Rohidas Aged About 45 Years R/o Dhapdhap, Police Station- Bankimongara, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh

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4 - Shani S/o Shri Manrakhan Rohidas Aged About 20 Years R/o Dhapdhap, Police Station- Bankimongara, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh

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5 - Smt. Rajni Bai W/o Shri Shani Rohidas Aged About 20 Years R/o Dhapdhap, Police Station- Bankimongara, District- Korba, Chhattisgarh

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... Respondents

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For Appellant/State : Mr. Avinash Singh, GA For Respondents : Mr. Surfaraj Khan, Advocate along with Mr. K. No.1, 3, 4 & 5 Ankit, Advocate

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Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey Hon’ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal, JJ

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Judgment on Board

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(14^th January, 2026)

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Per Rajani Dubey, J

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This Acquittal Appeal has been preferred by the State/Appellant against the judgment and order dated 09.05.2018 passed by the learned Additional Judge to Additional Sessions Judge, Katghora, District Korba (C.G.) passed in Sessions Trial No.42/2017, whereby the accused/respondents have been acquitted of the charges under Section 304-B r/w Section 34 of the IPC.

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Brief facts of the case are that the marriage of the deceased- Purnima and the accused- Sunil Kumar was solemnized in the year 2016. On 07.05.2017, Purnima sustained injuries and was admitted to the hospital; however, during the course of treatment, she died on 15.05.2017. Accused- Sunil Kumar is the husband of the deceased and the other accused persons are relatives of Sunil Kumar. FIR was registered under Crime No. 72/2017 and after completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed. The learned trial Court framed charges under Section 304-B r/w Section 34 of the IPC against all the accused persons. The charge-sheet was submitted before the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate who, in turn, committed the case for trial. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses and exhibited 35 documents.

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The learned trial Court after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, acquitted the accused/respondents by the impugned judgment dated 09.05.2018. Hence, the present Appeal has been filed by the appellant/State.

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Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the impugned judgment of acquittal is bad in law and facts, hence the same is liable to be set aside. The learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence recorded in its true and correct perspective and the prosecution had

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proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts against the respondents, but despite the same the accused/respondents have been acquitted. He further submits that the prosecution has categorically proved that the deceased died within 7 years of her marriage and that her death was caused by burning. The parents of the deceased have categorically deposed against her in-laws/accused persons, however, the learned trial Court solely relying on the dying declaration, acquitted the respondents. The learned trial Court failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence, therefore, looking to facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and finding of the learned trial Court is perverse and is liable to be set aside.

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Learned counsel for the respondents would support the impugned judgment and submit that from the very beginning, all documents clearly mention that the deceased was suffering from burn injuries. In her dying declaration (Ex-P/1), she clearly stated that she sustained burn injuries while making food. In the hospital memo, merg intimation, inquest memo, and all other documents, it is mentioned that she was burnt while preparing food and that the nature of death was accidental. The prosecution has failed to prove that before her death, she was subjected to cruelty in connection with a demand for dowry. Therefore, the learned Trial Court rightly acquitted the respondents. The judgment is well-merited, and no interference is called for

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Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

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It is clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that the accused persons were charged under Section 304-B r/w Section 34 of the IPC. After appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the

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learned trial Court acquitted the respondents of the aforesaid charges on the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of Section 304-B r/w Section 34 of the IPC and that the accused persons were entitled to the benefit of doubt.

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It is an admitted position before the learned Trial Court that the deceased, Purnima, was the wife of the accused/respondent- Sunil Kumar and their marriage was solemnized in the year 2016. It is also not disputed that the deceased sustained burn injuries on 07.05.2017 and died on 15.05.2017 during the course of her treatment.

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PW-1 Smt. Dhan Bai, grandmother of the deceased has stated that the accused- Sunil Kumar, allured and took her grand-daughter/deceased away. Thereafter, they performed the marriage, and after some time, her grand-daughter died. In her cross-examination, she admitted that deceased- Purnima was happy with her in-laws and did not inform anyone about any harassment or demand of dowry. She also admitted the suggestion that all the expenses for Purnima’s (deceased’s) treatment were borne by the in-laws.

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PW-2 Hari Lal, father of the deceased has stated that deceased had told him about a demand of dowry by her father-in-law- Manrakhan, and mother-in-law- Bisahin, but she did not tell him any torture or harassment made by the accused persons. He admitted the suggestion by the defence that she was living happily at her matrimonial home and did not inform anyone about harassment or torture. He also admitted the suggestion that she was admitted to New Value Hospital, Bilaspur, which is a reputed hospital, and that she was receiving proper treatment.

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PW-3 Kaushilya Bai, aunt of the deceased has stated that the accused persons quarreled with deceased- Purnima because dowry had not been

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given to them. She admitted the defence suggestion that after her marriage, Purnima never visited her home, and she also admitted the suggestion that Purnima had gone with accused- Sunil Kumar on her own free will and had married him willingly.

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PW-4 Kunti Bai, mother of the deceased has stated that Purnima called her at about 7:00 a.m., complaining of harassment by her in-laws, after which her phone was switched off. Thereafter, her elder brother-in-law informed them that she had been burnt. She admitted the defence suggestion that she was living happily in her matrimonial home and also admitted the suggestion that dowry is not practiced in their community.

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PW-6 Mongra Bai and PW-7 Aghin Bai both have stated that deceasedPurnima had suffered burns.

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PW-12- Dr. Brajesh Patel, at New Value Hospital, District Bilaspur, issued a certificate (Ex-P/16) on 13.05.2017 stating that Purnima was fit to give her statement.

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PW-16 Sahettar Kurrey, Head Constable has stated that he recorded the dying declaration of Purnima after obtaining the fitness certificate (Ex-P/16) and recorded her statement vide Ex-P/1. He admitted the doctor’s signature on the document Ex-P/16 and also admitted the signature of PW-2- Hari Lal (father of the deceased) on Ex-P/1 (dying declaration of deceased).

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In Ex-P/1, the deceased stated that she was lighting the chimney using kerosene. As soon as she struck the matchstick, her saree suddenly caught fire and she sustained burns. She stated that it was an accident and that there was no fault of her husband or her in-laws in the incident.

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In the matter of Karan Singh Vs. State of Haryana, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No.1076/2014, judgment dated 31^st January, 2025 has held in paras 8 and 17 which read as under:-

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“8. In this case, there is no dispute that the death of the appellant's wife occurred within seven years of the marriage. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act reads thus:"

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113-B. Presumption as to dowry death .-When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

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Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "dowry death" shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."

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The presumption under Section 113-B will apply when it is established that soon before her death, the woman has been subjected by the accused to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. Therefore, even for attracting Section 113-B, the prosecution must establish that the deceased was subjected by the appellant to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her death. Unless these facts are proved, the presumptions under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked.

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… Therefore, the prosecution did not prove the material ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 304-B. Not a single incident of cruelty covered by Section 498-A was proved by the prosecution. Section 304-B of the IPC was brought on the statute book in 1986. This Court has repeatedly laid down and

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explained the ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B. But, the Trial Courts are committing the same mistakes repeatedly.”

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The learned Trial Court carefully appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and rightly held that the prosecution has only proved that the deceased died within seven years of her marriage. However, the prosecution failed to prove that she was subjected to any cruelty in connection with a demand of dowry by the respondents. Consequently, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondents. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based on a proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, has held in para 36 as under:-

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“36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:-

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“(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive--inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary;

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(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

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(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

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(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

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(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

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(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.”

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Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karan Singh & Mallappa (supra) and the view which has been taken by the learned trial Court appears to be plausible and possible view and in the absence of any patent illegality or perversity this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment.

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Accordingly, the Acquittal Appeal is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.

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Sd/- Sd/-

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(Rajani Dubey) (Radhakishan Agrawal) Judge Judge

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Priyanka

State of Chhattisgarh v. Manrakhan

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State of Chhattisgarh v. Manrakhan

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